
ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF UPANIṢADS



VOLUME

2

SWAMI PARMESHWARANAND



This encyclopaedic dictionary is a vast collection and compilation of the Upanishadic themes of all important aspects of the Upanishads which plays vital role in development of Indian religio-philosophical tradition. If there is one mass of scriptures that has inspired and sustained the Hindus over the millennia, it is the Upanishads which have created, strengthened and preserved a great tradition of spirituality. This they have done, not only by a fearless spirit of inquiry to its logical conclusions, but also by intuitive mystical experiences beyond the ken of the intellect. No school of thought, no religious movement of the subsequent periods in the history of India has remained untouched by their influence if not pervaded by them.

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Swami Parmeshwaranand

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Preface

Events in recent decades have underscored the need for major reference works that provides immediate access to the all important aspects of the Upaniṣads which play vital role in development of Indian religio-philosophical tradition. This encyclopaedic dictionary is a vast collection and compilation of the Upaniṣadic themes. Although several encyclopaedic works have been published in India and abroad but none of them is able to produce such a vast informative encyclopaedic dictionary of the Upaniṣadic themes.

If there is one mass of scriptures that has inspired and sustained the Hindus over the millennia, it is the Upaniṣads which have created, strengthened and preserved a great tradition of spirituality. This they have done, not only by a fearless spirit of inquiry to its logical conclusions, but also by intuitive mystical experiences beyond the ken of the intellect. No school of thought, no religious movement, of the subsequent periods in the history of India has remained untouched by their influence if not pervaded by them. In fact, many of these schools and movements could gain respectability or acceptance only because they tread the path lighted up by the Upaniṣads.

The word 'Upaniṣad' is derived from the verbal root *sad which* has several meanings: loosening, movement and annihilation. Putting all these three senses together, the word 'Upaniṣad' refers to that divine knowledge or wisdom which loosens the bonds of *samsara* (transmigratory existence) of a being, annihilates his *ajnana* or ignorance of his real nature and leads him to Brahman or God, the Absolute. The book or the scriptural work that teaches this wisdom is also called 'Upaniṣad'.

The orthodox view is the Upaniṣads are Revealed Word. They are revealed by God himself at the commencement of each cycle of creation to the worthy few. However, treating them as books of spiritual wisdom, can we assign any date or period, in relation to human history as known till now? The Upaniṣads have been an integral part of the Vedas. Hence, a date assigned to them can as well hold good for the Upaniṣads also. The date of the *Rgveda* has varied from 4500 B.C. (B.G. Tilak) and 2400 B.C. (Hang) to 1200 B.C. (Max Muller). Modern European scholars assign the period 700 B.C. 600 B.C. to the Upanisads assuming a gradual evolution of the philosophical ideas from the period of the Vedic hymns to that of the Aranyakas and the Upaniṣads. B.G. Tilak, on the basis of an astronomical data provided in the *Maitrayanīya Upanishad*, has however, assigned 1900 B.C. as the date of the Upaniṣad. Hence, according to him and the scholars that concur with him, the Upaniṣads belong to the period 2500 B.C.-2000 B.C.

From among the extant Upaniṣads, only ten to fifteen are considered to be the older ones. They are the basic sources of ancient Hindu philosophy. However, do all these Upaniṣads teach a single system of philosophy? Or, do they contain several, mutually conflicting, systems?

The orthodox Hindu tradition has always considered the entire body of the Upaniṣadic literature as one unit (*Sruti*) and hence teaching once philosophy. Though this philosophy may contain several aspects, they always form a homogeneous unit.

A look at the different and divergent teachings of these Upaniṣads does not easily convince us about the soundness of the orthodox standpoint. The traditional commentators, have, however, solved this problem by sticking to one view as the teaching of the Upaniṣads and explaining the others in a way that suits their interpretation.

Could it be that, over the centuries, many vital links have been lost and what we now have, are only fragments of the original works leading to this dichotomy of views? Though this is a plausible explanation, there is no clinching evidence to prove it.

The entries included in these volumes cover a wide range of information given by the contributors. Entries in the encyclopaedia are alphabetically arranged, strictly letter by letter. In order to mark use of the specialized expertise of individual scholars which ensuring that all aspects of the Upaniṣads are fully covered. To guide our readers from one entry to related discussions elsewhere in the work there is extensive system of cross references within the entries.

For the collection and complication of this monumental project, I have taken support from the various sources like monographs, biographical notes, personal interviews, books and journals. I am thankful to all those scholars whose works have been utilised in this encyclopaedic dictionary.

-EDITOR

L

LIBERATION

Our study of the Upaniṣads has provided us, so far, with the solution of two major problems, viz., that of Reality and of Knowledge. We have been furnished with a picture of the goal or Reality, as well as with a complete map of the journey or the way. We have been told of the various methods of knowledge or *vidyā*; but *vidyā* is not an end in itself, it leads to *amṛta* or immortality, says the Upaniṣad (*vidyayā vindate amṛtam*). So we have to engage ourselves finally with the problem of this immortality, *amṛta* or *ānanda*. The three problems are not separate and isolated from one another but are closely bound together. In fact, it is the same one problem viewed from three aspects or points of view. All the problems centre round the one supreme and ultimate principle, viz., Brahman, and Brahman being *Saccidānanda* or triune by nature, the problem, too, necessarily becomes threefold. We have found the answer to the problem of *Sat* or Reality as also to the problem of *Cit* or Knowledge and now the answer is to be found to the final problem of *Ananda* or Fulfilment or Attainment.

Mokṣa as the end of all darśanas

This attainment is generally known by the term '*mokṣa*', which is counted as the last of the four-fold aims of life (*caturvarga*) as well as the supreme end of all human beings (*puruṣārtha*). Incidentally it may be pointed out that it is this conception of *mokṣa* that distinguishes the Indian systems of *darśana* from the Western systems of philosophy. All the *darsanas* are guided by this one aim, viz., the attainment of *mokṣa*, though their conceptions of it differ widely, while philosophy in the West keeps no such concrete aim in view. In India, a concrete realization, an actual enjoyment of freedom and joy has always been the only demand in the pursuit of knowledge, while the West has remained content with a mere logical apprehension of and intellectual speculation about Reality. Here knowledge is intimately bounds up with life, and the dawn of knowledge automatically transforms all life. The knowledge, which does not bring a release from misery, or does not give birth to *ānanda* or bliss is totally barren, and as such, does not deserve to be called *jñāna*, or knowledge. Hence, Śaṅkara rightly points out that one, who has known the nature of Brahman, can no longer continue to be a man of the world as before, and he who remains as such has never known it. Knowledge is thus tested only by its effect. The Upaniṣads, at every step, recount the effects that follow from each particular knowledge, and it is from these effects that it becomes possible to assess the worth of the different modes of knowledge and their respective values. Brahmavidyā, being a perfect science of the soul, promises exact and definite results which are bound to follow from different experiments in the search for the Supreme.

The relation of knowledge and Delight

The Upanisads, therefore, do not contain mere theories of soul or creation and the like, but they embody the saving wisdom that lifts one from the sphere of sorrow and suffering and bestows the gift of delight supernal. That is why we find in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* that the verses of *Gāyatrī* and *Madhumatī* are used together in the *Manthavidyā*. One line of the first is followed by another line of the second, which depicts that as knowledge grows through *Gāyatrī*, so delight flows through *Madhumatī*. Knowledge and delight move in an exact ratio, and so the steps of *Gāyatrī* are followed equally by those of *Madhumatī*. '*Madhu*' thus stands for the aspect of value, which forms an integral part of the Upaniṣadic Brahmavidyā, and '*mokṣa*' signifies nothing but the realization of the higher value, the '*rasānāṁ rasatamaḥ*' the '*ānandarūpam amṛtam*'.

The Nature of the Problem

But the problem arises as soon as we try to comprehend the nature of this *ānanda* or *amṛta* or immortality. The Upaniṣad says: 'Only in the Vast is bliss, not in the little is there any bliss. What is the Vast that is Immortal and that which is little is mortal'. Here the term '*bhūmā*' signifies the Infinite, and the opposite term '*alpam*' denotes the finite. True bliss or immortality is said to reside only in the Infinite and all that is finite is characterized by a lack of bliss or delight, and bears inevitably the stamp of mortality. The world, being essentially finite, is a realm of sorrow; then, does *mokṣa* or *amṛta* imply a getting out of the world? Again, the individual, too, is finite by his very nature, and so, if he seeks immortality should be bring about a self-extinction? As Radhakrishnan poses the question: 'Is the highest state of religious realization, the atonement with the supreme godhead, a mere vanishing into nothingness'? In other words, is *amṛta* or *mokṣa* an escape from the world, an utter self-extinction? Closely related to this problem is the second problem which, practically, arises out of the first: Is the attainment of this immortality not possible while one exists in the world or as an individual? The first problem is concerning the 'what' or the true nature of *amṛta* or *mokṣa* and the second centres round the 'when and where' of it.

Various Conceptions of Liberation

The answer to the first problem has been varied and diverse. The answers differ according to the difference in the conceptions of Reality. Thus, to the Cārvākas, there being no soul apart from the body, the very extinction of the body is liberation (*dehocchedo mokṣaḥ*). In fact, they do not recognize *mokṣa* at all as a desired end, for, to them, the only things that matter are *artha* and *kāma*, wealth and gratification of desires. Of the Bauddhas, the Yogācāras hold that the cessation of the modes of the mind is liberation, the Sautrāntikas take it as the objectless flow of consciousness, the Vaibhāṣikas conceive of it as a flow of consciousness free from '*kleśas*, while the Mādhyamikas take it as complete void. The Jainas conceive of the soul as of the size of the body and as covered by eightfold *karman* and when these ties of *karman* are slackened, one attains the four infinites, viz., knowledge, vision, strength and happiness; thereafter the soul moves, higher and higher, in the '*alokākāśa*' or boundless space. One thus attains independence (*svātantrya*) or becomes free, just as an encaged bird becomes free on the breaking open of the cage. This freedom is thus liberation, according to

them. Then, among the six systems of *darśana* too, the conceptions are found to be widely divergent. The Vaiśeṣikas take the Self as *'vibhu'* or all-pervasive and also as the repository of nine special qualities and it is the complete annihilation of these nine qualities that constitutes liberation, according to them. The Naiyāyikas, again, take the utter extinction of twenty-one forms of misery as *mokṣa*. Another school of them views it as the total annihilation of all actions. The Sāṅkhya views it as the absolute cessation of the threefold misery, viz., *ādhyātmika*, *ādhibhautika* and *ādhidaivika*, which follows from the discrimination (*viveka*) between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. According to Patañjali, it is the absence of the union between Puruṣa and Prakṛti or the dissolution of the *guṇas* and the regaining of the true status of pure consciousness. Then, of the Mīmāṁsakas, the school of Prabhākara regard it as the total rooting out of all relations with the body and the senses, caused by the extinction of *dharma* and *adharma*, while the Bhāṭṭas are often described as regarding it as the manifestation of eternal bliss caused by eternal knowledge. Some of the latter, again, take it as merely the absence of misery. Of the Vedāntins, there are some who regard *mokṣa* as nothing but the merging of the effect in the cause, others take it as the attainment of the Supreme Lord, and again, there are others who hold that it is nothing but the attainment of an unchanging state by the forsaking of the changeful state. Maṇḍana, in his *Brahmasiddhi*, refers to some more views about liberation. As for instance, some conceive of it as the non-generation of future consciousness of body and senses, or another regard it as a transformation into the nature of Brahman. Maṇḍana himself prefers to take it as the attainment of one's true nature by the removal of the taints of attachment. Apart from the six systems, there are other theistic schools who have their own idea about liberation. The Pāśupatas, for example, regard it as going to Paśupati or the Great lord without further return, while the Vaiṣṇavas take it as the attainment of the domain of Viṣṇu (*Viṣṇuloka*). The Hiraṇyagarbhas conceive of it as the attainment of Hiraṇyagarbha through the path of light (*arcirā*). We also hear of numerous other views about liberation, such as the loss of the subtle body, the attainment of immutable body in a special region, the absorption in the Supreme Self through the knowledge of identity of the Self, the imbibing of the qualities of Maheśvara after the extinction of all impure grandeur or power through the favour of Maheśvara and so on. Even there is the ridiculous conception of the devils, to whom devotion to wine and to the gods constitutes liberation. In fact, every individual, not to speak of the different systems, has his own idea of final fulfilment, and the conception differs according to one's taste and mental bias.

The Upaniṣadic conception is, however, distinct from all else. The Upaniṣads conceive of it as nothing else than the attainment of the Ātman or Brahman and in this attainment lies the highest bliss. It is within this grand conception that all other conceptions of liberation find their place, and practically they are all vague articulations of this one supreme end, which the Upaniṣads clearly set forth.

The Universal demand for Liberation

Though we get innumerable conflicting viewpoints regarding the ultimate nature of the attainment or consummation, yet one thing stands out clear from all of them. It is the fact that there is a dissatisfaction with the present state of things and a consequent striving to get out of it. As the *Vārttikasāra* beautifully puts it: 'All people

virtually seek liberation, in as much as they desire the attainment of supreme happiness and the end of misery. *Mokṣa* or *mukti* literally means a 'release', which necessarily pre-supposes a state of bondage. The bondage is nothing but the absence of the awareness of the true nature of the Self and the release is similarly nothing but a gaining back of the lost awareness. The Upaniṣad beautifully states the plight of the man in bondage thus: 'Just as he, who does not know the hiding place of a treasure of gold, does not find it, although he may pass over it again and again, so none of these creatures find the world of Brahman, although they daily enter into it (in deep sleep); for, they are covered by falsehood (or ignorance'). Thus the Upaniṣad makes clear that attainment consists in nothing but an awareness of the possession that eternally belongs to the soul. The very consciousness of imperfection implies a transcendence of it. The idea of perfection eternally abides with us and goads us on towards it even in the midst of imperfection. We carry the supreme treasure in our hearts and that is why all earthly possessions of value are cast off as useless even when one gets a glimpse of it. 'This then dearer than the son, dearer than wealth, dearer than all else is this inmost Self,' and it is supermely dear because it is most nigh, so close to the heart. Hence, according to the Upaniṣads, 'emancipation is not to be regarded as becoming something which previously had no existence.' It 'is not properly a new beginning but only the perception of that which has existed from eternity, but has hitherto been concealed from us. 'Thus Deliverance and total and absolute Knowledge are truly but one and the same thing; if it be said that Knowledge is the means of Deliverance, it must be added that in this case means and end are inseparable, for Knowledge, unlike action, carries its own fruit within itself; and moreover, within this sphere, a distinction such as that of means and end can amount to no more than a mere figure of speech, unavoidable no doubt when one wishes to express these things, in so far as they are expressible, in human language. If, therefore, Deliverance is looked upon as a consequence of Knowledge, it must be specified that it is a strict and immediate consequence.'

The Eternal nature of Upaniṣadic Liberation

It becomes necessary to stress this point while making clear the Upaniṣadic conception of liberation, because, according to the Upaniṣads, liberation is not a product which is generated at a particular time or place or state of existence, for if it be conceived as something produced or newly brought into being, then certainly it is liable to be destroyed sometimes or other. All that is created is bound to perish, only the Uncreated is the eternal and truly immortal. All systems are unanimous on this point that the state of liberation must be eternal and unchanging, but it is only the Vedānta that points out that it becomes truly so only if it is conceived not as a product or effect of something but as a mere revelation of that which is. Hence the Vedānta strongly asserts that 'deliverance is not effected by the knowledge of the Ātman, but it consists in this knowledge; it is not a consequence of the knowledge of the Ātman but this knowledge is itself already deliverance in all its fulness." Hence Śaṅkara points out that *mokṣa* is neither a thing to be generated (*utpādya*) nor something to be changed (*vikārya*), for in either case *mokṣa* will be transient in nature. Similarly, it is neither a thing to be newly had (*āpya*), for Brahman is all-pervasive like the ether and

hence already in the possession of all; nor is it a thing to be modified (*saṅskārya*), for a modification is made in two ways: either by the adding of some qualities or by the removal of some defects. Brahman, which is verily *mokṣa*, is not liable to further increase, being eternally self-complete and hence no addition of qualities is possible to it. Similarly, the question of the removal of defects does not apply to it at all because it is eternally pure by nature. Hence, as in the conception of knowledge we found that the Upaniṣads point to a unique type of processless cognition, so here too, in the conception of liberation, the Upaniṣads equally signify its processless nature.

Objections to the conception answered

But it may be objected that such a conception of liberation takes away the very value and significance of it. If it is neither *utpādya*, *vikārya* nor *saṅskārya* nor *āpya*, then the effort to achieve it turns out to be useless and utterly futile. It will rather be wiser to give up all efforts to attain liberation and take to inaction. But this charge is made from an utter ignorance of the Upaniṣadic or the Vedāntic standpoint. The Upaniṣad, no doubt, asserts that nothing but ignorance (*ajñāna*) withholds the supreme treasure from man which is eternally in his possession, and it is only *jñāna*, the mere awareness that reveals what always was there, yet this awareness or knowledge is not gained easily. Without the removal of the obstacles that stand in the way, the *vidyā* or knowledge cannot be manifest and that is why even one who is well-versed in the Vedas and their meanings does not become free or is not liberated. The obstacles or impediments are in the *buddhi* or the mind and until the mirror of mind is cleansed, the luminosity, which is always there but only covered by dust, cannot come out or make itself manifest. In this clearing up of the dust or the impediments, a sincere and total effort is needed. So the Upaniṣads do not damp the spirit by declaring that *mokṣa* is not produced by action, but rather, by this very assertion, infuse a new spirit of enthusiasm in the heart of the seeker, for it brings the assurance that liberation is not problematic or uncertain but within one's possession which can be realized simply by piercing through the veil of ignorance. One has just to resolve to shake off the impurity of sin just as a horse shakes off the dust from its body (*aśva iva romāṇi vidhūya pāpam*), in order to gain back the pristine purity. The removal of ignorance means the removal of limitation, and to be utterly unlimited or free is to attain liberation. The call for liberation is, therefore, a call for growth and development through a perpetual overcoming of limitations, which constitute bondage.

It is utterly wrong to think that behind the Upaniṣadic conception of liberation is 'the underlying idea that the world of human existence is a ceaseless meaningless round, a "bondage of everlasting sorrow', from which we may escape, but over which we cannot hope to obtain any victory', or to say that 'it is this longing for deliverance, rather than salvation, in the full sense of the term, which the philosophical thought of the Upaniṣads sets itself to satisfy'. There is not a single passage in the Upaniṣads which states that liberation consists in getting out of 'the meaningless round', or in an escape from 'everlasting sorrow' over which no victory is possible. The Upaniṣads are not unaware of the conception of 'victory' and the term 'conquers' or 'obtains victory' (*jayati*) has been used times without number to state the results of the different *vidyās*. The Western critics are not ignorant

of this fact that the Upaniṣadic conception of liberation includes the idea of 'victory' or supreme power, but they unfortunately misinterpret it to such an extent that it almost appears to be ridiculous. The remark of Keith is an example to the point, which is both amusing and annoying to all sincere students of the Upaniṣads. He says: "The emancipated self possesses autonomy but it is not an ethical state; it is merely a condition of unhindered power, the ideal of a despot, the state of the man who goes up and down these worlds, eating what he desires, assuming what form he desires". Evidently the word '*kāmacāra*' has misled Keith here and it is regrettable that a scholar of his eminence has failed to appreciate the true bearing of the term. It is neither out of a pessimistic disgust nor out of a lust for power that the Upaniṣadic conception of liberation took its rise. It rose out of the innate craving in man to return to his original nature, out of that nostalgia or homing instinct that drives man perpetually to come back to his own self.

The Purpose of Liberation

According to the Upaniṣadic conception, liberation, therefore, means nothing but the attainment of one's true nature or Self or '*svarūpa*'. The conception of the true nature of the Self, no doubt, differs with every system, but we have found that the Upaniṣadic conception of it is so comprehensive as to include within it all the other points of view. Similarly, in the conception of liberation we find an almost identical comprehensiveness which contains all the divergent opinions that are current in the difference systems about it. Before trying to find out the true Upaniṣadic conception, we must first try to find out the value and utility of liberation, or in other words, its rationale. Liberation, being the attainment of one's own nature (*svarūpa*), bondage necessarily implies a fall from the original nature, and this is known as *saṁsāra*. Now, what this fall is due to? Again, what is the guarantee that such a fall would not come to happen again after one attains liberation? The Ātman was in its own nature (*svarūpa*) before the fall, and if liberation means nothing but merely a return to that nature, then the possibility of the fall remains as before.

But, as we have pointed out, there is a deep purpose, according to the Upaniṣads, behind this fall or the plunge into ignorance, and that purpose is simply to make itself known (*tad asya rūpaṁ praticakṣaṇāya*), and it is in this knowing that delight consists. The Ātman originally, while alone, felt dreary and desolate (*sa vai nai'va reme*) and that is why he created a second to relieve the gloom of his isolation. He was also seized with fear (*so'avibhet*), being alone and this also prompted him to seek the company of a second. This creation of a second, rather the splitting of oneself into two, (*ātmānaṁ dvedhā pātayat*) was the signal for the plunge into *saṁsara*. Immediately with the birth of a second sprang forth the principle of desire, and this desire (*kāma*) is just the opposite principle of delight (*ānanda*). So long as there is a second outside oneself, there is bound to arise a desire for it and so long as desire is there, delight must be absent, for delight signifies a fullness, and desire a fragmented and sundered state of being. Hence for the attainment of delight the other part thrown out of one's being must be reabsorbed into itself, or, in other words, the second must be recognized not as an 'other' but as identical with oneself and this is taught by the great sayings of the Upaniṣads, *Tat Tvam Asi*, *Aham Brahmā'smi*. It is in this recognition that the delight consists, and this *ānanda* is the *amṛta* or immortality, the true *mukti* or freedom.

Though it is true that *mukti* is not a newly produced thing nor the effect of any action, but merely a discovery of an already existing fact, yet that does not take away the delight out of it but, on the contrary, enhances it. This discovery brings a delightful surprise and it is this element of surprise that increases the delight all the more. A thing, however pleasant, which follows in the natural sequence, fulfilling a normal expectation, does not cause so much delight as an absolutely unexpected and undreamt of event does. The plane of determinism has no delight to offer, for everything is pre-determined and absolutely fixed there. It is only in the plane of freedom that there is joy, for nobody knows what surprising revelation awaits him just round the corner; and this plane of freedom is the plane of the Atman. Hence the Upaniṣad says about this Brahmavidyā that 'wonderful is its teacher and wonderful, indeed, is he who knows it. Wonder and delight are its characteristic marks.

Element of Delight in Liberation

Thus liberation, though it means nothing but the attainment of one's true nature is not just a mere relapse into the original state of being from which one fell, but the element of delight in it points out that it is something more. If mere removal of the ignorance of one's true nature be the sole characteristic of liberation then it would turn out to be a mere negative state, but the Upaniṣads are emphatic that the positive mark of *delight* distinguishes that state. The fall, we have pointed out, is marked by two prominent characteristics, viz, fear and absence of delight, and the reattainment is similarly marked by the very opposite of these two characteristics, i.e., fearlessness and delight (*abhaya* and *ānanda*). The Upaniṣads specially speak of these two characteristics, viz., *abhaya* and *ānanda*, again and again, whenever they describe the state of liberation: 'Then he becomes free from fear', (*atha so'bhayaṁ gato bhavati*), 'He has no fear from anything having known the delight of Brahman', (*na bibheti kutaścana*), 'Theirs is the eternal happiness', (*teṣāṁ sukhaṁ śāśvatam*), 'He delights having attained the blissful', (*sa modate modanīyaṁ hi labdhvā*), and so on. We have also seen that desire (*kāma*) signifies the opposite principle of delight (*ānanda*) and so the Upaniṣads also invariably describe the state of attainment as the absorption or fulfilment or conquering of all desires: 'He conquers those sphere and those desires' (*jayate tāṁś ca kāmān*), 'Here and now all his desires utterly vanish' (*ihai'va sarve pravilīyanti kāmāḥ*), 'He attains verily all desires' (*āpnoti ha vai sarvān kāmān*) etc. Now this *abhaya*, *ānanda* and transcendence of desires, all these are due only to the cognition that the second or the 'other' is nothing but one's own self, absolutely identical with one's own being. Only the consciousness of absolute identity can make one completely free from fear and desire and sorrow. At the time of the fall, the Self was, *as it were*, unconscious of its own fulness or majesty, and that is why it felt impoverished in being, lonely and desolate, needing an 'other' to make it full and complete, and now after the return through liberation it feels its fulness, having absorbed within itself the whole wealth of diversity.

It should not, however, be wrongly assumed from this that the Self is endowed with a new quality or characteristic by the act of liberation, which was lacking in it before. There is no 'excess' ('*atiśaya*') or a new addition from the standpoint of the Ātman, but there is certainly a world of difference from the standpoint of its cognition, between the *svarūpa*' or reality that is known and the

'svarūpa' that is not known. The reality which is not known is almost equal to an unreality, and hence the supreme value and importance of knowing it and it is only in this knowing or the cognition that the original fall finds its justification. Metaphysically, the Ātman has neither any fall nor any regeneration as such, neither any bondage nor any liberation, yet it 'plays at being bound' in order to create the richness of delight. Hence the *Vārttikasāra* rightly points out that from the standpoint of the Ātman there is no 'excess' (*'atiśaya'*), but from the standpoint of the mind, the cognition (*'bodha'*) itself is a great addition no doubt'.

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga conception of Kaivalya

Thus we have found the significance and value of liberation from the concept of *ānanda* inherent in it. Without a complete reabsorption and identification of the second or the 'other' with oneself, this delight is not possible of achievement. Hence those who hold the second as eternally and actually an 'other' or an alien principle, the very opposite of the Self, have necessarily to conceive of their liberation in merely negative terms, as a cessation of sorrow or an absence of contact with the opposite principle. This becomes very clear especially from a study of the Śāṅkhya-Yoga conception of liberation. Both Śāṅkhya and Yoga are frankly dualistic and, according to them, both Puruṣa and Prakṛti are equally real entities and also absolutely opposed to each other, the one being pure Spirit and the other pure Matter. bondage consists, therefore, in the coalescence of these two principles, which brings in its train misery and suffering. Liberation, consequently, consists in nothing else but the severance of the connexion between the two, (*saṁyogābhāvo hānam tad dṛśeḥ kaivalyam*). Vyāsa, in his commentary, makes it clear that it means a 'non-mixed' state or in other words, a further absence of connexion with the *guṇas (puruṣasyā 'miśrībhāvaḥ punar asaṁyogo guṇair ity arthaḥ)*. The very term for liberation used in Sāṅkhya-Yoga viz. *'kaivalya'* signifies that the aim of these systems is to secure an 'aloneness' by severing all connexion with the second or the other, for, according to them, the root of all miseries is in the *'saṁyoga'* or connexion between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga can never think of resolving one of the terms into the other, for both of them are recognized as real as well as absolutely independent and of contradictory natures. Even when the discriminating knowledge (*vivekajñāna*) causes the separation between the two, Prakṛti does not vanish into nothingness but remains intact with all her potencies. Hence the Mīmāṁsakas, who take the view that nothing but the exhaustion of all actions can lead to liberation, rightly condemn the Sāṅkhya view as of no value, since the potencies remain there still, and there is no guarantee that they will not cause further bondage. As Keith puts the Mīmāṁsā view; 'The Sāṅkhya theory of liberation by knowledge is without value, since the potencies will remain able to come again into activity. Knowledge, it must be recognised, can never give freedom from bondage, which can be attained only by the exhaustion of action, for which the Sāṅkhya metaphysics affords no adequate possibility, owing to the infinite potentiality of nature.'

The Nyāya Vaiśesika View

Similarly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, we have seen, aims at the utter extinction of all the nine special qualities which pertain to the Ātman, or the total annihilation of the twenty forms of misery, and it is patent that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school conceives of the liberation in terms of

exclusion and negation. There is absolutely no place for *ānanda* in either the Sāṅkhya-Yoga or the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of liberation, for it is precluded by the very metaphysics which these systems envisage. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika even go further than the Sāṅkhya in this that they not only deny the existence of *ānanda* in the final state of liberation, but also that of *jñāna* or consciousness, for, according to the former, *jñāna* is essentially a quality which is produced in the Ātman through the contact with the mind and is not the inherent nature of it, as the Sāṅkhya-Yoga think. Hence some have ridiculed the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system by saying that their final aim is merely to turn into a stone! If even consciousness is denied in the final state of liberation, then there remains nothing to distinguish the Ātman from pure inert matter. Thus, in their zeal to root out misery, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika even do not hesitate to go to the ridiculous extreme of rooting out consciousness, too, in the process. Such is always the danger behind the extreme attitude of exclusion and negation.

The Upaniṣadic View distinguished

We have especially dealt with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceptions of liberation because the Upaniṣadic view is often represented as practically identical with or of the same nature as the *kaivalya* of Sāṅkhya-Yoga or the inert static *mokṣa* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. A study now, of the Upaniṣadic texts which describe the supreme state of attainment, will reveal how utterly distinct and absolutely unique is this conception from all else, and yet how it includes all the diverse views by placing each of them in its proper place within the hierarchy of values. The Upaniṣads, undoubtedly, recognize that there is a tendency towards exclusion or escape in the movement towards liberation and that this is a necessary and very important phase of it. The Sāṅkhya rightly points out that the urge towards liberation arises only from the impact of misery, and similarly the Nyāya, too, very closely analyses the successive steps in liberation describing how the release from one preceding thing automatically leads to the release from the next one following it, which is, in fact, the effect of the former, and there it is shown that misery is the ultimate form which the original evil of ignorance takes finally. Release from misery is, no doubt, the basic demand in man, and further when he finds that the whole of existence is full of misery, the demand takes the form of one for a release from existence as such. If birth or embodiment inevitably implies misery, as the *Nyāyasūtra* points out, then it necessarily becomes imperative to seek a release from birth or life itself. This attitude for getting out of life is born of a spirit of disgust and frustration. The very term *'mukti'* or *'mokṣa'* which signifies 'release', is generally taken to represent this attitude.

But the Upaniṣads are always careful in this that whenever the speak of 'release', they also immediately add that there is also an 'immortality' to supplement and complete the former. We have said that the conception of liberation depends closely on the conception of Reality and is in fact inseparable from the latter. There is no escape from a conception of it as *kaivalya* if one takes the Reality as distinctly two and utterly independent. But the Upaniṣads, we have seen, do not view the two as distinct and separate, but, on the contrary, as nothing else but the splitting into two halves of the same one original principle (*ātmānaṁ dvedhā pātayat*). We have also seen that this twin principle (*'mithuna'*) or one-in-two is known as Prāṇa in the Upaniṣads. Now this Prāṇa

has a double movement; one negative and another positive. The negative movement attempts to free the Prāṇa from impurities, while the positive one seeks to attain its pure and perfect form. A separation is, no doubt, needed and here the Sāṅkhya-Yoga are right. But what is separated or excluded is the imperfect form alone, and hence the Sāṅkhya-Yoga represent only one side of the movement, because to be relieved of the imperfect form is not enough. Another movement, and this of union, must lead to the attainment of the perfect form. In the words of the Upaniṣads, one must not only 'cross beyond death' but also 'attain immortality' (*mṛtyuṁ tīrtvā...amṛtam aśnute*), one must become 'freed' or 'released' and also have immortality (*mucyate...amṛtatvaṁ ca gacchati*).

Such Statements make it absolutely clear that, according to the Upaniṣads, the crossing or passing beyond death is not the same thing as the attainment of immortality. Immortality is something more than a mere release from mortality, for it is not merely negative in nature but carries a positive significance. This is clearly brought out in another context in the Upaniṣad, where it is stated that 'after rising out of the body and on attaining the supreme light one becomes endowed with his own true form, he becomes the Supreme Puruṣa'. The casting off or the rising out of (*samutthāya*) the body is the initial negative movement, which leads to the attainment of the pure light of consciousness. Many stop with this negative movement and, on attaining this *'jyotis'* or light, become merged in it and feel that they have reached the final goal, wrongly taking this light itself as the Brahman or the Ātman. This happens to those who take *'kaivalya'* as the final attainment. But the Upaniṣads, unfailingly, point out that there is still a higher evolution even after the attainment of this light. One rises from that vast ocean of light with a new resplendent form, which is truly his own form (*svena rūpeṇa abhiniṣpadyate*). What he had cast off before entering into the light was his false form, a mere shadow of the original, which had been projected only to carry on the work in the temporal world of illusion. But there is an eternal world of reality, which Plato conceived as the World of Ideas, and which the Upaniṣads call the supreme sphere of Brahman or *Brahmaloka*. To function in that sphere one needs a form alike to it in nature, i.e., eternal and pure. The Upaniṣads, therefore, speak of the endowment of a new form, original and truly own, after the attainment of the light. In other words, the true personality is gained only here, after one casts off the false one and emerges out of the pure light with all his limbs batched by it.

The Upaniṣads, therefore, do not advocate the ideal of a suppression of personality but always insist on its fullest and completest development. In the context of the *Madhu-vidyā*, it is stated again and again, as we have seen, that one enters into (*abhisamviśati*) that particular form of immortal essence (*amṛta*), but again rises out of it (*udeti*). Not a merger or dissolution of the self but an elevation or development of it is always the end that is kept in view. The attainment is, thus, not 'a sleep and a forgetting' but a waking and remembering, not a *'laya'* but an *'udaya'* or rising.

It is again not an escape through isolation but a victory through subordination of the forces of Nature. This sufficiently distinguishes the Upaniṣadic conception from the Sāṅkhya one, for there is no conception of victory in the Sāṅkhya theory of liberation nor can there be any in it because of its wrong metaphysics. But the Upaniṣads, in

recounting the effects of the different *vidyās*, speak of the attainment of victory or kingship, again and again.

Another feature of the Upaniṣadic conception sharply distinguishes it from *kaivalya*. It is the identity of the liberated self with the whole of existence which is held up as a prominent characteristic. 'He, the all-knower, enters into all', 'Those clam and self-united souls, having attained the All-pervading all around, enter into all', and such other statements point out that the universe is not something separate from or alien to the Self but the very stuff of its being. Thus the absorption of the whole existence or Prakṛti by the Self, and not its isolation or separation from it, is the mark of the final state of attainment, according to the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads do not rest content by merely absorbing the universe within the Self but also move further to transcend it, of which we shall speak later.

That the Upaniṣadic conception is also not akin to the inert staticity of *mokṣa*, as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, becomes all too patent even from a casual scanning of the texts. 'There the moves all around, eating, playing, enjoying' (*sa tatra paryeti jakṣan krīḍan ramamānaḥ*), 'Having known thus, he has his love in the Self, play in the Self, enjoyment in the Self, delight in the Self' (*evaṁ vijānann ātmaratir ātmakrīḍa ātmamithuna ātmānandaḥ*), 'With his play in the Self, love in the Self, full of activity is the highest of the knowers of Brahman' (*ātmakrīḍa ātmaratiḥ kriyāvān eṣa brahmavidāṁ variṣṭhaḥ*), and such other texts signify that, according to the Upaniṣads, the final state is not one of staticity but of the highest activity and movement. We have pointed out that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika even deny the existence of consciousness in the Ātman. After the enlightenment (*tattvajñāna*), according to them, the mind, though existing as an entity (*tattva*), ceases to function, and hence consciousness, too, ceases. But the Upaniṣads take just the opposite view, for, according to them in the Átman the organs of knowledge and action, the senses and the mind do not exist and yet all the particular functions go on even without the existence of the organs! 'He is without hand and feet and yet (moves) fast (or is swift), and is the knower. He sees though without eyes, he hears though without ears". Such is the paradoxical nature of the Upaniṣadic Átman. The movement or the functions do not cease but become all the more perfect in the Atman, because the limitations of the organs are transcended here. The Ātman can see, hear, know and feel and carry on all functions independently of all organs, because the organs themselves are dependent on the Atman and not vice versa. This is clearly brought out through repeated statements concerning the different functions of the senses in the *Kena Upaniṣad*: 'That which does not see through the eye but through which the eyes see' and so on. The infinite consciousness does not stand in the need of organs to contact the world of objects. Our finite consciousness is so limited and dependent by nature that it cannot conceive of dispensing with the organs and yet have knowledge. The Nyāya system, being merely an account of our empirical consciousness, naturally conceives that the Ātman, in its pure state, is without all functions and consciousness. But the Upaniṣads go deeper and point out the independent and creative nature of the infinite consciousness.

Other texts examined

We have sufficiently distinguished the Upaniṣadic conception of liberation from those of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, yet we may be accused of having

deliberately suppressed other texts of the Upaniṣads which run contrary to our contention. There are texts which clearly picture the final state as an utter self-loss: 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and form, thus a wise man, freed from name and form, goes to the divine person who is beyond all', or again, 'As a lump of salt which is thrown into the water dissolves and cannot be gathered up again, but wherever water is drawn, it is salty, so truly is it with this great being, the endless, the unlimited, the fullness of knowledge, from these beings it came into view and with them it vanishes. There is no consciousness after the great departure'.

We have stated more than once that the conception of the attainment is inseparable from the conception of Reality. So long we have been dealing with the attainment from one aspect of that Reality, viz., Prāṇa, and have quoted texts which point to its dual nature, negative as well as positive, especially emphasising the dynamic and creative character of the attainment. But we know, the Upaniṣads view the Reality not merely as Prāṇa but also as *prāṇasya prāṇaḥ* or *satyasya satyam*. The texts, we have just quoted above, describe the attainment of this supreme aspect of Reality, and these texts are liable to be interpreted as signifying a state where there is 'a survival without consciousness, where body is dissolved and mind extinguished, and all is lost in a boundless darkness'. As in out discussion on Reality, we pointed out that it is impossible to describe the transcendent Reality save through negative terms, so here, too, in the description of the attainment of that Reality a negative character or colour is inevitable and unavoidable. Such terms as 'disappear' or 'dissolve', no doubt, appear 'alarming' to us, but they are divested of such an import, if we bear in mind that they are not used for suggesting an annihilation or a loss, but merely for pointing to the unique nature of the realization which baffles or exceeds all description. This exceeding nature we always confound with the excluding one, and hence that which is beyond consciousness is taken as without consciousness. The confusion is quite natural, since the state beyond consciousness and that without consciousness look so similar outwardly and their descriptions, too, necessarily happen to be of the same nature.

That we are not thrusting our own interpretation and trying to read the Upaniṣadic texts in our own light, ignoring or twisting their real import, will be evident, if one cares to read further the remaining portion of the Upaniṣadic text itself, quoted above. Even at the risk of repetition, we point to it once more in order to show that the Upaniṣads are not unaware of the fact that this supreme state of attainment is liable to be interpreted as a sate of annihilation or a vanishing into a mere nothing, and so have guarded against it themselves, and this proves beyond doubt that the texts in question do not signify a loss or extinction but a gain which is infinite and immeasurable. On hearing from Yājñavalkya the lines quoted above, Maitreyī observes: 'This speech of thine that there is no consciousness after the great departure perplexes me'. Yājñavalkya replies: 'I tell thee nothing perplexing, it is quite comprehensible. Where there is a duality of existence, one can see the other, one can smell the other, one can speak to the other, one can hear the other, one can think of the other, one can apprehend the other. But where everything has turned into his Ātman, by whom will he be seen and whom will he see?' and so on.

This makes it quite clear that the description in question is meant just to convey the sense of utter unity, where all traces of difference (*bheda*) is absolutely obliterated. The unity is here so deep that it baffles all description. At the level of Prāṇa there was a play of the Self with the Self, an enjoyment and delight of the Self in the Self through the complete absorption and harmony of the two sundered parts. But here the parts not only unite to become the whole but they are realized as the sole reality. This unity is achieved not through a destruction of being, for the Ātman is eternal (*avināśī*) and indestructible by nature, (*anucchitti-dharmā*) as Yājñavalkya assures Maitreyī. It is brought about by a 'transcendence' i.e., by passing beyond all forms (*upādhis*). Hence it must be clearly borne in mind that 'the being is in no wise "absorbed" on obtaining "Deliverance" although it may seem so from the point of view of manifestation, whence the "transformation" appears as a "destruction"; viewed from the standpoint of absolute reality, which alone remains for it, the being is, on the contrary, dilated beyond all limit, if one may use such an expression, since it has effectively realized the fullness of its possibilities.'

Two aspects of Upanisadic Liberation

We have said that the same one Reality is viewed now as Prāṇa and now as Ātman from two aspects by the Upaniṣads, and so, in the attainment, too, the completeness comes only when both these are known. Reality as Prāṇa represents the aspect that is immanent in all existence and hence to know it means to become identified with the whole of existence, to become all. Reality as Ātman stands for the transcendent aspect, the true significance of which we have tried to comprehend already, and so, to know it means to become one with even that which overtops all existence and does not exclude all existence. On knowing this second aspect of Reality as Ātman, one does not cease to know all, as is commonly supposed, but the two realizations, of identification with all and with that which is beyond all, go together. There is a significant passage in the *Praśna Upaniṣad* which speaks of the simultaneous realization of both the aspects of Reality: 'He who comes to know the shadowless, bodiless, colourless, the pure and the immutable, attains that Supreme Immutable one and he, the knower of all, becomes all'. The description of Reality purely in negative terms points to its transcendent aspect, but the effect that follows from its knowledge is not merely an attainment of that transcendence but also of the immanence. This proves, once again, that the transcendence is not an exclusion but something more than the deepest inclusion.

The general law, however, of the attainment is to pass to the transcendence through the immanence, to reach the Ātman through the Prāṇa. The limit of Prāṇa, which is the creative principle or energy, is in the Creator or Īśvara or Prajāpati. Hence the highest attainment of Prāṇa means the attainment of the status of Īśvara. Beyond it is the status of Brahman. We know that many modern Vedāntins do not admit the possibility or necessity of the attainment of *Īśvaratva*, though they advocate the attainment of *Brahmatva*. But this is quite contrary to the views of the Upaniṣads and also of the great Ācārya Śaṅkara, as well as of the *Vedānta Sūtra*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* specifically states that he who realizes the Ātman becomes 'the maker of the world, the maker of all, his are the worlds, he himself is verily the world'. The author of *Siddhāntaleśa*,' at the end of his work, emphatically states that the liberated soul

truly becomes one with Īśvara too. The *Vedānta-Sūtra*, which speaks of the absence of any power over the world (*jagadvyāpāravarjam*) is not concerned with the supremely liberated soul, but only applies to those aspirants (*saguṇa upāsakāḥ*) who due to the lack of the complete unison, remain still in ignorance. But the truly liberated souls, having unquestionably attained the status of Īśvara, automatically have all the powers inherent in Him. The Upaniṣads are replete with the ringing words of the seers, who having gained the supreme realization, felt their identity with the whole of creation. 'Having realized this, the sage Vāmadeva stated, "I became Manu as also Sūrya", and the Upaniṣad adds that 'whoever even today thus realizes that "I am Brahman", he, too, becomes all this'. Thus the highest realization of '*Aham Brāhmā' smi'* carries with it, as a natural sequence, the consciousness of identification with all things whatsoever. The true inclusion of all within oneself comes only when one exceeds or transcends all, and hence, the attainment of *Īśvaratva* follows automatically from the attainment of *Brahmatva*, for the latter does not exclude the former, though it undoubtedly exceeds that. Similarly, another great seer, like Vāmadeva, named Triśanku cries out in an outburst of joy after the supreme attainment thus: 'I am the mover of the tree (of the world), my glory (rises) like the peak of a mountain. I am pure because high, I am the immortal essence of the Sun. I am the shining wealth, I am the pure Knowledge, immortal as well as undecaying'. It seems that the seer finds all words inadequate to fully express the glory of his realization. Do such soul-stirring statements leave any further doubt about the unfathomable richness and infinite grandeur of the final realization of the Upaniṣads?

Bhartṛprapañcas view

It will be interesting here to refer to the view of the great old Vedāntin, Bhartṛprapañca, about liberation. Bhartṛprapañca is emphatic that the attainment of the status of Hiraṇyagarbha or the Sūtra is indispensably necessary for one who seeks to attain final liberation. As Hiriyanna puts his views: 'According to all Vedāntins, *virakti* or detachment is necessary before one qualifies for *mokṣa*......Nobody, according to Bhartṛprapañca, can acquire genuine *virakti* who has not reached this state. Hence the first aim of a person that is desirous of liberation is to strive to reach this stage, by identifying himself, through *upāsanā* as taught in the Upaniṣads, with the Sūtra or Hiraṇyagarbha and carrying on simultaneously the *nitya-karmas* enjoined in the scripture.....It leads to '*apavarga'* or escape from *saṁsāra*, which Bhartṛprapañca viewed as distinct from *mokṣa*, though on the way to it (*apavargākhyām antarālāvasthām*-ŚB on BU, 3.2.13). The soul that has so far succeeded will not be born again, for it has given up all narrow attachment and its condition then is described as *antarālāvasthā* (i.e., a condition intermediate between *saṁsāra* and *mokṣa*). It is there free from all the ills of life. Though the baleful influences of attachment (*āsanga*), one of its two limiting factors, have then been overcome, the *jīva* has not yet realized its true nature, for *avidyā*, the other factor, persists separating it from Brahman. The *jīva* has so far identified itself with only Hiraṇyagarbha, a part of Brahman; and it has now to realize it as a part thereof. In other words, the oneness of the *jīva* with Brahman—not merely with Hiraṇyagarbha—is to be known, as taught in *Aham Brahma Asmi*'.

Bhartṛprapañca beautifully distinguishes between the two stages in liberation, one of which he calls '*apavarga*' and the

other *'mokṣa'*. We have pointed out in our introductory remarks that the term *'mṛtyu'* is used in different senses in different contexts in the Upaniṣads. The freedom from *'mṛtyu'*, which the Mukhya Prāṇa or the attainment of Hiraṇyagarbha brings, is merely a freedom from the grips of attachment or desire (*āsanga*), as we have shown in the chapter on contemplation. It is merely a relative freedom and hence Bhartṛprapañca rightly calls it an intermediate stage (*antarālāvastha*). The true freedom comes only with the removal of *avidyā* or ignorance, which is the original *mṛtyu*. Bhartṛprapañca only errs in this that he thinks that this *avidyā* will be removed through a synthesis (*samuccaya*) of *jñāna* and *karman*. The previous state of attainment of the status of *Sūtra*, no doubt, needs a synthesis, and the freedom from desire follows because of the very fact of coalescence (*mithuna*) of the two sundered parts, of which we have spoken. As the removal of *āsanga* necessarily involves a *samuccaya*, so the removal of *avidyā* necessarily precludes a *samuccaya*, for in the latter case there are no two things to be joined together, which has already been done, but only the last film of ignorance needs to be removed solely through the pure light of knowledge. However, we need not concern ourselves with the method of approach here. We should here only take note of the important fact that the Upaniṣads always refer to two distinct levels of realization and no liberation is complete without the gaining of both of them.

Comprehensive Conception of the Upaniṣadic Liberation

The Upaniṣads contain such a rich and varied expression about the attainment that it is possible to trace almost all the different conceptions about liberation to them. 'As a passage like the one from the *Chāndogya*, which tells us that the worshipper is lifted up to the region of the deity whom he has worshipped in life, support the doctrine of Madhva that absolution, consists not in being merged in the Absolute, nor even in being assimilated to Him, but in coming near his presence and participating in his glory'. 'Another passage from the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* tells us that the best kind of eternal life should be regarded rather as the companionship" of the highest God with whom the soul should be liberated at the time of the end. Not satisfied with a mere companionship, another passage declares that eternal life consists in attaining to an absolute "likeness" to God and enjoying life of personal immortality, a view which plays so large a part in the theology of Rāmānuja'. Similarly one may trace the conception of immortalising the body itself, which is advocated by the school of Raseśvara Darśana, to a passage in the *Śvetāśvatara*, where it is said that the Yogi has neither sickness, nor death, he having attained a body full of the Yogic fire. Even the art of prolonging life indefinitely was not unknown. We hear of one Mahīdāsa Aitareya, who lived for sixteen hundred years by completely defying the call of death. All these varied descriptions are nothing but the intimation of realization at different levels of Reality as Prāṇa.

Gradual & Immediate Liberation

Prāṇa being a graded reality, the attainment of it, too, essentially becomes graded and thus numerous levels of attainment can be traced and studied here. But as the Ātman has no levels or grades in it, being single and indivisible by nature, its attainment, too, knows no variety or degree, less and more. if the attainment comes, it comes all at once, total and complete, and not by stages or

degrees. Either the Ātman is known or it is not known. There is no intermediate stage between knowing and not-knowing. The first variety of attainment is technically known as *kramamukti* or gradual liberation, while the second is called *sadyomukti* or immediate liberation. We have said that, according to the Upaniṣads, nothing but ignorance constitutes bondage, but it does not become possible to remove the ignorance all at once and that is why a long period of preparation and a subsequent period of contemplation was found necessary to make one gradually fit to lift the veil of ignorance. It is not possible to complete the whole process within the belief span of one life alone. Some may stop with the preparation, others with a part of contemplation and so on, and hence, according to the Upaniṣads, one attains after death a status equal to his achievement in life, and the evolution may be carried on even there. Of course, a highly proficient seeker needs nothing but a single word of enlightenment from an illumined teacher for the removal of the last film of his ignorance, and immediately he attains the final realization. For him, there can be no question of any posthumous evolution. Concerning such a man of direct realization the Upaniṣad says: 'Of him who is without desires, who is free from desires, the objects of whose desire have been attained, and to whom all objects of desire are but the Self—the vital airs do not depart. Being Brahman itself, he is united with Brahman'. It is only in the case of the majority of human beings who fail to free themselves totally from ignorance while in life that an after-death journey or posthumous evolution is envisaged. It must, however, be always borne in mind that 'as concerns the being regarded in itself and in its totality, there can never be any question either of "evolution" or of "involution" in any sense whatever, its essential identity being in no wise altered by particular and contingent modifications of any sort, which can only affect one or other of its conditioned states'.

The Two Paths

The evolution is always of the Prāṇa, and the Prāṇa's evolution has always got a double movement, the one dark and the other bright, the one negative and the other positive, and even after death, the movement of Prāṇa takes either of the two forms. These are technically called the *'pitṛyāna'* and the *'devayāna'*, the way of the fathers and the way of the gods or the *'dhūmamārga'* and the *'arcirmārga'*, the smoky way and the lighted way. The earliest reference to these two paths we find in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, one of the oldest Upaniṣads, where it is said: 'I have heard of two ways about men, viz., of the fathers and of the gods and by them move all that are in the world'. The Upaniṣad also speaks of a third way (*tṛtīya gatiḥ*) by which move the evil souls. About the destiny of such souls of the Upaniṣad, in many places, says that they move to the 'sunless region covered by darkness' (*asūryā nāma te lokā andhena tamasā vṛtāḥ*) or the joyless regions (*anandā nāma te lokāḥ*). We, however, need not concern ourselves with this third way but must deal with the two ways briefly, the *dhūma* and the *arcira*, the dark and the bright.

The darkness and brightness of the way is made by *karman* and *jñāna* respectively. The first is dark because of the absence of enlightenment and hence is not the path of release but only of enjoyment and a subsequent return, while the second is bright because of the illumination of knowledge which gradually takes one towards the final liberation. The two paths are described in the detail by both the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the

Chāndogya. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, in connexion with the *Pañcāgnividyā*, describes the first path thus: 'Those who thus know this, as well as those who worship in the forest faith and truth, attain the light, and move from light to day, from day to the bright half of the month, from the bright half of the month to the six months during which the Sun moves to the north, from the months to the sphere of the gods, from the sphere of the gods to the Sun, from the Sun to the lightning, and then a 'non-human' person comes to those in the sphere of lightning and takes them to the spheres of Brahman and there, in those *brahmalokas*, they reside for an infinite length of time and theirs is no return'. The *Chāndogya* account slightly differs from the above in this that it mentions also the moon after the Sun and then refers to the lightning.

The second path is described thus: 'Those who conquer regions through sacrifice, gift and austerity, attain the smoke and move from the smoke to the night, from the night to the dark half of the month, from the dark half of the month to the six months during which the Sun moves to the south, from the months to the world of the fathers, from the world of the fathers to the moon'. The *Chāndogya*, again, adds more in this path too, viz., the sky (*ākāśa*) between the world of the fathers and the moon. The *Kauṣītakī*, however, makes a significant statement when it says that 'all those who depart from this world invariably go to the moon...this is verily the door of heaven, this moon'. Thus it seems that the moon was considered something as a junction-place, where all invariably went, some passing further upward and others again coming downward. The *Kauṣītakī*, also, further develops the conception of the path of the gods. It describes it thus: 'He, having attained the path of the gods, comes to the world of fire, then to the world of wind, then to the world of Varuṇa, then to the world of the Sun, then to the world of Indra, then to the world of Prajāpati and finally to the world of Brahman'. Then it proceeds further by saying that 'when such a soul has reached the world of Brahman, Brahman directs his attendants to run towards that soul and receive him with all the glory which is due to Brahman himself. He says that as the soul has reached the ageless river, he can never become old. He comes to the ageless river which he crosses merely by the movement of the mind. He then shakes off his good deeds as well as his bad deeds. ...And as a man driving fast in a chariot looks down on the revolving wheels, so does the soul look at day and night, good and bad and all the contrary pairs. Being free from good and from evil, knowing Brahman, he moves towards Brahman'. The Gītā also refers to the two paths thus: 'Fire, light, day-time, waxing moon, the half-year when the Sun ascends towards the north, then depart those who go to Brahman, knowing Brahman. Smoke, night, waning moon, the half-year when the Sun descends towards the south, there the Yogin attaining the light of the moon returns again. These are the two eternal paths of the world, the one bright and the other dark; by the one they go to return no more, by the other they go to return again.'

Brahmaloka as the highest end

From all these detailed descriptions one thing comes out clearly, viz., that the highest plane to which graduated liberation (*kramamukti*) leads is, according to all accounts, the Brahmloka. But it must be noted that mere attainment of the Brahmaloka does not necessarily give a complete guarantee against rebirth. It is true that the Upaniṣads say that theirs is no return who reach the Brahmaloka, but

as Ānandagiri points out in his commentary, the Upaniṣads use two significant adjectives, viz., *'imam'* and *'iha'* which show that there is no return only in that particular cycle and so there is always a possibility of a return in the next cycle. Hence it turns out to be only relative and does not signify an absolute cessation of return. The Gītā also specifically states that 'all the spheres (*lokas*), beginning with the Brahmaloka, come and go'. Nīlakaṇṭha and Madhu-sūdana, in their commentaries, make it clear clear that there are two classes of men who attain the Brahmaloka: some reach there through such *upāsanās* or *vidyās* as the *Dahara-vidyā*, which lead to gradual liberation and so they get their final enlightenment there and become liberated along with Brahman, while others reach there through other *vidyās* like the *Pañcāgni-vidyā* which have no connexion with knowledge as such, and hence their return is inevitable.

Thus there are two distinct destinies for those who reach the Brahmaloka: some are destined to return, while others are destined to be finally liberated at the proper time. It is concerning the latter that the *Muṇḍaka* says that 'those who have a sure comprehension through the knowledge of the Vedānta, the saints who are pure in being through renunciation, they are all liberated, in the Brahmaloka, at the end of the cycle, being supremely immortal". Śrīdhara, in his commentary on the *Bhāgavata*, however, mentions the possibility of three forms of destiny for those who reach the Brahmaloka. Those who reach there through excellence of virtues become the *adhikārins*, in the next cycle, according to their degrees of virtue. Those, again, who go there on the strength of their worship of Hiraṇyagarbha and others are liberated along with Brahmā. But those who are the worshippers of Bhagavān or Īśvara willingly pass beyond the cosmos and rise up to the supreme status of Viṣṇu. Thus of the three classes, one comes down at the end of a cycle, the other, though not destined to return, yet has to wait indefinitely there for the final liberation, while the third has no binding at all and simply passes through the region at will.

Conception of Brahmaloka

The conception of the Brahmaloka is, however, not very clear from the Upaniṣads. It seems that the term does not always signify the same sphere or world, and its use in the plural, in many places, also suggests that there are many grades of the same sphere, if not distinct worlds known by the same common name. The *Muṇḍaka*, for example, after describing the worship of the Fire, states that one, who so worships, is carried by the rays of the Sun to the holy Brahmaloka (*punyaḥ sukṛto brahmalokaḥ*), where all greet him with sweet words, and honours him. It then goes to condemn the cult of fire or sacrifice, pointing out that it leads to birth and death, again and again. Finally, it speaks of the way of the enlightened and there does not speak of Brahmaloka or any *loka* but simply states that they depart, there by the door of the Sun, where is the immortal Puruṣa, the immutable Ātman. Thus, evidently, the *Muṇḍaka* takes the Brahmaloka as a sphere which is attained only by the *karmins* or men of action or worshippers of the Fire and does not take it as a sphere for gradual liberation at all.

In the *Kaṭha*, the *śevadhi* or the treasure-house, referred to by Yama, is also nothing else but this Brahmaloka, as Sri Krishna Prem rightly points out. He says that 'in fact, it refers here to the great Treasure-house of the Universe, the world of Brahmā, the plane of Mahat or Cosmic Imaging'. But Yama calls this *śevadhi* as impermanent (*'anityam'*) and as he speaks

about it just after teaching the science of Fire to Nachiketas, it becomes evident that it is won through the worship of the Fire and hence its impermanence becomes inevitable.

But the Brahmaloka, which is referred to in connection with the *Dahara-vidyā* in the *Chāndogya*, appears to be of a totally different character. It appears almost identical with Brahman itself, as the descriptions, show, and even Śaṅkara is constrained to explain the term as 'Brahman itself the sphere' (*brahma eva lokaḥ*), because it cannot be conceived as a sphere *of* Brahman and as such separate from it. Thus it is clear that in the former cases, the Brahmaloka denotes the world of Brahmā and not Brahman, while in the latter case it stands for Brahman, which is itself the sphere.

However, a distinction is generally drawn between Brahmaloka and Brahman, the transcendent Reality, by saying that 'while the brahmloka, the sphere of unity, the *amūrta puruṣa*, is pure *nāman* existence, the attainment of the transcendent sphere implies the utter abandonment of both *rūpa* and *nāman*'. The *nāman* stands for the first Creative Idea and hence Brahmaloka may be viewed as the supreme World of Ideas, which projects the world of forms (*rūpa*) down below. Hence it is significantly called the '*sakṛdbibhātaḥ*', the eternally shining sphere, because it is not a world of shadows, like the world of *rūpa*, but a world of light, being the world of *vāc* or *nāman*. In the gradual ascent from the world of *rūpa*, one must first pass to the world of pure *nāman* and only thence move further towards the complete transcendence. Thus in the scheme of *kramamukti*, Brahmaloka occupies a supremely important place and from one point view, may be taken as the final limit of attainment.

Kramamukti and the Last Moment

In the conception of *Kramamukti*, the moment of departure from this world occupies a very important place and in fact, determines the whole nature of the future evolution and life. There is a natural indrawing of all the faculties of the senses and the mind at the hour of death, and hence the object of one's predominant passion in life spontaneously comes up at the moment and is seized with the whole being. It is clearly visualized now, all the distractions having ceased. That is why in *upāsanā* so much stress is laid on the last thought (*antyabhāvanā*), and in the Gītā, the Lord rightly asks Arjuna to constantly meditate on Him so that, at the end, he may attain to Him. Madhusūdana, in his commentary thereon, points out that this applies only to the worshippers (*upāsakas*) because they have to depend on the last thought. But those who realize the transcendent Reality get their liberation at the very moment of the dawning of knowledge, which dispels ignorance altogether and hence they do not stand in need of the final thought.

The process of meditation, however, must be carried on unremittingly through life so that the object of meditation may, spontaneously, spring up in the mind at the moment of death. The Upaniṣads give a very vivid description of the process of death: 'When the vital airs are gathered around him, the soul, collecting together all the portions of life, moves down into the heart; and when the 'person in the eye' has turned away, then he ceases to know any form. He becomes concentrated in himself, that is the reason why, they say, he is not able to see; he is at one with himself, that is the reason why, they say, he is not able to speak or hear or know. Then the tip of the heart is filled with light and through that light the soul moves out, either by the way of the eye or the head or any other

part of the body'.

Importance of the Heart-centre

Now the most important centre in the whole process is the heart, where all the faculties are finally focussed or where the light of consciousness contracts or withdraws itself from the whole body. The light gets out of the body through different channels and the particular channel that is taken for the exit determines the post-mortem evolution. As the *Kaṭha* and the *Chāndogya* say: 'A hundred and one are the subtle channels of the heart: of them, one extends upwards to the head. Having gone up by that, one attains immortality; the others are for going forth differently'. The one channel going upward is generally taken by the Yogin as the *suṣumnā*, and the passing out through the crown of the head (*brahmarandhra*) is generally taken as signifying a movement for liberation. In plain words, the one upward channel signifies the course of the straight motion of liberation, which follows only from the cessation of desire. The other innumerable channels are the diverse courses of the crooked movements of desire, which bring back the soul, again and again, to the world. The way of release is straight and one, while the ways of bondage are crooked and many.

The Sun & the Moon

Again, the two ways are closely connected with the two great symbols of the Sun and the Moon. The straight motion is connected with the Sun and the curve motion with the Moon, for it is only by piercing through the Sun that one secures total liberation, while from the Moon a return is inevitable. The Sun is called the 'door of the world', ('*lokadvāram*') by the *Chāndogya*, and Śaṅkara, in his commentary, makes clear that the '*loka*' here stands for the supreme Brahmaloka, of which the famous door is the Āditya or the Sun. The Upaniṣad adds that it is the way of approach for the enlightened, while it is an obstruction or a bar to the unenlightened, for the enlightened pass through it upward, while the ignorant find it an insurmountable barrier that blocks further movement. Śaṅkara explains why it proves to be a '*nirodha*' or obstruction for the ignorant. It is because the light of the Sun, in their case, remains diffused, and they are overpowered by the light and are kept confined within the body and hence cannot get hold of the upward channel towards the crown of the head. This also makes clear the prayer to the Sun, in the *Īśa*, for contracting its rays, because that alone makes possible the passage towards liberation and final union. We have also seen that the *Muṇḍaka* speaks of the departure of the enlightened through the door of the Sun (*sūryadvāreṇa te virajāḥ prayānti*). All these show how important a place the Sun occupies in the conception of graded liberation. The Sun, we have mentioned, stands for the Śabda Brahman or the principle that is active in creation, and hence, to pass out of creation, one must pierce through it. The passing out through the head signifies this piercing through the Sun.

The different bodies of the Self

It is generally supposed that after one pierces through the Sun, his subtle body (*sūkṣma śarīra*) is burnt or dropped. But the causal body (*kāraṇa śarīra*) still persists and moves towards the Brahmaloka. According to the Vedāntic conception, the dropping of all the three bodies constitutes liberation. Hence '*aśarīratva*' or bodilessness is a term sometimes used as synonymous with liberation. According to the Vedānta, to have a body is to have a separate

individuality and so long as separateness exists, utter liberation cannot be said to have been gained. But the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntists like Rāmānuja, who take the individual soul as an eternal portion of Brahman, do not recognize that in liberation one loses all forms or bodies. They explain the Upaniṣadic text which says that 'so long as one has a body there is no escape from likes and dislikes, only on becoming bodiless likes and dislikes do not touch,' as meaning merely the absence of the body of nature constituted by *karman* and not of the *aprākṛta* or divine form. Hence they conceive that when the soul drops the subtle body after crossing the Virajā river,—which is probably the same as the ageless river, referred to in the Kauṣītaki as Vijarā, a later name formed perhaps by a metathesis of the earlier one—it is endowed with a celestial form which has a further evolution towards the Brahmaloka.

There is no evolution without a body, and hence the Vaiṣṇavas, who give an account of the posthumous evolution in richer details, naturally have to conceive of subtler and subtler bodies fit for higher evolution. The conception of infinite varieties of body has been worked out probably in the richest detail by the schools of the medieval Indian saint, Kabir. According to them, the highest form of body is technically called *Haṁsadeha*, which is *tattvātīta* or beyond all categories. Then comes the *tattvamaya* body, which has two varieties, viz., one of *cit tattva* and the other of *acit tattva*. The latter, again, has two forms, viz., of pure *acit*, and of impure *acit*. The latter, again, has two sub-divisions, viz., one, the *kāraṇa* and the other, the *kārya*. The latter, finally, splits into two, viz., the *sūkṣma* and the *sthūla*. Such accounts are very interesting from the standpoint of *kramamukti*, for no final limit can be drawn to the evolution of Prāṇa and consequently to the evolution of the body or the form.

The problem of Jīvanmukti

The question of the body finally brings us to the most important problem connected with liberation, which is allied to or rather rises out of the two conceptions we have been just discussing, viz., *sadyomukti* (immediate liberation) and *kramamukti* (gradual liberation). *Sadyomukti*, we have seen, signifies immediate liberation, and so the question comes: Is liberation possible while in life, here and now? This is the age-old problem of *Jīvanmukti*, which had baffled many, and has given rise to innumerable points of view.

We have seen that it is the removal of ignorance that constitutes liberation, according to the Upaniṣads. If ignorance is removed all at once, it becomes possible to achieve liberation immediately, and it is only for those who fail to remove it in life that a gradual evolution after death is envisaged. There is no difficulty with the second conception, but about the first conception of *sadyomukti*, the problem is that if liberation is immediate and if it means the total removal of ignorance, then there must be an immediate separation from the body, too, which is a product of ignorance. 'The body and the actions performed by the body are due to ignorance, and when knowledge results ignorance must disappear, being very much opposed to the same. If the material cause disappears, the effect can no longer persist; and hence, if the body persists, that shows that ignorance still persists and liberation has not been attained. In other words, liberation conflicts with the presence of ignorance, and the movements of the body are evident indications of the persistence of ignorance'. In the face of such a difficulty, some, like Rāmānuja,

frankly deny the possibility of the attainment of liberation in life. They say that *jīvanmukti* is merely a name and to hold such a conception while tied to the *prārabdha karman* is merely to deceive others. Hence, according to them, the real liberation comes only after death, which is known as *videhamukti.* The Śaṅkhya, though recognizing *jīvanmukti*, places the *videhamukti* on a higher grade by calling it absolute and final, and, as such, takes the former not as real and absolute liberation but only as a relative one. It, however, accounts for the persistence of the body, even after *viveka-jñāna* has been gained, by saying that it goes on existing for some time, like the potter's wheel, through the momentum of the previous potencies (*saṁskāra*). This is evidently a very poor and disappointing solution; rather, the Śaṅkhya has no genuine conception of *jīvanmukti* at all.

Vedantic theories about Prārabdha

The teachers of the Vedāntic school have tried to explain away the difficult by devising numerous theories. Some try to explain it almost in the Śaṅkhya way, by saying that though knowledge dispels ignorance immediately, yet it does not destroy the effects of ignorance directly and hence the body and its movements continue for some time. Another common explanation is that knowledge does not destroy all actions but only the *sañcita* or the 'stored' and the *āgāmin* or the 'future'. The *prārabdha*, i.e., that which has already commenced bearing fruit, must run its usual course and can only be exhausted through experience (*bhoga*). Hence, even after *tattvajñāna* has dawned, the body continues to exist so long as the *prārabdha* is not completely exhausted. There are, again, some who think that knowledge only removes the sense of *truth* or *reality* that is attached to the world, and so even after one has gained knowledge one goes on existing in the world till the end of his *prārabdha*. 'According to others, *avidyā* (ignorance) has two aspects—the veiling (*āvaraṇa*) aspect and the projective or creative aspect (*vikṣepa*). Knowledge or revelation is opposed to the veiling aspect of ignorance and hence it is the veiling aspect only that is removed by knowledge. The creative aspect, however, persists even after knowledge, and it is this residual portion of ignorance (*avidyāleśa*) that explains the persistence of the body and the actions of the liberated individual (*jīvanmukta*)'. There are numerous other views on the problem but we refrain from discussing them in details here.

Vidyārañya's View examined

The problem, to our view, is purely a creation of our ignorance or misunderstanding of the true nature of the Upaniṣadic knowledge. We have pointed out, in the prolegomena, the lamentable confusion that has crept in the later Vedāntic thought regarding the actual nature of the Upaniṣadic knowledge. This becomes all the more evident from the conception about liberation propounded by the later Vedāntins. Vidyāraṇya, in his *Jīvanmukti-viveka*, refers to the two types of liberation, viz., *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti*. But, according to him, *jīvanmukti* is not gained through knowledge nor does *videhamukti* mean liberation after death. He gives a new connotation to the latter term and takes it as meaning merely the absence of the generation of future bodies. Hence, according to him, with the dawning of knowledge one gets *videhamukti*, which he also calls *kaivalya*, but for *jīvanmukti* one has to achieve the extinction of the mind (*manonāśa*) and the exhaustion of the desires (*vāsanākṣaya*). He says that most people describe *videhamukti* as that which follows after the dropping off of the present

body and take by the term *'deha'* all the bodies, present as well as future, but he takes it as meaning merely the future body (*'bhāvideha'*) and so *'videha'*, according to him, means merely the separation from future bodies, which is guaranteed by *jñāna*, and not from the present body too. So long as the present body persists, there is bound to be the action of the mind and the desires, and to inhibit them one has to practise *manonāśa* and *vāsanākṣaya*, and acquire the divine treasure of noble desires to overcome the evil tendencies of the mind and the base desires. Thus evidently, according to Vidyāraṇya, *jñāna* has to be supplemented by *yoga* for the achievement of *jīvanmukti*, for *jñāna* has no power whatsoever over the mind and the desires, which must have their play despite the dawn of knowledge. This reduces *jñāna* to a mere intellectual apprehension, but the Upanisadic knowledge (*jñāna*), we have shown, is of a totally different category. That knowledge dawns only to one who is full of the divine qualities (*'daivī sampat'*) and whose mind is already tranquil. Therefore *manonāśa* and *vāsanākṣaya* do not follow that knowledge but precede it. After the knowledge is gained, nothing more remains to be done, for the fulfilment is complete and instantaneous.

Solution of the Problem

To the Upaniṣads the whole problem is inadmissible, because the Reality, the attainment of which brings liberation, is not an excluding principle that has something in opposition to it, whether it be the world or the body. The supreme consciousness is gained not by going out of the body but here and now (*atra brahma samaśnute*). 'He tears up the knots of ignorance *here' (so' avidyā-granthin vikiratī' ha somya)*. Nor is it a fact that it has no power over the *prārabdha karman*, for, declares the Upaniṣad, 'torn are the knots of the heart, dispelled are all the doubts, extinguished are the actions on that Supreme being seen'. Echoing this, the Gītā says that the fire of knowledge burns *all* actions. Neither the Upaniṣads nor the Gītā make any reservations with regard to the extinction of actions. 'The body cannot constitute an obstacle to Deliverance any more than any other type of contingency; nothing can enter into opposition with absolute totality, in the presence of which all particular things are as if they were not. In relation to the supreme goal there is perfect equivalence between all the states of existence, so that no distinction any longer holds good between the living and the dead man (taking these expressions in the earthly sense)'. In this conception of *jīvanmuktī*, 'we note a further essential difference between Deliverance and "Salvation": the latter, as the Western religions conceive it, cannot be effectually obtained, nor even be assured (that is to say obtained virtually), before death'. Again, 'the Vedāntic view of liberation is very different from the Stoic conception of freedom. Liberation does not mean an withdrawal from a *real* universe, as the Stoics conceive it, for here there is no real world separate from Brahman, as nothing exists apart from that one Supreme Reality. Accordingly, 'it would be a mistake to suppose that liberation acquired when the being is quit of bodily form (*videhamukti*) is more complete than liberation "during life" (*jīvanmukti*)'.

Objections answered

It may, however, be asked: Are there not certain passages in the Upaniṣads which virtually deny *jīvanmukti* and say that liberation is truly gained only after death? One such text runs thus: 'There is no escape from likes and dislikes so long as one is in the body; only on becoming bodiless, likes and dislikes do not touch'.

Those who are not conversant with the true Upaniṣadic spirit merely misinterpret this text, and especially the term *'aśarīram'*, and thus get into a confusion. Śaṅkara raises the question in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* and gives the most effective answer to those who misinterpret the above text. He puts the question thus: 'The *Śruti* says that 'only on becoming free from the body, the good or bad do not touch'. Does it mean that the freedom from the body will come after the fall of the body and not while living?' and he answers with an emphatic 'no', and continues: 'Because, relation with the body is purely due to false knowledge; and it is not possible to imagine any other form of connexion with the body save the false knowledge in the form that the body is the Self. We have said that its freedom from the body is eternal because it is not due to any action. It is also not true to say that the relation with the body is due to the *dharma* and *adharma* done by it, because the relation with the body being not proved, it is also not proved that *dharma* and *adharma* are done by the Self. .....Therefore, relation with the body being due to false cognition, it becomes established that an enlightened man may have freedom from body even while alive. Therefore, the *Śruti* says about the knower of Brahman: 'As the slough of the snake cost on an anti-hill lies dead, thus does this body lie. Now is he without body, immortal, essence, Prāṅa, Brahman and the Light itself.' 'He is with an eye yet, as if, without an eye, with an ear yet, as if, without an ear, with the power of speech yet, as it were, without speech, with a mind yet, as if, without a mind, with life and yet, as if, without life and so on'.

Śaṅkara, thus, makes perfectly clear that the *'aśarīratva'* does not mean a quitting of the body but merely the forsaking of the false sense of selfhood attached to the body. The text from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, which he quotes, aptly illustrates how utterly separated from the body does the enlightened soul become, even while alive. All the particular functions of the body and the senses, of the mind and life are still there, yet they are all, as it were, not there. This is the mystery of the transcendent freedom of the Ātman, which does not exclude anything, but allows everything to have its full play while itself remaining untouched by them all.

Similarly, the other famous text which is very often quoted in support of *videha-mukti*, viz. *'tasya tāvad eva ciram yāvan na vimokṣye atha sampatsye'* is also grossly misunderstood and also misinter-preted. If one takes the particular context where the statement occurs then it is found that there is no justification of connecting it with something after death. There the Upaniṣad gives the beautiful illustration of a man who loses the track of his original home or country being left with closed eyes in a place far away from it, and narrates how he again gets instruction from an experienced man and moving accordingly from village to village finally reaches back to his native place. After this it is stated, 'similarly, here a man who has an instructor, knows' (*ācāryavān puruṣo veda*). Immediately after it, comes the above statement, which has since become famous. Hence, we think, what is really meant to be conveyed by the statement and especially by the term *'vimokṣye'* is nothing but the release from ignorance and not release from the body, which is absolutely out of the context. The release from ignorance comes immediately with the hearing of the instruction from the *Ācārya*, as in the case of the man from Gāndhāra. Therefore, it is said: 'He has only this much delay. As soon as he becomes freed from ignorance, he attains (his true nature)'. The gaining of one's nature (*sampatsye*) follows immediately with the release from ignorance

(*vimokṣye*). It is thus evident, beyond doubt, that those who have a bias for *videhamukti* twist the meaning of the text.

Conclusion

Thus it is clear that the Upaniṣad nowhere states that complete liberation is not possible while in the body, but rather, on the contrary, warn the seeker that unless he knows the Reality while in life, *here and now*, a supreme disaster awaits him and thereby tries to convey that the true liberation must be achieved while in life and not after death. Of course, the Upaniṣadic conception is so rich and comprehensive that it also gives scope to those who fail to realize it in life by opening out the alternative path of *kramamukti*. But the stress is always on *jīvanmukti*, because that is the true liberation achieved through a realization of the transcendent aspect of the Ātman.

Thus the problem of bliss (*ānanda*) is finally solved. There is no need of getting out of the world or quitting the body for obtaining that bliss or immortality. There is no particular place where it is to be had nor any particular time when it is to be enjoyed. It can be had, here and now, immediately with the dispelling of ignorance. 'Having attained this, the seers become content with their knowledge, their purpose accomplished, free from all desire and full of composure. Having attained the all-pervading Ātman on all sides, ever concentrating their minds, they enter into all.' This is the end of the road (*so' adhvanaḥ pāram ucyate*), the supreme status of the all-pervading Viṣṇu (*tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṁ padam*), and as the *Ṛgveda* declares, 'there, in the supreme status of Viṣṇu, is the fount of honey' (*viṣṇoḥ pade parame madhva utsaḥ*). Here is the eternal bliss, the absolute fulfilment, the final attainment and here is the end of all instruction (*etāvad anuśāsanam*).

LIFE BEYOND

It is this Atman which holds together in a state of harmony the various worlds in the cosmos, so that they may not create a chaos. The various elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether, the different worlds, the realms of being, as we call them—all these are held in position on account of the law of the Atman. The law ordains that what passes for a particular form should maintain that form until the duration of time prescribed for it, is exhausted by it in experience. If this Atman were not to exert its law by its very presence, there would have been no system or order or method of any kind. What we call system or method, symmetry or systematic action, internally or externally, is due to the presence of this all-comprehending Being, the Atman. The integration that we feel in our own body, in our minds and the orderliness that we see in nature outside, all these are due to the presence of the Atman. Else here would be confusion everywhere. Anything could be anything. Anything can happen at any time in any manner, without any kind of relevance whatsoever. But this does not happen. There is a cause and effect relationship between one experience and another. There is a relationship vitally established between various things in this world, on account of the symmetrical balancing character of the consciousness of the Atman.

This bridge, as it were, which is the Atman that connects one world with another world, is also like an embankment over which days and nights cannot pass, which means to say that time cannot touch this realm. Days and nights represent the time factor. There is no time here. When you cross this bridge which connects the world of ordinary experience with the realm of pure Being, there is a

transcendence of time. This Upanishad says that in the Atman there is no contact with anything that is phenomenal. Anything that you call temporal cannot touch this Being. Neither old age, nor death, nor sorrow can touch it. Actions of any kind cannot touch it, whether they be virtues or vices. Neither good nor bad, nothing that we regard as valuable here, no kind of regulation of this world can have any validity in that realm of Supreme Integrality. Every evil turns back after having touched this embankment. This supreme world we call Brahman is untouched by evil of every kind. Evil is nothing but the consciousness of body and consciousness of objects. This type of consciousness cannot be there. So it is free from every kind of contamination.

Even a blind one becomes free from the evil of blindness the moment he crosses this bridge which is called the Atman. Wounded ones are no more wounded there. People who are distressed are no more distressed there. An grieved ones have no grief there. Even night looks like day there. Night does not exist there. Because time does not exist, night and day cannot exist. Eternal light is this Brahman. It is eternal, perpetual, unending Self-luminosity. This is *Brahma-loka*. Here, *Brahma-loka* does not mean some world or realm comparable with the one in which we are living. *Brahmaiva loko brahma-lokah*—Brahman, the Absolute Itself is called the world of Brahman. It is symbolic way of representing its own Being as the totality of experience. The field of experience is called *Loka*.

Freedom untrammelled is the blessing of those who have reached this realm of Brahman through practice of continence and no limit can be there either to their powers or to their capacities to visualise things, or to their knowledge, or even to their own existence. It is limitlessness from every side, as the concluding portions of the third chapter have already told us.

M

MAIṬREYA-UPANISHAḌ

A king named Bṛhaḍraṭha, thinking this body to be impermanent and having acquired indifference (to objects), retired to the forest, leaving his eldest son to rule over (his) kingdom. With hands uplifted and eyes fixed on the sun, he performed a severe Ṭapas (or religious austerity). At the end of a thousand days, the Lord Śākāyanya Muni, a knower of Ātmā, who was like fire without smoke, and who was as a scorching fire with his Ṭejas (spiritual lustre) approached (him) and addressed the King thus: "Rise, rise and choose a boon." The King prostrated before him and said: "O Lord, I am not an Āṭmaviṭ (or knower of Āṭmā). Thou art a *Taṭṭwaviṭ*, we hear. Please enlighten me about Saṭṭva (the state of Saṭ or Brahman)." (To which) the Muni replied thus: "O thou that art born of the race of Ikshwāku: To begin with, your question is difficult (of explanation): do not question me. Ask for any other thing you desire." Thereupon the King touched the feet of Śākāyanya and recited the (following) verse:

"What is the use of these to me or any other? Oceans dry up. Mountains sink down. The positions of Ḍhruva (the Polar Star) and of trees change. Earth is downed. The Suras (angels) run away, leaving their (respective) places. (While such is the case), I am He in reality. Therefore of what avail to me is the gratification of desires, since one who clings to the gratification of desires is found to return again and again to this Samsāra (mundane existence)? Thou art able to extricate me (out of this Samsāra). I am drowned like a frog in a dry well. Thou art my refuge.

"O Lord! this body was the result of sexual intercourse. It is without wisdom; it is hell (itself). It came out through the urinary orifice. It is linked together by bones. It is coated over with flesh. It is bound by skin. It is replete with faeces, urine, Vāyu (air), bile, phlegm, marrow, fat, serum and many other impurities. O Lord! to me in such a foul body (as this), thou art my refuge."

Thereupon Lord Śākāyanya was pleased and addressed the King thus: "O Mahārāja, Bṛhaḍraṭha, the flag of the Ikshwāku race, thou art an Āṭmajñānī. Thou art one that has done his duty. Thou art famous by the name of Maruṭ". At which the King asked: "O Lord! in what way, can you describe Āṭmā?" To which he replied thus: "Sound, touch, and others which seem to be Arṭha (wealth) are in fact Anarṭha (evil). The Bhūṭāṭmā (the lower Self) clinging to these, never remembers the Supreme Seat. Through Ṭapas, Saṭṭwa (quality) is acquired; through Saṭṭwa, a (pure) mind is acquired; and through mind, (Parama) Āṭmā, (the higher Self) is reached. Through attaining Āṭmā, one gets liberation. Just as fire without fuel is absorbed into its own womb, so Chitta (thought) through the destruction of its modifications is absorbed into its own womb (source). To a mind that has attained quiescence and truth, and which is not affected by sense-objects, the events

that occur to it through the bondage of Karma are merely unreal. It is Chiṭṭa alone that is Saṁsāra. It should be cleansed with effort. Whatever his Chiṭṭa (thinks), of that nature he becomes. This is an archaic mystery. With the purifying of Chiṭṭa, one makes both good and bad Karmas to perish. One whose mind is thus cleansed attains the indestructible Bliss (through his own Self). Just as Chiṭṭa becomes united with an object that comes across it, so why should not one (be released) from bondage, when one is united with Brahman. One should meditate in the middle of the lotus of the heart, Parameśwara (the highest Lord) who is the witness to the play of Buḍḍhi, who is the object of supreme love, who is beyond the reach of mind and speech, who has no beginning or end, who is Saṭ alone being of the nature of light only, who is beyond meditation, who can neither be given up nor grasped (by the mind), who is without equal or superior, who is the permanent, who is of unshaken depth, who is without light or darkness, who is all-pervading, changeless and vehicleless, and who is wisdom of the nature of Moksha (salvation). I am He—that Paramāṭmā who is the eternal, the pure, the liberated, of the nature of wisdom, the true, the subtle, the all-pervading, the secondless, the ocean of bliss, and one that is superior to Praṭyagāṭmā (the lower Self). There is no doubt about it. How will calamity (or bondage) approach me who am depending upon my own bliss in my heart, who have put to shame the ghost of desires, who look upon this universe as (but) a jugglery and who am not associated with anything. The ignorant with their observance of the castes and orders of life obtain their fruits according to their Karmas. Men who have given up all duties of castes, etc., rest content in the bliss of their own Self. The distinctions of caste and orders of life have divisions among them, have beginning and end, and are very painful. Therefore having given up all identification with sons and as well as body, one should dwell in that endless and most supreme Bliss."

Then Lord Maiṭreya went to Kailās and having reached it asked Him thus: "O Lord! please initiate me into the mysteries of the highest Taṭṭwa." To which Mahāḍeva replied: "The body is said to be a temple. The Jīva in it is Śiva alone. Having given up all the cast-off offerings of Ajñāna, one should worship Him with So'ham (I am He). The cognition of everything as non-different from oneself is Jñāna (wisdom). Abstracting the mind from sensual objects is Dhyāna (meditation). Purifying the mind of its impurities is Snāna (bathing). The subjugation of the Inḍriyas (sensual organs) is Śaucha (purification). One should drink the nectar of Brahman and beg food for maintaining the body. Having one (thought) alone, he should live in a solitary place without a second. The wise man should observe thus: then he obtains Absolution.

"This body is subject to birth and death. It is of the nature of the secretion of the father and mother. It is impure, being the seat of happiness and misery. (Therefore) bathing is prescribed for touching it. It is bound by the Ḍhāṭus (skin, blood etc.), is liable to severe diseases, is a house of sins, is impermanent and is of changing appearance and size. (Therefore) bathing is prescribed for touching it. Foul matter is naturally oozing out always from the nine holes. It (body) contains bad odour and foul excrement. (Therefore) bathing is prescribed for touching it. It is connected (or tainted) with the child-birth impurity of the mother and is born with it. It is also tainted with death impurity. (Therefore) bathing is prescribed for touching it. (The conception of) "I and mine" is the odour

arising from the besmeared dung and urine. The release from it is spoken of as the perfect purification. The (external) purification by means of water and earth is on account of the worldly. The destruction of the threefold affinities (of Śāsṭras, world and body) generates the purity for cleansing Chiṭṭa. That is called the (real) purification which is done by means of the earth and water of Jñāna (wisdom) and Vairāgya (indifference to objects).

"The conception of Aḍwaiṭa (non-dualism) should be taken in as the Bhiksha (alma-food); (but) the conception of Ḍwaiṭa (dualism) should not be taken in. To a Sannyāsī (ascetic), Bhiksha is ordained as dictated by the Śāsṭra and the Guru. After becoming a Sannyāsī, a learned man should himself abandon his native place and live at a distance, like a thief released from prison. When a person gives up Ahankāra (I-amness) the son, wealth the brother, delusion the house, and desire the wife, there is no doubt that he is an emancipated person. Delusion, the mother is dead. Wisdom, the son is born. In this manner while two kinds of pollution have occurred, how shall we (the ascetics) observe the Sanḍhyās (conjunction periods)? The Chiṭ (consciousness) of the sun is ever shining in the resplendent Ākāś of the heart. He neither sets nor rises; while so, how shall we perform the Sanḍhyās? Ekānṭa (solitude) is that state of one without second as determined by the words of a Guru. Monasteries or forests are not solitudes. Emancipation is only for those who do not doubt. To those who doubt, there is no salvation even after many births. Therefore one should attain faith. (Mere) abandoning of the Karmas or of the Manṭras uttered at the initiation of a Sannyāsī (ascetic) will not constitute Sannyāsa. The union of Jīva (-Āṭmā) (the lower self) and Parama (-Āṭmā) (the higher Self) at the two Sanḍhis (morning and evening) is termed Sannyāsa. Whoever has a nausea for all Īshaṇa (desires) and the rest as for vomited food, and is devoid of all affection for the body, is qualified for Sannyāsa. At the moment when indifference towards all objects arises in the mind, a learned person may take up Sannyāsa. Otherwise, he is a fallen person. Whoever becomes a Sannyāsī on account of wealth, food, clothes and fame, becomes fallen in both (as a Sannyāsī and as householder); (then) he is not worthy of salvation.

"The thought of (contemplation upon) Ṭaṭṭwas is the transcendental one; that of the Śāsṭras, the middling, and that of Manṭras, the lowest. The delusion of pilgrimages is the lowest of the lowest. Like one, who, having seen in water the reflection of fruits in the branches of trees, tastes and enjoys them, the ignorant without self-cognition are in vain overjoyed with (as if they reached) Brahman. That ascetic is an emancipated person who does not abandon the internal alma-taking (*viz.*, the meditation upon the non-dual), generating Vairāgya as well as faith the wife, and wisdom the son. Those men (termed) great through wealth, age, and knowledge, are only servants to those that are great through their wisdom as also to their disciples. Those whose minds are deluded by My Māyā, however learned they may be, do not attain Me, the all-full Āṭmā, and roam about like crows, simply for the purpose of filling up their belly, well burnt up (by hunger, etc.). For one that longs after salvation, the worship of images made of stone, metals, gem, or earth, is productive of rebirth and enjoyment. Therefore, the ascetic should perform his own heart-worship alone, and relinquish external worship in order that he may not be born again. Then like a vessel full to its brim in an ocean he is full within and full without. Like a vessel void in the ether, he

is void within and void without. Do not become (or differentiate between) the Āṭmā that knows or the Āṭmā that is known. Do become of the form of that which remains, after having given up all thoughts. Relinquishing with their Vāsanās the seer, the seen and the visual, worship Aṭma alone, the resplendent supreme presence. That is the real supreme State wherein all Saṅkalpas (thoughts) are at rest, which resembles the state of a stone, and which is neither waking nor sleeping."

"I am "I" (the Self). I am also another (the not-Self). I am Brahman. I am the Source (of all things). I am also the Guru of all worlds. I am of all the worlds. I am He. I am Myself alone. I am Siḍḍha. I am the Pure. I am the Supreme. I am. I am always He. I am the Eternal. I am stainless. I am Vijñāna. I am the Excellent. I am Soma. I am the All. I am without honour or dishonour. I am without Guṇas (qualities). I am Śiva (the auspicious). I am neither dual or non-dual. I am without the dualities (of heat or cold, etc.) I am He. I am neither existence nor non-existence. I am without language. I am the Shining. I am the Glory of void and non-void. I am the good and the bad. I am Happiness. I am without grief. I am Chaiṭanya. I am equal (in all). I am the like and the non-like. I am the eternal, the pure, and the ever felicitous. I am without all and without not all. I am Sāṭṭwika. I am always existing. I am without the number one. I am without the number two. I am without the difference of Saṭ and Asaṭ. I am without Śaṅkalpa. I am without the difference of manyness. I am the form of immeasurable Bliss. I am one that exists not. I am the one that is not another. I am without body, etc. I am with asylum. I am without asylum. I am without support. I am without bondage or emancipation. I am the pure Brahman. I am He. I am without Chiṭṭa, etc. I am the supreme and the Supreme of the supreme. I am ever of the form of deliberation and yet am without deliberation. I am He. I am of the nature of the Akāra and Ukāra as also of Makāra. I am the earliest. The contemplator and contemplatior. I am without. I am One that cannot be contemplated upon. I am He. I have full form in all. I have the characteristics on Sachchiḍānanḍa. I am of the form of places of pilgrimages. I am the higher Self and Śiva. I am neither the thing defined nor non-defined. I am the non-absorbed Essence. I am not the measurer, the measure or the measured. I am Śiva. I am not the universe. I am the Seer of all. I am without the eyes, etc. I am the full grown. I am the Wise. I am the Quiescent. I am the Destroyer. I am without any sensual organs. I am the doer of all actions. I am One that is content with all Veḍānṭas (either books or Āṭmic Wisdom). I am the easily attainable. I have the name of one that is pleased as well as one that is not. I am the fruits of all silence. I am always of the form of Chinmāṭra (Absolute Consciousness). I am always Saṭ (Be-ness) and Chiṭ (Consciousness). I am one that has not anything in the least. I am not one that has not anything in the least. I am without the heart-Granṭhi (knot). I am the Being in the middle of the lotus. I am without the six enemies. I am within the within. I am without place and time. I am of the form of happiness having the quarters as My garment. I am the emancipated One, without bondage. I am without the "no". I am of the form of the partless. I am the partless. I have Chiṭṭa, though released from the universe. I am without the universe. I am of the form of all light. I am the Light (Jyoṭis) in Chinmāṭra (Absolute Consciousness). I am free from the three periods (of time past, present and future). I am without desires. I am without body. I am One that has no body. I am Guṇaless.

I am alone. I am without emancipation. I am the emancipated One. I am ever without emancipation. I am without truth or untruth. I am always One that is not different from Saṭ (Be-ness). I have no place to travel. I have no going, etc. I am always of the same form. I am the Quiescent. I am Purushoṭṭama (the Lord of Souls). There is no doubt that he who has realised himself thus, is Myself. Whoever hears (this) once becomes himself Brahman, yea, he becomes himself Brahman. Thus is the Upanishaḍ."

MAṆDALABRĀHMAṆA-UPANISHAḌ

Maṇdala means sphere. As the Purusha in the maṇdala or sphere of the sun gives out this Upanishaḍ to Yājñavalkya, hence it is called Maṇdala-Brāhmaṇa. It is very mystic. There is a book called *Rājayoga Bhāshya* which is a commentary thereon; in the light of it which is by some attributed to Srī Saṅkarāchārya, notes are given herein.

The great muni Yājñavalkya went to Āḍiṭyaloka (the sun's world) and saluting him (the Purusha of the sun) said "O reverend sir, describe to me the Āṭma-ṭaṭṭva (the ṭaṭṭva or truth of Āṭmā)."

(To which,) Nārāyaṇa (*viz.*, the Purusha of the sun) replied: "I shall describe the eightfold yoga together with Jñāna. The conquering of cold and heat as well as hunger and sleep, the preserving of (sweet) patience and unruffledness ever and the restraining of the organs (from sensual objects)—all these come under (or are) yama. Devotion to one's guru, love of the true path, enjoyment of objects producing happiness, internal satisfaction, freedom from association, living in a retired place, the controlling of the manas and the not longing after the fruits of actions and a state of vairāgya—all these constitute niyama. The sitting in any posture pleasant to one and clothed in tatters (or bark) is prescribed for āsana (posture). Inspiration, restraint of breath and expiration, which have respectively 16, 64 and 32 (māṭrās) constitute prāṇāyāma (restraint of breath). The restraining of the mind from the objects of senses is praṭyāhāra (subjugation of the senses). The contemplation of the oneness of consciousness in all objects is ḍhyāna. The mind having been drawn away from the objects of the senses, the fixing of the chaiṭanya (consciousness) (on one alone) is ḍhāraṇā. The forgetting of oneself in ḍhyāna is samāḍhi. He who thus knows the eight subtle parts of yoga attains salvation.

"The body has five stains (*viz.*,) passion, anger, out-breathing, fear and sleep. The removal of these can be effected respectively by absence of saṅkalpa, forgiveness, moderate food, carefulness, and a spiritual sight of ṭaṭṭvas. In order to cross the ocean of samsāra where sleep and fear are the serpents, injury, etc., are the waves, ṭṛshṇā (thirst) is the whirlpool, and wife is the mire, one should adhere to the subtle path and overstepping ṭaṭṭva and other guṇas should look out for Ṭāraka. Ṭāraka is Brahman which being in the middle of the two eyebrows, is of the nature of the spiritual effulgence of Sachchiḍānanḍa. The (spiritual) seeing through the three lakshyas (or the three kinds of introvision) is the means to It (Brahman). Sushumnā which is from the mūlāḍhāra to brahmaranḍhra has the radiance of the sun. In the centre of it, is kuṇdalinī shining like crores of lightning and subtle as the thread in the lotus-stalk. Ṭamas is destroyed there. Through seeing it, all sins are destroyed. When the two ears are closed by the tips of the forefingers, a phūṭkāra (or booming) sound is heard. When the mind is fixed on it, it sees a blue light between the eyes as also in the heart. (This is anṭarlakshya or

internal introvision). In the bahirlakshya (or external introvision) one sees in order before his nose at distance of 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 digits, the space of blue colour, then a colour resembling śyāma (indigo-black) and then shining as rakṭa (red) wave and then with the two pīṭa (yellow or orange red) colours. Then he is a yogin. When one looks at the external space, moving the eyes and sees streaks of light at the corners of his eyes, then his vision can be made steady. When one sees jyoṭis (spiritual light) above his head 12 digits in length, then he attains the state of nectar. In the maḍhyalakshya (or the middle one), one sees the variegated colours of the morning as if the sun, the moon and the fire had joined together in the ākāś that is without them. Then he comes to have their nature (of light). Through practice, he becomes one with ākāś, devoid of all guṇas and peculiarities. At first ākāś with its shining starts becomes to him Para-ākāś as dark as ṭamas itself, and he becomes one with Para-ākāś shining with stars and deep as ṭamas. (Then) he becomes one with Mahā-ākāś resplendent (as) with the fire of the deluge. Then he becomes one with Ṭaṭṭva-ākāś, lighted with the brightness which is the highest and the best of all. Then he becomes one with Sūrya-ākāś (sun-ākāś) brightened by a crore of suns. By practising thus, he becomes one with them. He who knows them becomes thus.

"Know that yoga is twofold through its division into the pūrva (earlier) and the uṭṭara (later). The earlier is ṭāraka and the later is amanaska (the mindless). Ṭāraka is divided into mūrṭi (with limitation) and amūrṭi (without limitation). That is mūrṭi ṭāraka which goes to the end of the senses (or exists till the senses are conquered). That is amūrṭi tāraka which goes beyond the two eyebrows (above the senses). Both these should be performed through manas. Anṭarḍṛshti (internal vision) associated with manas comes to aid ṭāraka. Ṭejas (spiritual light) appears in the hole between the two eyebrows. This ṭāraka is the earlier one. The later is amanaska. The great jyoṭis (light) is above the root of the palate. By seeing it, one gets the siḍḍhis aṇimā, etc. Śāmbhavīmuḍrā occurs when the lakshya (spiritual vision) is internal while the (physical) eyes are seeing externally without winking. This is the great science which is concealed in all the ṭanṭras. When this is known, one does not stay in samsāra. Its worship (or practice) gives salvation. Anṭarlakshya is of the nature of Jalajyoṭis (or waterjyoṭis). It is known by the great Ṛshis and is invisible both to the internal and external senses.

"Sahasrāra (*viz.*, the thousand-petalled lotus of the pineal gland) Jalajyoṭis is the anṭarlakshya. Some say the form of Purusha in the cave of buḍḍhi beautiful in all is parts is anṭarlakshya. Some again say that the all-quiescent Nīlakaṇṭha accompanied by Umā (his wife) and having five mouths and latent in the midst of the sphere in the brain is anṭarlakshya. Whilst others say that the Purusha of the dimension of a thumb is anṭarlakshya. A few again say anṭarlakshya is the One Self made supreme through introvision in the state of a jīvanmukṭa. All the different statements above made pertain to Āṭmā alone. He alone is a Brahmanishtha who sees that the above lakshya is the pure Āṭmā. The jīva which is the twenty-fifth ṭaṭṭva, having abandoned the twenty-four ṭaṭṭvas, becomes a jīvanmukṭa through the conviction that the twenty-sixth ṭaṭṭva (*viz.*,) Paramāṭmā is 'I' alone. Becoming one with anṭarlakshya (Brahman) in the emancipated state by means of anṭarlakshya (introvision), jīva becomes one with the partless sphere of Paramākās.

Then Yājñavalkya asked the Purusha in the sphere of the sun: "O Lord,

antarlakshya has been described many times, but it has never been understood by me (clearly). Pray describe it to me." He replied: "It is the source of the five elements, has the lustre of many (streaks of) lightning, and has four seats having (or rising from) 'That' (Brahman). In its midst, there arises the manifestation of tattva. It is very hidden and unmanifested. It can be known (only) by one who has got into the boat of jñāna. It is the object of both bahir and antar (external and internal) lakshyas. In its midst is absorbed the whole world. It is the vast partless universe beyond Nāda, Bindu and Kalā. Above it (*viz.*, the sphere of agni) is the sphere of the sun; in its midst is the sphere of the nectary moon; in its midst is the sphere of the partless Brahma-tejas (or the spiritual effulgence of Brahman). It has the brightness of Śukla (white light) like the ray of lightning. It alone has the characteristic of Śāmbhavī. In seeing this, there are three kinds of drshti (sight), *viz.*, amā (the new moon), pratipat (the first day of lunar fortnight), and pūrnimā (the full moon). The sight of amā is the one (seen) with closed eyes. That with half opened eyes is pratipat; while that with fully opened eyes is pūrnimā. Of these, the practice of pūrnimā should be resorted to. Its lakshya (or aim) is the tip of the nose. Then is seen a deep darkness at the root of the palate. By practising thus, a jyotis (light) of the form of an endless sphere is seen. This alone is Brahman, the Sachchidānanda. When the mind is absorbed in bliss thus naturally produced, then does Śāmbhavī take place. She (Śāmbhavī) alone is called Khecharī. By practising it (*viz.*, the mudrā), a man obtains firmness of mind. Through it, he obtains firmness of vāyu. The following are the signs: first it is seen like a star; then a reflecting (or dazzling) diamond; then the sphere of full moon; then the sphere of the brightness of nine gems; then the sphere of the midday sun; then the sphere of the flame of agni (fire); all these are seen in order.

"(Thus much for the light in pūrva or first stage.) Then there is the light in the western direction (in the uttara or second stage). Then the lustres of crystal, smoke, bindu, nāda, kalā, star, firefly, lamp, eye, gold, and nine gems, etc. are seen. This aline is the form of Pranava. Having united Prāna and Apāna and holding the breath in kumbhaka, one should fix his concentration at the tip of his nose and making shanmukhi with the fingers of both his hands, one hears the sound of Pranava (Om) in which manas becomes absorbed. Such a man has not even the touch of karma. The karma of (Sandhyā-vandana or the daily prayers) is verily performed at the rising or setting of the sun. As there is no rising or setting (but only the ever shining) of the sun of Chit (the higher consciousness) in the heart of a man who knows thus, he has no karma to perform. Rising above (the conception of) day and night through the annihilation of sound and time, he becomes one with Brahman through the all-full jñāna and the attaining of the state of unmanī (the state above manas). Through the state of unmanī, he becomes amanaska (or without manas).

"Not being troubled by any thoughts (of the world) then constitutes the dhyāna. The abandoning of all karmas constitutes āvāhana (invocation of god). Being firm in the unshaken (spiritual) wisdom constitutes āsana (posture). Being in the state of unmanī constitutes the pādya (offering of water for washing the feet of god). Preserving the state of amanaska (when manas is offered as sacrifice) constitutes the arghya (offering of water as oblation generally). Being in state of eternal brightness and shoreless nectar constitutes

snāna (bathing). The contemplation of Āṭmā as present in all constitutes (the application to the idol of) sandal. The remaining in the real state of the ḍṛk (spiritual eye) is (the worshipping with) akshaṭa (non-broken rice). The attaining of Chiṭ (consciousness) is (the worshipping with) flower. The real state of agni (fire) of Chiṭ is the ḍhūpa (burning of incense). The state of the sun of Chiṭ is the ḍīpa (light waved before the image). The union of oneself with the nectar of full moon is the naivēḍya (offering of food, etc.). The immobility in that state (of the ego being one with all) is praḍakshiṇa (going round the image). The conception of 'I am He' is namaskāra (prostration). The silence (then) is the sṭuṭi (praise). The all-contentment (or serenity then) is the visarjana (giving leave to god or finishing worship). (This is the worship of Āṭmā by all Rāja-yogins). He who knows this knows all.

"When the ṭripuṭi are thus dispelled, he becomes the kaivalya jyoṭis without bhāva (existence) or abhāva (non-existence), full and motionless, like the ocean without the tides or like the lamp without the wind. He becomes a brahmaviṭ (knower of Brahman) by cognising the end of the sleeping state, even while in the waking state. Though the (same) mind is absorbed in sushupṭi as also in samāḍhi, there is much difference between them. (In the former case) as the mind is absorbed in ṭamas, it does not become the means of salvation, (but) in samāḍhi as the modifications of ṭamas in him are rooted away, the mind raises itself to the nature of the Partless. All that is no other than Sākshi-Chaiṭanya (witness-consciousness or the Higher Self) into which the absorption of the whole universe takes place, inasmuch as the universe is but a delusion (or creation) of the mind and is therefore not different from it. Though the universe appears perhaps as outside of the mind, still it is unreal. He who knows Brahman and who is the sole enjoyer of brāhmic bliss which is eternal and has dawned once (for all in him)—that man becomes one with Brahman. He is whom saṅkalpa perishes has got mukṭi in his hand. Therefore one becomes an emancipated person through the contemplation of Paramāṭmā. Having given up both bhāva and abhāva, one becomes a jīvanmukṭa by leaving off again and again in all states jñāna (wisdom) and jñeya (object of wisdom), ḍhyāna (meditation) and ḍhyeya (object of meditation), lakshya (the aim) and alakshya (non-aim), ḍṛśya (the visible) and aḍṛśya (the non-visible and uha (reasoning) and apoha (negative reasoning). He who knows this knows all.

"There are five avasṭhās (states), *viz.*, jāgraṭ (waking), svapna (dreaming), sushupṭi (dreamless sleeping), the ṭurya (fourth) and ṭuryāṭīṭa (that beyond the fourth). The jīva (ego) that is engaged in the waking state becomes attached to the pravṛṭṭi (worldly) path and is the participator of naraka (hell) as the fruit of sins. He desires svarga (heaven) as the fruit of his virtuous actions. This very same person becomes (afterwards) indifferent to all these saying, "Enough of the births tending to actions, the fruits of which tend to bondage till the end of this mundane existence." Then he pursues the nivṛṭṭi (return) path with a view to attain emancipation. And this person then takes refuge in a spiritual instructor in order to cross this mundane existence. Giving up passion and others, he does only those he is asked to do. Then having acquired the four sāḍhanas (means to salvation), he attains, in the middle of the lotus of his heart, the Reality of anṭarlakshya that is but the Saṭ of Lord and begins to recognise (or recollect) the bliss of Brahman which he had left (or enjoyed) in his sushupṭi state. At last he attains this state of

discrimination (thus): 'I think I am the non-dual One only. I was in ajñāna for some time (in the waking state and called therefore Viśva). I became somehow (or involuntarily) a Ṭaijasa (in the dreaming state) through the reflection (in that state) of the affinities of the forgotten waking state; and now I am a Prajñā through the disappearance of those two states. Therefore I am one only. I (appear) as more than one through the differences of state and place. And there is nothing of differentiation of class besides me.' Having expelled even the smack of the difference (of conception) between 'I' and 'That' through the thought 'I am the pure and the secondless Brahman', and having attained the path of salvation which is of the nature of Parabrahman, after having become one with It through the ḍhyāna of the sun's sphere as shining with himself, he becomes fully ripened for getting salvation. Saṅkalpa and others are the causes of the bondage of the mind; and the mind devoid of these becomes fit for salvation. Possessing such a mind free from all (saṅkalpa, etc.,) and withdrawing himself from the outer world of sight and others and so keeping himself out of the odour of the universe, he looks upon all the world as Āṭmā, abandons the conception of 'I', thinks 'I am Brahman' and considers all these as Āṭmā.

"The yogin is one that has realised Brahman that is all-full beyond ṭurya. They (the people) extol him as Brahman; and becoming the object of the praise of the whole world, he wanders over different countries. Placing the bindu in the ākāś of Paramāṭmā and pursuing the path of the partless bliss produced by the pure, secondless, stainless, and innate yoga sleep of amanaska, he becomes an emancipated person. Then the yogin becomes immersed in the ocean of bliss. When compared to it, the bliss of Inḍra and others is very little. He who gets this bliss is the supreme yogin.

The great sage Yājñavalkya then asked the Purusha in the sphere (of the sun): "O Lord, though the nature of amanaska has been defined (by you), yet I forget it (or do not understand it clearly). Therefore pray explain it again to me." Accordingly the Purusha said: "This amanaska is a great secret. By knowing this, one becomes a person who has done his duty. One should look upon it as Paramāṭmā, associated with Śāmbhavīmuḍrā and should know also all those that can be known through a (thorough) cognition of them. Then seeing Parabrahman in his own Āṭmā as the Lord of all, the immeasurable, the birthless, the auspicious, the supreme ākāś, the supportless, the secondless the only goal of Brahmā, Vishṇu and Ruḍra and the cause of all and assuring himself that he who plays in the cave (of the heart) is such a one, he should raise himself above the dualities of existence and non-existence; and knowing the experience of the unmanī of his manas, he then attains the state of Parabrahman which is motionless as a lamp in a windless place, having reached the ocean of brāhmic bliss by means of the river of amanaska-yoga through the destruction of all his senses. Then he resembles a dry tree. Having lost all (idea of) the universe through the disappearance of growth, sleep, disease, expiration and inspiration, his body being always steady, he comes to his manas and becomes absorbed in Paramāṭmā. The destruction of manas takes place after the destruction of the collective senses, like the cow's under (that shrivels up) after the milk has been drawn. It is this that is amanaska. By following this, one becomes always pure and becomes one that has done his duty, having been filled with the partless bliss by means of the path of ṭāraka-yoga through the initiation into the

sacred sentences 'I am Paramāṭmā,' 'That art thou,' 'I am thou alone,' 'Thou art I alone,' etc.

"When his manas is immersed in the ākāś and he becomes all-full, and when he attains the unmanī state, having abandoned all his collective senses, he conquers all sorrows and impurities through the partless bliss, having attained the fruits of kaivalya, ripened through the collective merits gathered in all his previous lives and thinking always 'I am Brahman', becomes one that has done his duty. 'I am thou alone. There is no difference between thee and me owing to the fullness of Paramāṭmā.' Saying thus, he (the Purusha of the sun) embraced his pupil and made him understand it.

Then Yājñavalkya addressed the Purusha in the sphere (of the sun) thus: "Pray explain to me in detail the nature of the fivefold division of ākāś." He replied: "There are five (*viz*): ākāś, parākāś, mahākāś, sūryākāś and paramākāś. That which is of the nature of darkness, both in and out is the first ākāś. That which has the fire of the deluge, both in and out is truly mahākāś. That which has the brightest of the sun, both in and out is sūryākāś. That brightness which is indescribable, all-pervading and of the nature of unrivalled bliss is paramākāś. By cognising these according to this description, one becomes of their nature. He is a yogin only in name, who does not cognise well the nine chakras, the six āḍhāras, the three lakshyas and the five ākāś. Thus ends the fourth Brāhmaṇa."

"The manas influenced by worldly objects is liable to bondage; and that (manas) which is not so influenced by these is fit for salvation. Hence all the world becomes an object of chiṭṭa; whereas the same chiṭṭa when it is supportless and well-ripe in the state of unmanī, becomes worthy of laya (absorption in Brahman). This absorption you should learn from me who am the all-full. I alone am the cause of the absorption of manas. The manas is within the jyoṭis (spiritual light) which again is latent in the spiritual sound which pertains to the anāhaṭa (heart) sound. That manas which is the agent of creation, preservation, and destruction of the three worlds—that same manas becomes absorbed in that which is the highest seat of Vishṇu; through such an absorption, one gets the pure and secondless state, owing to the absence of difference then. This alone is the highest truth. He who knows this, will wander in the world like a lad or an idiot or a demon or a simpleton. By practising this amanaska, one is ever contented, his urine and faeces become diminished, his food becomes lessened: he becomes strong in body and his limbs are free from disease and sleep. Then his breath and eyes being motionless, he realises Brahman and attains the nature of bliss.

"That ascetic who is intent on drinking the nectar of Brahman produced by the long practice of this kind of samāḍhi, becomes a paramahamsa (ascetic) or an avaḍhūṭa (naked ascetic). By seeing him, all the world becomes pure, and even an illiterate person who serves him is freed from bondage. He (the ascetic) enables the members of his family for one hundred and one generations to cross the ocean of samsāra; and his mother, father, wife, and children - all these are similarly freed. Thus is the Upanishaḍ.

MĀṆḌŪKYA-UPANIṢAD

Lords! inspiration of sacrifice! May our ears hear the good. May our eyes see the good. May we serve Him with the whole strength of our body. May we, all our life, carry out His will. Peace, peace, and peace be everywhere. Welcome to the Lord! The

word Ôm is the Imperishable; all this its manifestation. Past, present, future—everything is Ôm. Whatever transcends the three divisions of time, that too is Ôm. There is nothing that is not Spirit. The personal self is the impersonal Spirit. It has four conditions.

First comes the material condition-common to all—perception turned outward, seven agents, nineteen agencies, wherein the Self enjoys coarse matter. This is known as the waking condition.

The second is the mental condition, perception turned inward, seven agents, nineteen agencies, where in the Self enjoys subtle matter. This is known as the dreaming condition.

In deep sleep man feels no desire, creates no dream. This undreaming sleep is the third condition, the intellectual condition. Because of his union with the Self and his unbroken knowledge of it, he is filled with joy, he knows his joy; his mind is illuminated.

The Self is the lord of all; inhabitant of the hearts of all. He is the sources of all; creator and dissolver of beings. There is nothing He does not know.

He is not knowable by perception, turned inward or outward, nor by both combined. He is neither that which is known, nor that which is not known, nor is He the sum of all that might be known. He cannot be seen, grasped, bargained with. He is undefinable, unthinkable, indescribable.

The only proof of His existence is union with Him. The world disappears in Him. He is the peaceful, the good, the one without a second. This is the fourth condition of the Self—the most worthy of all.

This Self, though beyond words, is that supreme word Ôm; though indivisible, it can be divided in three letters corresponding to the three conditions of the Self, the letter A, the letter U, and the letter M.

The waking condition, called the material condition, corresponds to the letter A, which leads the alphabet and breathes in all the other letters. He who understands, gets all he wants; becomes a leader among men.

The dreaming condition, called the mental condition, corresponds to the second letter U. It upholds; stands between waking and sleeping. He who understands upholds the tradition of spiritual knowledge; looks upon everything with an impartial eye. No one ignorant of Spirit is born into his family.

Undreaming sleep, called the intellectual condition, corresponds to the third letter, M. It weighs and unites. He who understands, weighs are world; rejects; unites himself with the cause.

The fourth condition of the Self corresponds to Ôm as One, indivisible Word. He is whole; beyond bargain. The world disappears in Him. He is the good; the one without a second. Thus Ôm is nothing but Self. He who understands, with the help of his personal self, merges himself into the impersonal Self; He who understands.

THE MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANIṢAD AND THE GAUḌAPĀDA KĀRIKAS

It is generally known that the *Māṇḍūkya* forms one of the ten principal Upaniṣads, and Gauḍapāda has explained it by his Kārikās or the explanatory verses, and these Kārikās together with the original Upaniṣad have again been commented upon by Śaṅkarācārya, the great commentator of the *Brahmasūtras*. This popular view must be either abandoned or modified to a great extent.

For the sake of convenience we shall first take up a question regarding the real

extent of the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad. In the present day we all know that it comprises only the prose passages, twelve in number, and the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda are mere explanation of the former, and thus these two works are different from each other. But this fact is not admitted on all hands. It is maintained by some that the Upaniṣad is composed not only of the prose passages referred to but also of the first book (*prakaraṇa*) of the Karikās. This view dates back at least from the time of Madhvācārya, the founder of the Dvaita school of the Vedānta philosophy (1199-1278). According to him and his followers, viz., Vyāsatirtha and Śrīnivāsa, both the prose passages and the Kārikās included in the first, book have been handed down by Varuna in the form of a *maṇḍūka* "a frog" the Kārikās, however,being regarded as *mantras* which are said to have been seen by Brahman, the creator as the *Ṛṣi*. I have already pointed out elsewhere that the commentator of *Nṛsiṃha-pūrvatāpanīya*, Upaniṣad who is also known by the name of Śaṅkarācārya and identical with the author of the *Prapañcasāra*, a tāntrik work, is also of the same opinion, though he does not give any particular as to whether the *Ṛṣi* or the seer of the whole Upaniṣad is Varuṇa or whether the Kārikās are seen as *mantras* by Brahman, the creator. Kūranārāyaṇa another commentator of the *Māṇḍūkya*. Upaniṣad belonging to the Rāmānuja school of Vedānta maintains the same view taking the Kārikās of the first book as *mantras*, which, in his opinion, too, together with the prose passages from the original Upaniṣad. Appaya Dīkṣita a commentator of the one hundred and eight Upaniṣáds seems to subscribe to the same view, for his commentary on this Upaniṣad extends only the prose passages and the Kārikās of the first book. A large number of manuscript of this Upaniṣad in different libraries contains only these prose passages and the Kārikās of the first book.

Thus it is perfectly clear from the above that by a considerable number of writers the first book of the Kārikās in their present form was taken as a part of the original Upaniṣad. Not only this, on the evidence of a large number of Mss., each of the four books of the Kārikās is also regarded as a separate Upaniṣad.

Be it as it may. It is however evident from what is said above that according to those authorities the last three books of the *Gauḍapāda-Kārikās* form quite a different book or books with which the *Māṇdūkya* Upaniṣad has not any connection. It cannot be said that these three last books were not known to them or in their times, for their priority to those authors can very satisfactorily be proved by the very simple fact that the great Śaṅkara who flourished long before them has quoted in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (1.4.14) a kārikā from the third book (III. 15). Here a question may be put as to why they did not explain the last three books of the *Gaudapāda-Kārikās* which they had before them. The answer might be twofold. First, it might be their honest belief that those books had no connection with the original *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad which, according to them, comprises only the twelve prose passages and the first book of the *Gauḍapāda Karikās*. And secondly, it might be said that they could not explain the Upaniṣad are divided into four parts. Just after each of them there is a line, viz. "*Atraite slokā bhavanta*" here are the slokas'. These introductory lines compared with similar sentences in the different Upaniṣads strongly suggest that the ślokas are quoted there only to support what is being discussed. And we have already seen that Madhvācārya and others, and specially the former, say the very thing quite clearly. Thus it follows from it that the ślokas or

Kārikās were already in existence and the prose passages came into being afterwards.

A question may, however, arise here as to whether these introductory lines (*"Atraite ślokā bhavanti"*) are in fact included in the Upaniṣad. In some of the Mss. used for the preparation of the second and third edition (1900 and 1910 respectively) of the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad with the Kārikās and the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara and *Ṭīkā* of Ānandagiri in the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, there is a short line apparently in the *bhāṣya* just at the beginning of *"Atraite ślokā bhavanti"* (p. 25) which introduces it saying "Now, here is the sentence of the author of the Vārtika (i.e. the Kārikās). This shows that the introductory lines are not included in the original Upaniṣad. This view is supported by the following lines of Ānandagiri: 'The teacher (i.e. Gaudapāda) having read the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad (up to that portion) introduces the ślokas which are its exposition by the words beginning with 'Here'. And the author of the bhāṣya (i.e. Śaṅkara) explains it, quoting it by the world 'Here'. Thus according to Ānandagiri, too, these introductory lines do not constitute the original Upaniṣad.

But this can hardly be accepted on the following grounds: First, we have already see that among those who hold that the Kārikās of the first book are included in the original Upaniṣad, Madhvācārya is the foremost. He expressly says that the introductory lines in question are also the parts of the Upaniṣad. For the writers in his commentary (pp. 7-8).

> "Brahmadṛṣtanato mantrān pramāṇaṃ salileśvaraḥ
> Atra ślokā bhavantīti cakāraivaṃ punaḥ puṇaḥ."

"Therefore, Varuṇa took the *mantras* as authority quoting them separately with the words 'Here are the ślokas". Madhvācārya says this couplet is in the Garudapurāṇa. If it is so, it would follow from it that this fact was known to the people long before him.

Secondly, as has already been shown, the manner in which these lines are introduced if compared with that in similar cases in the Upaniṣads and other works would strongly indicate that the introductory lines are included in the main work.

Thirdly, it is found in Sanskrit works that whenever an introductory phrase, such as "atrāyam ślokaḥ" etc., is used, only two things are possible there: *(i)* either the whole work including both the phrase and the ślokas is by the same author, or *(ii)* the ślokas introduced by the phrase are by one and the other portion of the work by another. In the first case the whole of the first book including both the prose passages and the Kārikās should be accepted as written by one, i.e., the teacher Ācārya Gauḍapāda; but Ānandagiri would not admit it. And in the second, the introductory phrases must be included in the main Upaniṣad as is the case with other Upaniṣads, but this would also not be admitted by him.

Fourthly and finally, as we shall presently see that the twelve prose passages of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad are based on the Gaudapāda-Kārikās in the first book and not the latter on the former, it is quite certain that the former should have the introductory line and the quoted Kārikās referred to by them, as the case is with other Upaniṣads.

MEANS OF SURVIVAL

The supremacy of Prāṇa or vital being is demonstrated in the Upaniṣads by allegorical experiments which have been stated in the foregoing chapter. Prāṇa or vital being is the essence of man's existence and all functions of life depend

on it. Prāṇa or vital being is a physical and secular value, which is common to men and animals. Not only all other secular values like sensory functions, sex etc. but all higher values also depend on it. Metaphysically the Prāṇa or vital spirit might well be a creative manifestation of supreme spiritual reality, but empirically even the recognition, discovery and realisation of the spiritual reality in life becomes possible only by virtue of vital existence. Life is the primacy condition of all cultural achievements of man. Empirically it is an a priori value of life. Hence it is identified with life in etymology and empirical usage.

Now Prāṇa or vital being depends on food. Food is assimilated into body and it nourishes Prāṇa and sustains its constant functioning which is the meaning of life. It is true that food also is assimilated by the power of Prāṇa or vital spirit, but when assimilated food nourishes and sustains life. Without Prāṇa existence of man ceases. He become dead and is reduced to physical elements of which his body is composed. But Prāṇa depends on food; without food Prāṇa or vital being withers. Not only physical but mental activities of man also weaken without food.

The importance of food for life and learning is elucidated in the Upaniṣad in two parables contained in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad. The parable of Ushasti found in the beginning of the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad illustrates the necessity of food for living and impossibility of surviving without food. Ushasti, a sage of Upanishadic times, thus the parable runs, could not get any food for some days, because the crop in the region in which he lived was devastated by hailstorm. He wandered in search of food for several days alongwith his young wife. He came to an elephant keeper and begged food of him. The elephant keeper said that 'I have no other food except these boiled black pulses, which I am eating.' Ushasti asked the elephant keeper to give him some of those pulses. He disregarded under pangs of hunger, the cultural consideration that he should not eat from those pulses which have been polluted by another person by starting to eat them. He refused the water offered by the elephant keeper for the same cultural consideration. When questioned by the elephant keeper "Are these pulses also not polluted like this water?" Ushasti replied that they were verily so, but that he could not help taking them because it was necessary for him to save his life under the situation. If he did not accept them he could not survive; unpolluted water could be available elsewhere also.

Ushasti saved his life by eating those black pulses offered to him by the elephant driver and went to attend the sacrificial session organised by a king. There at this session it was to be proposed as to which of the deities is to be invoked. Ushasti proposed that this deity was Prāṇa or the vital being. Later Ushasti proposed that this god is food, as all people live by taking food. The section of the Upaniṣad dealing with the parable of Ushasti and his presiding over the sacrificial session organised by the kind with a ritual chant for food in which Varuṇa, Prajāpati and Sun are invoked to bestow food, ends with a canine cry for food.

This parable of Ushasti contained in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad reveals in the light of a critical situation the primary importance of food for life and its cultural activities. Ushasti has confirmed the dependence of life on food in clear words. "I could not survive if I did not take these pulses given by you (the elephant keeper)." He also propounds the general principle that 'all people live by food' and they could not survive without food. The prayer to the gods to rain and sunlight who nourish

crops and corn is a religious ritual declaring the need of food for life, which is so glaringly recognised in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad in the parable of Ushasti.

The other parable which confirms the importance of food not only for living but also for learning (as mind also cannot work properly without food) is also found towards the end of the Chhāndogya Upaniṣads. This is the parable of Śwetaketu son of Aruna who returned home after observing Brahmacarya for twenty-four years at the place of his preceptor but without acquiring requisite humility which is the sign of spiritual realisation. Observing the impudence of his son Shwetakety, sage Āruṇi, his father, instructed him to keep fast for fifteen days and to live on water alone. The father consoled the son by saying that life survives on water and he would not die by not taking food for fifteen days. Water will sustain him.

So the son did, according to the instructions of his father. After fifteen days he came to his father. The father asked him to recite the hymns of the Vedas—Rigveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda. The son could not recollect and recite them due to his feebleness caused by fasting for fifteen days. The son said, "Sire, I cannot recollect and recite them.' The father said to the son—"Sweet son, just as the fire which is fed with ample fuel and consumed most of this fuel and a little fire is left in it like a fircely, it does not have much burning power, similarly fifteen parts of your vital being are exhausted without (fuel of) food and only one part of vitality is left. So you have become feeble without food and you are not capable of recollecting and reciting Vedic hymns. You take food, and you will soon regain the power to understand and recite the Veda.

On this Śwetaketu took food. His energies and senses revived. He recollected and understood the Vedic hymns he had learnt before he came to his father who said, "Even if a little spark of fire is left, it flares up if it is fed with fuel. So the one part of your vitality which remained out of sixteen after fifteen days fasting has flared up like fire and so now you can recollect and understand the Vedic hymns you learnt before. Water has sustained your vitality though it reduced due to want of food and now it is revived by fuel.

This parable of Śwetaketu substantiates the value of vital spirit and food for life. It confirms the vital truth of life by the method of concommitant variation. The dependence of Prāṇa or vital being on food is also confirmed in the Bṛihadaranyaka Upaniṣad. It says that the vital being withers without food. It is recognised that the dependence of Prāṇa or vital being on food is not absolute or one-sided. It sustains life only when it is assimilated. The assimilation of food is a vital function. It is the function of the vital being. It assimilates the food, then only food sustains life or vital being. If the vital being does not assimilate food, food rots. Therefore, food is not to be regarded an absolute reality. It is true that with all this relativity life or vital being cannot sustain without food. It depends on food and withers without it. The concrete truth as it is revealed in the Bṛihadaranyaka Upaniṣad is constituted by a unity of the two vital being and food. The two together make the whole truth. Man's existence depends on vital being with food to sustain it. At another place in the Bṛihadarañyaka Upaniṣad food is compared to the binding string which holds the vital being like the post to which life is bound. It is bound by the string of food. It means that vital being is the integral principle and essence of life. But it is sustained in the body by food.

The Chhāndogya Upaniṣad also confirms the truth. According to it Prāṇa or vital being seeks food for its sustenance. Chhāndogya is an Upaniṣad belonging to Sāmveda which is the Veda of music. It is inquired in the Upaniṣad; what is support of music? "Swara or musical voice" is the reply. Again when asked what is the support of voice?" "Prāṇa or vital being is the reply." It is true that voice depends on vital being. When it becomes feeble one cannot speak loudly. When vital being departs from the body one cannot speak, he becomes silent. Again when asked what is the support of vital being." As Śankara has elucidated in his commentary; it is food which holds and supports vital being in the body.

The Chhāndogya Upaniṣad even regards food as the seed of the body. Just as a tree spring from a seed so the body grows from food. Of course food or corn is not directly the seed of the body. The food is indirectly the cause of the body. The Prashna Upaniṣad explains this indirect causality. Food or corn in regarded is it at the god of generation (Prajapati). It is common knowledge that men are born of semen which contains the seed of generation. The sperms which are the actual seed of body flow in the semen. Semen and also sperms are generated from the food that a man eats and from this semen human beings are born. Thus food or corn is the seed of the body, as is propounded in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad.

The Muṅdaka Upaniṣad holds that the vital being or Prāṇa depends on food. This is supported by several Upaniṣads as stated above. The Chhāndogya Upaniṣad considers food as superior to physical strength. The meaning of it is that physical strength depends on food. Food is the cause or the source of physical strength. Cause is greater than the effect as the later depends on the former. It is in this sense of causal source of physical strength that the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad regards food as greater than physical strength. It also regards food as the support of senses and the mind. Senses work healthily only on the basis of physically strength which depends on food. Hence the senses also depend on food.

The mind also depends on food. Mind and understanding become feeble without food. It has been explained by the parable of Śwetaketu who fasted for fifteen days and became so weak by fasting that he did not recollect and understand Vedic hymns which he had learnt before. The Bṛihadaranyaka Upaniṣad propounds that the mind is formed of food. The Chhāndogya Upaniṣad also holds that mind is material in its nature because it is composed of food. The Chhāndogya Upaniṣad explains scientifically and analytically how the mind is made of food and is consequently material. It divides food into three parts according to its crudity and fineness. It understands that the crudest part of food becomes excretion. The finest part of food makes the mind and the intermediate parts forms the flesh of the body. Modern psychology identities mind with the grey matter which forms the brain. It is remarkable that the Upaniṣads understood the material formation of mind in those ancient days when biological experimentation had not even been started.

This physical nature of mind also indicates the inclination of the Upaniṣads towards understanding the physical basis of consciousness and spirit in man. This attitude seems to be the opposite of the extremely transcendental which is often attributed to the Upaniṣads and according to which the whole physical existence is illusory and unreal. This physical origin of mind is also to be reconciled with the

general Upanishadic view of creation according to which the whole physical universe proceeds from the spiritual reality called Brahman.

In the course of this reconciliation it is to be noted that the Upaniṣads regard food or corn so highly that they often raise it to the status of Brahman or the ultimate spiritual reality, it is true that after all, they do not finally confirm food or corn as the ultimate spiritual reality. But they do consider it in course of their quest for ultimate reality as an approximation to the ultimate spiritual reality. The Bṛihadaraṇyaka Upaniṣad does on an occasion confirm that food is identical with ultimate spiritual reality. The Taittiriya Upaniṣad contains a whole treatise on food. Bhrigu the son of Varuna was instructed by his father to observe penance and to discover reality for himself. At a stage of his quest he came to realise that food is the ultimate reality. This realization was not of course final but it indicates at least approximation of food to reality. Ultimate reality can be only that which is the ultimate source and support of life. Bhrigu came to realise that man is composed of the essence of food. Man is formed of food as explained above on the basis of the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad. Bhrigu came to realise that people are born of food and they live by food. Food is the ultimate support of man. Hence it is the ultimate reality and is to be adored as such. The vital being of man is glorified by food. It inspires life and is to be recognised at ultimate divine reality.

Upon this discovery of Bhrigu followed his gospel of food. It is the most secular part of the Upaniṣads and is to be seriously considered by those who believe the Upaniṣads to be otherworldly or world-negating and life-negating. What is more secular and more earthly than food? What philosophy can be more secular than a philosophy which raises food to status of highest & most sanctified reality. Taittirīya Upaniṣad after propounding food, at least provisionally, as the highest reality, proceeds on with most sacred injunctions regarding food. It exhorts us not to disregard food, as it sustains our life. It means that we should regard it with sanctity. It is on the basis of such scriptural injunctions that Indian people regarded food with divine sanctity and designated it as 'anna-devata.' nspired by this spirit of sanctity for food, they never disregarded or wasted it. They accepted it as a gift of God. They kept it with great care and cooked it with almost religious devotion. Kitchen has been a veritable temple for Indian women in which they have worshipped food and fire as gods of highest divine excellence. The injunctions of the Taittiriya Upaniṣad for not disregarding food, and for not neglecting it were observed with religious sanctity and faith.

The positive injunction of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad for increasing, growing and acquiring food (i.e. grain) confirms more strongly the positivistic and secular outlook of the Upaniṣads. It exhorts people to acquire abundant food grains, presumably by cultivating but also by begging. The motto of grow more food adopted by the Agricultural Ministry of Government of India has not only been adopted from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad but is a literal translation of the Upaniṣadic exhortation to people. The Upaniṣad also exhorts people to collect and acquire abundant food-grains, not only for their own food, but also for their guests. The guest was treated in Indian tradition with great reverence. He was considered to be almost divine. Travelling in extensive plains a man could be required to rest for night in any village. He came as an unexpected guest. As the date of his arrival not be known, he was designated as 'atithi' a person the date of whose arrival could not be known or

anticipated. But he was to be welcomed and given food. The Indian gospel of hospitality is an example of the high humanity which marked Indian culture. And the Upaniṣadic exhortation to people to acquire abundant food-grains not only for themselves but for their uncertain guests, marks the great regard to Upaniṣads for secular, and material values along with human and cultural values. Food-grains are to be acquired also to be given as alms to beggars particularly the Brahmāchāris, the spiritual students of ancient India, who were required to be supported by public gifts of foodgrains.

The Upaniṣads do not only confirm the importance of food-grains for sustenance of the vital being of man and for his physical strength, but they also exhort man to grow ample food grains and to acquire and collect enough of them for himself as well as for charity. They have not given so much importance to wealth as it is not so necessary for life. Abundance of wealth is conductive only to luxury of life, which is not consistent with the Upanishadic view of life which is moderate and borders on ascetism. But food is necessary for life. Hence abundance of food-grains, at least for need is emphasised in the Upaniṣads. The Bṛihadaranyaka Upaniṣad is notable for emphasising this quantitative importance of foodgrains. It reveals the productive secret of food-grains by virtue of which they become inexhaustible. It also advises a kind of worship which helps to make stores of food-grains inexhaustible. The emphasis on the quantity of food-grains confirms the normal and necessary attitude of Upaniṣads towards basic secular values.

Besides the physical and material aspect of the relation of mind to food, the Upaniṣads also suggest the psychological and ethical effect of it. Food-grains give joy to men. When there is ample rain and consequently there is hope of abundant food-grains people are greatly delighted. Every farmer directly realizes this simple but great truth of life indicated in the Prashan Upaniṣad. Others also realise it indirectly. Food supports and sustains the vital being. Abundant food promises abundant life free from the danger of famine and starvation. The hope of abundant life expresses in the jubilence of people at the expectation of good crops from ample rain. The delight which food gives to vital being of man can easily be noticed in its innocent form in the child. The child rejoices when you give it something to eat. Adults lose this joy due to their growing involvement in other worries of life and due to being accustomed to the routine of eating. They retain some joy of eating in the form of taste and variety of food. Feast is a cultural mode evolved by man to create common joy in eating together. Integration of delight in daily food will be a great achievement of civilisation.

The ethical aspect of food is an important feature of Indian view of life. It follows from the psychological aspect of food stated above. Physically and materially mind is made of food. But mind is also the seat of morals. Good and evil are the expressions of the mental attitude of man in life. The ethics of food is implied in the morality of immorality of the manner in which it is acquired. If it is acquired by exploitation it is evil and sinful. Hence in begging particularly it is to be carefully observed how is the food acquired by the persons who gifts it in charity. Food is to be accepted in charity only from a person of merit, because if one accepts it from a sinner he also shares his sin. This idea of ethical character of food has been a very influential idea in Indian cultural tradition. It is an evidence of the recognition in ancient Upaniṣads of the co-ordination of

ethical virtue with economic justice which is cardinal quest of human civilisation.

The Upaniṣadic recognise the importance of food to such an extent that they not only emphasise it as the source of sustenance of life and advise acquisition of food-grains, but they also describe man and even the self as an eater of food-grains. The Chhāndogya Upaniṣad emphasises the nature of man as an eater of food. So also the Kaushitaki Upaniṣad has a prayer for making the child an eater of food. The Brihadaranāyaka Upaniṣad describes the self as the eater of food. The spirit may be transcendental in its metaphysical nature, but as embodied in human person it is sustained by food and realisation of its transcendental nature in life can be possible only when first it is sustained by food in the body of man.

Water is a necessary part of accompaniment of food. It is included in the wider concept of food. But as Upaniṣadic discourse of food is centred round food-grains, separate mention of water is made in several Upaniṣads. Food is connected with hunger, and biological demand for water is called thirst. Hunger and thirst are separately mentioned in the Aitareya Upaniṣad, and also in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad. Water is more fundamental food of man. It has been identified in the etymology of Sanskrit language in a synonym for water (jeevan) which is a common term for life. In a hot country like India, the importance of water can be easily realised. When one is thirsty he needs water urgently. The need for food becomes urgent only after some days. Śwetaketu was instructed to live only on water for fifteen days, without any food. He became feeble but he survived without food. But one cannot survive long without water. Hence the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad regards water as the essence of life, and even considers body to have originated from water. Water is necessary for crops and also for life. Hence the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad regards water as greater than foodgrains. Foodgrains and water (anna-jala) is used as a combined term is common usage to signify the sustenance of life.

MEDITATION

Each Upaniṣad is a *Vidyā* and should be meditated upon as the Ancients used to do, rather than discussed about for the mere purposes of objective knowledge. This meditation leads to inward understanding, occult and profound of the subject matter however difficult of comprehension it may appear to be at the beginning. Meditation is also silent prayer, inward and deep and communion, a communion with reality in its depths rather than on its surface forms, merely, and as such it is something that passes into knowledge or con-sciring, or *śemuşī bhakti-rūpa* (knowledge of the form of devotion).

It is well-known that there is no Upaniṣad which enfolds so much of value and synthesis in the briefest compass other than the *Iśāvāsyopaniṣad*. In meditating upon its meditatable portion that is the final four verses (mantras—15 to 18) which is asked to be meditated upon, or used as Prayer-formula, I was singularly struck by the remarkable series of impression registered in my consciousness. I am trying to share these meditatations on the Supreme being, the 'I' of all beings and things, with all.

The first prayer: Hiraṇmayena Pātreṇa Satya Syāpihitam Mukham Tat Tvampūsa-napāvṛṇu Satyadharmāya Grstaye clearly reveals that the individual soul covered over by Ignorance, here described as the Passion-coloured (Golden) lid, is unable to see the Lord in everything outward. The

earlier instructions in the sixth and seventh verses: *Sarvabhūteṣu ca ātmānam* and *sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmani tiṣṭhan* and *sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmaivābhūt*: 'the self in all beings, 'all beings in the Self' and 'the Self as that which has become all beings,' are incapable of being realized or experienced through the senses, and even as the *Kenopaniṣad* has beautifully stated: *Yad vācā nabhyaditam yena vāgabhyudyate; Yan manasā na manute yenāhur mano matam; yaccakṣusā na pasyati yena cakṣūmsi paśyati: yacchrotreṇa na śṛṇoti yena śrotram idam śrutam: yat prāṇena na prāṇiti yena prāṇaḥ praṇīyate:* it is through the Self we see, hear, think, breathe, speak.

Thus the subject of all experiences is the Self, not only in respect of each individual but also in respect of all individuals. This Self is in all beings and it is this Self-nature that is to be known. It could not be known when the passion-coloured lid is removed. It is the Truth-Nature. Man aspires for the removal of this lid that prevents the realisation of truth-function or truth-nature. Every other function of the self, such as sensing, thinking, breathing and speaking is not the real function since they cannot intimate the original truth of the self. Thus it is that this Being, unseeable by the senses, is capable of being seen in a mind that is absolutely quite and clam. A strong and impregnable clam is the necessity of the soul; this may mean that there is much reserve strength of faith in the truth nature to sustain any loss that the loss of passions might have caused. More fully this claim must be conceived as very difficult of arriving by means of any ignorant move or passion or will that is egoistic, and it must therefore appear that it would be incapable of being achieved by the individual out of his own ignorant volition or ideation or emotion. The mental peace or *prasāda* that is stated to be possible to a soul that has got rid of all outward desires and crushed out all emotive and mental movements of the *citta*, is something attained through the practice of inhibition of the same constantly through *abhyāsa* and discrimination.

It is true here that though the soul possesses all this practice and discrimination and has attained the necessary peace too and calm, contentless existence, there survives yet the egoism, the true lid, golden as it is stated, attractive and beautiful, and yet it is something that has to be removed. This removal is stated to be possible only by or, through the Grace of God, Pūṣan, the Nourisher—Protector, the Supreme Godhead who is the One of whom the sages speak variously, because of different functions that He simultaneously discharges spontaneously, felicitously and through puissant Grace. This luminous Peace is Presence of the Divine, different in kind in a sense from the preliminary unstable peace attained through one's own will and contra-will. This peace is a revelatory Peace, a permanent and abiding true peace-nature that is the foundational nature of the individual soul in its unity with the Divine.

It is interesting always to find a myth in keeping with or corresponding to this discovery of a depth that is essentially to be probed, for it is the problem of the nature of the individual self as to whether it can only arrive at a golden peace, impermanent and capable of being defeated, or a true peace permanent and incapable of any disturbances despite all these occurring. The paurāṇic analogue here is the story of Hiraṇyakaśipu, the golden-bedded or gold-vestured or gold-coated being, a vital being (titan), mighty and dark with passion, who searched as

no man or God did for the omnipervader Viṣṇu, who, he had heard, was the enemy of all egoedness, egoed-eyedness (Hiraṇy-ākṣa) greedyeyed or greed-covered soul, of thieves or usurper-robbers of what really belongs to the Omnipervasive Iśvara.

He, Hiraṇyakaśipu, even like his brother Hiraṇyākṣa, was an ectype of the Archdemon dragon Vṛtra, the serpent-symboled being who encompassed all the worlds, even as the other Vedic figures like Vala, Pāṇis were, and the Purāṇic Naraka, Tāraka, Rāvaṇa were. They made it impossible for the true nature to flow out. They sequestered Truth, confined it, penned it in the Cave (of the Heart) making it impossible for it to emerge out of it. In the Heart is hidden the soul and Deity of the size of the thumb, brilliant and eternal the self of all beings. It was His lid of passion or egoism that was hindering the perception of the Omnipervader whom his son, Prahlāda, his own higher Buddhi, despite all the tortures and punishments was proclaiming to be everywhere; it was this that was prayed for to be removed. Perhaps it is well that we should remember that there are difference between souls,—divisions that cuts across our prejudices and castes perhaps;—and souls are marked either Āsura, Mānuṣa and Daiva (Man being bi-valent either incling to the Asura or Deva) or sattva, rājasa and tāmasa. It is even possible to hold that each of the former may have three divisions as shown in the latter; thus Asuras may belong to the sattva or rājasa or tāmasa kinds even as the Gods may. So Vibhīṣaṇa and Trijaṭā among the Asuras were considered to be sāttvika asuras even as Prahlāda and Mahābali have belonged to the sāttvika Asura-jāti. The prayer then is addressed to the Divine as the One Lord of all creatures, Prajāpati, the father and parent not only of Gods and men but even of the Asuras. The prayer is necessitated by the ardent fury of the frustrated passion-governed soul which thought of itself as the ardent fury of the frustrated passion-governed soul which thought of itself as the Self.

It is in one sense true that what man has made by ignorance man may unmake by means of knowledge. But ego is not merely a nuclius of the divine effulgence but also a constellation of habits of thought and sense and volition and sentiment. It is this latter that is usually called the self or soul by many and it is this which modern psychology recognizes as the self or personality even as the purely rationalistic Buddhistic schools conceived it to be, and therefore rightly denied its permanence. There is yet a truth in individuality which is not egoism which is entirely fundamentally a centre of Divine Being, a secret manyness of the Divine. It is this that is unreachable by thought and sense and volition because it is the universal that is uniquely individualised but that is egoed as a possessive Being.

This secret could be wrested only by the Self, that is, the Divine. As we have already pointed out the truth becomes clear when we agree to consider that there are supramental or divinised beings, mental beings and effulgent vital beings. The firṣt is a class by itself and has never probably suffered from this disaster of separation from the centre, the Truth, *Satya-dharma*, a separation resulting from the covering by the lid. It is only the human mental and the asuraic vital beings who are in need of this removal of the passionate separating lid, the lid of disjunctive diversity, the lid that makes it impossible to enter the inner being of itself. Confronted by the mystic truth that Prahlāda, the ḅuddhi-awakened, buddha, the child of manas, has brought, the joyful tidings of the Ever-present Omnipresent Reality of Spirit, Immortal and Consum-

mate, (Puruṣa) the Asura, his vital egoistic father of great austerity, Hiraṇyakaśipu engages upon a severe test of the nature of the Ātman, which has been stated to be *aśnāviram, śuddham, avraṇam, akāyam* (Iśa Up. 8) all attributes which reveal That Spirit, Iśa, to be other than the body and other than the Ego of Hiraṇyakśipu, which he has been proclaiming aloud and affirming with insolence as the Highest Being. It is thus that we have to read the prayer of the *Iśāvāsyopaniṣad* as the prayer of the illuminated understanding, Buddhi of Prahlāda (Or is it the truth-seeking, experimenting ego of Hiraṇya-kaśipu? to the Real Nourisher, to remove the golden (glittering) lid of passion, even if it be by force as indeed it has to be done—for it is the *Rudragranthi*, the knot of final death, dissolution of the egoism or the ego that releases therefore the self from the bondage to the material congeries, namely a private body.

It ceases thereafter to be a separated entity with a separate being. It becomes illumined, luminously conscious of its central self in the Divine, and knows its true self to be the Supreme who is the Self of the Gods and all creatures, high and low. It is then that the Lord in the form of the wonderful Narasiṁha (indeed a play on the word Puruṣottama), the lionine quality being shewn to illustrate the mystic symbol of the destruction of the elephant (*gaja*)—soul, by the lion the higher or superconscient vitality of the Seer emerges as the Purāṇa says with the *Om-kāra* (*Om* being the world that is Brahman as the *Kaṭha* and *Muṇḍaka* and *Māṇḍūkya* say and as the *Bhagavad-Gītā* proclaims, and even as the *Iśāvāsyopaniṣad* equates it latter in the 17th mantra with the *Kratu*—Viṣṇu, the Lord of Sacrifice)—out of the Pillar, *sthāṇu*, (a *Kaṭhopaniṣad*-symbol which denotes the Pillar of Fire within, which, being aroused, destroys the Heart-knot) and tears apart the bowels and entrails of Hiraṇyakaśipu which stand for or reveal the coils of desire and worldliness and possessive existence for the private self. It is thus only that the heart-knot could be broken and all doubts dispelled about the individual congeries being the most ultimate unity of being or permanent existence. Thus it is that once for all the doubts could be removed or extinguished and the truth-being known and understood and entered as Lord Kṛṣṇa has stated.

This break up of the heart-knot, this break up of the utter consecration to the material well-being and food-desire-enjoyment group leads to the Joyful Wisdom, the revelational immediacy of the Divine Illumination—Presence, which makes the Father of Prāhlada (or indeed thus may Prāhlada on behalf of his own deceased or rather released Spirit of his Father) pray to Narasimha, Puruṣottama "O Nourshier! O Sole Seer! O Yama (Death)! Sūrya! O Prajāpati! Withdraw thy hot rays, gather up thy beneficent rays so that I may behold thy Most auspicious Form, and know through that the thumb-sized Puruṣa indwelling as Self in the heart (of all) is identical with the Self in the Sun. This is the Āditya Hṛdaya, the secret of oneness in multiplicity, resolved in and by and through the experience of the Prahlādic-buddhi:-the Joyful Wisdom is this much alone.

The most important impediment to self-realization is, as anyone who is acquainted with the experience of the spiritual knows, the delusion that the body is the soul. Materialism—(in modern terminology Behaviourism) can never accept the reality of spirit or soul. According to its reading the soul is but a congeries of impressions, feelings, affects, volitions and ideations and these are all referable to the interactions between the

several chemical and physical processes within the physiological organism. Consciousness in an epiphenomenon, a resultant of these interactions within the organism. Or else it is a sort of energy that throws light on the processes backward and forwards and thus a purposive instrument of the organism. It is a biological evolute.

Whatever else it may be, according to Behaviourism it is not a permanent spiritual entity nor should it be construed as having a spiritual substance as its source or basis of which it is a quality or function. It is a bye-product, a useful bye-product. There is absolutely no-evidence to show that there is any other substance than the perceived unity of sense or matter. This being the reading of materialism the question about the existence of the soul or spiritual essence becomes all important for any system of spiritual philosophy (Vedānta) or Religion.

Idealism no doubt has done yeoman service in the cause of establishing the priority of mind (consciousness) and its indispensability and the omni-effectiveness of Mind. But these conclusions it has arrived at through the abstract activity of thought or reason or intellection which distinguishes or extracts the principles or laws of thought or axioms or categories of experience from the mass of presented sensations, feelings, dispositions, and instincts belonging to the changing flux which is characteristic of the universe of matter (sensory world). These ideas or reals or essences or principles or axioms or values that it has extracted or analysed from the *'A priori synthesis'* (of Kant's Metaphysics) it has sought to unify or integrate or systematize into a universe with the help of the principle of coherence and non-self-contradiction as between themselves. A reality so built up of these 'ideas' does indeed confer a permanence to the unity of thought, and may even be, in a truer measure, a reality of the mind—for really every thinking being feels himself to be a mind. But then this unity of reality in which the rational alone is real has been accepted to be just a "bloodless ballet of impalpable categories", whilst it did deliver the mind from the sensations, feelings and fleeting existence, it did not liberate the mind from itself, that is to say from its own structure, in order to permit activity or search or realization of that in the world.

It could not satisfy the structure of experience which constantly overflows the categories of both abstract thinking and sensory being. Philosophy secured a permanence and even a type of peace but not that which satisfies even its own inward drive towards all-round acceptance of integral being. The absolute of the idealist certainly could not be called a self or a soul. Reactions in the shapes of radical empiricism, positivism, pragmatism and realisms of the critical and neovarieties had indeed intervened as anticipated. But what was needed was not more materialism, but more of idealism and an acceptance of the fact that real progress should lead to a deeper and profounder truth of the self or spirit or mind than was made possible by intellectual idealism. The abstract activity of the intellect only protested against the sensory fleeting experiences, little knowing or discerning that the intellect itself is but a habit of being, and only the manufacture of the permanent structure of matter against its own fleeting structure.

The mystic always attempted a higher type of abstraction through a process that combined the intellectual type of abstraction or negation with the process of psychological renunciation of the sensory. This nivṛtti or abstraction that is two-pronged enabled his Yoga to go beyond the intellect itself to a state of being that might

be called *nirvāṇa-vāna*-less, that is, without any type of *citta-vṛtti*. This further made it possible for him to discover the utter duality between the soul and its body, and therefore helped 'death' or 'psychical death'. This psychical death is not a mere symbolic or mimetic act of dying but a real dying to the body so as to live to the soul, and incidentally making the body an instrument awakened to its soul's real and ultimate destiny, as against the present tendency of making the soul awakened to the destiny of the body. It is a death in a deeper and more intensive form that the physical death (civil or municipal death) which is but the termination of one's body, a biological death. The delusion that the body is the soul can never be got over unless or until the individual can release the soul from the tentacles of matter and the body that is physically understood as the configuration of instincts, desires and ideations and purposes or crayings, and make it move out of and into the latter at will.

No doubt the greatest assertion of the Mīmāṁsakas and others has been that unless we accept that there is a fundamental distinction between the body and the soul and predicate immortality or at least indestructibility to it, the injunctions of the Vedas that promise experiences in the heaven, world etc., will have no validity, a situation that is intolerable. But this is not enough. At least the Veda does intimate this 'unsheathing' as something devoutly to be wished for, for it speaks about a state of being of the Ṛṣis who knew fully and in experience of this absolute difference between the body and its soul or rather the soul and its bodies. This 'unsheathing' is an experience that is got in the state of ecstacy or integral absorption or concentric meditation and is explained as a siddhi (or to use the Buddhistic phrase 'iddhi') in Yoga (Hindu as well as Jaina). The jīvanmukta is one who at least knows and experiences the freedom of the soul in the body and this experience is not one merely of absolute control over the organs of sense and action and antaḥkaraṇa but a radical disjunction that is only short of a total abandonment. I do not hold that this is desirable or all that Yoga is aiming at, but this radical otherness of these components of the Organic is a thing that must first be learnt, and from this alone can arise knowledge and a being that entails a further step on the evolutionary unfoldment. This abstraction of the real psychic being not merely on the level of thought and mind but also on the Jāgrat level of waking consciousness and physical being is indeed very difficult. Many hold that this is dangerous. (So at least the ancient occult literatures hold).

Without the guidance and grace of God or the Divine powers it will mean lot of pain and even death, that entails a new effort in another life. But without this knowledge being achieved and realized fully with the help of reason and emotion, and a dynamic awareness, the illusion of body-soul (dehātma-bhrama) is incapable of being finally and utterly rooted out. Till then we shall continue to be helpless against the onslaughts of radical empiricism and scientific materialism. Biological death does not and cannot perform this act for us, for it can only liberate us from the outer shell or coat of perceptible existence outworn by experience, but not the subtle sheath which is stated to carry forward our *Sañcita-karma*. That is precisely the reason why we have to choose the 'psychic death,' the death that means the business of realization of our 'otherness' out of love of true liberation. This is achieved by knowledge that even transcends abstract

reason and is gnostic or supramental, or at least intuitive.

Thus the primary necessity emerges, in whatever way we may think, for a definite and complete vindication of the principle of the difference between the individual soul and its body, and any attempt to refer it to any pramāṇa is almost to deny to the self what is promised to the mind. It breeds always the fear of a possibility of fall or illusion. The promise of divine knowledge that from that there is no fall or regress (*acyuta*-knowledge or *anāvṛtti*-ascent) can never be kept. The siddhas have always taken the view that truths of vedic experience ought to be experienced and ought to be taken seriously.

Thus we come to an important point in our meditation when we find that the primary test visualised by the seeking vital soul (Hiraṇyakaśipu) was the invocation to Death and even may we say a willingness to see the truth through, whether indeed the Divine is in oneself, a fact that would settle two things at one stroke. What the enlightened Soul, Prahlāda, knew and experienced through his own sufferings at the hands of the Egoistic matter ridden being, is now being questioned radically by the latter. This is the cult of the intrepid warrior. A warrior in battle is prepared to die for some duty, or principle or loyalty. This preparedness to die is an actual asset in the solution of the problem of soul-body delusion. The 'psychical death' is effected at the very moment of the will to die in order to live. That it is a crude method and even a violent method does not vitiate the fact that it is a method. In the second chapter of the *Gītā*, Bhagavān Śrī Kṛṣṇa teaches the most important truth that the soul is unborn and that the body is perishable and is a coat that is worn and cast off when it has served the purpose, and even if the soul were but perishable it is better to die for a cause that is ultimate or for the sake of ordained kṣātradharma.

The metaphysical implication underlying the counsel is to get over the *bhrama* that even very advanced souls, like Śrī Arjuna, not only in respect of oneself but also in respect of other selves or souls. Further it is necessary to experiment with truth for the sake of absolute knowledge. Thus the kṣatriya-dharma prepares for the brāhmaṇa-dharma of total and absolute consecration that is not vitiated in the least by the delusion that the body is the soul. Wherefore the brāhmaṇa is a sacrificer and lives in the spiritual universe in all its manifold planes of creatures, men, elements, fathers, gods and the One Divine whose these are, in Whom all these exist and Who dwells in each and every one of these.

The kṣatriya-solution is a rājasic and vital pronouncement and experiment whereas the brāhmaṇic-solution is a mental and intuitive pronouncement of the some truth because if we understand the truth we shall see that not until one had been akṣatriya could such a one become a brāhmaṇa. This is also the reason why in the earliest literature the Veda and Upaniṣads, the problem of the spiritual universe was solved by the great kṣatriya kings and taught by them, for they were fully cognizant of this fundamenal need to know the relationship between the body and soul and the One Spirit. That is also the reason why they became breeders of the true knowledge of Sāṅkhya, discrimination. That this truth was not the only prerogative of the kṣatriyas can well be shewn, but that is not to our purpose. Spiritual knowledge stars with the discrimination of the soul as different from the body, and this is something that is to be learnt integrally by the will to perish and to dare and for the sake of the

knowledge of spirit or self. The dehātma-bhrama cannot be liquidated in any other way. Tapasyā, (mortification) suffering, crucifixion, brahmacarya and others all indicate the stages of this unsheathing that takes place gradually in Yoga. That is also the reason why Hiraṇyakaśipu was an Emperor, and why it was his business to solve once of all the truth about the self and even the nature of the supreme soul or Divine Godhead.

The fifteenth Mantra clearly indicates the prayer to the Nourishing Lord of all, and the soul, to tear away this veil of delusion, the delusion that prevents the realization of the true nature of the Spirit. That this spirit is immortal, moving and capable of tenanting many kinds of bodies is all intimated by the verse seventeen: vayuranilam amṛtam. That it is śukram, avraṇam, aśnāviram, śuddham, apāpaviddham, etc. is shewn earlier in the eighth mantra. But all these do not reveal much. Siddhis even may appear to reveal the possibilities of the material existence only rather than the nature of the Spirit that is other than it.

Obviously then when the search for the Divine took place He could not be caught any where by Hiraṇyakaśipu, for it is naively remarked by the Purāṇa that the Divine entered into His nose. Is it not as the *Kenopaniṣad* states by the Divine that one smells or knows or hears? The psychic death was sure to come, but not until one is prepared for the worst does it pass off, lightly, or joyously illumining the interiors and revealing the separateness by dismissing or sublatting the delusion. Otherwise the worst must be faced many times. The truth of intelligence is that it is *'ekasantagrāhī'*, whereas ignorance is *'anekasantagrāhī'*: The former requires no repetition the latter does. Prahlāda did not need repetition for he was buddhi. Hiraṇyakaśipu was instinct and needed all the violence of the spiritual to overcome is inward resistance. It is true that modern mystics and other generous souls who think that the theoretical philosophizing and acceptance of idealism or absolutism insufficient will find that all that has been written above merely clarifies the mystic sincerity and will scare away only drawing-room philosophers.

For others it is a welcome adventure in the spaces of spirit which will resolve the many controversies of philosophers and make for honest experience and practical spirituality. That does not mean that we need to bid good-bye to philosophizing. As already pointed out it is the business of this dynamic experiment in Vedāntic knowing (Sāṅkhya-Yoga in the language of Śri Kṛṣṇa), to lift up the understanding from the barren constructs of superficial abstractions. We can then proceed to see in the next two mantras the same illumined consciousness that has beheld the One Unity of all Godheads and its own self, now resolves to offer up itself in utter consecration for the sake of an integral transformation. The self or soul is immortal, an immortal portion of the Divine, a truth, which has no fixed habitation nor are its bodies permanent. The truth has been learnt that the self is other than the body (*Śarīra*). For it is a truth that a body is an instrument of a self which exists by reason of the soul or self within, which utilises it and enjoys it for some occult purpose or secret delight; and there is no particular reason to hope that these purposes are either iternal or permanent delights, though delight be the very nature of the Self-delight that enjoys the Oneness as well as secret manyness, or manyness and its secret oneness, being as well as becoming, which are just the conceptual representations of this two-fold delight of Transcendent Being. Now the sacrifice of the self or one of its

manynesses is sometimes held to be a necessity, a necessity of the truth of the former occult knowledge. Sacrifice or the Rite of Sacrifice is a total consecration to the Divine Lord of all Enjoyments and offering and not, as is usually held, a renunciatory act, an act that merely breathes the air of denudation however free from inward sorrow at non-possession of that which was possessed. The Body it is that is to be offered along with the inward self to the Supreme. One Being, the Omnipervader Iśa. It is by this act, apparently of a total surrender of all possession (as is intimated in the very first mantra of the *Isa : tyaktena bhuñjīthā*), that the fullest riches of the transcendent kind *(rāyi)* (*Śreyas* of the *Kaṭha* and the *Gītā*) are attained.

Thus it is that the awakened soul, seeking the fullest sovereignty and empire resolves upon the Great Rite and conquest of the Viśva through sacrifice. This sacrifice is sometimes called the Viśvajit sacrifice or the Aśvamedha sacrifice. In these sacrifices the gifts or dakṣiṇā are to be one's fullest possession. The Viśvajit sacrifice of Vājaśravas father of Naciketas, or the Aśvamedha of Mahā Bali is the greatest sacrifice, in this sense that it has a great mystic meaning: He who would possess (the) All must lose all or give or give away all other possessions and not "give up all." to others. This was the *pratijñā*, the resolution or resolve of the sacrificer who had awakened to the Joyful Wisdom (Prahlāda). And it is clear that is would not have been a complete sacrifice but for the coming of Vāmana, the Dwarf-brāhmaṇa, who claimed the three feet by His measure, as Lord of the Three Feet being the Fourth as ÔM (A U M) interpreted as Earth (Vaiśvānara) as Midatmosphere (Taijasa) (the subliminal abode of the rajas) and the Heaven (the Prajña the individual soul of Bali). The name Vāmana is used in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* in respect of the indwelling Dweller in the Heart-Cave, He who is the knower of past and present and future; He who is the Lightning correspon-ding to the Heart, of the *Kenopaniṣad* and the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*. Thus come forth the wonderful words of the Mantra I—: Om *Krato* (Viṣṇu, Vāmana, Lord of Sacrifice) *smara* Kṛtagam *smara* (Remember, remember that which was done); that is, says Sri Venkatanātha, "Please fulfil or complete this my sacrifice by acceptance of my surrender, by thyself coming and establishing thy Feet within me and making me thine own, even as Ālvar Śaṭhakopa has stated by making me his sandlals." That is, "Lead me thyself O Immortal Flame of Sacrifice! Thou knower of the Occult Paths! Chief of Gods! Agni! by cutting out all the devious ways of an sin and ignorance," even as the next Mantra (which is found in all the Vedas) runs.

The self is offered to its natural Lord—the Isa, now known as Sacrifice, *Kratu*, now Vāmana, the Brāhmaṇadwarf who is indeed He who has His eyes the Sun and Moon, and is the internal Ruler as Antaryāmī, and is the Death which is the Gate to fullest plenitude of Being. Thus we find that the last verse: *Agne naya supathā rāye*. . . really is a fulfilment of the Sacrifice of man's ego which has three steps, involving a triple transformation as Sri Aurobindo states of the Vital, mental and the material represented by the great asuras, who belong to One single family Hiraṇyakaśipu-Hiraṇyākṣa, Prahlāda and Mahābali, from which results an awakened sense of union (identity) with Truth, Satya, next a revelation of the Oneness of the self of each and the self of every thing else and all, the finally (thirdly) a quiet separation from the transitory which entails the sacrifice, the unique sacrifice that has as its aim the conquest of the Viśva (the

waking consciousness, the *Jāgrat*), for the spiritual transcedent existence which has been separated by three steps of the deep subconscious, uncounscious and subliminal. It is only through such precarious filtrations that our actions are being governed by the superconscious to our knowledge. It is the conquest of the Vaiśvānara, (the Nāciketa-fire of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* and the Agni of the *Agṇirahasyopaniṣad* of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*) which is invariably completed by the Divine's acceptance in person of the intimate identity that is the reality-function between the indwelling seer and the superconscient Universal. It is this ıtter and total acceptance that is usually ɜpoken of as the realization of the ɜstablishment of the Seat of Brahman in he Heart, the achievement of the Ānanda, he Rasātala or Mahābali. It is this ɔeatitude that has been stated to be the esult of a complete surrender. It is as it vere the shifting of the centre of action rom the individual ego to the Universal Person, the Cosmic and supraconscious ɜupracosmic Divine. It is not without ɜignificance that the Seer Priest who ɔfficiates at the sacrifice of Mahābali is Śukra (Īśa. 8) for on the path of real and 'undamental divine evolution the Leader, :he Sacrifice, Priest, every part of the ɔrocess of ascension, passion on, :ransformation is achieved by the Divine 'or the Divine and in the Divine, the ndividual soul playing the part of a quiet ıspiring flame, fed and lifted up unto ınion.

Surrender or Śaraṇāgati Vidyā is stated o have six steps: ānukūlyasya Saṅkalpa willing the helpful to ascent); Prātikūlyasya /arjanam (renouncing the obstructive); ;optrtva-varanam (electing the Goal); Mahāviśvāsa (radical faith in the Divine); ıtmaniksepa (placing of the self at the feet f God); and Kārpanya (complete dependence involving a feeling of helplessness without the Divine). We can see in these four mantras of the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad (15-18)* these six in some form: in the 15th verse—'Śatyadharmāya dṛṣṭaye' refers to this willing of the helpful (i); whereas the prayer to the Divine Nourisher (Pūṣan) to uncover the golden lid that covers the face of Truth is the renunciation of the obstructing forces (ii); the 16th mantra in its first part "Tat te rūpam kalyānatamam paśyāmi" is the wish of the votary to see the Divine auspicious form and thus forms the third step (iii); whereas the belief that the self of the worshipper and that of the Solar Orb is the expression of the great faith in the Omni-selfness of God, the mahāviśvāsa (iv); in the 17th verse we have the expression of the Ātmanikṣepa, surrender (Kṛtam) or sacrifice of the immortal soul (vāyur anilam amṛtam), so that its body of karma is turned to ashes (bhasmāntam śarīram) and it is uplifted by the Divine as Om and Sacrifice (Kratu) or Divine Will, and the repetition of the words Kṛtam smara merely affirms the total dependence on the Divine to help, a state of extreme helplessness of a soul that has given up all its being and existence to the Divine, whose only prayer is 'Na-mah' (Not I but Thee) (18th verse). This is the state of Kārpaṇya (ekānta-bhakti, akiñcanyatva, avyabhicārabhakti). All these six states of the soul are but deepening stages in the Soul's entry into the Divine but at every stage of the Divine's help it is that is being sought and not that of the limited and restricted and ignorant ego. Here too we find that knowledge of the Divine Oneness and All-ness it is that governs from the first actions of sacrifice of the self. Thus Śaranāgati is a dynamic Sacrifice and in it is comprised the aśvamedha, the puruṣamedha and the Brahmamedha, sacrifice of the senses, out-ward-moving and extravert; sacrifice of the ego as a

circumscribed and limited or private being apart from and in conflicting with the All, a possessive and egoistic entity; and the realisation of the Leadership of God the Omnipervasive Super-conscient Being in every fibre.

To conclude this meditation I may pointout in the first instance how the integral mind works with respect to the spiritual universe. The spiritual universe is the eternal universe in a sense, for, from it proceeds all types of presentation in space-time-events. The whole literature of the Hindu, or for that matter of any true religious community or philosophy is to be interpreted correspondentially as my friend Dr. Mohan Singh states from multiple stand-points, that is, from the ādhibhautika, ādhyātmika and ādhidaiva aspects. Each of these divisions may find further sub-divisions. And they may be called the Vedic, Brāhmaṇic, Upaniṣadic, Aitihāsic, Paurāṇic and Āgamic. The failure of modern philosophers to go behind to the bed-rock of spiritual experience is so clearly patent in their writings which despite their learning and scholarship (on which they pride themselves) that we are likely to miss the truth of the spiritual universe. There is an eternity streaming through the temporal, and a temporal that reveals the eternal, and this intermingling in the process of civilization, through poetry, art, sculpture, dance and philosophy and sciences, clearly portends so simple intellectual understanding. One the contrary rationalism has tended to be dogmatic and has ceased to see the confusion into which its own analyses have landed it. Spiritual understanding or gnostic being will clearly interleave the historical with that which is suprahistorical and grant meanings not available in the one or the other exclusively. The fundamental manner of interpretation was long ago envisaged in the Brāhmaṇic literature, but we have grown so much intellectual these days that we have been for a long time unaccustomed to see more than one aspect at a time and this seeing of one aspect did the trick of depriving us of the fruits and visions of the entire reality: To quote the *Isā*. (9.) again "Andham tamaḥ pravisanti Ye'vidyām upāsate tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u vidyāyām ratāḥ (See also the 12th mantra). Thus it is necessary to interpret the whole body of literature as an organic whole. This is undoubtedly difficult and may lead to lot of confusion and may be called Research in the strict and literal sense of the term, but this is not the research that will get the applause of the savants and scholars of the present day. It means the seeing of things temporal and eternal in one sweep and this one is forced to say 'sadly' is possible only to one supramentally awakened to the deep and foundational unity of the two by a radical experience.

METAPHYSICS THE

With a view of facilitating an enquirer of self-knowledge to comprehend the main doctrine of the Upanishads, which forms the subject of the accompanying treatise, a few explanations, are needed; and it is hoped that they will be of much help to him. Non-duality or the oneness of the Individual and Universal Spirit is the subject to be demonstrated, and an elaborate and critical analysis of the rival systems which look upon them as different and otherwise, have been fully discussed. That does not concern us for the present. What we propose is to lay down a few salient points, to give a skeleton sketch, leaving the rest to our author. In the discussion of his subject he had brought in, a mass of arguments from all available sources; the work itself is a result of a vast amount of reading, and whatever is worthy knowing of the Vedas, Mimansa, Nyaya,

Sankhya, Puranas etc., has been included in it. It contains likewise a discussion of the merits of personal and impersonal forms of worship, and seeks to satisfactorily account for the apparent and seemingly anomalous dictum of the several Purans, wherein each sets up a different form of worship and particularly insisting upon it, in lieu of others. In this way the different sects of worshippers—Vishuvite, Sivite, Ganpat, Sakta,—who have hitherto been taught to regard his especial Deity to be superior to the rest will find much to unlearn. Reason, and analogy, with the proofs derived from the *Shastras* have been amply introduced to help the comprehen-sion, and to erect at much labor, a neutral ground where the most inveterate bigot will cast away his rancor, and shake hands in fraternal love and harmony with one whom he had hitherto looked upon as a foo! and knave. Thus then there is much to engage the attention of the reader; caste and creed, stands not in the way of acquiring the knowledge inculcated here; for we find no mention about it by our author. The only caste he seems to recognise is that of qualification, and any person having the necessary qualities may profitably engage himself in its study. He will find much to interest him, much to engage his attention, much to evoke his sympathy; the scale from his eyes will be dropped of and it is hoped, he will rouse to realise a new existence; the clue to solve the mighty problem of existence, the end and aim of human life is here spoken out with as much fervour, as its dignity demands, and though to realise it and form the basis of turning a new life can only happen to the fewest of the few,—to those who have sown the seeds of knowledge in their previous births—yet it can be profitably made use of by all alike.

With this preamble, we enter into the few necessary explanations which we have promised at the outset. *Brahma* is described as "*Sat-chit-ananda*", '*Sat*' signifies Existence, '*chit*' Intelligence and '*ananda*' Bliss. It is therefore essentially Existent, Intelligence and Bliss. In the *Mundaka Upanishad* the story is related of the illustrious son of Sanaka, who desirous of knowledge, repaired to Angiras the sage, and enquired of him "what that was, which being known, every thing else would be known." He was told in reply, that the wise regard "the invisible, intangible, unrelated, colourless one, who has neither eyes nor ears, nor hands and feet, eternal, all-pervading, subtle, and indestructible as the cause of all that exists." This is the Impersonal God of the Vedâs, called severally by the names of *Parabrahma, Brahma* and *Paramatma*. It is said, prior to the evolution of the objective world there was present only '*Sat*' the ONE EXISTENCE *Parabrahma* without name or form, for name and form are indications of creation, and what is created is open to destruction hence non-eternal, therefore *Pa*r*abrahma* being eternal is devoid of both. The three expletives one' 'secondless' and 'Existence' (*ekam, ebam, adwaitam*) with which *Parabrahma* is always connected are only for differentiating it from bodies similar and dissimilar. That is to say, as It is one and secondless, and there exists not another body of Its kind, inasmuch as It is eternal,—while the world and its contents are non-eternal—It has only one indication. But a sect of Buddhists (*Madhyamiks*) contend that in the beginning there was present '*Asat*' or nothing instead of '*Sat*'. Virtually they teach that nothing produced everything, which is clearly impossible. Now if it be said, as *Parabrahma* also existed in the beginning, whence did the materials come from which the world was ushered into existence! The reply is as steam exists potentially in water, so was *Prakriti, Maya*

or *Ajnana*, so many names of matter residing potentially in the supreme *Brahma*. To be more explicit, *Parabrhma* is the supreme force residing within Matter in its primordial condition, or cosmic state. Thus then, we have both Matter and Force, or Matter and Motion, as the Western Scientists would have it, to satisfactorily account for whatever that exists. So much in common with the Materialist only, the difference is yet more marked. For, while Materialism discards any hereafter, the Vedântin looks upon metampsychosis as the inevitable lot of humanity, and as life means suffering and an incessant struggle, he wants to crush the seed which produces the tree of life, and lays his axe at its root, so that there be nothing left to produce it again.

We purposely refrain from entering into the arguments both for and against, as they have been amply dealt with by the author, ours is only a pencil sketch and this the reader is requested to keep in mind. Now then with regard to intelligence; —there are three states of consciousness called respectively the waking, dreaming and dreamless slumber. It is said, that consciousness of all the three conditions is one, the difference consists in the multiformness of the objects which consciousness covers: in other words, the several acts of cognition brought about by the sensory organs (sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste) relate to one consciousness, through the objects which that consciousness takes possession of, to render them perceivable, may be many and varied; and what is one is always eternal; hence the Supreme *Brahma* being eternal is also Intelligence. In the *Mundakya Upanishad*, *Brahma* is described as "neither conscious nor unconscious" neither is it cognizor, nor the object cognized; the purpose of all that is to shew that it is knowledge in the abstract, indicating cognition and not the subject of cognition: for that would be incompatible with truth and infinity. Now infinite cannot be marked or limited by any thing in any direction and a knowing subject must have objects and cognitions to limit it, hence *Parabrahma* is not a cogniser. Moreover in that case, a dualism would be involved, for whenever there is consciousness there is relation and relation, implies dualism. In this way, the knowledge of the Supreme *Brahma* like the heat in fire is "the abstract essence itself." Man drives his power of discovering or discerning from reflection of intelligence in the internal organ, (*antakaran*) or mind. Now this reflex intelligence is a reflected shadow of the Intelligence of *Brahma*, which for its close proximity sheds its lustre, in the same way as a red flower kept close to a crystal sheds its color on the glass and it appears red; or to quote a familiar illustration as a needle is moved by a magnet when held close to it. Thus then, *Brahma* is self-luminous; and all objects derive their luminosity from it. The word Intelligence is here intended to convey a very wide meaning. It may be taken for vitality, or life essence too. Because, it is universally present—from the insentient molecule of atomic dust to the huge Andes or Himalayas, from the rank weed infesting a stagnant pool of rain-water collected in the road-side ditch to the gigantic Banian, and from the tiny fly "dancing and frisking before our eyes" to man, each and all has its particle of vitality—its individual unit of intelligence, which keeps it in its present condition of activity; all are equally dependent on *Brahma* hence its another name or designation is "the source of all."

Brahma is likewise described as bliss. "Bliss" signifies cessation of misery. As in deep sleep, when there are no dreams to trouble him, a man cuts off his connection with the objective world, and is perfectly

insensible to pain, he may therefore be said to be in the highest enjoyment of felicity, and his personal experience also goes to establish it; since on rising from sleep he exclaims "I was sleeping happily I knew nothing then;" or in the condition of being absorbed into *Brahma*. Here every thing is joy, and there is no pain. We all have it in common. Ignorance is an obstacle to our perceiving it, and if that can be destroyed by knowledge, all illusions are at an end, the relation we establish with our connections and worldly goods lose their hold, we are on the road to *Nirvana*.

The importance of knowledge is thus clearly established. But of all knowledges, that which tends to know the nature of self is paramount, and this is called a crown. But we may be asked, how can Matter have any resemblance to Ignorance and why is it called so? We proceed to answer.

Ignorance is called in the *Veda*, as neither existent nor non-existent, and something indescribable. 'Existent' in so far as it is everywhere present, for no one can say that he knows every thing, consequently he is ignorant; and 'non-existent' because knowledge drives it away, and with that object it has been described as antagonistic to knowledge. It is quite distinct from real, and unreal as neuter is neither male nor female. In this way, though Ignorance is universally present, it cannot be mistaken for *Brahma* which also is universally present; likewise there is another similitude, for both of them are declared to be unborn. Because Brahma is eternal, and Ignorance is not—for with the advent of knowledge it disappears, or is reduced to non-being, therefore it is unreal; while Brahma is Real,—therefore as Ignorance cannot be particularized one way or the other, as it is neither real nor unreal, neither existent nor non-existent, and as it cannot be said to be with or without shape, it is hence indescribable. It cannot be contended, want of knowledge is Ignorance. For, want is negation, non-existent and unreal, while knowledge is positive, existent and real, therefore they cannot be connected with each other. Ignorance abounds in darkness and knowledge abounds in luminosity, that again constitutes another difference between them; and for this darkness which is identical with insentiency, Ignorance and Matter are one. What has just been said in regard to Ignorance applies equally to *Maya*. But *Maya* is called illusion, and it may be asked why? Because it is the very nature of illusion to make an unreal substance appear real, like objects seen in a dream.

Illusion can be removed only by knowledge, hence the imperative necessity of acquiring Self-knowledge cannot be too often repeated. We regard the world as something real, and hanker after the acquisition of property, and accumulation of riches with the false hope that they will procure bliss and felicity. It is an illusion to think so. Likewise the attribution to Self, of bondage, and to regard him as an agent or instrument, or one who is a doer of works is also due to illusion. "All our sense, perceptions, the cold in the hand, the smell in the nose, sight and hearing are illusions yet essential to existence." For as in the instance of a snake created in a rope,—an illusion of sight—the mistake is removed when the rope is fully known, so the mistaken attribution of bondage ceases only with thorough knowledge of Self.

Having thus done with Ignorance and Illusion it remains only to consider Matter or *Prakriti*. The best definition of Matter is that which occupies space, but a *Vedantin* says it to be indescribable. Because we are so little acquainted with its nature and properties, and the ways in which it works that the above epithet is very appropriate.

Matter is said to possess three attributes. These are the *Satwa* or good, *Raja* or active and *Tama* or dark; and as every object in nature is derived from the elements ether, water, fire, air and earth, therefore all of them have these properties more or less. In one sense, the so-called properties are nothing else but distinct forces, and we have thus a parallel of the forces of attraction, and gravitation etc. Now this can be established in the following wise:—

It is said, the first (*Satwa*) is light, the second (*Tama*) is heavy and the active force. Now *Satwa* and *Tama* can do nothing till over-powered by *Raja*. Thus then what is light has an upward motion, as gases, glazing fire etc.; the sensory and active organs for their acute perception and ready prehension are likewise said to be derived from the *Satwavic* quality. It is likewise possessed of luminosity. Motion is due to the active quality or *Raja*. It induces action everywhere. It sets the air in motion. The mind for its unsteadiness is also said to be a product of this quality. *Tama* is said to be heavy, because it obstructs the luminosity of *Satwa*, hence Ignorance is said to be a product of *Tama*. The first and the last have no velocity or motion, till acted upon by the second, which also receives a check from the heavy *Tama*, so that *Raja* or the active quality cannot lead *Tama* anywhere and everywhere; for by its force *Tama* counterbalances its action, hence there is no breach in the order and synchonism of natural laws. We have here a satisfactory explanation of intelligence in Nature. It is a stereotyped argument of anthropomorphism, that law signifies a law-giver, and as there is a display of intelligence in natural laws, that proves the presence of mind, and for that mind to remain there must be a requisite body, hence God almighty has a body etc. But a pantheist says, such a creator can neither be infinite, nor all-pervading, his pervasion must be limited by his body, for he cannot be present everywhere at the same time. The especially pleadings of both these views need not concerns us, as they are beyond the scope of the present notice. We therefore pass on to consider the elements.

At first sight, it may appear strange that our forefathers were taught to believe the so-called elements as simple bodies. That would imply their ignorance of physical science and chemistry notably. For, we in our time have been taught by Western Science to regard water, air, and earth as compound. There is Hydrogen and Oxygen in water; air contains oxygen and nitrogen besides an admixture of carbonic acid etc., and earth is a mixture of several substan-ces. But there is no necessity for such an apprehension, for their elements find no place in Western Science. The so-called elements of the West are liable at a future period, when chemical analysis and synthesis will have attained more perfection, to be decomposed or resolved into other simpler substances. But with regard to our classification, that shall never happen. It is said, the elements of which we have knowledge and which we are accustomed to use for our daily wants are different from what they were in the beginning, hence we have the subtle and gross elements. The latter are a result of peculiar form of mixture called quintupli-cation (*panchikarana*) as follows:—Divide each element into two equal parts; of the remaining ten parts, take the first five of each element and divide into five equal parts, then leaving the undivided second half of each element, add to the above mentioned four parts, the second halves of the other four elements, each to each. Thus then we have one element each, an eighth part of itself, while the rest is made up by the other four elements. And their presence is demonstrated in the possession

of qualities which naturally belong to them. That is to say, ether is said to possess the quality of transmitting sound, while air has sound derived from its cause ether, besides its individual property of touch; in the same way fire has sound, touch and form; water—sound, touch, form, and taste, while earth has sound, touch, form, taste and smell. From the same elementary combination have originated the seven abodes placed one above the other, Bhur, Bhuvar, Swar, Mahar, Janas, Tapas, Satya, and the seven nether spheres, one below the other severally called Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasatala, Talatala, Mahatala and Patala, together with Brahmânda, the four varieties of physical bodies with their adequate food and drink.

In respect to air and water we find them mentioned in the *Sruti Mimansa*, *Naya*, and other systems, that they are compound and not simple bodies. Their composite nature is easily demonstrable. For instance, water if left to stand will deposit a sediment of mud which is nothing else but earthy particles. Even in the clearest sample of water it is easy to detect the presence of earthy salts. But this cannot be practically proved in the case of the other four elements. Moreover, it is said that some of the five (*vutas*) elements in their subtle form have been mixed with similar subtle atoms of a second element, and have thus helped the production of the gross, while other atoms have produced similar results without any mixture. In short, the gross is a changed condition of the subtle with and without a blending of their atoms. In the gross elements we have a prolific cause for the material universe.

What is ether? The atmosphere which surrounds the globe does not extend beyond thirty or forty leagues, and diminishes in substance, in proportion to its elevation above the earth's surface. It is therefore not very high; beyond it, is the planetary ether of physicists and astronomers. It fills all space, and is drawn into the interstices of the solar systems, the stars, nebulae etc. It is all-pervading. It may be called a fluid, but it resembles the air we have, though much rarefied than it. In calculating the speed of heavenly bodies, resistance of ether is taken into account by astronomers, hence it is impossible to deny its existence.

Thus far we have been mainly concerned in introducing our readers to the signification of the technical terms abounding in the philosophy which forms the subject of the present treatise. Without a proper comprehension of the terms that will frequently occur, it is impossible to master the subject in all its details, hence it was necessary that they should be explained. We purpose now to touch upon the cardinal doctrines of Vedantism. These are besides non-difference of the Jiva and Brahma, the doctrines of *karma* and metampsychosis.

'*Karma*' is the collective totality of works good and bad which an individual performs in life. They determine his future existence both subjectively and objectively. That is to say, in proportion to a person's merits, he inherits a better sphere of existence after death. That may bring forth an abode in heaven, but after the consummation of happiness he is sure to be hurled back to an objective life. Actions are transient, and their fruits are likewise so, for the properties of a cause are transmitted to its products. Hence to abstain from works is of paramount importance. But it may be said, it is impossible for a man to live without doing any thing either by the active organs—hands, feet, etc.,—or by the mind; even if he turns into an ascetic and retires from the world, to live in a mountain cave,

certainly the necessity for appeasing calls of hunger and thirst, of defecation, and urination, and sleep must yet continue so that if works cease to produce re-birth, literally no one can be freed. To avoid this difficulty, knowledge is credited with powers of destruction. But all works cannot be destroyed. Apart from the daily and occasional rites, and forbidden works, or those sanctioned in the sacred writings, there are other works *viz.*, accumulated, fructescent and current:—that is to say, the first refer to works which have accumula-ted in several previous births, the second refer to those which have resulted in the present life and have already commenced to bear fruit, while the third comprise the works performed in the present life. They will bear fruit in a future life. The fruits of accumulated and current works are destroyed by knowledge of Self and his identity with *Brahma*. But the fructescent, can only be exhausted by enjoying their results during the present life. It is beyond the scope of the present notice to enter into details. Suffice it to say, that in this *'Karmaic* law', we have a satisfactory solution for the puzzling questions which so often harass us. We mean, in the instance when "virtue starves" as said by Pope in his *Essay on Man*, or a learned and able person with difficulty scraping together the means of a sorry meal for himself and family, and struggling on from day to day, not knowing when and where his troubles are to cease; or a young and handsome wife suddenly deprived of her husband in the heyday of his youthful career; of a poor widow, poor and friendless, aged and infirm, suddenly deprived of her son, who was her prop and support and the main stay of life. Now instances like these can be multiplied indefinitely, they are too common to escape the attention of any one, but what we have said will suffice. Here the *prarabdhakarma* is the key. 'Fructescent works' have already commenced to bear fruit, and as that fruit is to bring forth pain and suffering or the reverse, according to the nature of previous works, consequently an individual is seen unaccountably to suffer while another who is worthless, has for his portion all material comforts. In the case of children dying, there is the same operation of the *karmaic* law. But it is said that a person may, apart from physical circumstances, for his bad *karma*, be born blind, deaf or dumb and thus be a cause of anxiety to the parents. In this way, it will appear that heaven and hell are relative conditions of happiness and misery brought forth by the deeds of an individual. But opinions differ, for which a *Vedantin* is bound to accept the teachings of his Sacred Scriptures; he necessarily pins his faith with the truth, there taught. He may look upon the blissful abode of the seven upper spheres already mentioned, as a result of merit or good works, but after their consummation he must revisit earth in human shape and rehabilitate a body that must be a net result of his unexhausted *karma*. Kapila on the other hand, lays down the doctrine of a man's being reincarnated into a beast or Deva, in proportion to his demerit or merit. Buddhism teaches, after humanity, there is no more retrogression; that is to say, when a human being dies he must always be human in his furture reincarnations and not take his chance with beasts and birds, or vegetables and stone.

Though equally believing in *Karma*, yet Kapila maintains with much show of reason and strength of argument, his doctrine of *Bhavanamayasarira*. A person in his deathbed is overtaken with a fixed thought; if he is a lover of horse-flesh, his mind will be centered in a horse, so that when he dies, his astral body assumes the desired body of a horse. In this way, a

person may be a rogue all his life, and yet escape the torments of subjective or objective suffering. In his last moments, his thoughts may overtake *Brahma*, *Vishnu*, *Shiva* or any other *Deva*, and sure enough he goes there to reap happiness. A practice still prevails in Bengal and other countries to bawl out the name of Ganga, Narain and Brahma into the ears of a dying person; to one who is unacquainted with its signification it may sound unnecessary and cruel. But there is a fixed object in view, it means the momentous question of sending that person's soul to be received in heaven. If perchance, the reiteration of name does come to occupy his mind so as to be moulded after it, if it would direct his mind mentally to worship or remember his *mantram* given by his spiritual preceptor, he is saved from hell-torments.

The question of heaven and hell, is a relative existence. Our ancient writers are not very unanimous. Each author has made ample mention of them, but there are others who maintain quits an opposite doctrine. For instance, heaven and hell are for the enjoyment of happiness or suffering of misery. But who is to suffer? Let this question be first answered. A *Vedantin* says the *Atma* or seventh principle is neither an agent or instrument, he is passive, and does no works, he is neither subject to rebirth, consequently death cannot affect him, and he is free, therefore he is not subject to pleasure and pain. Under such circumstances the *Atma* is clearly neither responsible for the works performed by the *Jiva* in his career on earth, nor is it necessary for him to appear on the day of judgment to receive his sentence—of eternal happiness or eternal damnation in hellfire, as taught by the Christian Church. Ours is much simpler and more reasonable. It is said, for enjoyment or suffering, a body is required, not the subtle astral body, but the physical body which we have all got, hence it consequently follows, reincarnation is the scene of fruition as it is for fresh action. In this sense, there is neither heaven nor hell beyond the world. Heaven and hell are in our own keeping. By turning the mind away from objects of sensuous gratification, if we live for others, abolishing all selfish ends, and reverently perform all virtuous actions, we do what is best for weak and frail man to do. The reverse of what we have just been saying leads to a life of ineffable misery in next. Existence itself is admitted as a twain condition in which both happiness and misery are the unavoidable lot of all and every one of us; a man rolling in riches attended by servants in rich livery, living in a style befitting his rank and means, courted and flattered by his friends and relations may appear happy to all of us, but you will find, that he is in fact as miserable as an average human being without his advantages. Perhaps he is childless, or the slave of an insatiable thirst for accumulating more wealth, or he is a miserable wretch so far as health is concerned, or he may be very unfortunate in his wife; no one loves him, none cares a straw for his person, all his relatives are so many parasites anxiously waiting for the hour of death, so that they may be remembered in his last will. Such is the rule. Here we can expect no unalloyed happiness; the poet's dream of love and bliss are to holy to have a place here: our journey through life embraces a long period of time, of which a part goes in acquiring the usual training and experience to befit us in this up-hill struggle; another part is spent in fulfilling Darwin's law of survival of the fittest. In this way, is spent the best part, landing us now into the ladd of reflection, and decripitude, with hairs hoary sitting reverently as a crown for all the struggles

we had in the past. Now if in all this, we maintain an unflinching honesty,—honesty of word, deed and thought, we are then more than human. Show us the man who will say that he has been honest all his days, from the time when he arrived at years of discretion and we say that he is an exception. No doubt there are men, who are fit to be worshipped in every sense of the word—men who have retired from the sad turmoil of an empty and deceitful world to study self, to meditate on the mystic 'Om', or to dwell in *Samadhi*. These sages or wisemen or call them more properly theosophists, guard our destinies, a wide range of philanthropy actuates them, nationality they know not, man is the object of their solicitous care, and to teach and instruct is a favorite occupation with them. We cannot say that the world has become denuded of them, but their number is extremely few. The present writer has the good fortune to know one, who is his preceptor, and he can hardly express his gratitude adequately to Baba Purdumun Sing, Sadhu Nirmala.

To return from this digression to our subject, we find it laid down, that with death we part with our physical body just as a snake casts of its coil. Our conceptions and *Karma* remain impressed in the body called subtle or astral (*linga sharira*) which is again subjected to re-incarnation. It is everywhere the unanimous opinion that the astral body continues to come and go till emancipation. This is a very shadowy duplicate of the gross body, and has seventeen characteristic features. The five vital airs—*Pran* and the rest; five sensory organs,—sight, hearing etc.; five organs of action—hands, feet, mouth, anus and genitals, together with mind and intellect [the human soul and animal soul] constitute the *linga sharira*. By the practice of *Yoga* it can be projected out at a distance from the physical body, wherever a *Yogee* wishes it to be; in this way even the natural barriers offer no impediment to its passage.

The reader will find it mentioned in its proper place the need of a continued residence with a Guru, supporting him by begging and satisfying him in all manner by doing menial services, never troubling him even for food but waiting to receive whatever he offers, neither asking for instruction but bidding his time and pleasure—even these require no ordinary amount of patience—by a pupil duly qualified for receiving the necessary instruction on *Brahma Vidya*. Under these circumstances, it is easy to conceive, why the number of such qualified pupils have been getting less and less day by day. One must leave the world to all intents and purposes, and lead a life of absolute purity before he can acquire that knowledge. If it be asked what is the necessity for knowledge? For if the Jiva be one with *Brahma*, and if the natural felicity and intelligence of the latter be alike a part of the former, there is no reason why a person is to make such a sacrifice; or it may be argued, as in common practice, we do not trouble ourselves any more concerning a thing already got; similarly the felicity of *Brahma* and destruction of misery being already present in the individual, there does not exist any paramount necessity for the acquisition of knowledge. But the reply is, as a person with a piece of gold in his hand forgets about it and is seen to busy himself in its search, and when pointed out by another, he recovers it to all intents and purposes, though it never left his possession and he had it already; similarly the enveloping or concealing power of Ignorance hides the perception of felicity which naturally belongs to him and knowledge alone enables him to recover it. Then again, that knowledge, as it is antagonistic to

Ignorance, which again is nothing more or less than matter, destroys the materials out of which the seed for the future body of the individual is to grow, hence being removed from the fetters of consecutive re-births, he will abide for ever in the *Brahma* whose sole essence is joy. Destruction of grief is eagerly sought after by man, no matter whatever may be his position, and as it can only be effected by knowledge, we have here another incentive. But it may be replied, that for every kind of misery there are particular remedies, therefore, the application of remedies is equally capable of destroying it. Clearly, to say so, is a mistake. For instance, medicine removes or cures a great many diseases, that is true indeed; but there is no certainty that the disease would not return again in the life time of the individual; in the same manner pangs of hunger and thirst are removed by a good dinner, and drink, but there are yet a good many miseries which refuse to be destroyed and there is no remedy for them, beyond knowledge. When a person loses his only son, his grief knows no bounds, and no remedy is more potent to destroy his grief save the knowledge, that his so-called son was nobody; that it was a mere illusion which tied him in bonds of affection; that it is the ordinary lot of humanity from which there can be no escape; that the world itself is unreal and transient, and full of grief.

We are extremely selfish: without an expectation of deriving sure benefit we never undertake a work. The authors of the *Shastras* understood human character too well to allow it to escape their notice, hence we find it mentioned there are 'four incentives'. Of them 'necessity' is the last. That is to say the necessity of studying the *Shastras* is pointed out in all its bearings.

The philosophy of the *Vedanta* embraces two subjects, metaphysics and physics. The first has been considered in all its aspects, including a critical review of the arguments of the other contending systems, pointing out their mistake and establishing truth. In the elucidation of truth, a *Vedantin's* analysis and mode of arguing is simple as it is convincing. Our author has ransacked the whole ground covered by the partisans of especial theories, and though he had added nothing, yet he had, by bringing the arguments together in one place, rendered ample service to the cause he represents, to deserve the gratitude of his readers. In regard to the latter he is rather reticent, he dismisses the subject with the remark that the world and its contents are unreal, therefore deserve no especial or particular mention. Evidently he could not have done justice to it, without putting in another volume before the public, and the labor of the undertaking might have stood in his way. To every religious minded person, the physics are unattracting. Even in the present day, we find a conflict between religion and science. The Church in the West, had received severe wounds from the artillery brought in by science (physical); these wounds are now being dressed up with care and skill by her custodians—Bibliologists; and the recent authorised translation of the Holy Writ has been purged of several very objectionable points. In this way, to fit in with the facts of scientific evolution, the six days of the world which occupied God to create it, are said to cover an immense space of time. We happily, are not similarly placed. For we have our Brahmâ's day and night, that means time enough, and we have nothing to be ashamed of.

Turning from Physics to Metaphysics, we find a vast array of subjects, the sum total of which is to shew the illusory nature of all phenomena: they are therefore unreal. The world and its contents are relatively and not absolutely

false. As in the instance of an illusion of sight, when a person conceives the presence of a snake in a dark night, in a bit of straw, rope, etc., the so-called snake is discovered to be false when a light is brought to shew what the thing lying in front is. By the help of light, person derives the necessary knowledge of the rope, of all its parts, when the illusion is dispelled. Similarly the illusion of the word is only removed by a thorough knowledge of Self, who is no other but *Brahma*. In the foregoing instance, the reality of the site of the snake, the rope itself, is not at all denied; on the other hand, everywhere it is maintained as something substantial. Because without a site there can be no illusion. In the absence of the rope there can be no mistake of a snake. In other words, we must have something resting on the background, so to speak, on which to superimpose or project through a force of ignorance the necessary mistake or illusion. In the case of the world and its contents, what we objectively recognize through the medium of the several sensory organs are so far real, having an objective existence with the usual form, taste, touch, etc., but they are non-eternal, and it is an illusion to consider them otherwise, for there is only one entity of that nature and that is *Brahma*. Now in regard to our body, we are apt to confound it and the several organs of sense, etc., with self. It is the business of metaphysics to establish a correct knowledge of Self, and to shew that the body is not Self. Neither are the organs of sense, the vital airs, nor the mind come under that category. They have been fully dealt upon and with the help of the foot-notes, the reader will have enough to clear his mind of preconceived and incorrect ideas. Therefore we need not stop for considering them in this place. "All our sense perceptions are illusions." This requires a proof and we have in Astronomy a trite illustration. Stars are classified according to their magnitude. The higher are placed in the ascending scale, while the lower ones are nethermost. A star of the fifth magnitude will make its ray of light appear in the earth at an immense distance of time; all the time the light has been travelling with its accustomed velocity to reach our globe, and the telescope can find its site nowhere; the *rationale* is, by the time it reaches us, the star itself is lost. Now here we have a ray of light coming from a body that was existing in the time when that light started on its onward journey, but since then, the law of change has so worked upon matter, that the star is lost in the infinity of space.

To connect happiness and misery with Self is a common mistake, universally present. We find it commonly said by all classes of persons, and there is hardly any exception "I am very miserable" "He is very happy". These are a few of the instances in common use daily with all individuals according to their experience of grief or happiness. Opinions are divided according to the several Schools or Eastern Metaphysicians. From the Vedantin's standpoint happiness and misery are created by Jiva,—upon the relations created by him. They are not *Iswar's* productions. For instance, a father has his son residing abroad on foreign service, his neighbour has also one of his sons in a similar service, distant from home. Now when the father of the first son, receives intelligence of the demise of his son, by a person returning from that country, he is extremely depressed and his grief knows no bounds; similarly that other father is elated with the information that his son was doing well and intended shortly to return home laden with wealth, accompanied by a large retinue; but the fact is otherwise, his son was actually dead, while that other son was very prosperous. But

the man who gave the wrong information owed a grudge to the family and that is why he put the father into unnecessary grief, but when the mail brings the good tidings, in the hand-writing of the absent son hitherto taken for dead, his father is extremely delighted. Thus we find, that the relationship of the first father with his son artificially created by him, is the source of his grief and happiness. If the son were the seat of such grief and happiness, then for every son, each father would feel pleasure or pain, but that is not the case. But how is this relationship artificially created? By the internal organ. It may be argued the ties of affection are natural and it is improper to call them artificial. For throughout nature we find even in the lower animals the same feelings for their young ones. That indeed is correct. But what is here sought to be conveyed amounts to this:—*Iswara's* creation are natural. While those of a *Jiva* are artificial or imaginary. If *Iswara* would have created happiness in those who are called sons, another father would have felt equally for all sons of other persons equally with his own. Thus then, an imaginary connection or relationship created by *Jiva* in his internal organ through the medium of *Maya*, leads him to be a source of his own misery. The conclusion is therefore evident, that all objects have neither pleasure nor pain in them; but what pleasure or pain we vainly attribute to them is due to our ignorance. This can only be rendered plain by example. Wealth is generally believed to be a source of happiness. If it were so, all persons having wealth ought to have been happy. But is this really the case? By no means.

We all know how fireflies are attracted in autumn to the light of a lamp, they dance and frisk, hover and fall into the fire, you cannot keep them off; to them it is a pleasure thus to be present near the fire. If fire were endowed with such pleasing sentiments or say happiness, everyone would have likewise felt it. In the cold winter with a bitter frost, and sharp winds blowing, it is indeed extremely pleasant to sit by the fireside, but when the dogdays come and the hot blasts try our nerves, we never think of fire, we avoid it and court water; this should not be if any subject had in it the particles of happiness on misery. The *rationale* to the *Sidhanti* is, when a firefly is actuated with a desire of touching fire, its *Boodhi* loses its changibility, and by a relationship with it and desire, it is made steady, when perception of happiness is realized. When a person desires for an object, a relation is established between his desire and the internal organ, it loses its unsteadiness, and therefore he cognises felicity. Thus we find happiness is not situated in a subject, the same thing may be a source of happiness in some and pain in others. We all know the function of the internal organ is never fixed, or steady, it is ever changing according to the subject which demands its attention: it is therefore said to be subject to birth and death. But knowledge is not so.

What is knowledge? This is the subject of *Vedanta*. Knowledge is Self. That is the shortest and best answer. But it may be argued, knowledge is only an attribute or quality of Self, through which he discovers all objects. In that case the question is whether that knowledge is eternal or transient? If the answer be in the affirmative that will establish Self and knowledge identically the same. For Self is eternal and not-self non-eternal. Therefore, to say knowledge is eternal brings it in the same category with Self. You cannot regard knowledge as a distinct substance from Self, in that case it will be non-eternal; so that to speak of knowledge as eternal and yet distinct from Self, will be clearly

impossible as indicating existence of properties directly opposed to one another. If on the other hand, it be contended, knowledge is not-self. 'Not-self' is insentient, and devoid of intelligence, as for instance 'a jar'. It is non-eternal too. Because when a thing is non-eternal it is insentient. Therefore, knowledge cannot be maintained with any show of reason to be non-eternal; on the other hand, it is eternal. But there is only one substance that is eternal and secondless and that is Self or *Brahma* therefore knowledge is identical with Self. Apart from what we have been saying there are other considerations leading to the same conclusion. For instance, a quality of a substance may or may not be present all along. It may appear in a subsequent state of development, remain for a short time, then disappear. We find this notably in flowers and fruits. The rich juice and sweetness of several edible varieties of fruits are only produced in a subsequent stage of development when they are ripening. In the prior stages these qualities were absent, as they will disappear when over ripe. Therefore, starting with these premises, if knowledge were a quality of Self, he would be sometimes conscious and at others unconscious, at least his quality will be short-lived *i.e.*, transient. But since knowledge is eternal in duration, his resemblance with Self is complete.

What continuous in all conditions of time is called eternal. We have only three divisions of time—waking, dreaming and profound slumber. In all these states knowledge continues. Even in the condition of profound slumber the continuance of knowledge is proved by individual experience of felicity. A person on rising from sleep exclaims "I was sleeping happily, I knew nothing then." This should never follow, if there is no actual perception of felicity, and the subsequent remembrance is a fact of positive knowledge; for an unknown thing never crosses the memory. The sensory organs have no relation with knowledge. For in that sleep, the senses are at perfect obeyance; they cease to carry on their functions yet there is no absence of knowledge. Thus then knowledge is eternal and as Self never exists without it, they are therefore one.

The 'necessity' for knowledge is emancipation. Works and devotion are quite powerless in that way, they may lead to a better abode but they cannot make a person free from future re-births. There are various opinions on the subject: but from a *Vedantin's* view there can be no freedom from metempsychosis without knowledge, so a theosophist has nothing proper for him to do. He is beyond the pale of works and devotion. They are only the nethermost rungs by which the top of the ladder is to be reached. Good works make the mind pure, and remove its blemishes, devotion helps to make it steady, they are therefore only means to the acquisition of knowledge. All works are undertaken with a distinct desire of reaping their benefits hereafter. That means re-birth, but a theosophist has no desire of continuing his existence; he abstains from *Karma*. He waits only to see his cup of fructescent works—which have already commenced to bear fruit, and have produced his present existence-drained; he is no hurry about it, he does not wish for his death to come at once and make him free, but patiently abides his time. Prior to knowledge, whatever acts he had undertaken, and what have already been done cannot produce any more fruits, for they are destroyed by it. It is for inculcating this grand truth that we find an emphatic mention in all treatises dealing on the *Vedanta*, that a wise person has no more need of works and devotion, when he has

obtained a thorough knowledge of Self; as a result of that, he exclaims "I am *Brahma*". Just as a torch in extinguished by a traveller when he arrives at the door of his own house, or as the husk is thrown away after the grains have been gathered.

It will thus be found, that knowledge and works with devotion are naturally opposed to each other. For which the former brings on emancipation, the latter an objective existence in a better sphere, or its reverse, according to the merit of the works and the dignity of the object worshipped. It remains also to be observed that with thorough knowledge, actions are incompatible. Why? Because Self is regarded by a person engaged in works, as an agent and instrument. He is apt to exclaim "I am doing virtuous actions and their fruits must be my portion." A wise person has no such desire, he is devoid of virtue and vice, happiness and misery, and he knows Self is unconditioned, the Absolute, *Brahma*. As regards devotion, a theosophist knows not any distinction of worshipper and the object worshipped. He knows everywhere there is the same play of that one Intelligence which is nothing more or less than *Brahma*. Hence he has no inclination for devotion. To look upon Self as subject to the bondage of future re-births is the greatest of all mistakes, which knowledge only dispels. And in this, there is nothing unique; for as we have had occasion to mention, just as a snake is removed from a rope, when it is fully known, so knowledge of Self establishes his oneness with *Brahma*, and he is eternal and free. As for the destruction of the snake, knowledge of the rope alone is enough for the purpose, so in regard to emancipation, knowledge of Self alone is capable of bringing it about, and there is no need of works and devotion. In the *Shastras*, knowledge is called emancipation. It means, knowledge alone is a source of release. And works and devotion are not included in it.

At first sight, one is bewildered to find works, (good, of course) and devotion are helpless. They are helpless in cutting off the chain of consecutive re-births. That is in strict accordance to the *Karmaic* Law which knows no exception. Because every action must produce a fruit; the meritorious works in this way bear good fruits, which a person to enjoy must reincarnate in a better sphere; after their consummation he is hurled back into an earthly existence, to reap what he had sown in the past. Similarly the bad works lead to a nether sphere. Works and devotion are simply means to knowledge. If it be said, no theosophist in that case, can ever succeed in attaining emancipation. Prior to his knowledge he had been engaged in devotion and good works, and they must necessarily subject him to re-births. The reply is, there is no need for that; save and beyond the 'fructescent works' which have commenced to bear fruit, and which terminate with the present life of the individual, knowledge is capable of extinguishing the seeds of past *karma* which are to fructify hereafter. The natural acts of eating and sleeping, and satisfying the natural calls are a matter of habit, they cause him no injury. Because there is an absence of desire in him. In other words, he is never desirous of eating this or that, or discarding another, makes no choice of his bed. It would thus appear hat desire plays no insignificant part either in our present or in determining the future life. But opinions are divided, and the reader will find the arguments for and against, in the usual place. In connection with this subject, it is worth mentioning, there are two extreme views advocated by their respective partisans, *viz.*:—Restraint and Immunity from restraint. The learned author of the *Panchadasi* upholds the first,

as there are others of equal authority maintaining the latter view.

In the *Brihadaranyakopanishad* we find it mentioned, a theosophist liberated in life is absolved from works good and bad, unsoiled by sinful works, uninjured by what he has done and left undone. Anandagiri says:—"The theosophist so long as he lives may do good and evil as he chooses and incur no stain, such is the efficiency of knowledge. The commentator of the *Vedantasara* Nrisinha Sarasvati reviews it in the following words:—Some one may say, it will follow from this that the theosophist is at liberty to act as he chooses, that he can act as he likes, cannot be denied in the presence of texts of Revelation, traditionary texts and arguments like these 'not by matricide, not by paricide'. 'He that does not identify not-self with self, whose inner faculty is unsullied,—he, though he slay these people, neither slays them, nor is slain.' He that knows the truth is sullied neither by good actions nor by evil actions'.... In answer to all this we reply: True, but as these texts are only eulogistic of the theosophist; it is not intended that he should thus act." Thus then, we find the supporters of Immunity from restraint basing their authority on the *Vedas* and *Upanishads* advocate *Yathestacharana*, forgetting the impossibility of such freedom of action in a person who has acquired the supreme wisdom.

Frequent mention has been made of Illusion, and it requires a passing notice before we close. The source of an illusion is ignorance. A trite example is to mistake a rope for a snake. But it may be asked, how is it produced. There are several ways to account for it. For instance, a *Naiyayika* would say a person must have the impression of a snake seen in a previous period of time, and a defect in his sight. Given these two conditions and the snake illusion is sure to follow. In other words, when a person has seen a real snake in the past, its impression remains ever afterwards, it may be roused by the stimulus of an object resembling it, or by the force of words adequately representing it, so that in the dark when he comes across a bit of string, that stimulates the dormant impression of a snake seen in the distant past and he fancies he has a snake in front of him, which he avoids either by running away, or avoiding it anyhow; or he may have defective vision and that also brings it about. But on the other hand, it cannot be urged that a person whose sight is good, is not liable to be the subject of a similar illusion; therefore this view is not a correct one. The *Vedantin* accounts for it in quite a different way. His method is called. "The indescribable." In the visible perception of an object, the internal organ plays an important part. When a substance is seen, its cognition takes place by the internal organ establishing a connection with the object through the sense of vision; then it assumes the shape of the object to be cognized, drives away the ignorance resting on it, and at the same time illuminates or cognizes it. "The stock illustration of this is that of water flowing from a well or tank by means of a narrow open channel, emptying itself into the square beds with raised edges into which a field is sometimes divided, for the purpose of irrigation, and assuming the shape of those beds. The illuminated internal organ is the water, and the operation is called an evolution or modification of that organ." In the case of an illusion when a rope is mistaken for a snake, the function of the internal organ projected by the eyes, establishes a connection, with it, but the obstacles or defects as they are called (darkness etc.,) do not determine the modification of that organ, as to make it assume the shape of

the rope, consequently its envelopment of ignorance continues to be present. No snake is actually created in it, for if it were so, a light brought to discover what the thing lying in front is, discovers no more snake, but only a bit of string; this should not be; therefore we find, knowledge of a rope is an obstacle to the existence of a snake: so long as we do not know it to be so, the snake created or superimposed on it, by the force of ignorance, exists to all intents and purposes (relatively though) to the individual subject to that illusion. Then again, it cannot be said, no snake exists in the rope, for an appealing to individual experience, it will be found, that in all such instances men have been known to behave exactly as they would, if they had a real snake before them. Since therefore you cannot particularize one way or the other, "Snake is or is not existent" it is called 'indescribable'. It is a modification of ignorance, or better still, its changed condition. There are two causes at work for its production and discovery. Its formal cause is the particle of external ignorance situated on the rope, which transforms it into a snake, while the particle of ignorance situated on Intelligence discovers it in that changed condition.

The other doctrines of illusion need not detain us, as the reader will find them amply mentioned and argued with all the resources of our author's vast erudition. Illusion and knowledge are opposed to each other. Illusion is a modification of the dark quality of Ignorance, while knowledge is a modification of its good quality, which is light itself. There can be no illusion after knowledge has once arisen.

The student of Self-knowledge is to mould his internal organ into the modification of *Brahma*. Now, modification signifies assuming the shape of an object. In the case of formless *Brahma*, how can thought be moulded after it. This is a question that is easily met. What is meant, implies no contradiction; you are constantly to dwell upon non-duality of Self and *Brahma*, and when that has been firmly fixed in your mind, by repeated practice, you are indissolutely one with the subject of your thought. In this way, "I am *Brahma*" is the acme of knowledge and height of felicity. When that has been fully realized, there is no more any hankering left after material comforts; pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, heat and cold,—nay the most adverse circumstances will fail to unruffle the calm equanimity of a face radiant with beatific light. Various are the means of arriving at this knowledge. The usual means 'Discrimination,' 'Indifference' etc., only pave the way to it; constant study, hearing the precepts of a Guru versed in *Brahma Jnana*, consideration and profound contemplation are the chief factors. *Yoga* is a sort of Self-training that helps to make the mind unwavering and steady, and leads to the same goal finally. All our *Shastras*, how muchsoever they may differ in theory, are entirely of one accord so far as *Mukti* is concerned; their processes may differ, but the finality is everywhere the same. In this way, that staunch advocate of Materialism, Kapila, seers no necessity of discarding final disenthrallment from consecutive re-births. With him, *Prakriti Sakhyatkar* is supreme knowledge. The ordinary description of knowledge answers not the sense in which we have used it. An ignorant person is called one who has a conceit for his body; one may be a man of vast reading, yet so long as he mistakes Self with this or that, his physical body or the sensory organs, he must come under the category of the ignorant. Because he can no more be freed till his mistake or illusion is cleared away. Thus we find the ignorant and the wise are the respective

seats of bondage and emancipation; for the first is marked with desire, while the last is perfectly indifferent. The potency of desire even shakes a man of firm intellect, and whatever indifference he may have, is put to an extreme stretch, so that he has always to keep a thorough watch, to mount guard on the door-way of his *antakaran*. His desire may unruffle him momentarily, but the firm knowledge which he has acquired can never bring back the perception of reality in what he has once discovered to be unreal. He knows phenomena are unreal, material comforts equally so: unlike a dull person, when he shews an indifference for worldly goods, at best, it is but an invisible knowledge of their unreality and not a visible perception; or it may have been brought about by the presence of defects, so that, no sooner the defect is removed he is after them again, bent more for the accumulation of riches. But the indifference of the wise is caused by the visible perception of unreality, and if ever he shows any true regard for them, that unreality is removed for the time being, but it cannot continue ever afterwards. Just as a snake is removed, when the rope is discovered, and there is not a possibility of its being mistaken again. Thus then, as a wise man never becomes a subject of illusion after he has once discovered it, his indifference is therefore called firm. Whereas in the ignorant, his indifference is apt to come and go, hence it is said to be produced by the presence of defects. That is to say, just as a person after coitus feels an aversion for a female and is extremely indifferent to her, so in wealth and riches there are defects too, which produce indifference for the time being, till a person is re-agitated with a desire of acquisition. The ignorant look upon their self as a mine of affliction, while a theosophist looks upon him as one with *Brahma* whose sole essence is joy. But for such knowledge to arise, there are several grades. Hence it is said to be ordinary and particular. Now the particular variety comes after ordinary knowledge, by means of what are called Indications. In comprehending the transcendental phrases "That art Thou", and their like, the meaning can only be cleared by Indication of abandoning a part of the meaning; for instance 'That' refers to *Brahma* and 'Thou' *Jiva*. The proposition is to prove their identity. But there is a conflicting element in their composition, for both are Intelligence, yet one is marked with visibility, and the other with invisibility, therefore by deleting them from both sides of the equation, we have Intelligence equal to Intelligence.

The reader will constantly meet with the words Intelligence and Consciousness, Self and non-self, Being and non-being. They require a passing notice. From a *Vedantin's* standpoint, there is one Intelligence pervading everywhere; no matter a thing may be insentient,—a bit of stone for instance, yet it is prevaded by it, and that *Brahma*; our next word is only another name for it. Modern science traces in all substances the presence of a subtle force called *Odyle*. It was first discovered by Riechenbach, who wrote a treatise on the subject but only to be laughed at. In his experiments, very carefully conducted and including a large body of metals metalloids and other substances, he had found the presence of magnetism sufficient to influence a sensitive. It is everywhere present. We have therefore sufficient grounds based on science to connect intelligence with bodies appearing to all intents and purposes a mass of insentiency. Self and *Atma* are synonymous, they refer to the principle of individuality the perception of "I am I". He is 'existence', 'intelligence' and 'bliss'. What is uncreated

and eternal is called 'being' or 'existence'. Not-self includes all other objects—in short phenomena; while self is noumena. 'Non-being' is the opposite of 'being'. It signifies unreality. What is not eternal is called unreal. Therefore as the world we live in, with its contents, are liable to destruction, they are unreal, while self alone is real.

Destruction of the world is called '*pralay*' as *Mahapralay* means total destruction. But in reference to it, opinions are divided. The general belief is that no such total destruction ever happens, and we have *Sankhyakar's* protest against it.

It was not intended that the whole ground covered by the accompanying work should figure in this preliminary notice. We had touched on the main features of the Vedantic Doctrine to impart an idea of its philosophy and help the reader to form correct notions of the technical terms, with which every philosophy worth the name must necessarily abound; and in this, we believe, we have done our best to succeed. It cannot be too often repeated that the subject is as vast as it is important, and requires a patient study. There is much to profit by, and a great deal more. To succeed in mastering it, will depend a great deal on the personal endeavour and the amount of labour and time spent.

And in thus bringing to a close, we cannot but acknowledge with thanks the valuable assistance received from Babu Heeralal Dhole of Calcutta, for the labour devoted in correcting the proofs as they were passing through the press and expediting its publication. Labour of an anxious professional work leaves little inclination for continued literary effort and that will account for any shortcomings, so far as its English version is concerned. We had aimed at correctness more than beauty of diction, and have followed the text closely and faithfully.

MITHILA

The ancient name of Mithilā was Videha country at it was discovered and inhabited by Videha Madhava as is known from the Śat. Br. The name Mithilā came to be known later after the name of the King Mithi. The Vālmikiya Rāmāyaṇa reveals the same fact regarding the name of Mithilā. Janaka, the son and grandson of Mithi and Nimi respectively became so prominent that his family afterwards was known after his name and in the Upaniṣadic literature the proper names of the kings of his line are not so cautiously mentioned. In the Bṛd. only, which is one of the most ancient Upaniṣads, we got the name of Mithilā always as the Videha country and never as the former. In the *Kauṣitaki Br.*, the name of the country of Janak is mentioned as Videha. The name Mithilā does not occur in the earliest Upaniṣads, and besides these two, none of the Upaniṣads has any reference to the Videhadeśa. In some later Upaniṣads like that of the *Mahopaniṣad*. Janak has been mentioned as the king of Mithilā. It seems that the ancient name Mithilā *i.e.* Videha was very popular during the time of the Upaniṣads and the new name Mithilā till then was not so very popular.

The Upaniṣads nowhere mention the extent of the Videha country and so it is difficult to fix her territorial limits. But in later works, the extent of the Videhadeśa is referred to, which included the present districts of Muzaffarpur, Darbhangā and Champāraṇa with South-eastern Nepāl.

As regards the time of the establishment of the Videha country as described in the Upaniṣads we have two standards to fix the period in question. One is the literary evidence and the chronology of the Vedic literature and the next is the genealogical history of ancient India as preserved in the Purāṇas. The

latter sources are confusing and have no scientific background, so we have to depend more on the evidences of the literary chronology. The Upaniṣads are the last portion of the Vedas but scholars are divided on the date of these books. Ludwig's view that the antiquity of the Upaniṣads goes back to the 3,000 B.C., seems to be fantastic though the jerms of the philosophical thoughts may probably be so old but not the Upaniṣads as the Books. Pt. Balakrishna Dixita has pushed back their date to the 2,500 B.C. on the ground of the astrological data as preserved in the Upaniṣads. This also seems not to be logical as only the astrological data are not sufficient to fix the date of a particular work. B.G. Tilak thinks that the antiquity of the Upaniṣads goes back to 1600 B.C. His contention is based on the comparative perusal of the Upaniṣadic astrological data with the same in the *Vedāṅga-Jyotiṣa*. His view also falls in line with those of Ludwig and Dixita. According to Maxmuller the *Maitryūpaniṣad* is a pre-Pāṇinian Upaniṣad in which we get many quotations from the Upaniṣads like the Chāndogya, *Bṛhad*, *Taittiriya*, *Kaṭha* and *Iśa*, so undoubtedly these quoted Upanisads are either contemporary or more probably older than the *Maitry-ūpaniṣad*.

The date of Pāṇini is generally accepted as the 5th century B.C. He uses the world "Upaniṣad" in the sense of the book of that name. The *Gaṇapātha* of the *Aṣṭādhyāyi* clearly shows that either prior to him or during his time commentaries were being written on the Upaniṣads. So it may rightly be presumed that the date of the earliest Upaniṣads is the pre-Buddhist period. Some of the views of these books were preached and advanced later by the Budda. The period from the eighth to sixth century B.C., was of much importance. The Brāhmaṇas only were not the undisputed masters of knowledge, and the Vedic Karmamārga (i.e., the rituals) was not regarded as fruitful. The authorities of these both were challenged by the Kṣatriyas, and all there deliberations regarding *Jñāna* finally took concrete shape probably at the time of the advent of the Buddha. But prior to him we get reference to many kṣatriya philosophers like Ajātasatru of Kāśi. Aśvapati of the Kekaya country, the Pañchāla king Jaibalir Pravāhaṇa and the most prominent of all the Janak of Videha, who were the predecessors of the Buddha and even the Brāhmaṇa philosophers of the time come to them to gain knowledge. Now, on the basis of these evidences we many fix the date of the earliest Upaniṣads during the eighth sixth century B.C. The *Bṛd.* alone mentions the Videha country which is one of the earliest Upaniṣads, so the history of Mithilā as described in the Upaniṣads is of the period at least from the 8th century B.C. onward.

In the *Bṛd.* Janaka has been mentioned as the king of the Videha country, who was a great patron of scholars and a great philosophers himself. He was well-known for his generosity to the philosophers. Ajātaśatru, the Kāśi King had requested Gārgaya Bālāki not to go to Janaka and to remain with him as he was ready to offer thousands of cows for which Janaka was famous. This simple event shows the interest of the Videha king in the advancement of learning, whose material prosperity facilitated the growth of Indian philosophy. He occupied the highest position for his scholarship among his contemporaries of the equal designation. He was not merely a patron of scholars but also a great religious king who performed the Bahudakṣiṇā sacrifice in which the Brāhmaṇas even from the distant lands also were invited. The Kuru and the Pañchāla Brāhmaṇs had come to take part

in the performance of that sacrifice. Since the earliest times Mithilā has remained as one of the strongholds of the Vedic Karmakāṇḍa and the same is seen during the time of the Upaniṣads also.

The Vedic rituals were vehemently criticised and were regarded as fruitless, yet the Vedic King Janaka did not abandon the Vedic injunction and performed the sacrifice on a large scale. The king offered cows and gold to the Brāhmaṇas. But the most interesting feature of that sacrifice was the holding of a learned debate by king Janaka in order to know the most prominent philosopher and scholar (*Brahmavida*) among the Brāhmaṇas assembled on that occasion. He had declared the prize of one thousand cows for the most prominent *Brahmavida*. This announcement was an open challenge to the learned scholars; and Yājñavalkya came forward and accepted the challenge to prove himself as the best *Brahmavida* but the other scholars did not accept him to be so; and a large number of them discussed with him on various aspects of philosophy. Those who questioned him were Ārtabhāga, Lāhyāyani Bhujpa, Chākrāyaṇa Uṣasta, Kauṣitakeya Kahola, Gārgi the daughter of Vacakunki, Āruni Uddālaka and Śākalya. Yājñavalkya with the help of his dominating superb knowledge and excellent logic defeated them one by one and proved himself as the best philosopher. This event also shows that Janaka was a patron of learning and contributed his share to the cause of the advancement of philosophy by holding learned discussions and offering prizes to the victorious ones.

Perhaps the victory of Yājñavalkya over his contemporaries brought him nearer to Janaka who became his closest friend and patronised him in his court. He always held discussion with him on the philosophical subjects. The Bṛd. shows that Janaka was like the king Milinda in his intuition and desire of gaining knowledge and Yājñavalkya was like Nāgasena in his vast philosophical knowledge. Yājñavalkya was the most prominent scholar of his time. He had obtained knowledge from the famous Achāryas, namely, Jitvā, the son of Śilina, Udaṅka, the son of Śulva, Varku the son of Vṛṣṇa, Gardavivipita of Bhāradvāja Gotra, Satyakama-Jābāla and from Śākalya vidagdha. The Upaniṣads do not throw light on his personal life except that he had two wives namely Maitreyi and Kātyāyani. He spent his Gārhasthika life for a long time, remained in the court of Janaka and at last offered Saṁyāsa.

The most difficult problem is the identification of Janaka as we know that this name was a defaustic title of the kings. The *Brd.* does not say any thing about from the Purāṇas we learn that Janaka of the *Bṛd.* is Kṛti Janaka, the 19th king in the line of the Siradhvaja Janaka. This Janaka was a close friend of Yājñavalkya, who was a disciple of Hiraṇyanābha Kauśalya. It is known from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa that Kṛti also was a disciple of Hiraṇyanābha. The Vāyu confirms that Kṛti was the son of a king "Nṛpātmaja" and was the pupil of Hiraṇyanābha. Thus we see that Kṛti Janak is the Janaka of the *Bṛd* and was the classmate of Yājñavalkya, perhaps this ways the reason of the future intimacy between the two. Yājñavalkya had defeated Uddālaka, the son of Aruṇi in the discussion held on the occasion of the performance of the Vehudakṣiṇa yajña by Janaka. He (Uddālaka) and a certain veda were class friends. Janamejaya Parikṣita had requested veda to become his priest in the Nāgasatra. So, Uddālaka Aruni, Janamejaya Parikṣita, Veda, Hiraṇyanabha, Yājñavalkya and Janaka Kṛti were contemporaries to each other. Ajātaśatru, the Kāśi king and Jaibali Pravāhaṇa, the

Pāñchāla king were the contemporaries of Janaka Kṛti. Svetaketu, the son of Uddālaka Āruni and Kauṣitaki Kahoda discussed with Yājñavalkya. The *Mbh.* informs that Kahoda was the pupil and son-in-law of Uddālaka, the father of Śvetaketu.

The Upaniṣads do not give informations regarding the condition of the people during the time of Janaka, but with the help of some scanty references we may say that the king loved his subjects, he was the patron of learning ad performed the Yajña for his welfare and for the well-being of his subject also. The *Bṛd.* furnishes some important information regarding this subject. It shows that the king visited the villages within his territories and during the king's tour the Ugrakarmā Sūta and the Elders of the village arranged for king's comforts like Boarding and lodging, they waited on him and accompanied him in his tours. The Ugrakarmā Sūta has been designated as the officer-in-charge of the village administration along with the elders in the village. The king visited the villages for getting first hand knowledge of the people's condition in order to remove difficulties for performing more welfare works for them. The Sūta has been regarded as the Ugrakarmā the performer of the ferocious works. It seems that the Ugrakarmā Sūta was a police officer to look after the safety of the villagers from the dacoits and the evil-doers, so naturally his works were *Ugra*. The Brāhmaṇas, namely the Śatapatha, *Taittirīya* and the *Taittirīya Saṁhita* mention the Sūta as one of the eleven Ratnins. In the Mauryan civil list of the *Arthaśāstra* he is placed among minor officers who got 1000 a year. He is the later historiographer whom Yuwan Chwang found in the empire of Harṣa whose duty was to register good and evil events. But during the earliest times his works were related to the administration of the villages as the Bṛd. shows. It seems that during the Upaniṣadic period he was a police-cum-civil officer in charge of the village administration. More than this we get nothing regarding the political condition and more details may not be naturally expected from the Upaniṣads regarding this matter but we may rightly say that everything went well.

Scanty reference to social condition are also found. A general study of the *Bṛd.* shows that the people of the Videha country were more peaceful and inclined to learning, but it was not enough. They were skilled archers and soldiers and well known for being unrivalled fighters in the battle field. The Purāṇas, the *Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Aṣṭādhyāyi* also confirms the same thing. They were equally well versed both in pen and sword, and due to these two characteristic the Videhas distinguished themselves from their contemporaries.

The society was organised on the basis of the traditional system of the Varna and Āśrama. The Brāhmaṇas and the Kṣatriyas had secured the highest position in the society. It is a special characteristic of the age that the Kṣatriyas equalled themselves with the Brāhmaṇas in the spiritual knowledge and the latter came to the former for solving their doubts. As a class the Brāhmaṇas were much respected due to their scholarship.

The position of woman was fairly high. Polygamy was in prevalence and even a philosopher like Yājñavalkya had two wives named Maitreyi and Kātyāyani. The wives were the equal heirs in the husband's property and during his life time the husband could divide the property between the two wives provided he wished to offer Saṃyās. But material prosperity was not all in all as was the view of Maitreyi who declined to have share in her husband's property and

requested him to impart 'spiritual knowledge to her which was the permanent source of happiness and the means of salvation. The women were not only the Gṛhaswāminis but were highly educated and challenged the great philosophers also. Maitreyi, the wife of Yājñavalkya was a Brahmavādini. Likewise Gārgi, the daughter of Vachaknuki was the most prominent women philosopher of her time whose intellect and scholarship are well preserved in the *Bṛd*. Her discussion with Yājñavalkya shows that the women were highly educated. Yājñavalkya the unrivalled philosopher at last threatened her with the bad consequences of the *Atipraśna* and thus silenced her, who spoke of him as being unparalleled in the philosophical knowledge as on one was able to defeat him. These are only a few examples which show the high position of the woman in the society; who could study the Vedas and discussed with the male scholars in open learned debates. It seems that there were no purdah and illiteracy among the women.

The people gave more attention to education. The common type of education is not referred to, yet Yājñavalkya has advanced a principle heard from his father that the teacher should not accept any thing in the form of the gift offered by the pupils prior to the completion of their education, and this statement occurs six times in the *Bṛd*. This was the principle of imparting education to the students and thus certainly the poor economic condition was never a hindrance to the academic career of a man. The teachers performed selfless service to the society. The advancement of learning did not lag behind due to lack of fund. The teachers were never to suffer from hunger because they were supported by the State. We have seen that in the Yajñas the kings offered cows and gold to the Brāhmaṇas and on many other occasions also they got the same. The king's doors were always open to the scholars for their financial support. The adequate State support for the advancement of learning was the main reason for the growth of philosophy. A large number of the subjects were taught as the four Vedas Itihāsa, Purāṇa, Vidyā, Upaniṣada, Śloka, Sūtra, Anuvyākhyāna and Vyākhyāna etc. Though it is not mentioned but the Āśramas of the sages were the popular centres of learning. It may be assumed that the percentage of literacy was very high in the Videha country.

The means of recreation are also referred to. Dundubhi, Saṅkh and Vinā have been mentioned by the Sage Yājñavalkya. Those were played upon for producing sweets sound for recreation. Viṇā is one of the most ancient musical instruments and was of two types, known as the Vāna and Viṇā respectively. The former type had 100 strongs. The Sāmaveda mentions five types of the Viṇā named Alābū Vakrā, Kapiśirṣā, Mahāviṇā and Śālaviṇā. Perhaps all these types were known to the people during the Upaniṣadic age also. Saṅkha and Dundubhi also were well-known musical instruments of hoary antiquity and had religious importance also.

Though there are no direct reference to the economic condition of the Videha country in the Upaniṣads yet we get some ideas indirectly. The performance of the Bahudakṣiṇa Yajña by the videha king Janaka shows that the country was rich and the Rājakośa had abundance of wealth because a king with this right budget could not perform it. He offered cows to the Brāhmanas in thousands of number and requested Yājñavalkya on many occasions to accept cows which gave birth to oxen equal in strength to the elephants. This shows that the Videha country had the best type of the cattle wealth and the

state took much care of the welfare of the cattle. The fertile soil of the Videha country yielded foodgrains. The country was rich. Trade and commerce were not neglected. The *Bṛd.* mentions the bullock carts with heavy loads. Chariots and the boats were the means of communication.

The Society had passed the experimental stage of the coin-evolution and gold coins were in use as Ten *Svarṇa-Pādas* were tied to the horns of each of the 1000 cows offered by Janak to the most prominent Brāhmavida on the occasion of the performance of the Bahudakṣiṇa sacrifice. Svarṇapāda certainly was 1/4th of the then complete one gold coin. On the evidence of *Pāṇini* it may be said that during his times also the Svarṇa was a type of the gold coin and the person possessing two svarṇa was known as the *Dvisvarṇaḍhanaha*. Svarṇa as it seems was a manufactured coin. According to Kauṭilya the weight of Svarṇa was one Korṣa i.e. 150 grains or 80 Guñjas. He refers to Sauvarṇika and Rupyasuverṇama many times in the Arthaśāstra. The Udaya Jataka mentions the Suvarṇamā-ṣaka. Kautilya informs that Māṣa is the 1/16th part of the karṣa so it was of 5 Rattis, thus the Svarnapāda was of 4 Māṣas or of 20 Rattis. So the Svarṇa was a manufactured coin of gold and was used in daily life of transactions. Its antiquity goes back at least upto the 8th century B.C. Thus we see that the Videha country was very rich and its economic prosperity was the main reason for its advancement in the academic field as only the prosperous people can give their best attention to this subject.

In due course, the Ṛgvedic simple sacrifices became very complicated and the people lost the real meaning of the religion. The Upaniṣads are a reaction against the Karmakāṇḍa of the Vedas and the *Munḍakopaniṣad* denouces the Vedic sacrifices as fruitless. Yet inspite of this criticism the people in the Videha country had their unshakable faith in the vedic rituals. It was believed that the persons may get Immortality with the help of Agni and vāka, who were the vedic Gods. We have seen that even Janaka, the Jñani king had performed the Bahudakṣiṇa sacrifice on a large scale. The five performers of the yajña namely the Yajamāna, Ṛtvika, Aḍhvaryu, Udagātā and Hoā, and the three types of the Ṛchās to be recited on the occasion of the performation of the sacrifices, are referred to. It was popularly believed that the performer of the Aśvamedha goes to the heaven.

The people had faith in one, three, thirty-three and in 3303 gods, but the most prominent were only the 33 gods namely the eight Vasus, eleven Rudras, Twelveādi-tyas, Indra and Prajāpati respectively. They believed that the birth and death occur only due to the karma. Which is the main basis for the attainment of the Lokas namely the Devloka, the Pitṛloka and the Manuṣyaloka. The nature of the Brahma and of the soul are well described by Yājñavalkya in his discussions with Āruṇiudālaka and with Gārgi. The soul is Immortal, Agrāhya, Asprsya, Asaṁga and Avaddha. The Brahmȧ is Aparimeya, unmeasurable; Dhruva, Immovable; Nirmal, Pure; Sukṣma, not easily to be seen; Ajanmā; Mahāna and Avināsi, the Brahma cannot be realised by verbal talks as it is only the exercise of the mouth.

The fundamental philosophy of the *Brd.* which embodies the view of Yājñavalkya, the Great philosopher in the court of Janaka is that renunciation is the condition of the attainment of Immortality. The temporal and the sensual objects are like the Grahas which give sufferings to the people. So, for getting permanent

happiness it is necessary to discard the desires. Later on the Buddha also advanced the same principle *i.e.*, discard the desires for the attainment of Nirvāṇa.

Thus, this is the picture of Mithilā, the Videha country of the upaniṣads. She witnessed during this period a gallaxy of scholars, ȧdvancement of learning, economic prosperity, religious, ferments, social developments and of all the region of the philosopher king Janaka Kṛti. No country except Videha is described in such a detail and it was certainly on account of her prominence among other countries from which she distinguished herself in many respect.

Abbreviations

Sat. Br.-Śatapatha Brāḥmaṇa.
Bṛd.-Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada.
Mbh.-The Mahābhārata
Vāl. Rām.-The Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa.
Sank. SSI.-Saṁskrita Sāhitva ka Saṁkṣipta Itihāsa.

MUDGALOPANIṢAD, THE

He Mudgalopaniṣad is one of the minor and later Upaniṣads. Its first part consists of nine ślokas in which an attempt is made to explain the substance of the Puruṣa-sūkta (RV. 10, 90)—which, so to say, is the foundation stone of Viṣṇuite philosophy—, and to identify the Primeval Person with Viṣṇu. Section two—like three and four written in prose—pretends to be the résumė of esoteric instruction imparted by (Viṣṇu) Vāsudeva to Indra, the representative of those inhabitants of the universe who are not yet initiated into the secret knowledge of Bhāgavatism and final emancipation. He teachings themselves are in substantial agreement with the main tenets of epic and post-epic, especially pāñcarātric, Viṣṇuism with regard to the relations between the One—who is not only the origin of the world but also the cause of final emancipation-and the evolved universe, with occasional references to the vyūha doctrine, Brahmā's function as a demiurge etc. Section three deals with the various aspects and manifestations of the Highest Being and the effects of identificatory worship. After having enumerated some of the negative qualities of the Highest and explained their character, the last section enlarges upon the good results of the study of this work and the precautions to be taken in teaching it.

Thus this small Upaniṣad is one of the documents attesting to the long process of penetration of older ('Vedic') doctrine and traditions by younger, so-called Hinduistic, and in case Viṣṇuite doctrines, to the endeavour, on the part of Viṣṇuite teachers, to support their own beliefs and theories by Vedic authority, to harmonize them to Vedic lore, and to adapt the latter to the requirements of their own milieu and times. He importance of the Veda is no less emphasized then Viṣṇu's identity with the Original one and Highest, the study of the Vedic corpus is regarded as no less essential than initiation into the esoteric doctrines of his devotees. He author's view of the process of creation and the relation between *the* One and the world is, as compared with, for instance, definite Pāñcarātra texts, rather uncomplicated;: one fourth of Puruṣa Nārayaṇa. *viz.* Aniriddha Nārayaṇa, orders Brahmā to create the universe by means of self-immolation and emanation. He phraseology of the small work, while sometimes reminiscent of the Bhagavadgītā and epic and Pāñcarātric terminology, has much in common with that of other upaniṣads of the same class; some expressions seem however to have been peculiar to it, although they may occur in non-upaniṣadic texts.

He Pūruṣasūkta is incorporated in those Vedic texts which deal with the *puruṣamedha* or Human Sacrifice. Whereas other texts give this rite the character of a real human sacrifice, by which one can reach that which is not reached by the *aśvamedha* (ŚŚŚ. 16, 10, 1), the White Yajurveda, enjoining that the victims be released, describes it as a symbolic' rite (ŚB. 13, 6, 2, 13). According to ŚB. 13, 6, 1, 1, extending the idea of the Puruṣasūkta, this ritual performance of five days (*pañcarātram*) was mentally seen by Puruṣa, then already called Nārāyana—according to the Anukramaṇī the inspired poet of the sūkta—who succeeded by it in surpassing all beings and in identifying himself with "this All" (*idaṃ sarvam*), i.e. with the totality of existence. He man who reiterates this primeval sacred act will, the text continues, attain the same result. He number of the stanzas of the sūkta (sixteen) is an essential element in this performance, because Totality is, like Puruṣa himself (ŚŚŚ. 16, 14, 16) sixteen-fold (SB, 13, 6, 2, 12). What is of special interest, is the prescript given SB. 13, 6, 2, 20: after having caused his sacrificial fires to enter into himself and having worshipped the sun with the Uttara-Nārāyana litany (VS. 31, 17-22, immediately following on the Pūruṣasūkta 31, 1-16, taken with some transpositions and variations from ṚV., 10, 90; see also TĀ. 3, 12, 1 ff.), the sacrificer should go to the forest not to return home (*araṇyam iyād apunargṛhāya*, comm.); besides, *the* should not impart (the secret of) this sacrifice to anyone. He commentary on KŚS. 21, 1, 17 speaks in this connection of an entrance into another stage in life (*āśrama*-). That means, that after having himself ritually identified with the All, the sacrificer may—already in the view of these 'Vedic' authorities-become what later is called an anchoret or *saṃnyāsin*.

In order to evaluate the significance attributed to the sūkta by these authorities and its historical connections it is necessary to remember that the stanzas of the Puruṣa-Nārāyaṇa litany (as it is called SB. 13, 6, 2, 12). Which are recited over the assembled human victims (cf. e.g. ĀpŚS. 20, 24, 10 and see ŚSS. 16, 13, 1; VaitS. 37, 19; AVŚ. 19, 6) were in the Vedic ritual according to some authorities also used to consecrate, in building the great fire place (ĀpŚS. 16, 28, 3; TĀ. 3, 12), the human figure made of bricks. We know that Agni, the fire place, is the Puruṣa who is ritually 'rebuilt' and that the sacrificer who knows thus is identified with the reintegrated god and thus attains to a transformation or a higher stage of existence. He sūkta is moreover (ĀpŚS. 20, 20, 2 etc.) recited over the sacrificer of the *aśvamedha* at the moment of his unction which is to confer upon him the benefits of the unction of the *rājasūya* and that of the *vājapeya*, an auction being intended to disintegrate and reintegrate the sacrificer, and to mark his 'rebirth' out of the sacrifice and his identification with the Cosmic Man; the sheet of gold which is placed on his head helps to make him surpass the normal human condition.

In the course of time ṚV. 10, 90, came to accompany ritual acts related to Viṣṇu, to whose devotees the idea of reintegration—and hence emancipation—through sacrifice on the basis of the identification of Viṣṇu and Puruṣa made a strong appeal. It occurs MŚS. 11, 4, 5 in prescriptions for a ceremony in connection with the lunar mansion Āśleṣa; here it is—after the Savitar formula addressed to Savitar and the Soma satnza ṚV. 10, 57, 6 to Soma etc.-to accompany libations offered to that god. He Vaikhānasas—who believe that Nārā-yaṇa is the Highest Brahman to be reached by meditation and concentration (VaikhSS. 10, 7)—prescribe it in the *baki*

offering to Nārāyaṇa, who is explicitly called the god with a thousand heads, the highest Puruṣa, the highest brahman etc. and the cause of All, whose soul (*ātman*) is the sacrifice (VaikhSS. 10, 10), together with TS. 1, 2, 13, i-o = ṚV.1, 154, 1 "I shall proclaim the mighty deeds of Viṣṇu", and further in the Viṣṇu-pūjā described iidem 4, 11 and 12. He devotee who performs these rites will reach Viṣṇu's highest abode there to be happy and prosperous. He first word of the sūkta is TĀ. 10, 11, 1 the beginning of a characterization of Nārāyaṇa as the Highest God and his MahNārU. 235 followed by some other epithets and an identification with the same Nārāyaṇa.

In a long and very interesting-though no doubt later—passage of the Ṛgvidhāna this sūkta—which dealing with creation contains many forms of the verb *jan*—"to be born"—is prescribed in a rite for obtaining a son—the person concerned will at the same time obtain "a thousand", i.e. become the All (cf. ŚB. 8, 7, 4, 11) and go to the highest place of Viṣṇu—; for that purpose one should praise twelve aspects of that god in the twelve months of the year and one's wife must, after adoring Nārāyaṇa, eat the remnants of the oblation (ṚVidh.3,26,1 ff.) The relation to a cosmogony becomes here also the exemplary model for any "creation" and for any "new beginning" The author adds a long explanation of the homage to be paid, with this sūkta, to Viṣṇu which will lead to the absorption in *brahman*, as well as the practical rules connected with the text and relating to a *nyāsa* rite of tantric character, *pūjā*, i.e. worship of Viṣṇu with the stanzas of the sūkta, a hymn of praise, advising also to mutter—for the sake of re-integration—the sūkta always while dwelling in the wilderness (then the man who loves Him truly will see God Nārāyaṇa, the eternal creator) or while living in the words as a householder.

He Mudgala-Upanisad is, as already observed, another document attesting to the "viṣṇuization" of an important Vedic text and to the endeavour of Viṣṇuite circles to give their doctrines a Vedic substratum. In details its Viṣṇuite interpretation of the sūkta is curiously different from a similar attempt undertaken by the author of the Ahirbudhnya-Saṃhitā, 59, 2-39.

As to the title of the text it may be recalled that Mudgala is the reputed author of the very difficult sūkta ṚV. 10, 102, which according to Geidner relates the story of the old ṛṣi Mudgala who undertakes a chariot-race with an ox-cart and one single steer, putting the yoke also upon a block of wood which, replacing the second drought-animal, appears to smash up the competitors. Mudgala's young wife, who holds the reins, wins the race. This text was, in my opinion, by L. VON Schroeder and others misunderstood as "eine Art Scherzdrama". It may, with all proper reserve, rather be asked whether the author had in view an achievement during a raid under enormous disadvantages, and whether the recitation of his poem was to reiterate hie-et-nunc the successful result of a similar undertaking. Anyhow, the commentator Durga provides us with a remark about the supernormal power (*aiśvarya-*) with which Mudgala drove the block of wood (*drughaṇa-*). Since the names of Mudgala and his father Bhṛmyaśva (mentioned in Nirukta 9, 23=9, 2, 3) occur, together with Indrasenā (who, though now a daughter-in-law to Mudgala, is identical with Mudgala's wife in ṚV. 10, 102; cf. st. 2) also in purāṇic texts, where they are presented to us as members of the royal house of the Pañcālas, who were, or became, also Brahmans, some legendary fact may perhaps be assumed to underlie the information given by the commentators.

There do not seem to be serious reasons for excluding the possibility that this supranormally powerful (Durga) and unconventional ṛṣi is identical with Mudgala who AVŚ. 4, 29, 6 (AVP. 4, 38, 6) is, together with Medhātithi, Triśoka, Uśanas Kāvya, Gotama and many others, called a favourite of Varuṇa and Mitra, the gods who favour the man who holds to truth and reality in conflicts (st. 1;2) and "whose chariot, of true track, of straight reins, goes to the detriment of him who behaves falsely" (st. 7). In TB. 2, 5, 6, 5 Mudgala's family (descendants) are said to strengthen with oblations (the goddess of) the medicinal plant *sībāla* which grows on the Himālaya and is implored to bestow wealth on those speaking.

More information about this ṛṣi can be derived from the Mahābhārata (3, 246 f. cr. ed.). Vyāsa, relating—in order to illustrate the merit of bestowing even a slight gift in a pure spirit—the story of Mudgala, describes him as a virtuous sage who lived in Kurukṣetra by picking up very small amounts of food from ears of corn celebrating however the sattra called *iṣṭīkṛta*—which 3, 229, 1 is said to have been performed by Prajāpati himself—and the Full and New Moon rites and feeding hundreds of Brahmans. He naked and frantic *ṛṣi Durvāsas* after repeatedly eating up all his food and insulting him without arousing anger or agitation on Mudgala's part, told him that in reward *He* should go to heaven (*svargam*) in his present body (*sasarirah*). Immediately a celestial messenger appeared and invited him to ascend his chariot, adding that *He* has attained the highest state of perfection (*saṃsiddhim*). Mudgala, after having listened to the messenger's exposition of the advantages and disadvantages of a sojourn in the heavenly regions, did not desire to follow the messenger but expressed his intention to seek that "place" (*sthānam*) where people do not lament and are not subject to pain or agitation. At this point some Devanāgarī manuscripts belonging to the central group insert four ślokas which have also been included in printed editions and, for instance, in Roy's translation. These ślokas lend a decidedly Viṣṇuite character to the whole passage in contradistinction to the no doubt older and more authentic shorter text, according to which Mudgala bade farewell to the messenger and resumed, perfectly content, his ascetic and meditative life, so as to attain, not only "power by means of mental concentration" but also "that supreme state of emancipation which is regarded as eternal perfection" (*śāsvatīṃ siddhiṃ parāṃ nirvāṇalakṣaṇām*). The inserted ślokas run as follows: "Mudgala asked the messenger to inform him about another "world" (*lokam*) which is free from defects. Thereupon the messenger of the gods said: "Above the seat of Brahman there is the supreme place (the well-known *paramaṃ padam*) of Viṣṇu, pure, eternal light, known as *pram brahma*. There cannot repair persons who are attached to the objects of the senses, nor can those subject to arrogance, convetousness, anger, infatuation and perfidy. Only those who are disinterested (*nirmamāḥ*), free from egotism (*nirahaṃkārāh*), and from the pairs of conflicting opposites (*nirdvandvāh*), who have restrained their senses and are engaged in concentration (*dhyāna*—) and yoga have access to that (world)".* Notice the reminiscences of the Bhagavadgītā (2, 71; 12, 13; 5, 28; 16, 4, 12; 18; 18; 53). This insertion in the Mahābhārata and the attribution of the contents of the Mudgalopaṇiṣad to him are both indicative of the same tendency, viz. to make the person to this famous ancient rsi subservient to Viṣṇuite propaganda.

As already noticed Mudgala occurs, beside other persons of the same name,

also in some purāṇas. According to ViP. 3, 4, 22 and VāP. 60, 64 (cf. 65, 107) *the* was one of the five pupils of Śākalya—who is held to be the arranger of the pada text of the Ṛgveda—to whom this teacher gave a recension of that text. He Viṣṇu-Saṃhitā makes mention of a Maudgala-Saṃhitā. He Mudgala-Purāṇa must be left undiscussed here.

Another point of interest is that Mudgala's wife Indrasenā is likewise in some manuscripts of the epos (Mbh. 3, 113, 24; 4, 21, 8)—no doubt as the result of a tendency of Viṣṇuization of these figures—given the patronymicum Nārāyaṇī, which can hardly have another meaning than "daughter of, or relating to, Nārāyaṇa".

Translation

I am the full Brahman, (which is) the object of the illustrious Puruṣasūkta, the body of which is Full Bliss and which is celebrated as the Highest Puruṣa.

1.1 We shall explain in detail (the conclusion of an investigation into) the significance of the Puruṣasūkta. In the Puruṣasaṃhitā the substance of the Puruṣasūkta is taught summarily. In stanza 1 the word *sa* ("*He*") signifies the Infinite One (Ananta). And thus the utterance *daśāṅgulam* "in the length of ten fingers" declares (him to be) an endless number of yojanas in extent.

1.2 With the first (stanza) of this (sūkta) Viṣṇu's universal pervasion (omnipresence) is stated with respect to place. With the second the universal pervasion (omnipresence) of this Viṣṇu is spoken of with respect to time.

1.3 And with the third it is then told that Viṣṇu grants final emancipation. With the mantra beginning with "so great" (the author informs of us) Hari's high-power-and-greatness (*vaibhavam*).

1.4 And with *the* same mantra the alternatively states that (Hari is) the One of four vyūhas. With the stanza beginning with *tripād* ("with three quarters", i.e. 4) Aniruddha's high-power-and-greatness is taught.

1.5 With the stanza beginning with "from him Virāj (was born" i.e. 5) is pointed out the Origin of prakṛti and puruṣa from Pāda Nārāyaṇa (who really is) Hari.

1.6 With stanza 6 the sacrificial rite relating to creation is spoken of, (and it is) related that it had seven paridhis (sticks laid round a sacrificial fire to keep it together) and fuel-sticks.

1.7 With stanza 7 the sacrificial rate relating to creation is spoken of, and with the same mantras final emancipation is also spoken of.

1.8 With stanza 8 the creation of the world of living beings (*jagat-*) is spoken of. With the two mantras beginning with "I know" the high-power-and-greatness of Hari is related.

1.9 "With the sacrificial rite" (st. 16) a resume is (to conclude with) given of creation and final emancipation, for the man who knows this thus will be emancipated.

2. Now in the Mudgalopaniṣad the high-power-and-greatness of the Puruṣasūkta is thus explained in detail. After having taught to Indra the higher knowledge concerning the Bhagavat, Vāsudeva informed him, as *the* behaved reverentially in order to hear the subtle details, also that which constituted the highest esoteric doctrine with the two Puruṣasūktas, viz. the two sections. (For) they pass for two sections (of the same text). *He* who is mentioned here, the Person (Puruṣa), after having abandoned the sphere which is inaccessible to name, form and knowledge and is excessively difficult to be known by those who abide in the saṃsāra, has, urged by the desire to seize (in order to rescue) gods and other

(beings) who are completely tormented by the afflictions (*kleśa*) and so on, assumed his appearance (*veṣa-*) which is excellent because its limbs-and-parts consist of a thousand component elements (parts: *kalā-*) and which gives final emancipation merely by being seen. Having penetrated with that appearance the world, i.e. the earth and so on, *the* projected over (a distance of an) endless (number of yojanas). Puruṣa Nārāyaṇa was that which has been, what is (or, is on the point of becoming) and what will be. *He* was also the granter of final emancipation to all (beings). And *He* is superior to (greater than) all greatness. Nobody is superior to Him (greater than *He*). The Great Puruṣa, after having divided himself into four, was with three-fourths in the highest firmament. By the other fourth, viz., Aniruddha-Nārāyaṇa all things came to exist. *He*, then Pāda Nārāyaṇa, created nature (*prakṛti-*) in order to emanate the world (*jagat-*). (For), being complete of body *He* did not know how to perform the emanation (immediately). The, Aniruddha-Nārāyaṇa, taught him how to emanate: "O Brahmā, after having contemplated Thine organs of sense as performers of the sacrificial rite, having contemplated (Thy) solid joint-body which is the sheath (*kiśa*) as the oblation, having contemplated Me as the enjoyer of the oblation, having contemplated spring-time as the sacrificial butter, contemplating summer as the fuel, contemplating autumn-time as the juice and having thus poured oblations into the fire (Thy) body (*kalevara-*) is because of bodily contact regarded as Vajra. Thereupon having emanated the (living individual) souls (*jīva-*) of all sentient beings (*prāṇin-*) which (are to) fulfil each his own function (and) which will become manifest later on—, then the world (*jagat-*) which consists of immovable and movable (beings and entities) will come into existence. It is worth investigating that through this relation between the soul of the living being (*jīva-*) and the universal soul (*ātman-*) the nature of final emancipation is also described. *He* who understands this sacrificial act concerning the emanation (understands also) the nature of final emancipation and obtains a full duration of life.

3. He One God having entered in many ways, though not being born, is born in many ways and places. He adhvaryus worship-and-recognize Him as Agni. For as *yajuḥ He* enjoins this All (the universe). The chandogas as sāman. For on this All (the universe) is firmly established. He serpents as poison. Those who are versed in ophiology as the serpent. He gods as (strengthening) nourishment (*ūrj-*). Men as goods. He asuras as the (suparnormal and incomprehensible) creative power (*māyā-*). The Fathers as the libations due to them (*svadhā-*). Those who are experts in 'demonology' (i.e. in the knowledge of the means of averting superhuman beings) as superhuman beings. He gandharvas as a handsome outward appearance. He apsarases as gandharva. In whatever manner one worship-and-recognizes Him that exactly one becomes. A brahman should therefore realize, by way of mental concentration, (*bhāvayet*) the identity of his own I (*aham iti*) and the Highest Brahman which has the form of the person (Puruṣa). *He* becomes of that nature (*rūpa*) who knows thus.

4. That Brahman is beyond the three afflictions (*tāpa-*), free from the six sheaths (*kośa-*), without the six waves (of existence), beyond the five sheaths, void of the six modifications of becoming and free from all other such characteristics. He three afflictions are that which, arises from oneself, that which comes to one from other beings and that which comes to one from the (divine) powers of nature; (and

that is) threefold. viz., doer, deed, what is to be done; knower knowledge, what is to be known; enjoyer, enjoyment, what is to be enjoyed. He six sheaths are skin, flesh, blood bones, tendons and marrow. He group of the six enemies consists of desire, anger, covetousness, infatuation, pride (conceit) and jealousy (enviousness). He five sheaths consists of food, breath (vitality), 'mind' (*manas-*), intelligence and bliss respectively. He six modifications of becoming are the *priyātman*, birth, growth, (decline of age after) maturity (*pariṇāma-*), decay and complete destruction. He six waves are hunger, thirst, sorrow, infatuation, old age, dying. He six embarrassments are family (*kula-*), kin (race, *gotra-*), caste, social class or order, stage in life (*āśrama*) and conditions (circumstances).

Through contact (*yoga-*) with these the Highest Person becomes a soul in a living being (*jīva-*), nothing else. *He* who studies this upaniṣad continually becomes purified by fire. *He* becomes purified by the air (*vāyu-*). *He* becomes purified by the sun. *He* becomes healthy and becomes prosperous (eminent etc., śrīmant-). The becomes rich in (the possession of) sons and grandsons. *He* becomes learned (knowing). *He* becomes rich in (the possession of) sons and grandsons. *He* becomes learned (knowing). *He* becomes purified of great sin. *He* becomes purified from (the evil consequences of) drinking spirituous liquor. *He* becomes a purified of (the sin of) intercourse with a woman with whom cohabitation is forbidden. *He* becomes purified of (the sin of) intercourse with his mother. He becomes purified of (the sin of) intercourse with his daughter or daughter-in-law. *He* becomes purified of (the sin of) stealing gold. *He* becomes purified of (the sin of) abandoning (one's) sacrificial bed and the milieu in which one has been born (*janman-*). *He* becomes purified of (the sin of) disobedience towards his spiritual guide. *He* becomes purified of (the sin of) sacrificing for a person for whom one must not offer sacrifices. *He* becomes purified of eating what is not to be eaten. *He* becomes purified of receiving (anything) from an ugra. *He* becomes purified of (the sin of sexually) approaching another's wife. *He* becomes free from the trouble (arising) from desire, anger. covetousness, infatuation, envy (malice) and so on. *He* becomes free from all manifestations of evil (*pāpa-*). *He* becomes the Person in his present existence. One should therefore not teach this meaning of the Puruṣasūkta which is exceedingly secret, the royal mystery, a mystery known only to the gods, more secret than secret, to one who is not consecrated. Nor to one who is not able to repeat the Veda. Nor to one who is not practising the sacrificial rites. Nor to one who is not a Viṣṇuite. Nor to one who does not apply himself to yoga. Nor to one who talks too much. Nor to one who speaks unkindly. Nor to one who does not (yet) know for a whole year. Nor to one who is discontent. *He* must not teach it to a person who has not studied the Veda. A spiritual guide, also when *the* knows thus, should, when *the* is wise, teach the meaning of the Puruṣasūkta in a pure place, under an auspicious *nakṣatra*, after having restrained his breaths, meditating on the Person (*puruṣa-*), to a pupil who has approached him (for instruction) in his right ear. He should not speak manifoldly. *He* becomes exhausted. *He* should give instruction to the ear (i.e. secret instruction) more than once. When *the* does so the student as well as the teacher become in this existence, the Person, thus the upaniṣad "Speech (is established) in my mind". Peace!

MUKṬIKOPANISHAḌ

Addressing with devotion and obedience Śri-Rāma—the Lord Hari, at the end of His Samāḍhi, who being Himself changeless is the witness of the thousands of changes of Buḍḍhi, and who ever rests in Swarūpa-Ḍhyāna (the meditation on Reality) while seated under the bejewelled dome of the palace in the lovely city of Ayoḍhyā, in the midst of Sīṭā, Bharaṭa and Soumiṭri (Lakshmaṇa) Śaṭrughna and others, eulogised day and night by Sanaka and other hosts of Munis, as well as by Vasistha, Śuka, and other devotees of Vishṇu—Hanūmān, after praising them, asked: "O Rāma, Thou art Paramāṭmā of the nature of Sachchiḍānanḍa. O foremost of the family of Raghu, I make prostrations to Thee again and again. O Rāma, I wish to know for the sake of emancipation, Thy nature as it really is. O Rāma, be Thou gracious enough to tell me that by which I shall be easily released from the bondage of mundane existence and by which I shall attain salvation."

(Śrī-Rāma replied:) "O mighty-armed one, well asked: hearken then to the truth uttered by Me. I am well established in Veḍānṭa (or the end of Veḍas or knowledge). Have thou recourse to Veḍānṭa well."

(Hanūmān again asked:) "O foremost of Raghus, what are Veḍānṭas? where do they abide? Pray enlighten me" (Śrī-Rāma replied:) "O Hanūmān, listen to me. I shall truly describe to you the nature of Veḍānṭa. Through the expiratory breath of Myself—Vishṇu, the Veḍas were generated as many. Like the oil in the sesamum seeds, Veḍānṭa is well established (or latent) in the Veḍas."

(Hanūmān asked again:) "O Rāma, how many are the Veḍas and their branches? O Rāghava, what are the Upanishaḍs? Please, through Thy grace, tell me truly."

(Śrī-Rāma said:) "Through the divisions of Ṛgveḍa and others, the Veḍas are said to be four in number. Their branches are many. So also the Upanishaḍs. In Ṛgveḍa, there are branches, 21 in number. O son of Vāyu, there are 109 branches in Yajurveḍa. O conqueror of enemies, there are 1,000 branches in Sāmaveḍa. O best of Monkeys, there are 50 branches in Aṭharvaṇaveḍa. In each branch, there is one Upanishaḍ. Whoever with devotion to Me studies even one of the Ṛks (hymns) in these attains the state of absorption, rare for the Munis to attain."

(Hanūmān asked:) "O Rāma, some excellent Munis have said there is one kind of salvation only, while others [stated that salvation is attained] through the uttering of Thy name or the initiation into Ṭāraka (Om) at Kāśī (Benares); others through Sāṅkhya-Yoga, others through the Yoga of Devotion; other Mahārshis through the meditation upon the meaning of Māhavākyas (the sacred sentences of the Veḍas). Salvation is stated to be of four kinds through the divisions of Sālokya and others."

(Śrī-Rāma replied:) "There is only one true emancipation. O Kapi (Monkey), even a person addicted to evil practices attains the salvation of Sālokya (My world) through the uttering of My name, but not of other worlds. Should one die in Brahma-nāḷa (the lotus-stalk—also street) in Kāśī, he attains My Ṭāraka (Manṭra). Such a person attains salvation without any rebirth; wherever he may die in Kāśī, Maheśwara initiates him by whispering My Ṭāraka (Manṭra) into his right ear. Such person, freed from all sins, attains My Swarūpa (Form). It is this that is termed Sālokya-Sārūpya salvation. The twice-born who is of virtuous conduct and who, without diverting his intelligence on any other, meditates upon Me, the All-Aṭmā, attains Sāmipya (nearness) to Me.

"It is this that is termed Sālokya-Sārūpya-Sāmīpya salvation. The twice-born who according to the path opened by the teacher, meditates upon My immutable Reality attains Sāyujya (absorption) into Me, like the caterpillar into the wasp. This is the Sāyujya salvation which is productive of Brāhmic bliss and auspicious. Thus these kinds of salvation arise through the Upāsanā (worship) of Me.

"The only means by which the final emancipation is attained is through Māṇḍūkya-Upanishaḍ alone, which is enough for the salvation of all aspirants. If Jñāna is not attained thereby, study the 10 Upanishaḍs; thou shalt soon attains Jñāna, and then My Seat. O son of Añjanā, if thy Jñāna is not made firm, practise (study) well the 32 Upanishaḍs. Thou shalt get release. If thou longest after Viḍehamukṭi (or disembodied salvation), study the 108 Upanishaḍs. I will truly state in order the (names of the) Upanishaḍs with their Sānṭi (purificator Mantras). Hearken to them. (They are:) Īśa, Kena, Katha, Praśna, Muṇda, Māṇḍūkya, Ṭiṭṭiri, Aiṭareya, Chhānḍogya, Bṛhaḍāraṇyaka, Brahma, Kaivalya, Jābāla, Śweṭāśwaṭara, Hamsa, Aruṇi, Garbha, Nārāyaṇa, (Parama)-Hamsa, (Amṛṭa)-Binḍu, (Amṛṭa)-Nāḍa, (Aṭharva)-Śira, (Aṭharva)-Śikhā, Maiṭrāyaṇī, Kaushīṭaki, (Bṛhaṭ)-Jābāla, (Narasihma)-Tāpanī, Kālāgniruḍra, Maiṭreyī, Subāla, Kshurikā, Manṭrikā, Sarvasāra, Nirālamba, (Śuka)-Rahasya, Vajrasūchikā, Ṭejo-(Binḍu), Nāḍa-(Binḍu), Dhyāna-(Binḍu), (Brahma)-Viḍyā, Yoga-Ṭaṭṭwa, Āṭmaboḍhaka, Parivrāt (Nāraḍa-Parivrājaka), (Ṭri)-Śikhī, Sīṭā, (Yoga)-Chūḍā-(Maṇi) Nirvāṇa, Mandala-(Brāhmaṇa), Ḍakshiṇā-(Mūrṭi), Śarabha Skanḍa, (Tripāḍvibhūṭi)-Mahā-Nārāyaṇa, Aḍwaya-(Ṭāraka), (Rāma)-Rahasya, (Rāma)-Ṭāpanī, Vāsuḍeva, Muḍgala, Śāṇḍilya Paiṅgala, Bhikshu, Mahaṭ-Śārīraka, (Yoga)-Śikhā, Ṭurīyāṭīṭa Sannyāsa, (Paramahamsa)-Parivrājaka, Akshamālikā, Avyakṭa, Ekākshara, (Anna)-Pūrṇā, Sūrya, Akshi, Aḍhyāṭma, Kuṇdikā, Sāviṭr, ĪĀṭmā, Pāśupaṭa, Parabrahma, Avaḍhūṭa, Ṭripuraṭāpanī, Devī, Ṭripura, Kara, Bhāvanā, (Ruḍra)-Hṛḍaya, (Yoga)-Kuṇdalinī, Bhasma-(Jābāla) Ruḍrāksha, Gaṇapaṭi, Ḍarśana, Tārasāra, Mahāvākya, Pañchabrahma, (Prāṇa)-Agnihoṭra, Gopala-Tāpanī, Kṛshṇa, Yājñavalkya, Varāha, Śāṭyāyanī, Hayagrīva, Ḍaṭṭaṭreya, Gāruda, Kali-(Sanṭāraṇa), Jābāla, Soubhāgya, Saraswaṭīrahasya, Bahvricha, and Mukṭika. These 108 (Upanishaḍs) are able to do away with the three Bhāvanās [of doubt, vain thought, and false thought], conferring Jñāna and Vairāgya, and destroying the three Vāsanās [of book-lore, world and body].

"The twice-born—after learning the 108 Upanishaḍs, together with the Śāṇṭi as prescribed both before and after from the mouth of a Guru well versed in the observances of Veḍic knowledge and study—become Jīvanmukṭas till the destruction of their Prārabḍha; in course of time as Prārabḍha is destroyed, they attain My disembodied salvation. There is no doubt of it. O son of Vāyu, these 108 Upanishaḍs, which are the essence of all the Upanishaḍs, and are capable of destroying all sins through their mere study, have been imparted by Me to you as a disciple. This science of the 108 Upanishaḍs taught by Me, is occult one, and will free persons from bondage, whether they read them with or without knowledge. To gratify the desire of a supplicant, a kingdom may be given or wealth, but never shall the 108 Upanishaḍs be imparted to an atheist, an ungrateful person, one intent on vicious actions, one having no devotion towards Me, or one who loses his path in the cave of books. On no account shall they be given to one devoid of devotion. O Māruṭi,

it is only after a thorough examination that they should be imparted to a disciple doing serving (to a Guru), to a well disposed son, or to one devoted to Me, following good observances, belonging to a good family, and being of good intelligence. Whoever studies or hears the 108 Upanishaḍs attains Me. There is no doubt of this. This is stated in the Ṛk (verse) thus—Viḍyā (Saraswaṭī) went to a Brāhmaṇa (and addressed him) thus: 'Protect me. I shall be thy treasure. Do not confide me to the envious, to one not treading the right path, or to the rogue. Then I shall be potent.' Impart this Āṭmanishtha-Viḍyā relating to Vishṇu to one after well examining him who had studied much, is alert, intelligent, observant of the row of celibacy, and serving [the Guru]."

The Hanūmān asked Sri-Rāmachanḍra to relate the Śānṭi of each Upanishaḍ according to the divisions of Ṛgveḍa and others to which they belong. To which Śrī-Rāma replied: "Aiṭareya, Kaushīṭaki, Nāḍa-(Binḍu), Āṭma-Boḍha, Nirvāṇa, Muḍgala, Akshamālikā, Ṭripurā, Soubhāgya and Bahvricha— these 10 Upanishaḍs are of Ṛgveḍa and have the Śānṭi beginning with 'Vāṅme-Manasi, etc.' Īśa, Bṛahaḍāraṇyaka, Jābāla, Hamsa, (Parama)-Hamsa, Subāla, Manṭrikā, Nirālamba, Triśikhī-Brāhmaṇa, Maṇdala-Brāhmaṇa, Aḍwaya-Ṭāraka, Paiṅgala, Bhikshu, Ṭurīyāṭīṭa, Aḍhyāṭma, Tārasāra, Yājñavalkya, Sāṭyāyanī, and Mukṭika—these 19 Upanishaḍs are of Śukla Yajurveḍa and have the Śānti beginning with 'Pūrṇamaḍa, etc.'

"Katha, Ṭaṭṭiri, Brahma, Kaivalya, Śwetāśwaṭara, Garbha, Nārāyaṇa, (Amṛta)-Binḍu, (Amṛṭa)-Nāḍa, Kālāgniruḍra, Kshurikā, Sarvasāra, Śukarahasya, Ṭejo-(Binḍu), Dhyāna-(Binḍu), (Brahma)-Viḍyā, Yoga-Ṭaṭṭwa, Ḍakshiṇā-(Mūrṭi), Skanḍa, (Śāriraka, (Yoga)-Śikhā, Ekākshara, Akshi, Avaḍhūṭa, Kara, (Ruḍra)-Hṛḍaya, (Yoga)-Kuṇdalinī, Pañchabrahma, (Prāṇa)-Agnihoṭra, Varāha, Kali-(Sanṭāraṇa), and Saraswaṭirahasya,—these 32 Upanishaḍs are of Kṛshṇa Yajurveḍa and have the Śānṭi beginning with 'Sahanāvavaṭu, etc.'

"Kena, Chhānḍogya, Āruṇi, Maiṭrāyaṇī, Maiṭreyī, Vajra-sūchikā, (Yoga)-Chūḍā-(Maṇi), Vasuḍeva, Mahaṭ-Sannyāsa, Avyakṭa, Kuṇdikā, Sāviṭrī, Ruḍrāksha, Jābāla, Darśana, and Jābāli,—these 16 Upanishaḍs are of Sāmaveḍa and have the Śānti beginning with 'Āpyāyanṭu, etc.'

"Praśna, Muṇdaka, Māṇdūkya, (Aṭharva)-Śira, (Aṭharva)-Śikhā, (Bṛhaṭ)-Jābāla, (Nṛsihma)-Ṭāpanī, (Nāraḍa-Parivrājaka), Sīṭā, Śarabha, Mahā-Nārāyaṇa, (Rāma)-Rahasya, (Rāma)-Tāpanī, Śāndilya, (Paramahamsa)-Parivrājaka, (Anna)-Pūrṇā, Sūrya, Āṭma, Pāśupaṭa, Parabrahma, Ṭripuraṭāpanī, Devī, Bhāvanā, Bhasma-(Jābāla), Gaṇapaṭi, Mahāvākya, Gopāla-Ṭāpanī, Kṛshṇa, Hayagrīva, Ḍaṭṭāṭreya, and Gāruda,-these 31 Upanishaḍs of Aṭharvaṇa-Veda have the Śānṭi commencing with 'Bhaḍram-Karṇebhiḥ, etc.'

"Persons desirous of emancipation and having developed the four means of salvation should, with presents in their hands, approach a Guru full of faith, of good family, proficient in Veḍas, scripture-loving, of good qualities, straightforward, intent upon the welfare of all beings, and an ocean of compassion; and after studying under him, according to the rules, the 108 Upanishaḍs, he should ever be going through the process of studying, thinking and reflecting upon them. With the cessation of the three bodies through the destruction of Prārabḍha, they attain the state of Plenum without any Upāḍhis like the ether in the pot (after the pot is broken). This is the embodied salvation, this is the final emancipation. Therefore, even those in Brahmaloka through the studying of Veḍānṭa from the mouth of Brahmā attain with Him the final emancipation. Hence to all these is stated the

final emancipation through the Jñāna path, and not through Karma, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and other Upāsanās. Thus is the Upanishaḍ."

Again Māruṭi (Hanūmān) addressed Śrī-Rāmachanḍra thus: "What is Jīvanmukṭi? what is Viḍéhamukṭi? what is the authority therein? what about its perfection? what is the object of such a perfection?"

(Śrī-Rāma replied:) "The Ḍharma of a man's Chiṭṭa that has the characteristics of agency and enjoyment is fraught with pains and hence tends towards bondage. The control of it (the Chiṭṭa) is Jīvanmukṭi. Viḍehamukṭi follows when through the extinction of Prāraḅḍha, the removal of the vehicles [of the bodies] takes place like the ether in the pot [after the pot is broken]. The authority on the points of Jīvanmukṭi and Viḍehamukṭi is the 108 Upanishaḍs. Its object [of perfection] is the attaining of eternal bliss through the removal of the pains of agency, etc. This has to be achieved through human efforts. Like progeny obtained through the Puṭrakāmeshti sacrifice, wealth in trade, or heaven through the Jyoṭishtoma sacrifice, so Jīvanmukṭi is gained through Samāḍhi arising through Veḍānṭic study, and accomplished through human efforts. It has to be won through the extinction of all Vāsanās. Regarding it, there are verses thus: 'The efforts of man are sated to be of two kinds, those that transcend scriptures and those that are according to scriptures. Those that transcend scriptures tend to harn while those that are according to scriptures tend to Reality.' To men, true Jñāna does not arise through the Vāsanās of the world, scripture and body. Vāsanā is divided into two, the pure and the impure. If thou art led by the pure Vāsanās, thou shalt thereby soon reach by degrees My Seat. But should the old impure Vāsanās land thee in danger, they should be overcome through efforts. This river of Vāsanās towards objects, which flows in the pure and impure paths, should be diverted to the pure path through human efforts. The impure ones have to be transmuted into the pure. That which is diverted from the impure turns towards the pure. So also the reverse. This child, Chiṭṭa has to be fondled through human efforts. O killer of enemies, it is only when through means of practice both Vāsanās quite abandon thee, that thou wilt be able to realise the effects of [such] practice. Even in the case of doubt, the pure Vāsanās alone should be practised.

"O son of Vāyu, there is nothing wrong in the increase of the pure Vāsanās. The extinction of Vāsanās, Vijñāna and the destruction of Manas [as these three] when practised together for a long time are regarded, O great and intelligent one, as fruitful. So long as these are not equally practised again and again, so long the [Supreme] Seat is not attained, even after the lapse of hundreds of years. Even should one of these [three] be practised for a long time, it will not yield its fruit like a Manṭra imperfectly done. Through the practice of these for a long time, the firm knots of the heart are cut, without doubt, like the breaking of the threads in a lotus-stalk rent in twain. The illusory Samsāric Vāsanā that has arisen through the practice of [many] hundreds of lives never perishes except through the practice of Yoga for a long time. Therefore, O Somya [disciple], after having put away to a distance the desire of enjoyment through discriminative human effort, resort to these three alone. The wise know that a mind associated with Vāsanā tends to bondage, while a mind well freed from Vāsanā is said to be an emancipated one. O Mahā-kapi [great Monkey] practise the state of a mind devoid of Vāsanā. Vāsanā perishes through well-conducted

deliberation and truth. Through the absorption of Vāsanās, Manas attains quiescence like a lamp [without oil]. He whose mind, devoid of destruction is [centred] on Me as of the nature of Chinmāṭra [consciousness alone], abandoning the Vāsanās, is no other than Myself of the nature of Sachchiḍānanḍa. Whether sāmaḍhi and Karma are performed or not, one who has a supreme Chiṭṭa with a heart devoid of all desires is an emancipated person. He whose mind is freed from Vāsanās is not subject to the fruits arising from the performance or non-performance of actions, or Samāḍhi or Jñāna. Except through the entire giving up of Vāsanās and through Mouna [the observance of silence towards objects], the Supreme Seat is not attained. Though devoid of Vāsanās, the eye and other organs are involuntarily prompted to their (respective) external objects through habit. Just as the eye without any desire sees without any effort the objects that fall on it, so also the undaunted man of intelligence enters into the affairs [of the world] without any desire. O Māruṭi, the Munis know that as Vāsanā which is manifested through the consciousness of objects, which is of the nature of the object itself, and which is the cause of the origination and absorption of Chiṭṭa. This excessively fluctuating Chiṭṭa is the cause of birth, dotage and death, due to the identification of itself with objects practised firmly [for a long time]. Like the analogy of the seed and the tree, the vibration of Prāṇa arises through Vāsanā and (*vice versa*) the Vāsanā through the former—these forming the seed of Chiṭṭa. To the tree of Chiṭṭa, there are two seeds: the vibration of Prāṇa and Vāsanā. Should either of them perish, both perish soon. Through the actions of the world being done without attachment, through the abandoning of the [thought of the] reality of the universe and the conviction of the destructibility of the body, Vāsanā does not arise. Through the complete giving up of Vāsanā, Chiṭṭa becomes not-Chiṭṭa. When the mind does not think at all, being completely devoid of Vāsanā, then dawns the state of mindlessness which confers the great peace. So long as you are without a mind of [true] discrimination and are not a knower of the Supreme Seat, so long should you follow whatever has been decided by the teacher and the authorities of the sacred books. When your sins are burnt up and you are a knower of the Reality without any anxiety, then all the good Vāsanās even should be given up.

"The destruction of Chiṭṭa is of two kinds, that with form and that without form. [The destruction of] that with form is of the Jīvanmukṭa. O son of Vāyu, hearken to [the means of] the destruction of Chiṭṭa. That is said to be the destruction of Chiṭṭa when it, associated with all the attributes of Maiṭri (friendship) and others, becomes quiescent [without any resurrection]. There is no doubt of it. Then the Manas of a Jīvanmukṭa is free from fresh rebirth; to him, there is the destruction of Manas with form. But to the Viḍehamukṭa, there is the destruction of Manas without form. It is Manas that is the root of the tree of Samṣāra with its thousands of shoots, branches, tender leaves and fruits. I think it to be Saṅkalpa alone. In order that the tree of Samsāra may wither soon, dry up its root through the quiescence of Saṅkalpa. There is only one means to control one's mind. That is to destroy the mind as soon as it rises. That is the (great) dawn. In the case of the wise, the mind is destroyed: but in the case of the ignorant, it is indeed a fetter. So long as the mind is not destroyed through the firm practice of the One Reality, so long as Vāsanās are prancing about in the heart like Veṭāla (goblin) in the night-time. The Vāsanās of

enjoyment of one who has destroyed the egoism of Chiṭṭa and controlled the organs, the enemies, decay like lotuses in mid-winter. Pressing one hand against the other, setting teeth against teeth, and forcing one limb against the other, he should first conquer his mind.

"It is not possible on the part of the one-thoughted to control the mind by sitting up again and again except through the approved means. As a vicious rutting elephant is not subject to control except through the goad, so in the matter of the control of the mind, the effective means are the attainment of spiritual knowledge, association with the wise, the entire abdication of all Vāsanās and the control of Prāṇas. While such are the [prescribed] means, should persons try to control the mind through violence, they are like those that search in darkness, having thrown aside the light (in their hands). Those who endeavour to control the mind through force are but trying to bind a mad elephant with the filaments of a lotus-stalk.

To the tree of the mind having the ever-growing branches of modifications, there are two seeds. One is the fluctuation of Prāṇa, and the other is the firmness of Vāsanā. The [One] All-pervading Consciousness is agitated by the fluctuation of Prāṇa. The means of Ḍhyāna by which [the one] Jñāna is attained through the one-pointedness of the mind is now imparted to you. After duly resolving back the things originated [in the universe] with all their changes, meditate upon that which remains—[*viz.*], Chinmātra (the consciousness alone), which is also Chiḍānanḍa (conscious-bliss). The wise say that the interval experienced by Yogins after the inspiration and before the (next) expiration is [the internal] Kumbhaka (cessation of breath); while the interval of complete equilibrium after expiration and before the next inspiration is the external Kumbhaka. Through the force of the practice of Ḍhyāna, the current of the modification of Manas devoid of Self that is of Brāhmic nature is said to be Samprajñāṭa Samāḍhi, while the mind with the utter quiescence of modifications that confers upon one supreme bliss is said to be Asamprajñāṭa-Samāḍhi that is dear unto Yogins. This [state] that is devoid of light, Manas and Buḍḍhi, and that is of the nature of Chiṭ (consciousness merely) is styled by the Munis Aṭaḍvyāvṛṭṭi Samāḍhi (a Samāḍhi that does not care or require the aid of another). It is Plenum above, below and in the middle, and is of the nature of Śiva (auspiciousness). This noumenal (or occult) Samāḍhi is itself Viḍhi-Mukha (sanctioned by books or Brahmā).

"The clinging to objects without previous or subsequent deliberation through intense thought [or longing] is stated to be Vāsanā. O chief of Monkeys, whatever is meditated upon by a person with ardent impetuosity without any other Vāruna—that he soon becomes. A person that is entirely subject to Vāsanā becomes of the nature of what. When he regards this [universe] as Saṭ [the Reality], then he is subject to delusion. Because of the many strong Vāsanās, he does not abandon the nature of the universe. This person of wrong vision sees everything under infatuation like one deluded. Vāsanās are of two kinds—the pure and the impure. The impure ones are the cause of rebirth, while the pure are the destroyers of it. The impure are said by the wise to be of the nature of intense Ajñāna, associated with the great Ahaṅkāra and generative of rebirth. Of what avail is the chewing again and again of the many Śāsṭric stories to one that has abandoned the seed of rebirth, having turned it into a burnt one? O Māruṭi, thou shouldst with effort seek the effulgence within. O tiger of

Monkeys, whoever, after having abandoned the visible and the invisible, is as the One alone is not a mere knower of Brahman but is Brahman itself. One who having studied the four Vedas and the various books does not cognize the reality of Brahman is like the ladle ignorant of the taste of the dainty. Therefore what other advice of indifference can be imparted to a person that has not attained the indifference to the impure Vāsanā of delusion [or body]? This body is very impure while the one [Ātmā] that dwells in it is very pure. When the differences between the two are [thus] known, what then may be ordained as the purification? The bondage of Vāsanā is the [real] bondage, while the destruction of Vāsanā is salvation. After wholly abandoning the Vāsanās, give up even the desire for salvation. After first giving up the Vāsanā of objects dependent upon the Vāsanā of the mind, attract unto thyself the pure Vāsanās associated with Maitri [friendship] and others. Though engaged in the world with these pure Vāsanās, give up them too and retire within the quiescent desires and become of the form of the longing after Chiț alone. Then, O Māruți! giving up that also associated as it is with Manas and Buddhi, mayst thou now left alone become firm in Me in Samādhi. O son of Vāyu! always worship My Reality that is destructive of pains, without sound, touch, form, decay, taste, destruction or smell, and without name and Gotra [clan]. I am that non-dual One (Brahman) that is of the nature of the visible (Jñāna), like unto the Ākāś, supreme, always shining, without birth, non-dual, without destruction, without attachment and pervading all. I am the All, and of the nature of salvation. One should ever meditate upon Me thus: 'I am of the form of the visible [Jñāna], the pure, of changeless nature and have really no objects in Me. I am the ever-full Brahman, transverse and across, up and down.' Also meditate upon Me thus: 'I am birthless, deathless, ageless, immortal, self-shining all-pervading, destructionless, causeless pure beyond the effect (of the universe) and ever content.' When one's body becomes a prey to time, he gives up the state of Jīvanmukți, as the wind attains the motionless state.

"The following is said in the *Rg* [-Veda] also: Like the eye which is spread in the Ākāś (seeing all things without any obstacle), so the wise ever see the Supreme Seat of Vishṇu. The Brāhmaṇas that have ever the Divine vision praise in diverse ways and illumine the Supreme Seat of Vishṇu."

MUNDAKA-UPANIṢAD

Creator

Lords, inspiration of sacrifice! May our ears hear the good. May our eyes see the good. May we serve Him with the whole strength of our body. May we, all our life, carry out His will. May peace and peace and peace be everywhere.

The Creator came first; He created Himself as Creator; then called Himself the Protector of the world. He gave the knowledge of Spirit, foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest son Atharwa.

Atharwa gave it to Angee; Angee to Satyawaha Bhāradwāja; Satyawaha Bhāradwāja to Angiras.

That famous man the householder Shounaka said to Angiras: 'What is it that when known, makes us know everything in the world'?

Angiras said: 'Those who know Spirit say that there are two kinds of knowledge a lower and a higher.

'The lower is the knowledge of the four Wedas and such things as pronunciation, ceremonial, grammar, etymology, poetry, astronomy. The higher knowledge is the knowledge of the Everlasting;

'Of that which has neither tangibility, nor antecedent, colour, eyes, ears, hands, feet; of that which is prevalent everywhere, immeasurably minute, self evident, indestructible, always alive; of that which the wise name the Source.

"As the web springs from the spider and is again withdrawn, as the plant springs from the soil, hairs from the body of man, so springs the world from the Everlasting.

'Brooding Spirit creates food, food life, life mind, mind the elements, the elements the world, the world Karma, Karma the Everlasting.

'He looks at all things; knows all things. All things, their nourishment, their names, their forms, are from His will. All that He has willed is right.'

Rituals

'The Sages studied the rituals described in the Wedas, went beyond them to the truth. You may find it better to stay with them; if you seek the reward of your actions, stay with them.

'When the sacrificial fire has been kindled, set it ablaze with butter, pour an oblation, then let the butter set it ablaze again.

'If the worshipper does not offer his sacrifice, according to the rules, during the new moon, or full moon, or at the rainy season, or at harvest time, if he offer it without regularity or at other seasons, or not at all, if he entertain no guests at the sacrifice, his people for seven generations shall be unlucky.

'There are seven tongues of fire, the ruinous, the terrible, the swift, the smoky, the red, the bright, the flickering.

'If the sacrifice has been made at the right time, the tongues, emblem of the solar rays, carry the devotee into paradise.

'"Welcome! Welcome" cry his pleasant flattering good deeds, as the tongues, emblem of the solar rays, carry him "Look upon what we have made for you, look upon this beautiful paradise."

"Those sacrifices with their crew of eighteen men, are unseaworthy ships, belong to a trivial karma. The fool fixes his hopes upon them; goes to wreck.

'Fools brag of their knowledge, proud, ignorant, dissolving; staggering to and fro, blind and led by the blind;

'Dunces think, in their pride, that they have solved every problem; the passionate never learn. All these, the merit of their sacrifice exhausted, are thrust from paradise into the misery of life.

'These dunces think ritual and alms are enough, they know nothing of the good itself; when ritual and alms have done their work, they fall into their old human life or it may be lower still.

'The wise and the clean, content with what they get, living in solitude, practising austerities, go to the Deathless, through the gates of the sun.

'He that understands the results of action, wants to renounce them all. Activity cannot attain the Inactive; therefore, with hands folded, let him go to some teacher who lives in Spirit and in whom revelation lives.

'To such a pupil, humble, master of mind and sense, the teacher can teach all he knows, bringing him to the Deathless.'

Truth

'This is the truth: the sparks, though of one nature with the fire, leap from it; uncounted beings help from the Everlasting, but these, my son, merge into It again.

'The Everlasting is shapeless, birthless, breathless, mindless, above everything, outside everything, inside everything.

'From Him are born life, mind, sense, air, wind, water, earth that supports all.

'He is the inmost Self of all. Fire, His head; sun and moon, His eyes; the four

quarters, His ears; revelation, His voice; His breath; world, His heart; earth, His feet.

'Fire is from Him, its fuel sun, moon from sun, rain from moon, food from rain, man from food, seed from man; thus all descends from God.

'From Him are hymns, holy chants, ritual, initiation, sacrifice, ceremonial, oblation, time, deeds, everything under sun and moon;

'From Him, gods, angels, men, cattle, birds, living fires, rice, barley, austerity, faith, truth, continence, law;

'From Him seven senses like ritual fires, seven desires like flames, seven objects like oblations, seven pleasures like sacrifices, seven nerves like habitations, seven centres in the heart like hollows in the cavern.

'From Him, seas, rivers, mountains, herbs and their properties: in the middle of the elements the inmost Self.

'My son! There is nothing in this world, that is not God. He is action, purity; everlasting Spirit. Find Him in the cavern; Inaw the know of ignorance.'

Spirit

'Shining, yet hidden, Spirit lives in the cavern. Everything that sways, breathes, opens, closes, lives in Spirit; beyond learning, beyond everything, better than anything; living, unliving.

'It is the undying blazing Spirit, that seed of all seeds, wherein lay hidden the world and all its creatures. It is life, speech, mind, reality, immortality. It is there to be struck. Strike it, my son!

'Take the bow of our sacred knowledge, lay against it the arrow of devotion, pull the string of concentration, strike the target.

'Om is the bow, the personal self the arrow, impersonal Self the target. Aim accurately, sink therein.

'Into His cloak are woven earth, mind, life, the canopy, the Kingdom of Heaven. He is alone and sole; man's bridge to immortality.

'Come out of all the schools. Meditate upon Om as the Self. Remember He takes many shapes, lives in the hub where the arteries meet; and may His blessing bring you out of the darkness.

'He knows all, knows every particular. His glory prevails on earth, in heaven, in His own seat, the holy city of the heart.

'He becomes mind and guides body and life. He lives in man's heart and eats man's food. He that knows Him, in finding joy, finds immortality.

'He that knows Him as the shaped and the shapeless, cuts through the knot of his heart, solves every doubt, exhausts every action.

'In a beautiful golden scabbard hides the stainless, indivisible, luminous Spirit.

'Neither sun, moon, star, neither fire nor lightning, lights him. When He shines, everything begins to shine. Everything in the world reflects His light.

'Spirit is everywhere, upon the right, upon the left, above, below, behind, in front. What is the world but Spirit?'

Self

'Two birds, bound one to another in friendship, have made their homes on the same tree. One stares about him, one pecks at the sweet fruit.

'The personal self, weary of pecking here and there, sinks into dejection; but when he understands through meditation that the other—the impersonal Self—is indeed Spirit, dejection disappears.

'When the sage meets Spirit, phallus and what it enters, good and evil disappear, they are one.

'The Sage who knows Him as life and the giver of life, does not assert himself; playing with Self, enjoying Self, doing his duty, he takes his rank.

'The Self is found by veracity, purity, intelligence, continence. The ascetic, so purged, discovers His burning light in the heart.

'Falsehood turns from the way; truth goes all the way; the end of the way is truth; the way is paved with truth. The sage travels there without desire.

'Truth lies beyond imagination, beyond paradise; great, smaller than the smallest, near, further than the furthest; hiding from the traveller in the cavern.

'Nor can penance discover Him, nor ritual reveal, nor eye see, nor tongue speak; only in meditation can mind, grown pure and still discover formless truth.

'The self shines out of the pure heart, when life enters with its five fires and fills the mind.

'A pure man gets all he wants. A man with mind fixed upon some man who knows the Self, gets all he wants.'

Desires

'The daring man adores the knower of that Spirit, wherein the world lives and is bright; knows him escaped from the seminal fluid.

'He who desires one thing after another, brooding over them, is born where his desires can be satisfied; but the Self attained, one desire satisfied, all are satisfied.

'The Self is not known through discourse, splitting of hairs, learning however great. He comes to the man He loves; takes that man's body as His own.

'Blunderers, charlatans, weaklings, cannot attain the Self. he is found by the pure, daring, cautious man.

'He who has found Him, seeks no more; the riddle is solved; desire gone, he is at peace. Having approached from everywhere that which is everywhere, whole, he passes into the Whole.

'When the ascetic has mastered theory and practice, he forgets body, remembers Spirit, attains immortality.

'His phases return to their source, his senses to their gods, his personal self and all his actions to the impersonal imperishable Self.

'As rivers lose name and shape in the sea, wise men lose name and shape in God, glittering beyond all distance.

'He who has found Spirit, is Spirit. Nobody ignorant of Spirit is born into his family. He goes beyond sorrow, sin, death; the knots of his heart unloosed.

'The Rig-Veda says "Tell this to those that know the Wedas, do their duty, obey the law, make themselves an oblation to the sole Fire."

'This is that ancient Truth', sage Angiras declared. 'Obey the law and understand.'

We bow down to you, Great Sage!
Bow down to you, Great Sages!

N

NĀḌABINḌU-UPANISHAḌ

The syllable A is considered to be its (the bird Om's) right wing, U, its left: M, its tail; and the arḍhamāṭrā (half-metre) is said to be its head.

The commentator says that M is the last letter and hence tail and arḍhamāṭrā is the head, as it enables one to attain to higher worlds.

The (rājasic and ṭāmasic) qualities, its feet upwards (to the loins); saṭṭva, its (main) body; ḍharma is considered to be its right eye, and aḍharma, its left.

The Bhūrloka is situated in its feet; the Bhuvarloka, in its knees; the Suvarloka, in its loins; and the Maharloka, in its navel.

In its heart is situate the Janoloka; the ṭapoloka in its throat, and the Saṭyaloka in the centre of the forehead between the eyebrows.

Then the māṭrā (or manṭra) beyond the Sahasrāra (thousand-rayed) is explained (*viz.*) should be explained.

An adept in yoga who bestrides the Hamsa (bird) thus (*viz.*, contemplates on Om) is not affected by kārmic influences or by tens of crores of sins.

The first māṭrā has agni as its ḍevaṭā (presiding deity); the second, vāyu as its ḍevaṭā; the next māṭrā is resplendent like the sphere of the sun and the last, the Arḍhamāṭrā the wise know as belonging to Varuṇa (the presiding deity of water).

Each of these māṭrās has indeed three kalās (parts). This is called Omkāra. Know it by means of the ḍhāraṇās, *viz.*, concentration on each of the twelve kalās, or the variations of the māṭrās produced by the difference of svaras or intonation). The first māṭrā is called ghoshiṇī; the second, viḍyunmālī (or viḍyunmāṭrā); the third, paṭaṅginī; the fourth, vāyuveginī; the fifth, nāmaḍheya; the sixth, ainḍrī; the seventh, vaishṇavī; the eighth, sāṅkarī; the ninth, mahaṭī; the tenth, ḍhṛṭi (ḍhruva, Calcutta ed.); the eleventh, nārī (mauni, Calcutta ed.); and the twelfth, brāhmī.

If a person happens to die in the first māṭrā (while contemplating on it), he is born again as a great emperor in Bhāraṭavarsha.

If in the second māṭrā, he becomes an illustrious yaksha; if in the third māṭrā, a viḍyāḍhara; if in the fourth, a ganḍharva (these three being the celestial hosts).

If he happens to die in the fifth, *viz.*, arḍhamāṭrā, he lives in the world of the moon, with the rank of a ḍeva greatly glorified there.

If in the sixth, he merges into Inḍra; if in the seventh, he reaches the seat of Vishṇu; if in the eighth, Ruḍra, the Lord of all creatures.

If in the ninth, in Maharloka; if in the tenth, in Janoloka (Ḍhruvaloka, Calcutta ed.); if in the eleventh, Ṭapoloka, and if in the twelfth, he attains the eternal state of Brahmā.

That which is beyond these, (*viz.*,) Parabrahman which is beyond (the above māṭrās), the pure, the all-pervading, beyond kalās, the ever resplendent and the source of all jyoṭis (light) should be known.

When the mind goes beyond the organs and the guṇās and is absorbed,

having no separate existence and no mental action, then (the guru) should instruct him (as to his further course of development).

That person always engaged in its contemplation and always absorbed in it should gradually leave off his body (or family) following the course of yoga and avoiding all intercourse with society.

Then he, being freed from the bonds of karma and the existence as a jīva and being pure, enjoys the supreme bliss by his attaining of the state of Brahmā.

O intelligent man, spend your life always in the knowing of the supreme bliss, enjoying the whole of your prārabḍha (that portion of past karma now being enjoyed) without making any complaint (of it).

Even after āṭmajnana (knowledge of Āṭmā or Self) has awakened (in one), prārabḍha does not leave (him); but he does not feel prārabḍha after the dawning of ṭaṭṭvajñāna (knowledge of ṭaṭṭva or truth) because the body and other things are asaṭ (unreal), like the things seen in a dream to one on awaking from it.

That (portion of the) karma which is done in former births, and called prārabḍha does not at all affect the person (ṭaṭṭvajñānī), as there is no rebirth to him.

As the body that exists in the dreaming state is untrue, so is this body. Where then is rebirth to a thing that is illusory? How can a thing have any existence, when there is no birth (to it)?

As the clay is the material cause of the pot, so one learns from Veḍānṭa that ajñāna is the material cause of the universe: and when ajñāna ceases to exist, where then is the cosmos?

As a person through illusion mistakes a rope for a serpent, so the fool not knowing Saṭya (the eternal truth) sees the world (to be true).

When he knows it to be a piece of rope, the illusory idea of a serpent vanishes.

So when he knows the eternal substratum of everything and all the universe becomes (therefore) void (to him), where then is prārabḍha to him, the body being a part of the world? Therefore, the word prārabḍha is accepted to enlighten the ignorant (only).

Then as prārabḍha has, in course of time, worn out, he who is the sound resulting from the union of Praṇava with Brahman who is the absolute effulgence itself, and who is he bestower of all good, shines himself like the sun at the dispersion of the clouds.

The yogin being in the siḍḍhāsana (posture) and practising the vaishṇavī-muḍrā, should always hear the internal sound through the right ear.

The sound which he thus practises makes him deaf to all external sounds. Having overcome all obstacles, he enters the ṭurya state within fifteen days.

In the beginning of his practice, he hears many loud sounds. The gradually increase in pitch and are heard more and more subtly.

At first, the sounds are like those proceeding from the ocean, clouds, kettle-drum, and cataracts: in the middle (stage) those proceeding from marḍala (a musical instrument), bell, and horn.

At the last stage, those proceeding from tinkling bells, flute, vīṇā (a musical instrument), and bees. Thus he hears many such sounds more and more subtle.

When he comes to that stage when the sound of the great kettle-drum is being heart, he should try to distinguish only sounds more and more subtle.

He may change his concentration from the gross sound to the subtle, or from the subtle to the gross, but he should not allow his mind to be diverted from them towards others.

The mind having at first concentrated

itself on any one sound fixes firmly to that and is absorbed in it.

It (the mind) becoming insensible to the external impressions, becomes one with the sound as milk with water, and then becomes rapidly absorbed in chiḍākāś (the ākāś where Chiṭ prevails).

Being indifferent towards all objects the yogin having controlled his passions, should by continual practice concentrate his attention upon the sound which destroys the mind.

Having abandoned all thoughts and being freed from all actions, he should always concentrate his attention on the sound, and (then) his chiṭṭa becomes absorbed in it.

Just as the bee drinking the honey (alone) does not care for the odour, so the chiṭṭa which is always absorbed in sound, does not long for sensual objects, as it is bound by the sweet smell of nāḍa and has abandoned its flitting nature.

The serpent chiṭṭa through listening to the nāḍa is entirely absorbed in it, and becoming unconscious of everything concentrates itself on the sound.

The sound serves the purpose of a sharp goad to control the maddened elephant—chiṭṭa which roves in the pleasure-garden of the sensual objects.

It serves the purpose of a snare for binding the deer—chiṭṭa. It also serves the purpose of a shore to the ocean waves of chiṭṭa.

The sound proceeding from Praṇava which is Brahman is of the nature of effulgence; the mind becomes absorbed in it; that is the supreme seat of Vishṇu.

The sound exists till there is the ākāśic conception (ākāśa-saṅkalpa). Beyond this, is the (aśabḍa) soundless Parabrahman which is Paramāṭmā.

The mind exists so long as there is sound, but with its (sound's) cessation, there is the state called unmanī of manas (*viz.*, the state of being above the mind).

This sound is absorbed in the Akshara (indestructible) and the soundless state is the supreme seat.

The mind which along with Prāṇa (Vāyu) has (its) kārmic affinities destroyed by the constant concentration upon nāḍa is absorbed in the unstained One. There is no doubt of it.

Many myriads of nāḍas and many more of binḍus—(all) become absorbed in the Brahma-Praṇava sound.

Being freed from all states and all thoughts whatever, the yogin remains like one dead. He is a mukṭa. There is no doubt about this.

After that, he does not at any time hear the sounds of conch or ḍunḍubhi (large kettle-drum).

The body in the state of unmanī is certainly like a log and does not feel heat or cold, joy or sorrow.

The yogin's chiṭṭa having given up fame or disgrace is in samāḍhi above the three states.

Being freed from the waking and the sleeping states, he attains to his true state.

When the (spiritual) sight becomes fixed without any object to be seen, when the vāyu (prāṇa) becomes still without any effort, and when the chiṭṭa becomes firm without any support, he becomes of the form of the internal sound of Brahma-Praṇava.

Such is the Upanishaḍ.

NARAḌAPARIVRAJAKA-UPANISHAḌ

Once upon a time, Nāraḍa, the ornament of Parivrājakas (roaming ascetics), after roaming over all worlds and cleansing, through merely by looking at the places of pilgrimage able to impart rare religious merits, observed, with a mind that had attained purity, without hate, quiescent and patient, and indifferent towards all

(objects), the forest of Naimiśa (the modern Nimsār), filled with Ṛshis that were engaged in the contemplation of Reality and had attained the greatness of the ordained bliss; (there) through the recitation of stories about Hari (Vishṇu), associated with the musical motes of Sa, Ri, Ga, Ma, Pa, Ḍha, and Ni (of the gamut), able to impart indifference to objects and to make one look down upon the universe, and instilling divine devotion, fixed and movable (or mental and bodily), he entered (the forest), fascinating the crowds of beings human, animal, Kimpurushas, celestials, Kinnaras, Apsaras (Houris), and Urgas' (collected there). (Thereupon the) great Ṛshis Śaunaka and others who had been engaged for twelve years in saṭṭra sacrifice well-skilled in the recitation of Veḍas, the knowers of all, and the good practisers of ṭapas, observed Nārada the son of Brahmā and the dovotee of the Lord, and having risen up, paid due respect to him. Then having with due respect requested him to sit down, they also seated themselves and addressed him thus: "O Lord, son of Brahmā what is the means of salvation for us? It is meet that it should be communicated (to us)." Thus addressed, Nārada replied to them thus: "One born in a good family and fit to go through the forty-four samskāras, upanayana and others, should, under a teacher to whom he is devoted, study, after the recitation of the Veḍa of his own sākhā (division), all the different branches of knowledge; then should fulfil, according to the rules ordained, for twelve years the observance of Brahmacharya (celibacy), such as the service of the guru, etc., then for twenty-five years the āsrama (order of life) of a gṛhasṭha (house-holder), and for twenty-five years the āsrama of a vānaprasṭha (forester). After thus practising well the fourfold celibacy, the sixfold householder's life, and the fourfold forester's life, and having performed all the duties thereof, he should acquire the fourfold means of salvation; thus the sannyāsin who gives up the desires along with the karmas of mind, speech, and body in this samsāra as well as the vāsanā towards the threefold desire (of son, wife, and wealth), and being without malice and endowed with quiescence and patience, undisturbed in the order of life of Paramahamsa, quits the body in the contemplation of Reality, is an emancipated person. Such is the Upanishaḍ."

All the Ṛshis, Śaunaka and others addressing Lord Nārada said thus : "O Lord, please tell us the rules of sannyāsa." At which, seeing them, Nārada replied : "It is but meet that we should know the whole truth from the mouth of Brahmā Himself." After the saṭṭra sacrifice was completed, he took the ṛshis along with him to saṭyaloka; and after duly making prostrations to and eulogising Brahmā engaged in meditation upon Brahman, he along with others was duly seated under the orders of Brahmā. Then Nārada addressed Brahmā thus: "Thou art guru; thou art father; thou art the knower of the secret of all learning; thou art the knower of all; thou shalt therefore tell me one secret. Who else but thee is fit to tell the secret dear unto me? It is this. Please tell us the rules of the real sannyāsa (asceticism)."

Thus prayed to by Nārada, Brahmā surveyed all in the four quarters; and after meditating for one muhūrṭa (48 minutes), and assuring himself that the inquiry was truly for the purpose of escaping from the pain of samsāra, Brahmā eyeing Nārada, said thus: "The mystery that was imparted before by Virāṭ-Purusha of illimitable form according to the *purusha-Sūkṭa-Upanishaḍ* us now being divulged to you. It is very mysterious. It is fit to be hearkened to with great attention. O Nārada, one born in a good family and obedient to his

parents, should, after the performance of upanayana according to the rules, find a virtuous guru that is other than his father, is of good custom and habits, of faith, born of good family, a knower of Veḍas, a lover of Śasṭras, of (good) qualities and free from duplicity. Having made prostrations and rendered useful service to him, he should respectfully acquaint him with his intention. Having studied all departments of knowledge and rendered service for twelve years, he should, under his (the guru's) orders, marry a girl fit for his family and dear unto him. Then having performed for twenty-five years the karmas incidental to a householder and attained the status of a Brāhmaṇa that has performed sacrifices and the rest, he should beget a son with the only desire of perpetuating the family. After thus spending twenty-five years in the performance of household ḍharma, he should bathe thrice daily for twenty-five years and take only one meal in the fourth period; he should live alone in the forest, after giving up his previous wanderings in city and village; and without desire for fruit, should perform the karmas incidental to that (forester's) order of life, and he without desire for objects seen and heard. Being skilled in the forty samskāras, he should be devoid of desire for all, have a purified mind, have burnt up desire, jealousy, envy and egoism, and have developed the four means of salvation. Then he becomes fit for sannyāsa. Such is the Upanishaḍ."

Then Nāraḍa addressed the grandfather thus:

"O Lord, by whom, after attaining the qualifications of sannyāsa, is it fit to be taken?" To which Brahmā replied: "After first expounding the qualifications of sannyāsa, the rules of sannyāsa will then be stated. Hearken carefully. A euncuch, the outcaste, the maimed, the lewd, the deaf, the youth, the dumb, the heretic, the discus-bearer, the Liṅga-wearer, the vikhānass (forester,) the Haraḍhvaja (carrier of Śiva's flag), the reciter of Veḍas for hire, the bald-headed, one without (sacrificial) fire-all these, even though they have attained vairāgya are unfit for sannyāsa. Even though they have become sannyāsins, they are unfit to be initiated into the mahāvākyas (sacred veḍic sentences). The Paramahamsa sannyāsin stated before (as fit to take sannyāsa) is the one qualified. It is stated in the smṛṭis that he is a parivrāt who is not afraid of others, as others are not afraid of him. The eunuch, the limbless, the blind, the youth the sinful, the outcaste, the door-keeper, the vaikhānasa, the Haraḍhvaja, the chakrī (discusbearer), the Liṅgī (Liṅga-wearer), the heretic, the bald-headed, one without fire (sacrifice), one that had undergone sannyāsa twice or thrice, the reciter of Veḍas for hire-all these are not fit for regular sannyāsa out only for āṭura-sannyāsa (viz., sannyāsa taken while a person is afflicted, etc.). What is the opinion of āryas (Hinḍūs) on the (fit) time for āṭura-sannyāsa (being taken)? The time when prāṇa (life) is about to rise (out of the body) is called āṭura. The time other than it is incapable of conferring (upon one) the path of salvation and is not āṭura. Even in āṭura-sannyāsa, the wise should according to rules, initiate themselves into sannyāsa after reciting the manṭras again and again in the course of respective manṭras. There is no difference between regular and āṭura-sannyāsa in the manṭras to be uttered at the time of taking sannyāsa. There is no karma without manṭras; (hence) karma needs manṭras. Anything done without manṭra cannot be termed karma. Hence manṭras should not be given up. Any karma done without manṭras is like an offering made in ashes. Through the conciseness (of the performance) of the karmas, it is stated to be āṭura-sannyāsa.

"Therefore, O Muni, the recitation of manṭras is stated to be in āṭura-sannyāsa. One who is always duly doing agnihoṭra (fire-sacrifice) should, when he quits (the house) for foreign places through indifference, perform the prājāpaṭya sacrifice in water and then take up sannyāsa. After completing in water the observances of karma through the mind, or the recitation of manṭras, the wise man should attain sannyāsa. Else he becomes a fallen man. When, in the mind, indifference to all objects arises, then men should long after sannyāsa, (that being the best time for it); otherwise they are fallen. One who attains vairāgya should take sannyāsa. One who does not, should remain at home. That vile twice-born with desire, should he take sannyāsa, reaches hell. That Brāhmaṇa who is a celibate,who has under control his tongue, sexual organ, stomach, and hand may become a sannyāsin without undergoing the ceremony of marriage. Having known samsāra as one without sāra (or essence) and not having undergone any marriage on account of the desire to know the sāra (or essence of God), they become sannyāsins on account of the practice of the supreme vairāgya. The characteristic of pravṛṭṭi (path) is the performance of karma; that of nivṛ is jñāna. Therefore placing jñāna in the forefront, the wise man should take up sannyāsa. When the reality of the eternal Prabrahman is understood, then he should take up one ḍaṇda (staff) and abandon the holy thread and tuft of hair. Then he becomes fit to eat the alms-food (of sannyāsa), having become devoted to Paramāṭamā, indifferent to those that are not-Paramāṭamā and freed from all desires. He becomes fit to be the eater of alms-food who preserves the same countenance when he is beaten, as when he is worshipped or prostrated to. He becomes fit to be the eater of alms-food who is of the firm certitude that he is no other than the non-dual and indestructible Brahman, otherwise named Vāsuḍeva. He is who are existent śānṭi (control of the organs), śama (control of mind), purity (of mind and body), saṭya (truth), sanṭosha (contentment), ārjava (straightforwardness), poverty, and non-ostentatiousness should be in the order of life of kaivalya (sannyāsa). When one does not, through actions, mind, or speech, commit any sinful action to any being, then he becomes fit for eating alms-food. Having become quiescent (through the control of the mind), having practised the ten kinds of ḍharmas, having, according to rules, studied veḍānṭa, and having paid the three debts (to ḍevas, ṛshis, and piṭṛs), one should take up sannyāsa. Courage, fortitude, the control of the body, honesty, purity of (mind and body), control of the (inner) organs, shame, knowledge, truth, and absence of anger- these ten are the characteristics of ḍharma. One who does not look back (with pleasure) upon past enjoyments, nor forward into the future, and one who does not rejoice in the present, is fit to become a sannyāsin. One who is able to control within, the inner organs and without, the external organs, may be in the order of life of kaivalya. One who while in life is not affected by pleasures and pains, as the body is unaffected by them after death, may be in the order of life of kaivalya.

"An ascetic of the Paramahamsa (order) shall wear two loin-cloths, one ragged cloth, and one staff. Nothing more is ordained (in his case). Should he through desire wear more than these , he will fall into the hell of raurava and be born into the womb of an animal. Having stitched together old and clean cloths into one and having coloured it with red (ochre), he should wear it as his upper cloth. He may be with one cloth or even without it. He

should roam about alone with the sole vision (of Brahman), devoid of desires; but he may be in one place alone in the rainy season. Having quite abandoned his family, including son and wife, veḍānṭa, sacrifice, and the sacred thread, the ascetic should wander incognito.

Having given up all faults, such as passion, anger, pride, desire, and delusion, the parivrāt (ascetic) should become one that owns nothing. He is a muni who is devoid of love and hate, who regards equally a clod of earth, stone, or gold, who does no injury to any living creature, and is freed from all. That ascetic reaches salvation who is associated with Āṭmajñāna, who is freed from ostentation and egoism, from doing injury and tale-bearing. Through attraction to the senses, he becomes subject to fault, there is no doubt: through their control, he gains perfection. Lust when enjoyed is never gratified. Just as fire increases with the oblation (of ghee, etc., poured into it) so also lust waxes strong (with enjoyment). It should be known that that man who does not rejoice or grieve through hearing, touching, eating, seeing, or smelling is a jiṭenḍriya (conqueror of the organs). He whose speech and mind are well brought under control attains, completely and always, all the fruits of veḍānṭa.

"That Brāhmaṇa who is always afraid of respect as poison and always longs after disrespect as nectar, sleep soundly and rises happily even though he is treated with disrespect. He moves about happily in this world. The one who treats him with disrespect perishes. All cruel words should be endured. None should be treated with disrespect. On account of bodily relationship, none should be mad inimical. No anger should be directed in turn towards one who is angry. Soft words (only) should be spoken, even when (violently) pulled by another. No untrue words should be uttered, even should afflictions arise to the seven gates (of the body). One desirous of bliss should dwell in this universe through the aid of Āṭmā alone, intent upon Āṭmā, free from desires, and without the desire of blessing (others). He becomes fit for salvation through the control of the organs, the destruction of love and hate and non-injury to beings. He should abandon (all identification with) this feeble, perishable, and impure body of five elements whereof the bones are the pillars, which is strung by the nerves, coated over with flesh and blood, covered up by the skin, is of bad odour, full of urine and faces is ever haunted by dotage and miseries and is the seat of all ills. If an ignorant man be found of this body firmly knit together with flesh, blood, pus, feces, and urine, nerves, fat, and bones, he would, a *fortiori*, be fond of hell. That (identification of the body with the Self) is alone the seat of the Kālasūṭra hell. That is alone the Mahā-Vīchi-Vāgura (hell). That is alone the Asipaṭravanaśreṇi (hell). Such an idea of the body being the Self should be strenuously abandoned, though all should perish. That love of the body is not fit to be felt by one intent upon his welfare: just as a low-caste woman eating dog's flesh is unfit to be touched.

"One (fit to reach salvation), after leaving all meritorious actions to those dear to him and all sins to those not dear, attains the eternal Brahman through ḍhyāna-yoga. Such a man, through the ordinances, gives up little by little all associations, and being freed from all pairs of opposites, remains in Brahman alone. On account of the accomplishment (of salvation), he should be moving about alone and without any help. He who having understood the effect of being alone never derogates from it, is never left in want. The bowl, the foot of the tree, the tattered robe, the state of being without

help, the equality of vision in all these are the characteristics of the emancipated one. One intent upon the welfare of all beings, with a quiescent mind, having the three-knotted staff and bowl, and ever devoted to the One (Brahman), after taking up sannyāsa, may enter a village. Such one is a bhikshu (alms-taker). Should two unite, it is called mithuna (a pair of union); with three, it becomes a grāma (of village); with more, it is a nagara (or city). No city or village, or, mithuna should be made, and an ascetic who commits these three (offences) falls from his duty. Through such intercourse (of ascetics), all kinds of talks connected with the king and alms, friendship, tale-bearing, and malice occur between them. There is no doubt of it.

"He (the ascetic) should be alone and desireless. He should not converse with anybody. The ascetic should ever be uttering the word Nārāyaṇa in each sentence. Being alone, he should be meditating upon Brahman in all mental, spoken, and bodily actions. He should neither rejoice at dying or living. He should be anticipating the time when life will close. He should not be glad of dying; nor should he be glad of living. He should be biding his time like a hireling (for his pay). An ascetic who plays the part of the dumb, the eunuch, the lame, the blind, the deaf, and the idiot is emancipated through the (above six) means. There is no doubt of this. He who has not fondness for eating, saying that this is good and that is bad, who speaks only words that are beneficial, true, and moderate is said to be the dumb. He is a eunuch who is no more affected by the sight of a sixteen years old girl than of a new-born female baby or a hundred years old women. He who does not move about for more than the distance of a yojana for alms or for the calls of nature is a lame man. That parivrāt (ascetic) is said to be a blind man, who whether sitting or walking, has his vision extended to no more than four yokes' distance on the ground. He is said to be deaf who, though hearing words, beneficial or non-beneficial, pleasant or painful to the mind, is as if he does not hear them. That clever ascetic is said to be an idiot who is ever in a state of sleep, as it were, having his organs non-agitated by objects, even though near. He should never observe the following six—the senses of dancing, etc., gambling, lovely women, eatables, enjoyables, and women in their monthly course.

"The ascetic should never in thought even think of others with the six (viz.,) love, hate, pride, deceit, treachery, and the illusion (of confounding them). To the ascetics, the following six are sinful: cot, white cloth, the stories of women, love towards women, sleep during the day, and vehicles. He who is engaged in Āṭmic contemplation should carefully avoid a long journey. He should ever practise the upanishaḍic viḍyā tending to salvation. The ascetic need not bathe daily. He need not observe upavāsa (fast). He need not be one that had studied Veḍas. He need not be one that is able to produce a commentary (lecture). He should daily observe acts without sin, deceit, or falsehood. He who, having withdrawn the organs within, like a turtle its limbs (within its shell), is with the actions of the organs and the mind annihilated, without prostrations, without desires, without possessing any object as his own, without dualities, without prostrations, without the oblations to piṭṛ ḍevaṭās (they being with desires), without mine or I, without awaiting anything, without the desire to be happy, and living in please where men do not live—he alone is emancipated. There is no doubt of this.

"A celibate, or householders, or forester, who is (ever) vigilant, has karma,

devotion, and knowledge and is independent, after understanding his peculiar tendency and having become indifferent (to his order of life), may become an householder after ending the celibate life, or may from the householder's life enter the life of a forester, and then the life of an ascetic; or from the life of a celibate, or householder, or forester may (directly) enter that of an ascetic. The moment vairāgya arises in him, he may become an ascetic that moment, whether he is with vraṭa (religious observance) or not, is snāṭaka or not, or with a discontinued fire-sacrifice or not. On account of that some perform Prājāpaṭya-sacrifice alone; or Āgneya-sacrifice may be performed. Is not agni, prāṇa? Through this alone, one should perform that sacrifice only which is connected with the three ḍhāṭus. The three ḍhāṭus. are saṭṭva, rajas, and ṭamas alone. With the manṭra, अयं योनिर्त्रृत्विजो यतो जातो अरोचथा:। तं जानन्नग्ना आरोहाथा नो वर्धया रयिं ।।, agni (fire) should be taken in . Thus it is said (in the Sruṭis): एष वा अग्नेर्योनिर्यः प्राणः, प्राणं गच्छ स्वां योनिं गच्छ स्वाहा ।। The agni from āhavanīya should be brought and taken in as before (with the mantras above menṭioned). Should such an agni be not obtinable, the homa (oblation) should be done in water with the manṭra, आपो वै सर्वा देवतास्सर्वाभ्यो देवताभ्यो जुहोमि स्वाहा। After performing homa, the water should be taken in and sipped. After uttering the manṭra, साज्यं हविरनामयं मासद, he abandons the tuft of hair in the head, the holy thread, father, son, wife, karma, veḍic study and manṭra and becomes an ascetic. The Śruṭis say that a knower of Āṭmā should be engaged in meditation upon Brahman, through the three manṭras tending to salvation."

Then Nāraḍa asked Brahmā thus: "How can one, without the holy thread, be a Brāhmaṇa?" To which Brahmā replied: "The wise should, after shaving (the head) together with the tuft of hair, cast off the holy thread. He should wear, as his sūṭra (thread), the indestructible and supreme Brahman. On account of (sūchanāṭ) its being an indication, it (thread) is called sūṭra. Sūṭra is the Pramapaḍa (supreme seat). He by whom that sūṭra is known is Brāhman. That sūṭra (thread of Brahman) in which is strung the whole universe like beads on a sūṭra (string), should be worn by the yogin that has known yoga and ṭaṭṭva. The wise man that is in supreme yoga should abandon the other sūṭra (thread). He who wears (in his heart) this sūṭra of Brāhmic Reality is alone Brāhmaṇa. Through wearing this higher suṭra, it becomes not a rejected one, not an impure one. Those only whose suṭra is internal, having the holy thread as jñāna are the real knowers of the sūṭra; they are said to possess the yajñōpavīṭa (holy thread). To those whose śikhā (tuft of hair) is jñāna, whose holy thread is jñāna, and whose meditation is upon jñāna, jñāna alone is supreme. It is said that jñāna alone is able to purity. That wise man alone who possesses the jñāna-śikhā like the śikhā (flame) of agni (fire) is said to possess śikhā (tuft of hair). Those that have mere śikhā are no śikhīs. The Brāhmaṇas and others that are entitled to perform the veḍic karmas are allowed to wear the (external) thread, only as an auxiliary to the karmas. It is only veḍic. The knowers of Brahman know that all Brāhmaṇya (the state of Brahman) accrues to him only that has the jñānamaya śikhā (knowledge-tuft of hair) and the ṭanmaya (That or Brahmanful) upavīṭa (holy thread).

"Having known it, a Brāhmaṇa should take up sannyāsa. Such a sannyāsin, should be, in order to bear the bodily afflictions, with one cloth, bald-headed and without having anything as being required (for his use) ; or according to rules, he may be (naked) as nature made his body, and should abandon his son,

friend, wife, trustworthy relatives, etc., as well as all karmas and love for the universe, the loin-cloth, staff, and covering. Enduring all pairs of opposites without cold or heat, happiness or grief, fame or disgrace, without the six changes, I-ness, malice, pride, ostentation, jealousy, slander of others, love and hate, pleasure and pain, passion, anger, greed and delusion and regarding his body as a mere carcase, without thinking of all the things, internal and external; that are other than Self. Without prostrations, without the worship of ḍevas and piṭṛs and without praise or condemnation, he should wander about of his own accord. He should not receive gold and others. For him, there is no invocation or dismissal (of deities), manṭra or non-manṭra, meditation or worship, aim or non-aim, others or not-others; without having another's or (his own) settled place of residence, and having a firm conviction, he should be in a desolate house or at the foot of trees, or in a temple, a plenteous turfed spot, a potter's place or that of agnihoṭra or sacrifice, river, tank, sand-heap, subterranean vault, cave, mountain-rill, the place prepared for sacrifice or forest; or like the asked personages, Śveṭakeṭu, Ṛbhu, Niḍāgha, Jadabharaṭa, Ṛshabha, Ḍurvāsas, Samvārṭaka, Sanaṭsujāta, Vaiḍeha (Janaka), Vaṭasiḍḍha, Śuka, Vāmaḍeva, Ḍattāṭreya, Raivaṭaka and Goraksha, he should roam about as nature made him, without being recognised and without any means of discovery of his course of life, like a lad, or an insane man, or a ghost, with the actions of a madman though not mad, after discarding in water the three-knotted staff, the stringed sling (bag), vessel, bowl, waist-string, loin-cloth, stick, and cloth. He should ever be engaged in Āṭmic deliberation. Being in his natural state without being affected by the pairs, without receiving anything, being ever settled firmly in the Brāhmic path, having a pure mind, eating the food that is obtained without asking, in the palm as vessel, or in another's in order to merely protect the body at the tim-required, being of equal mind whether the object in gained or not, without having aught of his own, always meditating upon Brahman, being with Āṭma-nishthā, having eradicated all actions, virtuous and sinful, and having given up all-that one who ever utters Brahma-Praṇava, that "I am Brahman' alone, with the blissful and non-dual jñāna, and after rising above the three bodies (to Brahman), like the analogy of the wasp and the worm, gives up the body as a sannyāsin, is said to have done all his work (in this world). Such is the Upanishaḍ."

"One who after giving up the world, the Veḍas, the objects and the organs is in Āṭmā alone, attains the supreme abode. A good ascetic should not make known his caste, name, goṭra (clan), etc., his place and time, and Veḍas, etc., studied by him, his family, age, history, observance, and conduct. He should neither converse with women nor remember the women he had seen. He should give up all stories connected with women. He should not even see the figure of a woman in a picture. The mind of an ascetic who through delusion adopts the above four things connected with woman is necessarily affected and thereby perishes. The following are prohibited (in his case): Thirst, malice, falsehood, deceit, greed, delusion, the pleasant and the unpleasant, manual work, lecture, yoga, kāma (pssion), desire, begging, I-ness, mine-ness, the obstinacy of curing diseases, penance, pilgrimage and the accomplishment of fruits of manṭras and medicines. He who performs these interdicted things, goes into a debased state. A muni who has

moksha as his supreme seat should address such respectful words as "please come, please go, please stay, and welcome" to one, even though he be his intimate friend. He should neither receive presents, etc., nor ask for them to be given to others. Even in dream, an ascetic should never direct a person (to do work for him). Even should be witness or hear of the happiness or grief of his wife, brother, son, and other relatives, he should not be affected thereby. He should abandon all joy and sorrow.

"To the ascetics controlling their mind, the following are their svadharmas (own duties): Harmlessness, truth, honesty, celibacy, non-coveting, humanity, high-spiritedness, clearness of mind, steadiness of mind, straightforwardness, non-attachment (to any), service to the guru, faith, patience, bodily restraint, mental restraint, indifference, firm and sweet words, endurance, compassion, shame, jñāna, vijñāna, yoga, moderate food, and courage. That paramahamsa of an ascetic in the order of life of a sannyāsin who is without dualities, always follows the pure sattvaguṇa and sees all equally, is no other than the actual Nārāyaṇa Himself. He may live one day in a village and five day in a city, but five months in the wintry season. At other times he should live in other places (such as forest, etc.). He should not live in a village for two days (even): should he do so, desires and the rest will arise in him and thereby he becomes fit for hell. He should live like a (harmless) worm on the earth with his mind under control and with no settled place of residence, at the end of the village where there are no persons. He may live in the same place in the wintry season. He should roam about on the earth with one or no cloth, with the one vision (of Brahman) alone, with no desires (of objects), with no condemnation of the actions of the wise and with meditation. That yogin of an ascetic should go about, observing the duties of his order of life, and with the eyes cast on the earth, in pure places. He should nor roam about in night, midday or the two twilight periods in which are places void or difficult to be waded through or likely to injure living creatures. He may live for one day in a village, for three days in a town, for two days in hamlet and for five days in a city. He may live in the wintry season (longer) in one place surrounded fully by water. The ascetic should regard all creatures as Self and dwell upon earth like the blind, the hunch-back, the deaf, the insane, and the dumb. The bahūdaka and the forester should bathe thrice a day. In the case of hamsa, one bath only is ordained; but none in the case of a paramahamsa. In the case of the one having one staff, seven things are ordained, *viz.*, silence, yoga-posture, yoga, endurance, solitariness, desirelessness, and equal vision over all. Bathing being not prescribed for a Paramahamsa, he should abandon all the modifications of the mind only; what is the difference between the worms and the men that rejoice over this ill-smelling body which is but a collection of skin, flesh, blood, nerves, fat, marrow, bone, offal and urine? What is the body but a collection of all, phlegm, etc. ? And what are the qualities, the vāsana of the body, effulgence, beauty, etc.? (They are opposed to one an other). The ignorant man that is fond of this body, which is but a compound of flesh, blood, the ill-smelling urine and offal, nerve, fat and bone, will be fond of hell too. Though there is no difference between the women's secret parts that cannot be described by words and an (ever) oozing tubular wound, yet through the difference of the mind, (men are deluded). Such men are said to be without prāṇa, (*viz.*, dead) though alive. Prostrations to those that sport in that

piece of flesh which is rent in twain and tainted with the breaking of the wind, etc. What more revolting thing is there than this?

"To the wise, there is nothing to do, no sign (of identification). The muni who is without 'mine' and fear, with quiescence, without duality and eating leaf (alone), should ever be in meditation with either loin-cloth or no cloth. A yogin who is thus in meditation becomes fit to be Brahman. Though he may have some signs (of identification to pass under this order of life or that), such signs are useless for gaining moksha. The cause of salvation is jñāna alone. He is a (true) brāhmaṇa who cannot be identified as saṭ (good person) or asaṭ, knower of religious books or not, follower of good conduct or bad conduct. Therefore that learned man who is without signs, a knower of ḍharma, engaged in the actions of Brahman and a knower of the secret mysteries, should roam about, incognito. He should go about on this earth without any caste or order of life and without being (even) doubted (regarding his identity) by any beings, like the blind, the idiot, or the mute. Then (even) the angels become fond of him who has a quiescent mind. It is the dictate of the Veḍas that the sign (of non-identification) itself is Kaivalya."

Then Nārada asked the Grandfather about the rules of sannyāsa. To which Brahmā assented and said: "Before either the āṭura or regular sannyāsa is taken, kṛchchhra penance should be done and then the eight sräḍḍhas. In each of the (eight) sräḍḍhas, two brāhmaṇas should be fed, in lieu of Viśveḍevas called Saṭya-vasu and the (Ṭrimūrṭis called) Brahmā, Vishṇu, and Maheśvara, in Ḍevaśrāḍḍha first; then in Ṛshiśraḍḍha in lieu of Ḍevaṛshi, Rājaṛshi, and Manushyaṛshi; then in Ḍivyaśrāḍḍha, in lieu of Vasu, Ruḍra, and Āḍiṭyas; then in manushyaśrāḍḍha in lieu of Sanaka, Sananḍana, Sanaṭkumāra, and Sanaṭsujāṭa; then in bhūṭaśrāḍḍha, in lieu of the five great elements, pṛṭhivī, etc., eye and other organs and the four kinds of collections of bhūṭas; then in Piṭṛśrāḍḍha, in lieu of father, grandfather and great-grandfather; then in māṭṛśrāḍḍha, in lieu of mother, mother's father and mother's grandfather; and then in Āṭmaśrāḍḍha, in lieu of himself, his father the grandfather or of himself, grandfather and great-grandfather, should his father be alive. He should perform the eight śrāḍḍhas in one day, or eight days, with the manṭras of his śākha in one yājñapaksha or eight yājñapakshas. Then he should worship and feed the brāhmaṇas according to the rules contained in piṭṛyajña. Then offering the piṇdas (balls of rice to the piṭrs), he should gladden the brahmaṇas with the ṭāmbūla (nut and betel, etc.,) presents and dismiss them. Then for the accomplishment of the remaining karmas, he should pluck off seven hairs; then again for finishing the rest of the karmas, he should hold seven or eight hairs and have the head shaved. Except his arm-pit and secret parts, he should have the hairs of his heads, whiskers and mustache and nails shaved. After shaving, he should bathe and perform the evening sanḍhyā, uttering Gāyaṭrī a thousand times. Then performing brahmayajña, he should establish his own fire and acting up to his śākhā, should perform the ablation of ghee according to what is said therein till the ājya portion with those (manṭras beginning with) Āṭmā, etc.; he should eat thrice the fried rice-powder, and then sipping the water, he should maintain the fire; then seated north of the fire on a deer-skin, he should be engaged in the study of Purāṇas; without sleeping, he should bathe at the end of the four yāmas and after cooking the oblation of (rice) in the

fire, he should offer it to the fire in sixteen oblations according to (the mantras of) Purusha-Sūkṭa. Then having done viraja-homa and sipped water, he should close it with the gift (to brāhmaṇas) of cloth, golden vessel, and cows along with presents of money and then dismiss Brahmā (who had been invoked). With the prescribed manṭra, he should attract Agni (fire) unto himself. After meditating upon and coming round and prostrating before the fire, he should dismiss it. Then in the morning performing sanḍhyā and uttering Gāyaṭarī a thousand times, he should make upasṭhāna (worship) to the sun. Then descending into water up to the navel, he should make arghya (water-offering) to the gurdians of the eight quarters; then he should give leave to Gāyaṭrī, making Sāviṭrī enter into vyāhṛṭi.

The manṭra prescribed for this should be uttered through the mind and voice in high, middling, and low tones. With the manṭra, अभयं सर्वभूतेभ्यो मत्तः सर्वं प्रवर्तते । the water should be sipped and having taken the water with the two hands, it should be droped on the east. Having uttered स्वाहा, he should pluck his hair (yet left) end uttering the prescribed manṭra, and having torn off the sacred thread and taken it in the hand with water, should utter ओं भूः, go to the ocean' and cast them down as oblation in water:- ओं भूः संन्यस्तं मया । ओं भुवः संन्यस्तं मया । ओं स्वः संन्यस्तं मया ।। Having uttered thrice and saturated thrice (the water) with (the influence of) the manṭra, he should sip the water; and then uttering the manṭras ओं भूः, etc., he should cast aside in water the cloth and waist-cord. Having thought himself to be the abdicator of all karmas, he being in the meditation of his own Reality as nature made him, should go as before northward with hands upraised. Should he be a sannyāsin learned (in the Veḍas, etc.), he should get himself initiated into Praṇava from his teacher and go about at his own free will with the thought of there being none other but his Self, and feeding his body with fruits, leaves and water, live in mountains, forest and temples. That lover of salvation who after sannyāsa roams about naked in all places with his heart full of the enjoyment of Aṭmic bliss, with the fruit of avoidance of karmas and maintaining his life with fruits, juice, barks, leaves, roots and water should abandon his body in mountain caves, uttering the Praṇava. But an aspirant after wisdom, should he become a sannyāsin, should, after walking a hundred steps, be addressed by the teacher and other Brāhmans thus: "O Mahābhāga (very fortunate person), stay, stay, wear the staff, cloth and bowl, come to the teacher in order to learn the meaning of Praṇava manṭra vākya". He should then take up the waist-cord, loin-cloth, red-coloured cloth and bowl. A bamboo staff which is not injured from top to bottom, equal, beautiful, and not spotted with black, should be worm, by him, after sipping the water and uttering the mantra prescribed for the purpose. Then the bowl should be taken up, after uttering the manṭra with the Praṇava preceding it: - ओं जगज्जीवनं जीवनाधारभूतं मातेव मा मन्त्रयस्व सर्वदा सर्व सौम्य।। Then after first uttering (the manṭra) गुह्याच्छादनं कौपीनं ओं। शीतवातोष्णत्राणकरं देहैकरक्षणं वस्त्रं ओं।। he should take up the waist-cord, loin-cloth and cloth with the achamana (sipping of water) preceding it.

"Thus consecrated with yoga and thinking that he had done all that should be done, he should be firm in the observances of his order of life. Thus is the Upanishaḍ."

Sannyasa

Then Nāraḍa said to the Grandfather thus: "You said that sannyāsa was the liberator of all karmas. Now you say again that the sannyāsa is one that should be in the observance of his āsrama (order of

life). (How to reconcile the two?)" To which the Grandfather replied thus: "To the jīva possessing the body, there are three avasthās—the waking, the dreaming, and the dreamless sleeping with ṭurya (the fourth). Those beings of Purushas that are subject to these avasṭhās follow the observances, incidental to them, of karma, jñāna and vairāgya." Nāraḍa said: "O Lord, if so, what are the differences of different orders of sannyāsa? And what are the difference of their observances? Please tell us truly."

Therefore, the difference of sannyāsas, and the difference of observances were related for the sake of Nāraḍa by Brahmā, after assenting to his (Nāraḍa's) question thus:

"Truly sannyāsa is of one kind only. On account of ajñāna, inability and non-performance of karmas (of persons), it is divided into three and then into four, thus: vairāgya-sannyāsa, ajñāna-sannyāsa, jñānavairāgya-sannyāsa, and karma-sannyāsa.

The vairāgya-sannyāsin is one who becomes an ascetic after being in a vicious condition of lust, etc., and then, becomes disgusted with the objects through his former good karmas. A jñāna-sannyāsin is one who becomes an ascetic with the four means of salvation, after controlling the organs through book-wisdom, and becoming familiar with the experiences of the world of virtue and vice, after abandoning anger, jealousy, envy, ahankāra and all sannyāsa productive of identification, after giving up the three vāsanās of the body, books and world, which are the form of desires for women, wealth and earth, and after thinking that the whole of the universe should be given up, like vomited food. A jñānavairāgya-sannyāasin is one who becomes an ascetic as nature made him, after practising and enjoying all, and having the body alone remaining, through jñāna and vairāgya, in the realisation of the Reality. A karma-sannyāsin is one who, though he has no vairāgya, becomes an ascetic by regularly passing from one āsrama to another, from the celibate, to the householder and then to the forester. A vairāgya-sannyāsin is one who becomes an ascetic from the celibate order (directly), being as nature made him.

"(There is another fourfold classification). The four kinds are: viḍvaṭ-sannyāsa, jñāna-sannyāsa, vividisha-sannyāsa and karma-sannyāsa. In karma-sannyāsa, there are two (sub) divisions, nimiṭṭa (causal) and animiṭṭa (non-causal). Āṭura-sannyāsa (on account of the cause of approaching death, disease, etc.), is nimiṭṭa-sannyāsa. The karma (regular) sannyāsa is animiṭṭa. Āṭura-sannyāsa is on account of defective karmas. When sannyāsa is taken at the time of death, it is called nimiṭṭa. Animiṭṭa is that when one becomes duly a sannyāsin when the body is strong, (after being convinced) that all created things are subject to destruction, that body and others should be given up, that all Āṭmās (souls)—each one shining in the pure, Ākās, dwelling in all, moving in the anṭariksha (middle world) as of the form of vayu, in the sacrificial pit as of the form of fire, in the moon, in all men, in the supreme angels, in the form of truth, in ākās, in the form of the conch, pearl, fish, etc., in water, in the form of grain, etc., on earth, in the form of the limbs of Veḍas, in the form of the rivers from the mountains, in the form of truth and the great one—are no other than Brahman and that others are but perishable.

"There are six classes of sannyāsins—kutichaka, bahūḍaka, hamsa, paramahamsa, ṭuriyāṭīṭa and avaḍhūṭa. Kutichaka is one who wears the tuft of hair, holy, thread, staff, bowl, loin-cloth and tattered cloth, who worships mother, father, and teacher, who has potsherd and

sling, who is uttering manṭras, who takes food in one and the same place, who wears, vertically, the white earth (on the forehead as sect-mark) and who has a staff. Bahūḍaka is one who, like kutīchaka, wears the tuft of hair, tattered cloth, etc., as well as the three (sect-) marks, but who eats eight morsels of food through getting alms. The hamsa is one who wears matted hair and the three vertical sect-marks and eats the alms-food without any limit (as to the morsel) and wears the bare loin-cloth, wears one red cloth alone and sacred ashes and has given up all. The ṭurīyaṭīṭa is one who either may take fruits, eating them with his mouth like cows, or if he is an eater of food, may beg food from three houses. The naked man having the body alone has the bodily actions (quiescent), like the dead body. Such an one is the ṭurīyāṭīṭa. The avaḍhūṭa is he who is without any rules, gets his food (in his mouth), following the course of the boa constrictor, from all persons except persons of ill-repute and outcastes, and is ever engaged in the realisation of the Real. Should the āṭura-sannyāsin be alive (after taking sannyāsa), he should take up regular sannyāsa. The rules to be observed in the case of the (three), kutīchaka, bahūḍaka and hamsa are the same as for the orders of life from the celibate to the sannyāsin. For the three, paramahamsa upwards, they have no waist-cord, lion-cloth, cloth, bowl and staff. They may get food from all castes and should be as nature made them. Such are the rules.

"At the time of the sannyāsa, the recitation of the Veḍas should be made till the mind is cleared; and after casting aside in water the waist-cord, loin-cloth, staff, cloth, bowl, etc., he should roam about. He should be without even the slightest tattered cloth. He should neither utter anything other than Praṇava, nor talk nor hear. He should not study logic or grammar. He should not talk many words; they will but pain his vocal organ. He should not converse with people through the vocal organ. He should not talk in other language (than Samskṛṭ). He has no worship of God and no witnessing of festivals; he should be free from pilgrimage. The other rules of ascetics are: The kutīchaka should beg alms in one house only; for the bahūḍaka, eight morsels in eight houses; for the hamsa, there is no limit; for paramahamsa, he should beg with his hand as the vessel in five houses; for the ṭurīyāṭīṭa, he should eat fruits with his mouth like cows; (for avaḍhūṭa), he should take food like a boa constrictor in all castes. The ascetic should not dwell in one place for many days. He should not make prostrations to any one. Among the ṭurīyāṭīṭa and avaḍhūṭa (ascetics), even though one is junior, he should not make prostrations to another, a senior who has known the Reality. He should not swim with his hands and cross the river. He should not climb up a tree, nor get into a carriage. Nothing should be purchased or sold (by him). No exchange should be made, no ostentation for him. There is nothing for the acetic to do. If there is anything for him to do, he will perish. Therefore, the only thing he is qualified to do is reflection, etc.

"To the āṭuras and kutīchakas, the world they attain is bhūrloka and bhuvarloka; to the bāhūḍakas, swarga-loka; to the hamsas, ṭapoloka; to the paramahamasas, saṭyaloka. To the ṭurīyāṭīṭa and avaḍhūṭa, Kaivalya in Āṭmā according to the analogy of the wasp and the worm through the realisation of Reality. It is the command of the Veḍas that whatever from one thinks of at the last (death) moment and before leaving the body is attains by him and no other. Knowing it thus, he should not be a

practiser of anything but the realisation of Reality.

Through the observance of any other, he goes to the world, of that other. To one that has attained jñāna-vairāgya, his salvation is in the Self, as there is no other observance for him. The same one (Āṭmā) alone is stayled Viśva in the walking state, Taijasa in the dreaming state and Prājña in the dreamless sleeping state. Through the difference of states, there is the difference of the agent presiding over them. To the fourteen organs (the ten organs of sense and actions and the four organs of the mind in these states), the outer and inner, vṛṭṭis (modifications) are the material cause. There are four vṛṭṭis, *viz.*, manas, buḍḍhi, ahaṅkāra and ehiṭṭa. Through the differences of actions of the vṛṭṭis, there arise the differences of separate functions. When (the presiding agent is) in the eyes there is the waking state; in the throat, the dreaming state; in the heart, the dreamless sleeping state; and in the head, the turya (or fourth) state. Knowing these and that the ṭurya is the indestructible, one should not hear or see anything in the waking state, as if he were in dreamless sleeping state. To such a one who does not apparently know them, even the dreaming state forms the same (dreamless sleeping) state. Such a one is termed Jīvanmukṭa. All the Veḍas say that there is salvation to such a one.

"To the ascetic, there should be no desire of this world or the higher. Then he will be one that will practise accordingly. Through the practices of (the study of) books foreign to the realisation of Reality, he becomes a useless person like a camel bearing saffron paint. To him, there is no entry into yoga books, no study of sānkhya books, no practise of manṭra of ṭanṭra. Should there be any entry into other books (than the one treating of Reality), then it will be like an ornament to a dead body. Like a cobbler, he should be beyond karma and knowledge and unfit for salutation and repeating the names of the Lord. He will duly get the benefit of the karmas (of his order of life). Having given up all like the foam (separating itself) from the castor oil, having the mental staff which controls the mind clinging to objects, having the hand as the vessel (for eating) and having the quarters alone as the cloth, the ascetic should go about like a lad, idiot, or ghost. He should neither desire to live nor die. Like a coolie abiding his appointed times (of pay), the ascetic should bide his time (of death). One who lives by taking alms without (the qualifications of) patience, wisdom, vairāgya and the qualifications beginning with sama (control of mind) is the spoiler of the order of life of an ascetic. There is no salvation obtained through the mere assumption of the staff or making the head bald or other disguise or through ostentatious observances. That man who has jñāna as his staff is said to be the ekaḍaṇḍī (one having Brahman alone as the staff). An ascetic who, having, merely a wooden staff without jñāna, eats all (indiscriminately) in all places, goes to the terrible hells called Mahāraurava. (The sense of) greatness in his case is likened by the rshis to the pig's dung. Having given it up, he should move about like a worm. Food and cloth without being begged for by him should be obtained involuntarily through the will of others. A naked (ascetic) may bathe at the wish of another. A man who practises the meditation upon Self in the dreaming state as in the waking is said to be the foremost and first of Brahmavāḍins. He should neither grieve for things not obtained, nor rejoice at things obtained. With the organs not attached, nor rejoice at things obtained. With the organs not attached to objects, he should be engaged in the sole protection of life. He should always look down upon

the gains obtained with much respect (shown to him). Through the gains obtained with much respect, the ascetic though released becomes bound. What is meant by the protection of life, is this: When the fire (of the hearth in a house) had been extinguished and all have taken food, he may go to the houses of caste people that are fit for taking alms from: The yogin who has his hand only as his alms-bowl should not often take alms. He may take (food) standing or sitting; so in the middle (of taking food), he may sip water. Those who have pure mind should not over-step the limits like the ocean. The great ones do not give up their self-restraint like the sun. When the muni takes, like a cow, the food with the mouth only (without the use of the hand), he becomes of equal vision to all beings. Then he becomes fit for salvation. He may, for alms, go from a forbidden house to a non-forbidden one. He should go (for alms) to a house where the door is ajar, but not to a house where it is closed. The muni who has a dusty body, an uninhabited house or the foot of a tree as his abode, without anything dear or not dear to him , sleeping where the sun sets, without any fire-worship, without any settled place and with patience and the organs under control, should live without any desire in any place obtained. He who after going to the forest dwells with jñāna as the sacrifice and the organs under his mastery and awaits his time (of death), is fit to be of the nature of Brahman. A muni who goes about with no cause for instilling fear into all beings need never have any fear from them. One without any abhimāna (identification with body) or egoism or dualities or doubt, never is angry, never hates, never lies through the vocal organ. That person who, having visited all sacred places, does not do any injury to any living creature and gets alms at the proper time, is fit to be of the nature of Brahman. He should not associate with a forester or householder. He should conduct himself in such manner as not to be known to others. He should not be glad of anything. He should roam about on earth like a worm, according to the direction points out by the sun. He should not do or cause to do works tending to (his) fame or pains or people's benefit. He should not be inclined towards vicious books. He should not live dependent upon any. He should give up all over-disputatious reasoning. He should not join any party (fighting with another). He should not take any disciples. He should not study many books. He should not discourse. Neither should he commence any works. Without any distinguishing characteristics and without letting others know his opinions, that wise man, or muni, ever intent upon the Brāhmic vision, should exhibit himself to people like an idiot, or a lad, or a mute person. He should neither do nor talk anything. He should not think of a good or bad thing. Rejoicing in That within himself, the muni should go about like an idiot. He should roam about alone without associating with any, and with the senses under control. The clever jñāni sporting in Āṭmā, ever delighting in Āṭmā-jñāni, and playing like a child, should wander about like an idiot. That learned man versed in Brahma-viḍya should talk like a madman. He should follow the observances of cows (by eating with the mouth, causing no trouble to anybody). A good jñānī whether pushed, disregarded, slighted, beaten, or hindered by the vicious, or burnt by their acts, or having urine and faces thrown upon him by them, or afflicted in various other ways, should always think well of them though pained, and thus make them lift themselves through their own Selves. A yogin whether praised or afflicted by other, never thinks of it in order to reach

a superior state in yoga. A yogin who is slighted by people, attains a higher state in yoga. A yogin never goes against the actions of the virtuous. He is the same whether people slight him or do not desire his association. He should do all that is right through the actions of mind, speech and body to all beings born out of the embryo or the egg, etc. He should harbour no malice against any and give up all clinging to things. The ascetic after giving up passion, anger, pride, desire, delusion and other faults should be without fear. Eating alms-food, preserving silence, ṭapas, special meditation, a good jñāna, and vairāgya-these are said, in the opinion (of the great), to be the ḍharma of the ascetic. Wearing the red cloth, and being ever in ḍhyāna-yoga, he should live either at the foot of a tree, outside the village, or in the temple. Daily he should live upon begging. He should not eat one food alone (from one only). Till the mind becomes pure, the learned man should thus be moving about. Then when the mind is purified, he may be anywhere as a parivrājaka. Seeing Janārḍana in and out everywhere, preserving silence, being without stain like vayu, roaming everywhere, being equal in happiness and pains, and with patience, eating whatever comes to hand, equally regarding without any hate brāhmaṇa, cow, horse, beasts and others, meditating through the mind upon Vishṇu that is Paramāṭmā and Iśvara, thinking ever of Brāhmic bliss and thinking himself to be Brahman- such a one having know thus, regarding the staff to be no other than the certitude of the mind as above, having no desire, being naked and having abandoned all samsāra through the actions ever done through the mind, speech, and body, attains salvation, according to the analogy of the wasp and the worm, through the practice of the realisation of Reality without ever seeing the universe. Such is the Upanishaḍ."

Jñāna-vairāgya

Nāraḍa addressing Brahmā asked : "O Lord ! You said of abhyāsa (practice) according to the analogy of wasp and the worm. What is that practice?"

To which the Grandfather replied thus:

"One (*viz.*, an ascetic) should live with true speech and jñāna-vairāgya and with the body alone as the remaining (possession). Know jñāna alone as the body, vairāgya alone as prāṇa, sānṭi (mental control) and ḍānṭi (bodily control) as the eyes, mamas alone as the face, buḍḍhi alone as kala (parts of effulgence), the twenty-five ṭaṭṭvas as the limbs, the avasṭhās as the five great elements, karma, bhakṭi, jñāna, and vairāgya as the branches (or parts) and that the waking, dreaming, dreamless sleeping, and ṭurya avasṭhās and the fourteen organs as being of the nature of a pillar planted in the mud. Though such is the case, the man who masters these through his buḍḍhi like a boat-man regarding the boat immersed in the mire, or the elephant driver regarding the elephant (under his control), and has known that all else beside Self is illusory and destructible and became indifferent, should ever utter: 'I am Brahman alone'. He should not know anything as other than Self. A Jīvanmukṭa who lives thus is a doer of that which should be done. He should not discourse that he is other than Brahman. But he should ever be discoursing: 'I am Brahman'. From the waking, dreaming and dreamless sleeping states, he should reach the ṭurya state and then ṭuryāṭīṭa (the state beyond turya). The waking state is in the day; the dreaming in the night and the dreamless sleeping in the midnight. Each avasṭhā (or state) has its sub-states. The functions of the fourteen organs, eye and others mutually dependent are the

following: The eyes perceive forms; the ears, sounds; the tongue perceives tastes; the nose, odours; the vocal organ speaks; the hand lifts; the leg walks; the anus excertes; the sexual organ enjoys; the skin feels; the buḍḍhi perceives objects, being under the control of the organs; through buḍḍhi, he understands; through chiṭṭa, he thinks; through ahaṅkāra, he says 'I'. All these should be abandoned. Through the identification with the house (the body), he, like a householder, becomes a jīva thinking that the body is itself.

"The jīva is dwelling in this body. When he is in the eastern petal (of the heart), he is inclined to virtuous actions; in the south-eastern petal, to sleep and laziness; in the southern petal, to cruel actions; in the south-western petal, to sinful actions; in the western petal, to love of sport (or to flirt); in the north-western petal, to travelling; in the northern petal, to peace of mind; in the north-eastern petal, to jñāna; in (the middle of) the pericarp, to vairāgya; in the filament, to Aṭma-deliberation. Such are the different aspects to be understood (in the heart). The first living avasṭhā (of jīva) is the waking; the second is the dreaming; the third is the dreamless sleeping; the fourth ṭurya; that which is not these four is turyāṭīṭa. The one Lord alone that is witness and without qualities appears (as many) through the differences of Viśva, Ṭaijasa, Prājña, and Ṭatasṭha (the neutral). One should (always) utter: 'I am Brahman alone'. Else in the waking state, (he is) in the four states of the waking state and others: in the dreaming state, (he is) in the four states of ṭurya and others; to the turyāṭīṭa that is nirguna, such states are not. There is only one witness in all the states of Viśva, Ṭaijasa and Prājña, who is presiding over the gross, the subtle and the causal (bodies). Is Ṭatasṭha the seer? or is he not? As (to Ṭatasṭha), there is the property of seeing; the jīva that is affected by the egoism, etc., of agency and enjoyment is not the seer. The one other than jīva (*viz.*, Ṭatasṭha) is not concerned (with egoism, etc.). If it is said that the jīva is not so (concerned with egoism), then it is not a fact. Through the abhimāna of the jīva, there is the abhimāna of the body. And (conversely) through the abhimāna of the body, there is the abhimāna of the jīva. The state of the jīva is as a screen (to screen Brahman) like (the pot and house in) the pot-ākāś and the house-ākāś. Through such a screen, he reaches self-realisation through the mantra— 'Hamsa-Soham' having the characteristics of inspiration and expiration. Having known thus, if he should give up the identification with the body, then he does not identify himself with the body (*i.e.*, not attain the state of jīva). Such a one is stated to be Brahman. Having given up abhimāna and anger, being content with moderate food, having conquered the organs and having controlled the avenues (of the organs), one should make the mind enter into meditation. The yogin who has always controlled (his mind and organs) should ever diligently commence his meditation in empty places, caves and forests. The knower of yoga who is bent upon accomplishing the end should never be engaged in giving feasts to Brāhmaṇs, in srāḍḍha sacrifices, etc., or in going to places of pilgrimages, festivals or crowds. The well-controlled yogin should go about as if people had treated him with disrespect. He should not go against the actions of the wise. That great ascetic is said to be a ṭridaṇdin (or having a three-knotted staff) who holds firmly the three-ḍaṇda (control) of mind, speech, and body. That ascetic is said to be a supreme person who begs alms-food of worthy brāhmaṇas, when smoke has ceased and fire has been extinguished (in their houses). Is he not a

degraded ascetic who, though holding the staff and begging food, is without vairāgya and is not intent upon the observances of his order? He is an ascetic-not any other-who does not go to the house where he expects to find special alms or which he already visited. He is said to transcend all castes and orders of life who realises the self-shining supreme Ṭaṭṭva that is without body and organs, the all-witness, the real vijñāna that is of the form of bliss. To the Āṭmā that is of the nature of jñāna, such an idea as: 'the order of life, etc., is mine.' being generated out of māyā in this body, can never exist. He who knows thus through veḍānṭa is beyond all castes and orders of life. He from whom all castes and orders of life slip away through Atmic vision, transcends them all and remains in Āṭmā alone. That person is said by knower of the meaning of the Veḍas to be aṭivarṇāśramī (beyond caste and order of life) who after crossing all castes and orders of life abides in Āṭmā alone. Therefore, O Nāraḍa, the castes and orders of life which are foreign (to Āṭmā) are attributed falsely, by the ignorant, to Āṭmā. O Nāraḍa, for those that are Brahma-jñānis, to be given up or not; similarly nothing else (for them). Having attained indifference to all objects even up to Brahmā's seat, having destroyed (or done away with) all fondness for everything, as for son, relatives, wife, etc., and having faith in the path of salvation, and through love of veḍānṭa-jñāna, he should approach a guru who is a knower of Brahman with gift (in his hand). Having an equilibrated mind, he should satisfy the guru for a long time through service, etc., and learn with a steady firm mind the meaning of the sentences of the Veḍas. Then being devoid of 'I' and 'mine' and of all attractions, and having attained peace of mind, etc., he sees Āṭmā in himself. Through observing the faults of samsāra, there arises indifference. There is no doubt that sannyāsa arises in one who becomes disgusted with samsāra. The aspirant after salvation who is called paramahamsa should, through the hearing, etc., of veḍānṭa, practise Brahma-jñāna, which is the direct and chief means of salvation. In order to attain Brahma-jñāna, the one named paramahamsa should possess the qualities of the control of mind and body, etc. He should always be a practiser of veḍānṭa, being master of the mind, the body and the organs, without fear and egoism, with a firm mind, without the pairs (of opposites), without attaching himself self to any, having a worn-out loin-cloth, and being bald-headed or naked. He should have the great intelligence of the knower of veḍānṭa, a yogi without I and mine and being equal and friendly to friends and other beings. That jñāni alone and none else is able to cross samsāra who has his mind at peace. With the grace of the guru towards him, he should live with him for one year. He should be careful to observe yama (restraint) and niyama (religious observance). At the end of that (year), he should attain the supreme jñāna-yoga, and roam about on this earth without going against ḍharma; (or) at the end of one year, he should give up the three orders of life and attain the chief āśrama (of sannyāsa), as well as the supreme jñāna-yoga. Then, taking leave of the guru, he should wander over the earth, having given up association (with wife, etc., as well as anger, and being content with moderate food and having controlled the senses. The householder who does not perform karma, and the ascetic who performs karma-both become fallen through their perverse doings. Each becomes intoxicated through drinking alcohol. Therefore women, mere sight of whom is poison, should be shunned at a distance. Such things as conversation and

proximity with, and sight of, women, dancing, singing, using violence against persons, and disputatious arguments should be given up. Therefore, O Nāraḍa, to such a one, there is neither bath nor muttering of manṭras nor worship nor homa, nor means of accomplishment, nor any karma of fire-sacrifice, etc., nor worshipping with flowers, etc., nor karmas to the piṭṛs nor pilgrimages, nor religious observance, nor ḍharmas, nor aḍharmas, nor any rules of observance, nor any other worldly karmas. He should give up all karmas and worldly observances. That yogin of an ascetic who is a learned person, having his intelligence directed towards Reality, should never injure any worm or insect, bird or tree. O Nāraḍa, roam through the world with vision ever directed inwards, with purity, with mind under control, with a mind that is full of Brahman and all attraction given up within. The muni that goes about alone, does (or should) not dwell in countries there is no king. (In his case), there is neither praise nor prostration, nor the propitiation of ḍevas or pitrs. Thus, the ascetic who has his abode changeful (in body), or changeless (in Āṭmā), should be content with whatever gets. Thus is the Upanishaḍ."

The Observance of Ascetic

The Grandfather, after eulogizing Nāraḍa who asked about the observance of ascetics, replied thus:-

"The ascetic that has attained indifference (to objects), should stay in one and the same place in the rainy season (for four months), and then for (the remaining) eight months should wander alone. Then also the ascetic should not stay in one and the same place for more than a day. Like a door that does not stay in one place on account of fear, he should not stay in one place. He should not create an attraction (in his mind) that may serve as an obstacle to his going about. He should not cross a stream (by swimming) with his hand, nor ascend a tree, nor witness the festival of a God, nor partake of regal food, nor do the external worship of God. Having discarded all things other than the Self, he should be with his body emaciated by taking food (from each house) like the bees (from each flower). He should not increase there fat (in the body); he should discard ghee like blood. Regarding such royal food as flesh, sandal-coating, etc., as offal, the different tastes as the degraded caste, the cloth as a defiled vessel, the oil-bath as sexual union, the gladdening of a friend as urine, desires as cow's flesh, the country known to him as the outcasts' place, gold and women as cobra or deadly poison, the place of assembly as the burning ground, the capital of the town as the hell called Kumbhīpāka, and royal food as balls of rice offered to the dead, he should be without any worship of God other than the Self; and having given up all the actions of the world and his own country, and ever thinking of the bliss of his Self like the bliss arising from the discovery of a lost object, forgetting his country and the fondness for his body, and knowing that his body should be slighted like a carcase, he should dwell away from son, relations and native place, like a thief released from prison. Taking whatever comes to him without effort, ever intent upon the realisation, through meditation, of Brahma-Praṇava, being freed from all karmas, having burnt up all passion, anger, greed, delusion, pride, malice, etc., having transcended the three gunas, being without the six human infirmities, without the six changes, speaking the truth and being opposed to all savoury things, he should live for one day in a village, five days in a town, five days in a sacred place, and five days in sacred waters. With no

settled place of residence and with a firm mind, he should dwell alone in mountain caves without uttering falsehood. Two persons should not join together. Should three join, there is created a village thereby; with four, is formed a city. Therefore, he should live alone in a village. In it, the ascetic should not give scope to his fourteen organs. Having attained wealth of vairāgya through the non-dissipated jñāna, and having deliberated within himself that there is none other than the Self, he should attain Jīvanmukṭi, having seen the Reality everywhere. Till prārabḍha karma is over, he should understand the four kinds of savarūpa (in Ṭaṭṭvamasi) and should live in the realisation of Reality, till his body falls (a prey to death).

"To the kutichaka there is (prescribed) a bath three times daily; to the bahūḍaka, twice; to the hamsa, once; to the paramahamsa there is the mental bath; to the ṭuryāṭiṭa, there is the holy-ashes bath; to the avaḍhūṭa, there is the wind as the bath. For the kutichaka, there is the vertical sect-mark; for the bahūḍaka, there is the three-lined (horizontal) sect-mark; for the hamsa, both; for the paramahamsa, there is the holy-ashes sect-mark; for the turyatita, there is the spot-sect-mark; for the avaḍhūṭa or for the ṭuryāṭiṭa and avaḍhūṭa, there is none. For the kutichaka, shaving takes place once in two months; for the bahūḍaka, once in four months; for the hamsa and paramahamsa, none, or if wanted, once in a year; for the ṭuryāṭiṭa and avaḍhūṭa, none at all. The kutichaka should take the food in one (place only); the bahūḍaka should take alms (in many places); for the hamsa and paramahamsa, the hand is the vessel; the ṭuryāṭiṭa, should take food with the mouth as the cow; for the avaḍhūṭa, it is like the action of the boa constrictor (opening the mouth and taking whatever comes into it). For the kutichaka, there are two cloths; for the bahūḍaka, there is one cloth; for the hamsa there is a piece of cloth; and the paramahamsa should be naked or have only a loin-cloth; in the case of the ṭuryāṭiṭa and avaḍhūṭa, they should be as nature made them. For the hamsa and paramahamsa, there is (prescribed) a deerskin, and for no others. For the kutichaka and bahūḍaka, there is the worship of the divine (image); for the hamsa and paramahamsa,. there is mental worship; for the ṭuryāṭiṭa and avaḍhūṭa, there is the idea that they alone are Brahman. The kutichaka and bahūḍaka are entitled to manṭras and japas; the hamsa and paramahamsa, to ḍhyāna (meditation); the ṭuryāṭiṭa and avaḍhūta are entitled to none; but they are entitled to the initiation of the sacred sentences of the Veḍas; so also the paramahamsa. The kutichaka and bahūḍaka are not entitled to initiate others; for them, there is (the uttering of) the mental praṇava; for the hamsa and paramahamsa, there is the internal praṇava (in the heart); for the ṭuryāṭiṭa and avaḍhūṭa, there is the Brahma-praṇava (always). For the kuṭichaka and bahūḍaka, there is śravaṇa (hearing and study); for the hamsa and paramahamsa, there is manana (thinking and remembering); for the ṭuryāṭiṭa and avaḍhūṭa (there is nidiḍhyasana (profound meditation ever). For all these, there is necessarily the meditation upon Āṭmā. Thus the aspirant after salvation should ever be uttering the Praṇava which enables one to cross samsāra, and be living as a Jīvanmukṭa. Thus the ascetic, according to each one's capacity, should ever be seeking the means to attain Kaivalya. Such is the Upanishaḍ."

Parameshthi

Then Nāraḍa asked Parameshthī (Brahmā) to enlighten him, who had

surrendered himself to Him, about samsāra-ṭāraka (or that ṭāraka or Praṇava which lifts one out of samsāra).

Assenting to which, Brahmā began thus : "Omkāra that is Brahman is the vyashti (individual) and the samsahti (cosmic). What is the individual? What is the cosmic? Brahma-praṇava iś of three kinds, samhāra-(destructive) praṇava, sṛshti — (creative) praṇava, and ubhayāṭmaka (belonging to both) praṇava, as being of two forms, internal and external. (It is also eight;) Anṭaḥ-praṇava, Vyāvahārika-praṇava, bāhya-praṇava, ārsha-praṇava, ubhayāṭmaka or virāt-praṇava, samhāra-praṇava, brahma-praṇava, and arḍhamāṭrā-praṇava. Om is Brahman. Know that the manṭra of the one-syllabled Om is Praṇava. It has the eight differences of akāra, ukāra, makāra, arḍhamāṭrā, nāḍa, binḍu, kalā, and śakṭi. Know it is not four (alone). Akāra is associated with ten thousand limbs; ukāra, with one thousands limbs; makāra with one hundred limbs; arḍhamāṭrā is of the nature of endless limbs. That which is saguṇa (associated with guṇas) is virāt-(preservation) praṇava; that which is nirguṇa (not associated with guṇas) is samhāra-(or destruction) praṇava; that which is associated with guṇas and is not so associated, is virāt; that which is associated with guṇas and is not so associated, is uṭpaṭṭi-(or origination) praṇava. Pluṭa (the elongated accent) is virāt; pluṭapluṭa is samhāra. The virāt-praṇava is of the form of sixteen māṭrās and is above the thirty-six ṭaṭṭvas. The sixteen māṭrās are thus: Akāra is the first māṭrā; ukāra is the second; makāra is the third; arḍhamāṭrā is the fourth; nāḍa is the fifth; binḍu is the sixth; kalā is the seventh; kalāṭiṭa is the eighth; śānṭi is the ninth; sānṭyaṭiṭa is the tenth; unmanī is the eleventh; manonmanI is the twelfth; puriṭaṭi is the thirteenth; ṭanumaḍhyamā is the fourteenth; paṭi is the fifteenth; parā is the sixteenth. Then (again) having sixty-four māṭrās and their division into the two, Prakṛṭi and Purusha and resolving themselves into the one hundred and twenty-eight differences of māṭrās, it becomes saguṇa and nirguṇa. Though Brahma-praṇava is one only,it is the substratum of all, the support of the whole universe, of the form of all aksharas (letters), time, Veḍas, and Śiva. This Omkāra should be sought after, that is mentioned in the Veḍas of the nature of the Upanishaḍs. Know that this Omkāra is the Āṭmā that is indestructible during the three periods of time, past, present, and future, able to confer salvation and eulogized by Brahma-sound (Veḍas). Having experienced this one Om as immortal and ageless, and having brought about the Brahma-nature in this body, become convinced that your Āṭmā, associated with the three bodies, is Parabrahman. Through Viśva and others (*viz.*, Ṭaijasa, Prājña, and Ṭurya) in order, the realisation of Parabrahman should be attained, since Āṭmā is of four kinds through his identification with, and the enjoying of, the gross as well as the enjoyer of the gross, the subtle as well as the enjoyer of the sublte, and through his identification (with the third body) enjoying bliss in the fourth. He has four feet. The one presiding over the waking state is gross; and since he is the enjoyer of Viśva (the universe), he becomes the sṭhūla-prajña (gross consciousness). He has nineteen facets and eight parts. He is pervading everywhere and the Lord. He is the enjoyer of the gross and is the chaṭurāṭma called Viśva. He alone is the Purusha called Vaiśvānara. He alone is Viśvajiṭ (the conqueror of the universe). This is the first foot. When this Lord attains the dreaming condition, he is the sūkshma-prajña (subtle consciousness). O

conqueror of all, he is the one having eight limbs, and there is none else. He is the enjoyer of the subtle and is chaṭurāṭma, named Ṭaijasa and the protector of elements. He alone is the Hiraṇyagarbha, presiding over the gross (or subtle matter rather). He is said to form the second foot. Sushupṭi (or the dreamless sleep) is that state where one sleeps without any desire and where one sees not any dreams. The one identified with this dreamless sleep is Prajñāna-ghana, is blissful, of the nature of eternal bliss and the Āṭmā in all creatures; yet he is enjoyer of bliss, has cheṭas (consciousness) as his (one) foot, is all-pervading, indestructible, chaṭurāṭmā and the Lord, and is named Prājña, the third foot. He alone is the Lord of all, the knower of all, the subtle-thoughted, the latent one, and the cause of all creation. He alone is the origin and the destruction. These three (states) are obstacles to all creatures obtaining (the final) peace. As is svapna, so is sushupṭi, it (also) being said to be illusory. The chaṭurātmā, the fourth, as he is Saṭ, Chiṭ and Ēkarasa (the one essence), ends as the fourth and follows (upon the heels of each of the above states), is the knower of the means of vikalpa-jñāna and is the anujñāṭā (the one following knower). Having known them, and known as māyā the three vikalpas of sushupṭi, svapna, and ānṭara (the inner), even in this state, is he not (to be known as) Saṭ-Chiṭ-Ēkarasa? This shall be expressed as differentiated thus: It is not even the gross prajñā; nor it is the very subtle prajña; nor is it prajñā itself (of the causal body): O muni neither is it the trifling prajñā; nor is it the non-prajñā; nor is it the dual prajñā; nor is it the internal prajñā, though it is without prajñā; it is Prajñāna-ghana. It can never be known by the organs; nor it can be known by the reason; it cannot be grasped by the organs of action. It cannot be proved. It cannot be reached by thought. It cannot be proved by analogy. It can be realised by Self-realisation alone. It is with the waking state, etc. It is the auspicious, with changes, without a second. Such a one is thought to be Ṭurya. This alone is Brahman, Brahma-praṇava. This should be known. There is no other Ṭurya. To the aspirants after salvation, it is the support, like the sun everywhere; it is the Self-light. As it alone is Brahman, this Brahma-Ākāś is shining always. Thus is the Upanishaḍ."

Brahma-swarup

Nāraḍa asked: "Who is Brahma-swarūpa?" To which Brahma replied thus: "Brahma-swarupa is thus: Those who know that 'he (Brahman) is one and I am another' are only paśus (animals): The real paśus (animals) are no animals. The wise man who knows Brahman thus (as himself, and himself as Brahman) escapes out of the mouth of death. There is no other path to salvation.

"Is time the cause (of origination of universes)? or nature? or karma? or accident? or the (great) elements? or Purusha? This should be considered. It is not the union of them. (Then) there is the Āṭmā, but (jīva-) Āṭmā is not the Lord, as it is subject to pleasures and pains. Those (Ṛshis) following ḍhyāna-yoga have beheld, as the cause, the ḍevāṭma-śakṭi concealed by its own qualities of that One that presides over all the cause associated with time and Āṭmā. Him (the Universal Soul), we consider as the wheel which has one circumference, which is covered by three (layers), which has sixteen end-parts, which has fifty spokes and twenty counter-spokes, which has six times eight (nails), which has one rope of various forms, which has the threefold path, and which has delusion arising from the twofold cause. Him (we worship as a river) which has (water) ozzing out of the five currents

(of organs), which is terrible and crooked through the five causes (of elements), whose prāṇas are the five waves, which has buḍḍhi, etc., as the root cause, which has five whirlpools, which is impelled by the velocity of the five pains, which has the five differences (or has the five miseries), and which has the five obstacles. In this wheel of Brahman, which is the support of life and the last abiding place of all beings, and which is infinite, is whirling deluded the jīva, thinking that it is different from the one (Lord) Ordainer. Being blessed by Him, he gains salvation through such (a blessing). This is declared as Brahman, as the supreme and the indestructible. In it, are the three (the enjoyer, the enjoyed and enjoyment). Hence, it is the firm abode (of all). The knowers of Brahman having known Brahman within (the universe, etc.,) attain samāḍhi in Brahman and are absorbed in Brahman. Īśvara upholds this universe, closely associated with the destructible and the indestructible, which are manifest and unmanifest; but the not-ruler of (jīva-) Āṭmā is bound through the thought of its being the enjoyer; and having known the Lord is freed from all fetters. Both Īśvara and jīva are birthless; one (the former) is jñāni and the other (latter) is ajñānī. (The goddess of) Brahmāṭma-śakṭi, is birthless, is alone engaged (in this world), on account of the enjoyment of the enjoyers. Āṭmā is endless. The universe is His form. He is not the agent. Whoever knows the Brahman that is threefold (as jīva, Īśvara and the universe) is released from bondage. It is praḍhāna alone that is destructible. It is Īśvara that is immortal and indestructible. The one Lord (Īśvara) ordains Praḍhāna and Purusha.

"The illusion of the universe disappears through meditation on union (or absorption) and saṭṭva-bhāva of Paramesvara always. Through knowing the Lord, aviḍyā and the rest are destroyed. Through the removal of such, pains, there is freedom from birth and death. Through the meditation of that Parameśvara, the third body is acquired after this (physical) body, all wealth is enjoyed, and he attains whatever should be attained. He should know with certitude that all the three things (*viz.*,) the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and enjoyment are nothing but Brahman, and are of the nature of his own Self. There is none but it to be known. All Āṭmic knowledge is through ṭapas (only). That, Brahman contains in itself all excellence. Having known thus, whoever meditates upon the (Āṭmā-) savarūpa, to him where then is grief? Where then is delusion? Therefore, the Virāt is the past, present, and future time, and is of indestructible nature.

"Āṭmā, that is the atom of atoms and the greatest of the greatest, is in the cave of the heart of all creatures. One without the through of objects and without grief, knows the Āṭmā capable of neither increase nor decrease through the grace of Īśvara or through the non-attraction to the objects of the senses. He (Āṭmā) walks speedily without legs, lifts objects without hands, sees without eyes and hears without ears. He knows all, but none knows Him. He is said to be the foremost Mahā-Purusha. Having known Āṭmā that is bodiless in this fleeting body, the great, the all-pervading, the support of all, with incomprehensible power, fit to be known through the meaning, etc., of all the Upanishaḍs, the supreme of the supreme, the supreme object fit to be known, the one remaining after all, the all-knowing, the eternal, the foremost of all foremost beings, the ordainer of all, the one fit to be worshipped by all angels, the one without beginning, end, and middle, without limit or destruction, the cause of Brahmā, Vishṇu, and Ruḍra, the one that has all

the universe latent in himself, of the nature of the five elements with the expansion of all the quintuplicated careation, without being enveloped by his own limbs of quintuplicated objects, superior to the supreme, greater than the greatest, of the nature of effulgence, the eternal and the auspicious, the undaunted personage never grieves. One who has neither given up vicious actins, nor controlled his organs, nor mastered his mind, nor given up longing after fruits of actions though the mind is undisturbed, nor brought his mind to one state (or point), will not attain this Āṭmā.

"This (Brahman) is neither internal nor external consciousness ; is neither gross, nor jñāna, nor ajñāna; nor is it the state between the waking and the dreaming states. It cannot be cognised by the organs; is not subject to proof; is within. He who knows that which is by Itself alone is an emancipated person."

The Lord Brahmā said that he becomes an emancipated person. He who knows Reality is a Parivrāt. Such a Parivrñāt roams about alone. Through fear, he is like a terrified deer. He will not be opposed to going anywhere. Having given up all but his body, he will live lime a bee, and without considering others as foreign to himself; ever meditating upon Reality, he attains liberation in himself. Such a Parivrāt will be without delusion, without action or causing others to act, being absolved from teacher, disciple, books, etc., and having abandoned all samsara. Such a Parivrāt roams about thus — without wealth, being happy, able to get wealth (if wanted), having crossed jñāna and ajñāna as well as happiness and grief, being Self-effulgence, being fit to be known by the Veḍas, having known all, able to confer siḍḍhis and remaining himself as Brahman, the Lord. Such a Parivrāt attains the supreme abode of Vishṇu, from which a yogin that has gone to it does not return, and where the sun and the moon do not shine. He does not return. Such is Kaivalya.

NATHANIEL BRASSEY HALHED

To the general public in the West today the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā are probably the best known representatives of Hindu thought. Yet the circumstances in which they first became known were very different. The Bhagavadgītā appeared in an attractive English translation, made directly from Sanskrit, and published immediately after completion by the East India Company, at the request of Warren Hastings. Upaniṣads, on the contrary, were first made available in a literal Latin translation of a Persian compilation, which saw the light only after considerable delays.

No less than twenty-four years separate Anquetil Duperron's first work on the Upaniṣads from the publication of his translation. In December 1775 he received from his fried Le Gentil, the French ambassador at the court of Oudh, a manuscript of the Persian compilation of some fifty Upaniṣads made in 1657 in Delhi under the leadership of Dārā Shikūh, eldest son of Shāh Jahān. This he began to collate ith another manuscript of the same text also obtained from Le Gentil, and deposited in the French Royal Library. He first described it in 1778, and promised a translation. Yet of his initial French translation only four Upaniṣads were published. He then turned to a literal Latin translation, which he completed in 1795 and finally published in 1801-1802.

Meanwhile Nathaniel Brassey Halhed, a servant of the English East India Company in Bengal, whom Warren Hastings had appointed to translated into English a Persian version of the treatise on

Hindu law composed by eleven panaits at his request, came to know of Dārā Shikūh's copulation, and translated an extract from it in his preface. He was then busily engaged in collecting Oriental manuscripts, and he acquired two manuscripts of the text. Later, back in England, he translated it into English. His manuscripts translation, 332 folios long, and bearing the date of May 1787, was acquired by the British Museum in 1796. Although he originally intended to publish it, he never did. Later the compiler John Haddon Hindley transcribed it, with the intention of publishing it. Yet, whereas Hindley published other works by Halhed, the translation of the Upaniṣads remained unpublished. Although it was known to some other regular users of the British Museum collections at the time, it was soon forgotten. There would be little point in bringing this translation out today. Yet Halhed's prefactory remarks constitute an interesting document, and an instructive instance of orientalist work in its formative period at the end of the eighteenth century. They will be published here for the first time, with some critical and explanatory notes.

Halhed's preface is unfinished. It ends abruptly, exhibits a blank space, which was to be filled in later on, and, like all other Halhed manuscripts, contains a number of corrections and additions, both marginal and interlinear, not always formulated in complete sentences, which were suggested to the author by further reading. As such it affords us a glimpse at the orientalist at work.

Halhed—apparently misunderstanding Dārā Shikūh's preface—takes the Upaniṣads to be commentaries on the four Vedas, of which Westerners knew only the names at that time. His main concern is to ascertain the antiquity of the original Sanskrit texts. In spite of the widespread criticism which had greeted his acceptance of traditional Hindu chronology in the preface to the *Code of Gentoo Laws*, he remains convinced of the historicity of the four yugas, and of the unfathomable antiquity of Hindu scriptures. Although his conclusion has since been proven false, his reasoning is cogent: the Mahābhārata, which mentions all four yugas, was written in the kaliyuga; the Upaniṣads, which mention neither the Mahābhārata as a text, nor the protagonists of the epic, are earlier; they speak of the first three yugas only, and therefore must have been written before the fourth began. Halhed found confirmation of the Upaniṣads' anteriority vis-a-vis the Mosaic deluge in a work published in the same year by another believer in the high antiquity of Hindu records, the French astronomer Bailly. One point on which he joined Wilkins, and which has resisted the test of time, is that the Atharvaved is later than the first three Vedas. Halhed even holds that the "commentary" (i.e., Upaniṣads) on the Rgveda was begun before the Atharvaveda. He, therefore, pushes the redaction of the first three Vedas far into the Tretayuga, leaving the latter part and the dvaparayuga for the "commentary" on the Rgveda, the Atharvaveda itself, and all other Upaniṣads.

If Halhed thus remains faithful to the belief in Hindu antiquity which he had first voiced in the preface to the *Code of Gentoo Laws*, his approach to Hinduism shows a significant departure. Whereas he had earlier strongly criticized the recourse to symbolical, allegorical interpretations of Hindu concepts in order to reconcile them with Christian doctrines, he himself now falls a prey to this attitude. This change is paralleled by an evolution in his personal beliefs; the sceptic of earlier years is turning into a mystic, destined to

become a convert in 1795 to the millenarian prophecies of Richard Brothers.

The text published in the following pages preserves Halhed's spelling in every respect. The names of Muslim figures and of Persian works are easily recognizable. For Sanskrit words, which tend to be more disfigured, a full index is appended. Their spelling shows a marked improvement on his earlier work; it is less influenced by Bengali pronunciation than was the preface to the *Code of Gentoo Laws*: we now have *Ved*, no longer *Beid*;*Sanscrit*, with only one lapse into *Shanscrit;* yog, as against one *jog* only. Punctuation and use of capitals are adapted to modern usage. Halhed's addition to his original manuscripts are either indicated between < > within the text, or mentioned in lettered notes.

The book here offered to the public is professedly a compilation in its original form, and in its present state a translation of a translation. It has not the support of any collateral proof in testimony of its antiquity nor authenticity; and indeed the Eastern writers, as far as I have been able to discover, are as silent as those of Europe respecting it. In what light then must it be considered? I shall just throw together such internal evidences of its antiquity as occur to me, and leave the world to decide on its pretensions.

In the first place it must be recollected that the Mogul Empire attained to the summit of its grandeur in the reign of Acber, and continued to flourish till the close of the reign of Aureng Zebe, younger brother of Dārā Shekoh. That in Acber's time every possible attention was paid to the learning and religion of the antient Hindoos—and that wonderful display of sound wisdom and important research, the Ayēneh Acberee, bears the strongest testimony of that attention: one third of the whole book is occupied by a learned account of the doctrines and rites and ceremonies and learning of the Hindoos, a subject to which Abūl Fazl <who alone was ever worthy to be ranked with our great Bacon> was almost exclusively equal, since he joined an acquaintance with the Sanscrit language to a profound knowledge of every science then known in the world, for, while his brother Feizi employed many years upon the Mahabharet, he himself amid all his laborious occupations found time to translate the Geetā, a work which I have compared with the elegant translation of Mr. Wilkins, and in testimony to the merits of both, have found the differences between them very immaterial, so as at once to prove the skill and fidelity of the two translators, and the purity of the manuscripts on which they worked. In the Ayēneh Acberee is a catalogue of books translated from Shanscrit and preserved in the Emperor's library, of which is the list: (*blank*)

Herein is no mention of the translation of the 4 Vedas by Feizi, which I always suspected to be a fabricated tale, and of which the silence of the Ayeneh Acberee is a prefect confutation, particularly as the Mahabharet is mentioned. It is conviction to me, who know the country and the indifference of the modern un-inquisitive Mahometans, that they either were content to suppose an identity between the 4 Vedas and the Mahabharet or calculated the fiction, to gratify European curiosity which eagerly sought a disclosure of the Veds and knew not the name of the Mahabharet. Taking up the argument in this place, from Abul Fazl's silence only I make no scruple to pronounce that no translation of the *Vedas* ever existed. Were it otherwise, for what purpose would 'Dārā Shekoh fifty years afterwards have sat down to translate the Openkhets? Dārā

shekoh eldest son of the reigning emperor, only fifty years from the publication of the Ayeeneh Acberee, with a lively imagination, eager curiosity, and extensive reading, could not possibly have been ignorant of such a translation if it had ever existed. He had found means to get translations—which in his preface he very justly decrise—of the Pentateuch, Psalms, and Gospels. The latter, which were done by Xavier, a Portuguese missionary, into Persian are notoriously disfigured according to the custom of the Romish Church in that period. There is another translation into Persian, of which an exemplar is in the Escurial, and from what I once saw from a copy of it, I suspect to have been translated by Armenians settled in Ispahan or some other part of Persia. Dara mentions the Syriac among his acquired languages; I suppose therefore he might have drawn some lights from the Syriac Christians of the peninsula, who possessed many books which the misguided zeal of the archbishop of Goa contrived totally to demolish. It is therefore probable they might have the Pentatueuch as well as the Psalms, neither of which I have ever been able to discover in Persian or Arabic. I only mean to infer from hence that with so extensive and well guided a search Dara could not possibly have missed the translation of the 4 Vedes, nor have omitted to mention it in his preface. Whether in Dara's time the original Vedes no longer were to be found, or if found whether preface. Whether in Dara's time the original Vedas no longer were to be found, or if purpose, he has not chosen to explain. The Openkhets, which he calls the essences of the Veds, and which are clearly commentaries and paraphrases upon them, with a very sparing introduction of the original text, are what necessity or inclination have led him to translate, as in his idea superior in point of sound monotheism to anything he had discovered in any of our books or revelation. We are not even gratified with the names of any of the authors or compilers of these paraphrases, so that it is impossible to guess at their antiquity but from internal evidence. But the composition of the Vedas themselves, and that the Hindoo religion as at present professed indisputably existed at the period of their composition. Dārā is totally silent as to their epoch, which is a singular instance of moderation if he had been the free thinker his enemies would have made him; but it is probable he seriously and bonafide thought it possible to reconcile the Mahommedan and Hindoo religions. The Mahommedan idea that the Coran existed from all eternity with God, tho' only promulgated on earth during their prophet's mission, sufficiently reconciled its antiquity, however remote, which the Hindoo scriptures might arrogate, but it did not accord so well with their doctrine of the period of the creation of man, which, being founded by its author nearly on the Mosaic chronology, must necessarily have annihilated two entire Hindoo epochs and almost the whole of the third. He is therefore totally silent as to the duration of their existence, at the same time that he allows them to be the most antient of all books, which of course in his idea carried them beyond and epoch of the deluge, since the composition of the Mahabharet translated by Feizi, which it is impossible he should not have read, goes up to that period. I will just digress here to mention that the four yogs, or Indian epochs, are named in the Mahabharat, and in the Opnekhets there is nothing said but of the three first.

I will first have recourse to some of the internal arguments that prove the Opnekhets not to be modern—I mean by modern, to be more antient then any other

known books.

1. The four great original castes of the Hindoos are alone mentioned in them, and no notice is taken of verné senker, or fifth cast, formed by the illegal intermarriages or connexions of the other four.
2. Only three of the yogs are named; it may seem therefore that the fourth had not commenced.
3. It appears from the beginning of the work that the fourth Ved itself did not exist when the commentary was written on the first—which is corroborative of Mr. Wilkins's idea on the same point.
4. Neither the Mahabharat nor any other book is mentioned in any of the Opnekhets, except the *Vēds*, and their *Menters*.
5. Neither Krishna nor Arjoon, nor any of the personages of the Mahabharat make their appearance here. Nor is even Vyas, the acknowledge compiler of the modern *Vēds*, once named here as their author.
6. The whole is professedly composed on principles of monotheism, no mention is made of idolatry to any of those subordinate divinities which have overrun modern India; it is probable therefore they had not then appeared. There is no Hānūmant, no Ram, nor Rawen, nor any of their contemporaries.
7. Even the 10 Outars of Māhādew, which make so conspicuous a figure in modern Hindoo mythology, have no place here.
8. The constellations of the moon are mentioned to be 28, and Mr. Bailly has very learnedly and sagaciously demonstrated that the astronomical tables of the Hindoos, which have now but 27 constellations, altho' dating from the epoch of the Mosaical deluge, are modern, and that they must have had tables more antient with 28 constellations.

No Vickramādeitya nor Salewahen>

The very personifications are a strong mark of early antiquity. We have: Herennye Gherbeh, or a personification of chaos;

Prejapet, a personification of the first elementary combination:

<all the elements separately as well as the sun and moon> Dewtas, or Virtues; Jins, or Vices; all the senses and mind and intellect; the three great Angels, or Beings subordinate only to Brehma himself, appear to be nothing more than personifications of <matter, space and time in> the three qualities of creation, preservation and destruction.

The form of dialogue may be reckoned another proof of their antiquity.

In all the Opnekhets from the Reik, Yejur, and Sam Vēds I recollect two instances of mention of the Athreben Ved, vizt. in the Opnekhet of Anende Belee from the Yejur Ved, and in the Meetree Opnekhet. And it must be observed that in the first three Veds three is always the mythological, mystical, and cabalistical number; in the Athreben it is always 4. And, what is still more extraordinary, the distinctions in the three first are all well marked and precise; in the fourth there is evidently a posterior invention, a lobour to create a distinction where there existed no difference. Every principle of the doctrine is really full and complete in the number three, as all the instances prove. The 4th is always an addition, an incumbrence. The state of treeya is but an intensity of sekhpet; the senyasee is but an extension of the banpreste. Upon the whole I suspect the three first Veds to be the original of the religion, and that the fourth was added by Vyas, or whoever collected together the dissipated fragments [of the other three. The] style, the philosophy, the spirit, is very different in them from that of the

fourth. If then the Atherben be attributed to a time somewhat anterior to the composition of the Mahabharet—which is certain, as they are all four mentioned therein—the other 3 must be carried far into the tritha jog, at least as far as Mr. Bailly's Astronomy will fairly warrant, Brehma's four faces are not mentioned till we come to the Athreben Ved; in that most antient sculpture in Elephanta the principal figure—probably Brehma—has only three.

As Pythagoras, Manes, Thales, and other distinguished founders of sects professedly travelled into India for instruction, it cannot but be a subject of curiosity to find a Hindoo book from whence the principles of the Manichean, Pythagorean, and other famous systems may clearly be deduced—and a book too which most indisputably must have been written before the earliest civilization of the western world. The Manichean heresy, or at least a resemblance of it, which for want of better terms I have been obliged to call duality and heteroism, is particularly combated through this whole composition, the principal aim of which seems to be to establish not only the unity, but the universality of the godhead, or a system reinvented the other day by the learned bishop of Cloyne. But these sages with all their sagacity have certainly afforded ample grounds for the heresy by giving to their Māyā an existence from all eternity, for it is hardly possible upon their own grounds to avoid taking Brehm for the good, and Māyā for the evil principle.

The doctrine of the metempsychosis is clearly and precisely inculcated, and that of numbers also.

Hope and fear being the two grand hinges of the present life, future happiness is made to consist in their total annihilation. Hence to perform any devout works for the sake of the reward ennexed to them is always discouraged; and an idea of attaching religious merit to the performance of them even treated as criminal. Hence too in every page the truly wise and happy man is said to be freed from dread, which is throughout considered as the great distinguishing feature of our present state.

NEGATIVE VALUE

Negative values are those values which are not positively desirable but which arouse a negative disposition to avoid or overcome them. They art not, in fact, values but anti-values i.e. marked with a character which is antagonistic to values. The Upaniṣads recognise several positive secular values like food, sex, wealth etc. and assign due importance to them in human life. The Upaniṣads are not Epicurean but spiritual. They do not prescribe indulgence in secular values but they do accept a restrained and regulated enjoyment of these secular values. They also recommend a spiritualization of secular values in order to transform them into effective instruments of spiritual salvation. These secular values are considered in many of the Upaniṣads. Some of them like food and sex have been treated elaborately. An account of these positive secular values is given in about ten chapters in this treatise and a brief introductory account of them is given in this prefactory chapter.

Negative secular values are those aspects of life which a characterised by a deprival of desirable positive counterparts and by undesirable experience of apprehension which inhilates life relatively or absolutely. Suffering, fear and death are notable among these negative secular values. These are secular because they concern with the physical and mental experience and existence of man. So far as

the spirit is concerned these do not affect it is it is transcendent of them. These are negative as these nihilate the physical existence of man either relatively or absolutely. Suffering and fear do it relatively Death does it absolutely. Pain is the general character of them. Fear is also not pleasant. It is painful. The pain of fear is mental. Fear is mental nihilation of existence. Death is total nihilation of man's existence. Its idea or apprehension is painful and fearful. It is inevitable and man is always occupied with some mental or practical engagement in order to avoid the idea of death and to belie it as far as possible at least in his illusory make-believe.

Suffering is a common fact of life. Every person observes and experiences it in life. But post-upanishadic Indian philosophy is remarkable for recognising it so emphatically as to mark it the crux of thought. Buddha is responsible for having highlighted so brilliantly the place of suffering in thought and life. Buddha's extraordinarily protected life and consequent supersensitiveness is the reason for his making suffering the pivot of his philosophy. Later schools of Indian philosophy took the lead from the influence of Buddhism. But there is not such emphasis on suffering in pre-Buddhistic Upaniṣadic thought. Death is more severely recognized in the Upaniṣads than common suffering. More then death the Upaniṣads are occupied with the attainment of immortality. The Upaniṣads are not pessimistic as they are often alleged to be. They do not emphasise suffering. Nor do they affirm a despairing destiny. On the other hand, they seek a most optimistic way of immortality and eternal happiness. Pain and suffering is experienced in dualistic consciousness. It can be overcome and transcended in non-dualistic spiritual super-conscious which is characterised by bliss; and cannot be overcome in any other way.

Fear is most significant negative value and it is remarkable for such ancient scriptures as the Upaniṣads to present a revealing analysis of it. The Upaniṣads are more positive and optimistic. Therefore, they consider happiness, fearlessness and immortality more than suffering, fear and death. But a singular reference found in the Brihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad is remarkable for the subtlety and depth with Prajāpati, the original creator of the world felt afraid as he was alone in the absence of creation. Thus reports of Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. He felt afraid and loneliness and did not enjoy alone. So he created the world of copular duality and enjoyed through various copular species. Now the Upaniṣad inquires as to why did Prajāpati feel afraid when he was alone. Fear is aroused by the other person when he is suspected to be dangerous. There was no other person to be afraid of for Prajāpati before creation as no other person existed.

This parable of Prajāpati reveals the secret of fear. Fear is positively the reaction of lack of non-dualistic spiritual fulfilment in bliss and positively a challenge to one's existence. The idea of antagonism with the other person poses such a challenge and also a lack of non-dualistic spiritual fulfilment in Bliss. Hence, it arouses fear. Either of the two situations noted above can arouse fear. Non-dualistic spiritual fulfilment leads to attainment of fearlessness. Hence Janaka is said to have attained a state of fearlessness. Spiritual realization is affirmed to be accompanied with fearlessness in several statements of the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣadic view of fear can be experimentally verified by comparing situations of varying degrees of lack of presence of affiliating spiritual non-duality.

Death is the supreme suffering of life. It is the greatest nihilator of man's existence. Every man dies and every man is aware of it in advance by his observation. As life advances in age and consciousness every may develops deeper fear of death. But no one can live under shadow of death. Hence everybody seeks to avoid the idea of death by keeping himself occupied by engagement of life, as R. L. Stevenson has depicted in his famous essay on 'Aes Triplex'.

Death is the inevitable end of physical body of man. Body is deteriorating and decaying by nature. Death is an evident and inevitable fact of life which can neither be improved nor avoided by any enlightenment. Decay is the nature of composite bodies and death is the inevitable end of this process of decomposition. The Upaniṣads discover the root cause of it in hunger. Apparently hunger maintains the body by assimilating food. But in fact it is this need of nourishment which is the cause of death. Body decays and dies when it becomes too feeble to assimilate food. That is normal death. It can be precipitated by some disease or defect in organism. Man has created a paradise of imagination in which man keep young for long. But it is not immortality but only prolonged youthful existence which ends in deluge. The Upaniṣads discover the secret of immortality in non-dualistic spiritual experience. Death is the consequence of course of time which gnaws human existence. Spirit is above time and is not affected by its course of mutation. Attainment so spiritual non-dualistic experience which is transcendent of time secures immortality of man. It may not be eternal continuation of bodily existence, but it is undoubtedly an unchallengeable experience of immortality. It is unchallengeable by death and interminable by time. Numerous references to this immortal experience are found in the Upaniṣads.

Bio-aesthetic Values

The Upaniṣad are believed to be spiritual scriptures and they are undoubtedly so. Treatment of spirit dominates their texts. But they are not so exclusively spiritual as to ignore the secular and worldly values. It is a distorted understanding of Upaniṣads to take them as propounding a world-negating philosophy. Our exposition of secular values as they are recognized in the Upaniṣad will convince both admiers and critics of, Upaniṣad how much space and importance is given by them to secular values. What is surprising is that rather than being oblivious of secular values or condemning them, the Upaniṣads have duly emphasised basic secular values like food, sex etc., what is still more surprising is that they have emphasized, though only on rare occasions, some such secular values as are considered to be highly important by people with a deep sense of life, but which are not duly considered in axiological philosophies. Sleep without dreams is one such value. Sleep is not merely suspension of activity and physical rest. It conceals profound and deep secret of life.

A most remarkable feature of these ancient spiritual scriptures is the recognition of bio-aesthetic values which are rarely considered in axiological treatises. Among these aesthetic excellence of physical structure of the body, efficiency of sense organs, lustre of the body and face, and sweetness of voice are specially appreciated in the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣadic sages pray for a healthy and a well-modulated body. Besides aesthetic formation of the body, physical strength and efficiency of senses also are

considered to be important physical strength is regarded as the necessary condition of self-realization. On who lacks in physical strength expect to realize the spirit, according to the Mundaka Upaniṣad. Strong and aesthetic formation of parts of the body is aspired by sages. They pray for it. Efficiency is senses is also prayed for. Senses are admittedly secular in their evident from, though the Upaniṣad regard the spirit to be the original power and inspiration behind them. They are instruments by which man deals with this external environment. Prayers for efficiency of sense organs are an evidence of the Upaniṣadic regard for secular values. The senses are extrovert and in so far unspiritual, but they are valuable for life, though they are to be spiritualized. Ears and eyes are main and more developed among sense organs. The sages in the Prasna Upaniṣad pray for excellent power of hearing which was important in a plain country like India. They pray for efficiency of eyes also. Other cognitive senses are not deemed to be so important.

But it is notable that sweetness of voiced is prayed for. Voice is the most spiritual of all sensory functions. It relates man with his fellow beings most intimately. Harsh voice is displeasing to others. Sweet voice is pleasing and affiliating. Everybody likes it. Besides physical and organic reasons there is also a spiritual basis of sweet voice. Voice becomes harsh by quarreling. It retains its natural sweetness by loving and affectionate disposition. The Upaniṣads atleast affirms the importance of sweet voice and suggest the spiritual secret of it which is practically useful for every one who loves to have a sweet voice.

The lustre of body and face, and even the sweet fragrance of the body, besides cheerfulness of face smile are bio-aesthetic values which are highly appreciated in civilized society for which people use costly cosmetics. Recognition of these values by the ascetic sages of Upaniṣads is remarkable and surprising. Though they do not show any taste for artistic beauty, they keenly appreciate the importance of these aesthetic excellences which enhance the aesthetic status of body and personality. Sweet voice and sweet fragrance of the body are specially notable among them. The sage in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad prays for sweet voice, and the Shwetashwatara Upaniṣad marks sweet fragrance of the body as a sign of initial achievement of yoga. Civilized people use cosmetics for overcoming bad odours of body and for giving sweet fragrance to it. These aristocratic cosmetics are very costly. The yoga of the Upaniṣads affords an organic and internal fragrance to the body which is natural and not artificial and external. The secret of the sweetness of the voice has not been explained in the Upaniṣad but it can easily be understood as being spiritual. Human voice becomes harsh by conflict and quarrel, because in these antagonism is stressed besides the tone of the voice. Antagonism is unspiritual as spirit is affiliating. A disposition of affection and affiliation cultivates sweet voice. It can be experimentally ascertained. The aesthetic importance of sweet voice as underlined in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad is quite consonant with the spiritualism of the Upaniṣads.

Lustre of the body and face and cheerfulness of facial disposition adorned with a smile are aesthetic excellence of the body and personality which are rare and highly convetable. Rich and happy people often have them. But they are rarer in common people because they are oppressed with conflicts in life which rob them of spiritual affections and consequently of these aesthetic excellences of the personality. Spirit is the supreme

energy and spiritual affiliation energies the body from within and the illumination of its energy shines as lustre of the face. Smile is specifically spiritual. Hence children smile more and smile fades with age. The evidence of the spirituality of smile is found is Chhāndogya. Upaniṣad is which Varuṇa the father of Bhrigu declared the latter as on one who has realized the spirit on the basis of cheer and smile of his face, which he acquired in the course of his successful penance for spiritual realization. This Upaniṣadic aesthetics of personality is highly valuable for civilized society of all times.

After Bruno we come across a pantheistic tendency in the thoughts of Nicholas Malebranche, the reputed Catholic priest of France. His immediate predecessor Geulinex with his theory of occasionalism tried to solve the problem of mind-body relation initiated by Descartes. But he failed miserably since his views on God virtually relegated Him. (God) to a Deus-ex-machina,' for God was supposed to be a transcendent reality occasionally intervening to make the interaction between mind and body possible. Malebranche following Geulinex tried to set up a more consistent view of God. But our question precisely is how far he has been successful in giving us a truly consistent pantheistic world-view. The following analysis will make it clear.

One of the fundamental problems raised by the Cartesians viz., the dualism of thought and extension provides the starting point for Malebranche's doctrine. Accepting the Cartesian dichotomy between thought and extension he says that one can not directly act on the other. Although he speaks of the dependence of mind of body and of the close relation between them, his substantial thesis is that mind and body are entirely opposed to each other and there is a correspondence but no interaction between them. In order words, he has in his mind Psycho Physical parallelism rather then interactionism. In our common experience it appears that our arm moves because we 'will' to move it. we are thus the natural cause of the movement of our arm. But natural cause are not the 'true cause'; they are just the 'occasional causes' which act only by the power and efficacy of God's will. It is evident, as Malebranche holds, that there is no necessary connection between our 'will to move our arm, and the arm's movement. A true cause is that between which and its effect mind perceives a necessary connection. To be a true cause again is to be a creative agent and no human being can create God thus as a true cause moves my arm on the occasion of my willing that the arm should be moved. It is thus by distinguishing between the natural or occasional cause and the true cause that Malebranche tries to bring in the concept of God. When in ordinary experience we find a particular event e.g., A being followed by another event 'B' we regard 'A' as the cause of 'B'. But Malebranche would say that on metaphysical reflection 'A' is only the occasion of God's activity in producing 'B'.

The definition of substance as given by Descartes logically precludes any interaction between body and mind. Malebranche's theory, although untenable, appears to have atleast an advantage in avoiding the difficulties of Descartes' speculation on mind-body problem. It must be conceded, however, the Malebranche's conception of God as a Being constantly involved in producing all effects in the world or as engaged in producing sounds, tastes, smells and motions is the physical world is hardly satisfactory.

Malebranche's idea of God as related to the world is clearly revealed in his analysis

of the knowledge situation. We have already seen that Malebranche acknowledges the opposition between mind and matter, the one being composed of nothing but ideas and the other of extended events. In fact mind can not even claim to know the body. All the mind is capable of, is to receive ideas. When we think of bodies what we are thinking of is 'intelligible extension' rather than 'physical extensions. So when mind and matter are totally different from each other, how can the mind have the knowledge of the external world? Malebranche is of opinion that the knowledge which we have of the external world is always in the form of ideas. Now since mind or pure understanding is passive, it only receives ideas and can not produce them. The question naturally arise as to how or from what source it receives them. How, in other words, do the ideas of things distinct from ourselves come to our minds? There is no possibility of receiving these ideas from the external world of material objects. Had it been possible, the ideas or impressions received from innumerable objects would have contorted or destroyed one another. These ideas again can not be produced by human mind for their production by man would imply his power of creation which he does not actually possess. Nor again can it be supposed that God has implanted in the mind from the beginning a complete stock of innate ideas. Hence the only reasonable explanation, as Malebranche holds, is that the human mind must receive the ideas neither from any human soul nor from external matter, but from a third source which is God. We see all things in God. To quote Malebranche : 'God has in Himself the ideas of all the things which He has created; for otherwise He could not have produced them. Hence all our ideas are in the efficacious substance of the divinity. The material world and the world of spirits or minds, although distinct from each other, are the ideas in the mind of God. God is thus supposed to be the repository of all ideas of all possible objects. Hence God being conceived as a Supreme Reason embracing the ideas of all possible objects, the material world remains terra incognita.

Now in view of what has been said so far it is almost clear that Malebranche's Philosophy does not reflect the pantheistic spirit. Pantheism proper as we have indicated in our previous analysis, involves the idea of an all pervading Supreme Reality who embraces all and annuls none. In' other words, the distinctive mark of pantheism is that it recognizes the reality of the different parts of the outer world and consider them to be the manifestation of one all-pervading unifying principle. This is what has been established in the philosophy of the Upaniṣads with all clarity and precision. There is no doubt that Malebranche has attempted to reach this conclusion, but he has failed to advance convincing arguments. His analysis serves to indicate a leaning more to the dualism of a theist than to pantheism. In fact he brings in the concept of God only to explain the possibility of knowledge of the external world. In his later writings he develops the concept of God in the spirit of a Christian philosopher and is intent on interpreting the world and human experience in the light of his catholic faith. T. C. Roy is absolutely correct when he observes: "Malebranche carried the Cartesian view to the threshold of pantheism, but his catholic bias stood in the way of establishing pantheism proper.

NARAYANA-UPANISHAD

Om. Then Nārāyaṇa, the supreme Purusha desired. "I shall create offspring."

From Nārāyaṇa emanates prāṇa, manas, the several organs of sense and action, ākāś, vāyu, agni, āpas and pṛthivi that supports all. From Nārāyaṇa emanates Iṇḍra Brahma. From Nārāyaṇa emanates Ruḍra. From Nārāyaṇa emanates Inḍra. From Nārāyaṇa emanates Prajāpaṭi (the divine progenitor). From Nārāyaṇa emanates the twelve āḍiṭyas, ruḍras, vasus, and all the chhanḍas (Veḍas). From Nārāyaṇa only do (all these) proceed. Through Nārāyaṇa do (they) prosper. In Nārāyaṇa (they) are absorbed. The Ṛgveḍa teaches this.

Then Nārāyaṇa is eternal. Brahmā is Nārāyaṇa, śiva is Nārāyaṇa, Inḍra is Nārāyaṇa, Kāla (time) is Nārāyaṇa, Ḍik (space) is Nārāyaṇa, the intermediate quarters also are Nārāyaṇa; that which is above is Nārāyaṇa, that which is below is Nārāyaṇa, that which is in and out is Nārāyaṇa, the whole universe which existed and will exist is Nārāyaṇa. Nārāyaṇa is the only one that is stainless, sinless, changeless, and unnameable, and that is pure and divine. There is no second. Whoever knows Him thus, becomes Vishṇu Himself. The Yajurveḍa teaches this.

One should utter "Om" first, then "namaḥ", and then "Nārāyaṇaya". "Om" (is) a single syllable; "Namaḥ" contains two syllables: "Nārāyaṇāya contains five syllables. This is the sentence known as the Ashtākshara of Nārāyaṇa.

Whoever studies this Ashtākshara of Nārāyaṇa and recites it constantly, attains full life and supremacy over men, enjoys the pleasures of royalty and becomes the master of all souls. He attains moksha; yea, hé attains moksha. The Samaveḍa teaches this.

The Yogin having pronounced (the name of) Him who is complete bliss, who is Brahma-purusha and who is of the nature of Praṇava (Om)—a combination of A, U, and M— is released from the bondage of birth and mundane existence. He who practises the manṭra "Om-Namo-Nārāyaṇāya" reaches Vaikuṇtha (the abode of Vishṇu). It is this lotus (heart). It is replete with vijñāna: It has the brilliance of lightning. The son of Ḍevāki is Brahmaṇya. Maḍhusūḍana is Brahmaṇya. Nārāyaṇa who pervades all elements, who is one only, who is the cause Purusha and who is causeless, is known as Parabrahman. The Aṭharvaṇa Upanishaḍ teaches this.

Whoever recites (this Upanishad) in the morning destroys the sins committed the night (before). Whoever recites it in the evening destroys the sins committed during the day. Whoever recites morning and evening becomes free from sins, however sinful he may be. Whoever recites (it) in the noon facing the sun is freed from all the five great sins as well as from the minor ones. He derives the good effects of the recitation of all the Veḍas. Whoever knows thus attains Sāyujya of Nārāyaṇa (*viz.*, is absorbed in the essence of Nārāyaṇa). He attains Sayujya of Narayana. Thus is the Upanishaḍ.

NIRĀLAMBA-UPANISHAḌ

I shall related in the form of a catechiśm whatever should be known for the removal of all miseries that befall these ignorant creatures [men].

What is Brahman? Who is Īśwara? Who is Jiva? What is Prakṛṭi? Who is Paramāṭmā? Who is Brahmā? Who is Vishṇu? Who is Ruḍra? Who is Inḍra? Who is Yama? Who is Sūrya? Who is Chanḍra? Who are Ḍevas? Who are Rākshasas? Who are Piśāchas? Who are Manushyas? Who are Women? Who are Paśus, etc.,? What is Sṭhāvara? Who are Brāhmans and ọthers? What is Jāṭi (caste)? What is Karma? What is Akarma? What is Jñāna? What is

Ajñāna? What is Sukha? What is Ḍuḥkha? What is Swarga? What is Naraka? What is Banḍha? What is Moksha? Who is Upāsya? Who is Viḍwān? Who is Mūdha? What is Āsura? What is Ṭapas? What is Paramapaḍa? What is Grāhya? What is Agrāhya? Who is Sannyāsi? Thus are the questions.

1.What is Brahman?

It is the Chaiṭanya that appears, through the aspects of Karma and Jñāna, as this vast mundane egg composed of Mahaṭ, Ahaṅkāra and the five elements, earth, water, fire, Vāyu and Akāś—that is secondless—that is devọid of all Upāḍhis [vehicles], that is full of all. Śakṭis [potencies], that is without beginning and end, that is described as pure, beneficial, peaceful, and Guṇa-less and that is indescribable.

2.Who is Īśwara? and what are His characteristics? Bramhan itself, having through His Śakṭi called Prakṛṭi (matter) created there world and being latent in them, becomes the ruler of Buḍḍhi and Inḍriyas (organs of sense and action) as well as Brahmā (the creator and others. Hence he is named Īśwara.

3.Who is Jīva?

Īśwara Himself, subject to the false superimposition upon Himself [of the idea] "I am the gross" through the [assumption of the] names and forms of Brahmā, Vishṇu, Ruḍra, Inḍra, and other is Jīva. Though one, he appears as many Jīvas, through the force of the different Karmas originating the bodies.

4.What is Prakṛṭi (matter)?

It is nothing else but the Śakṭi [potency] of Brahman which is of the nature of Buddhi that is able to produce the many motley words by virtues of the mere presence of Brahman.

5.What is Paramātmā? The supreme Āṭmā or soul.

It is Brahman alone that is Paramāṭmā as it (the former) is far superior to bodies and others.

6. Who is Brahmā [the creator]?
7. Who is Vishṇu [the preserver]?
8. Who is Ruḍra [the destroyer]?
9. Who is Inḍra?
10. Who is Yama [the angel of death]?
11. Who is Sūrya [the Sun]?
12. Who is Chanḍra [the Moon]?
13. Who are Ḍevas [the Angels]?
14. Who are Asuras [the Demons]?
15. Who are Piśāchas [the evil spirits]?
16. Who are Manushyas [the men]?
17. Who are Women?
18. What are beasts, etc.?
19. What are the Sṭhāvaras [fixed ones]?
20. Who are Brāhmans and others?

That Brahman is Brahmā, Vishṇu, Ruḍra and Inḍra, Yama, Sun and Moon, Ḍevas, Asuras, Piśāchas, men, women, beasts, etc., the fixed ones, Brāhmans and others. Here there is no manyness in the least degree: all this is verily Brahman.

21. What is Jāṭi (caste)

It cannot refer to the skin, the blood, the flesh or the bone. There is no caste for Āṭmā; caste is only conventional.

22. What is Karma?

Karma is that action alone which is performed by the organs and ascribed to Āṭmā as "I do" (*viz.*, agency being attributed to Āṭmā).

23. What is Akarma [or non-Karma].

Akarma is the performance, without any desire for the fruits, of the daily and occasional rites, vows, austerities, gifts and other actions that are associated with the egoism of the actor and the enjoyer, and that are productive of bondage, rebirth, etc.

24. What is Jñāna?

It is the realisation by direct cognition of the fact that is this changing universe there is nothing but Chaitanya [the one life] that is Consciousness, that is of the form of the seer and the seen, pervading

all things, that is the same in all, and that is not subject to changes like pot, cloth, etc. This realization is brought about by means of the subjugation of the body and the senses, serving of a good Guru (teacher), the hearing of the exposition of Veḍānṭic doctrines and constant meditation thereon.

25. What is Ajñāna?

It is the illusory attribution, like the snake in the rope, of many Āṭmās (souls) through the diverse Upāḍhis [or vehicles] of the angels, beasts, men, the fixed ones, females, males, castes and orders of life, bondage and emancipation, etc., to Brahman that is secondless, all-permeating and of the nature of all.

26. What is Sukha (happiness)?

It is a state of being of the nature of bliss, having cognized through experience the Reality of Sachchiḍānanḍa [or that which is be-ness, consciousness and bliss].

27. What is Ḍuḥkha (pains)?

It is the mere Sankalpa [or the thinking] of the objects of mundane existence [or of not-Self according to the Bombay].

28. What is Swarga (heaven)?

It is the association with Saṭ [either good men or Brahman which is Saṭ, the true].

29. What is Naraka (hell)?

It is the association with that which brings about this mundane existence which is Asaṭ [the false].

30. What is Banḍha [bondage]?

Such Sankalpas [thoughts] as "I was born", etc., arising from the affinities of beginningless Ajñāna form bondage.

The thoughts obscuration [or mental ignorance] of the mundane existence of "mine" in such as father, mother, brother, wife, child, house, gardens, lands, etc., are bondage.

The thought of the development in oneself of the eight Siḍḍhis (higher psychical powers) as Aṇimā and others is bondage.

The thought of propitiating the angels, men, etc., is bondage.

The thought of going through the eight means of Yoga practice, Yama, etc., is bondage.

The thought of performing the duties of one's own caste and order of life is bondage.

The thought that command, fear and doubt are the attributes of [or pertain to] Āṭmā is bondage.

The thought of knowing the rules of performing sacrifices, vows, austerity and gift is bondage. Even the mere thought of desire for Moksha (emancipation) is bondage. By the very act of thought, bondage is caused.

31. What is Moksha [emancipation]?

Moksha is the (state of) the annihilation, through the discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal, of all thoughts of bondage, like those of "mine" in objects of pleasure and pain, lands, etc., in this transitory mundane existence.

32. Who is Upāsya [or fit to be worshipped]?

That Guru (or spiritual instructor] who enables (the disciple) to attain to Brahman, the Consciousness that is in all bodies.

33. Who is Śishya (the disciple)?

The disciple is that Brahman alone that remains after the consciousness of the universe has been lost (in him) through Brahmic wisdom.

34. Who is Viḍwān (the learned)?

It is he who has cognized the true form (or reality) of his own consciousness that is latent in all.

35. Who is Mūdha [the ignorant]?

He who has the egoistic conception of the body, caste, orders of life, actor, enjoyer and others.

36. What is Āsura [the demoniacal]?

It is the Ţapas [austerity] practised by one inflicting trouble on the Āţmā within through Japa [or inaudible muttering of Manţras], abstinence from food, Agnihoţra, [the performance of the worship of fire], etc., attended with cruel desire, hatred, pain, hypocrisy and the rest for the purpose of acquiring the powers of Vishņu, Brahmā, Ruḍra, Inḍra and others.

37. What is Ţapas?

Ţapas is the act of burning—through the fire of direct cognition of the knowledge that Brahman is the truth and the universe, a myth—the seed of the deep-rooted desire to attain the powers of Brahmā, etc.

38. What is Paramapaḍa [the supreme abode]?

It is the seat of the eternal and emancipated Brahman which is far superior to Prāņas (the vital airs), the organs of sense and actions, the internal organs (of thought), the Guņas and others, which is of the nature of Sachchiḍananḍa and which is the witness to all.

39. What is Grāhya [or fit to be taken in]?

Only that Reality of Absolute Consciousness which is not conditioned by space, time or substance.

40. What is Agrāhya?

The thought that this universe is truth—this universe which is different from one's Self and which being subject to Māyā (or illusion) forms the object of (cognition of) Buddhi and the organs.

41. Who is the Sannyāsi [ascetic]?

A Sannyāsi is an ascetic who having given up all the duties of caste and orders of life, good and bad actions, etc., being freed from [the conceptions of] "I" and "mine" and having taken his refuge in Brahman alone, roams at large practising Nirvikalpa Samāḍhi and being firmly convinced of "I am Brahman" through the realisation of the meaning of such sacred (Veḍic) sentences as "Thou art That" "All this is verily Brahman" and "Here there is no manyness in the least". He only is an emancipated person. He only is fit to be adored. He only is a Yogin. He only is a Paramahamsa. He only is an Avaḍhūţa. He only is a Brahman. Whoever studies the *Nirālamba-Upanishaḍ*, becomes, through the grace of Guru, pure like fire. He becomes pure like Vāyu (air). He does not return. He is not born again: nay he is not born again.

Such is the Upanishaḍ.

Organic Nature

According to the meaning of the Indian word for creation, *sŗishţi* this is to be thought of as a discharge, a setting free of emission, an emergence therefore of the universe from Brahman; although this is really in contradiction with the fundamental dogma of the sole reality of Brahman. The doctrine therefore of the creation of the universe, if this last were not to be contrasted with Brahman as a second and foreign, demanded for its completion the idea that Brahman himself having created the universe entered into it as soul. "Into it (the universe) that one (the âtman) has entered up to the finger-tips." "Thereupon that deity (Brahman) entered into these three deities (the elements) with this living self (*jîva âtman*, the individual soul), and separated out thence name and form." "After he had created it, he entered into it." "Thereupon he cleft asunder here the crown of the head, and entered through this gate". Brahman creates the organisms as citadels (*puras*), and then enters into them as citizen (*purusha, i.e.* as the soul), cp. Bŗth. 2.5.18:

As citadels he created the bipeds,
As citadels the quadrupeds also;
Into the citadels he entered as a bird,
Into the citadels as citizen.

All living creatures, and therefore all plants, animals, men and gods, are abodes

of this character, into which Brahman has entered as individual soul.

> From him the gods in their many forms have sprung,
> The blessed ones also; from him, men, cattle and birds,
> Inspiration and expiration, rice and barley,

as it is expressed in Muṇḍ. 2.1.7, echoing Ṛigv. X. 90.8 and Atharvav. XI. 4.13 According all living creatures are Brahman: "This (consciousness, i.e. the âtman) is Brahman, this is Indra, this is Prajâpati, this is all the gods; it is the five elements, earth, wind, ether, water, lights; it is the tiny living creatures, and whatever is similar to them; it is the seed of one and another kind; it is that which is born of an egg or the mother's womb, of sweat or from a shoot; it is horses, cattle, men, elephants,—all that lives. all that walks or flies, all that is motionless. By the "motionless" (*sthâvaram*) the plant world is to be understood. On the entire passage Sankara remarks : "Thus in the individual bodily forms from Brahman down to a blade of grass (*brahmâdi-stambaparyanteshu*, an expression frequently employed later) Brahman assumes this or that name and form. "A division of organic beings into three classes, "born from the egg, born alive, and born from the germ," is found as early as Chand. 6.3.1, to which the foregoing (later) passage adds as a fourth class, "born from sweat" (insects and the like). In each of these phenonmenal forms the entire Brahman dwells. Brahman is called *Sâman*, "because he is equivalent (*sama*) to the ant, the gnat, the elephant, these three world-regions, to this entire universe." Chand. 6.11.1 furnishes an example of the animation of plants in the case of the tree which exists "penetrated through and through by the living self (*jîva âtman*, the individual souls), exuberant and joyful." That the migration of soul extends to the plant world also is taught by Kâth. 5.7:

> The one enters into the maternal womb,
> Incorporating himself in bodily form,
> Into a plant another moves,
> Each according to his works or knowledge.

According to the above the migration of souls extends to the world of the gods: "As a sculptor takes the material from a statue, and chisels therefrom another newer fairer form, so this soul also, after it has shaken off the body and rid itself of ignorance (temporarily), creates for itself another newer fairer form, whether of the fathers of the Gandharvas or the gods or Prajâpati or Brahmân or other beings. The coming forth of the creatures from Brahman, after their entrance into him (in deep sleep and in death), like the nectar of the flowers into the honey or the rivers into the ocean, takes place unconsciously; "Therefore in truth none of all these creatures when they come forth again from the self-existent one know that they come forth again from the self-existent one; that whether they were tiger here or lion or wolf or boar or worm or bird or gadfly or gant, whatever they may have been, thereto are they again fashioned. Cp. the similar and perhaps borrowed enumeration in Kaush. 1.2— "Whether in this world he be worm or fly or fish or bird or lion or boar or stinging insect or tiger or man, whatever he was formerly, in this or that place is he reborn, each according to this works or according to his knowledge."

A mythical description of the origin of human and animal kinds is given in Birth. 1.4. 3.4. The âtman is originally neither male nor female, but (as in the myth of Aristophanes in Plato Symp. 189 C seq.) an undistinguished union of the two, which is cleft asunder, and in the act of begetting attains to a fresh unity.

Thereupon the female flees, and hides herself successively in the different species of animals, the cow, horse, ass, goat, sheep, down to the ant; the atman however pursues her through all the forms, and thus begets individual creatures of each kind. We might be tempted to read a deeper meaning into this myth. The male principle would be the will which desires to manifest itself, the female the essence of the forms (the Platonic idea) which although derived from the will is yet distinct from it and flees from it, until the creative will gains the mastery, in order in it to go give expression to all its own being. In any case the myth asserts that all animals and human forms are essentially similar, and are alike incarnations of the âtman.

In what follows is described how the atman creates above and beyond himself the various classes of gods :"Because he created the gods to be higher (than he himself is), and because he being mortal created the immortal, therefore is he called the overplus of creation (*atisṛishṭi*). "This much at least is implied, that the âtman incorporated in man contains in himself the principle of all higher worlds and beings.

O

ORIGIN & EVOLUTION OF UPANISHAD

The Upanishads have come down to us, like the rest of the texts of the three older Vedas, through the Brâhmans. All the more striking is it, therefore, that the texts themselves frequently trace back some of their most important doctrines to kings, *i.e.* Kshatriyas. Thus, in the narrative of Chând, 5. 11-24, five learned Brâhmans request from Uddâlaka Âruṇi instruction concerning the Âtman Vaiśvânara. Uddâlaka distrusts his ability to explain everything to them, and all the six therefore betake themselves to the king Aśvapati Kaikeya, and receive from him the true instruction, the defectiveness of their own knowledge having first been made clear. In Bṛih. 2. 1 (and the parallel passage, Kaush, 4), the far-famed Vedic scholar Gârgya Bâlâki volunteers to expound the Brahman to King Ajâtaśatru of Kâśī, and propounds accordingly twelve (in Kaush, 16) erroneous explanations; whereupon to him, the Brâhman, the king exhibits the Brahman as the âtman under the figure of a deep sleeper, prefacing his exposition with the remark, "that is a reversal of the rule, for a Brâhman to betake himself as a pupil to a Kshatriya in order to have the Brahman expounded to him: now I proceed to instruct you." In this narrative, preserved by two different. Vedic schools, it is expressly declared that the knowledge of the Brahman as âtman, the central doctrine of the entire Vedânta, is possessed by the king; but, on the contrary, is not possessed by the Brâhman "famed as a Vedic scholar." In Chând. 1.8-9, two Brâhmans are instructed by the king Pravâhaṇa Jaivali concerning the *âkâśa* as the ultimate substratum of all things, of which they are ignorant. And although it is said in Chând. 1.9.3 that this instruction had been previously imparted by Atidhanvan to Udarasâṇḍilya, yet the names allow of the conjecture that in this case also a Brâhman received instruction from a Kshatriya. Similarly Chând. 7 contains the teaching given by Santakumâra, the god of war, to the Brâhman Nârada. Here the former pronounces inadequate the comprehensive Vedic learning of the Brâhman with the words : "all that you have studied is merely name." Finally the leading text of the doctrine of the soul's transmigration, which is extant in three different recensions, is propounded in the form of an instruction given to Âruṇi by the king Pravâhaṇa Jaivali. The king here says to the Brâhman :— "Because, as you have told me, O Gautama, this doctrine has never up to the present time been in circulation among Brâhmans, therefore in all the words the government has remained in the hands of the warrior caste."

When we consider that the passages quoted discuss such subjects as the knowledge of Brahman as âtman, the knowledge of this âtman as the all-quickener, and the fate of the soul after death, that is, precisely the most important points of Upanishad teaching; that not only is the king represented in them as

endowed with wisdom, but is expressly contrasted with the Brâhman who is ignorant or deluded; and that these narratives are preserved to us by the Vedic Śâkhâs, and therefore by the Brâhmans themselves ; we are forced to conclude, if not with absolute certainty, yet with a very high degree of probability, that as a matter of fact the doctrine of the âtman, standing as it did in such sharp contrast to all the principles of the Vedic ritual, though the original conception may have been due to Brâhmans, was taken up and cultivated primarily not in Brâhman but in Kshatriya circles, and was first adopted by the former in later times. The fact, moreover, which is especially prominent in the last quoted passages, that the Brâhmans during a long period had not attained to the possession of this knowledge, for which they nevertheless display great eagerness, is most simply explained on the supposition that this teaching with regard to the atman was studiously withheld from them; that it was transmitted in a narrow circle among the Kshatriyas to the exclusion of the Brâhmans; that, in a word, it was *upanishad*. The allegorical method of interpreting the ritual in the light of the âtman doctrine, though it may have been already practised among the Kshatriya circles, was probably undertaken on a larger scale after the adoption of the new doctrine by the Brâhmans. It would follow that the third of the above-mentioned meanings of the word *upanishad* as "secret import" (of some ritual conception) is probably in the first instance secondary. If we ask further, which of the two other meanings, (1) secret word, (2) secret text, is the more primitive, it would seem that a transition from the second to the first is with difficulty intelligible, but that the first passes into the second by a natural and readily comprehended change.

We may therefore assume that the doctrine of the âtman as the first principle of the universe, the gradual rise of which we have traced through the hymns of the Ṛigveda and Atharvaveda, was fostered and progressively developed by the Kshatriyas in opposition to the principles of the Brâhmanical ritual; whence the new knowledge was expressed in brief words or formulas, intelligible only to the initiated, such as *tadvanam, tajjalân, satyasya satyam, saṁyadvâma, vâmanî, bhâmanî,* etc. A formula of this kind was then called an *upanishad*, inasmuch as the condition of its communication and explanation was the absence of publicity. Such formulas were naturally accompanied by oral explanations, which also were kept secret, and from these were gradually developed the earliest texts that bore the name of Upanishad. The manner in which the formulas *tad vai tad or vi-ram* are discussed may serve as examples of such secret words accompanied by secret explanation.

In these and similar ways the secret doctrines, i.e. the *vidyâs, arose*, of which mention is so frequently made in the Upanishads, Their authors or exclusive possessors were renowned in the land. Pilgrims sought them, pupils served them for many years, and rich gifts were offered to them in order thereby to gain the communication of the *vidyâ*. In the case of some of these *vidyâs* the name of the author is preserved. Several of them, in fact, are equipped with a formal genealogy, which recounts the original author and his successors, and usually closes with the injuction to communicate the doctrine only to a son or trusted pupil.

A suitable field, of the successful development of these doctrines was first opened up when they passed from the Kshatriya circles, where they had originally found a home, by ways that a few illustrations have already taught us to

recognise, into the possession of the Brâhmans, whose system of scholastic traditions was firmly established. The latter eagerly adopted the âtman doctrine, although it was fundamentally opposed to the Vedic cult of the gods and the Brâhmanical system of ritual, combined it by the help of allegorical interpretation with the ritualistic tradition, and attached it to the curriculum of their schools. The Upanishads became the Vedânta.

Soon also the Brâhmans laid claim to the new teaching as their exclusive privilege. They were able to point to princes and leaders, as Janaka, Jânaśruti, etc., who were said to have gone for instruction to Brâhmans. Authorities on the ritual like Śâṇḍilya and Yâjñavalkhya were transformed into originators and upholders of the ideas of the Upanishads, and the âtman doctrine was made to presupposed the tradition of the Veda:—"Only he who knows the Veda comprehends the great omnipresent Âtman," as it is said in a passage of the Brâhmaṇs.

After the Upanishad ideas had been adopted by the Śâkhâs, and had been made a part of their Vedic system of instruction, they passed through a varied expansion and development under the hands of the Vedic teachers. To begin with they were brought into accord with the ritual tradition by interpreting the latter (in the Âraṇyakas) in the spirit of the âtman doctrine; and thus the adherents of the Ṛigveda brought it into connection with the *uktham* (hymn), those of the Sâmaveda with the *sâman*, and those of the Yajurveda with the sacrifice, especially the horse-sacrifice as being its highest form. The new doctrine, however, was further developed in a manner which altogether transcended the traditional cult, with which, indeed, it often found itself in open contradiction. In regard to this an active communication and exchange must have existed between the different schools. Definitions which by the one were highly regarded failed to meet with acceptance in another.

Teachers who in the one Śâkhâ exercised supreme authority are found in another in a subordinate position (Âruṇi), or are altogether unknown (Yâjñavalkhya). Texts appear with slight variations in the different Vedic schools, whether borrowed directly or going back on either side to a common original. Other texts are met with side by side in one and the same Śâkhâ in numerous recensions, often very similar, often widely divergent from one another. This rich mental life, the details of which can scarcely be further reproduced, may not improbably have lasted for centuries; and the fundamental thought of the doctrine of the atman have attained an ever completer development by means of the refection of individual thinkers in familiar intercourse before a chosen circle of pupils, and probably also by public discussions at royal courts. The oldest Upanishads preserved to us are to be regarded as the final results of this mental process.

The Extant Upanishads

Owing to the manner in which the Upanishads have arisen from the activity of the different Vedic schools and their intercourse one with another, we are unable to lay down any precise chronological order of succession among them. All the principal Upanishads contain earlier and later elements side by side, and therefore the age of each separate piece must be determined by itself as far as this is possible from the degree of development of the thoughts which find expression in it. Here, where we still treat of the Upanishads as a whole, we can only attempt a rough and approximate

determination of the period to which in general an Upanishad belongs.

We distinguish first four successive periods of time, to which the Upanishads as a whole may be assigned.

I. The Ancient Prose Upanishads.-

Bṛihadâraṇyaka and Chândogya.
Taittirîya.
Aitareya.
Kaushitaki.
Kena.

The last-named stands on the border-line.

These are collectively the Vedânta texts of the actually existing Śâkhâs, and in their earlier parts are usually closely interwoven with Brâhmaṇs and Âraṇyakas, of which they form the continuation, and whose ritualistic conceptions are interpreted by them in various allegorical ways. It is only the later, and as we may suppose younger texts which emancipate themselves from the ritual. The language is still almost entirely the ancient prose of the Brâhmaṇas, somewhat ponderous stilted and awkward, but not without natural charm. The order adopted above is in general chronological. The *Brihadâraṇyaka* and *Chândogya* are not only the richest in contents, but also the oldest of the extant Upanishads. As compared also with one another, the *Brihadâraṇyaka*, as we shall often see, shows almost without exception greater originality in the grouping of the texts. On the other hand, the literary outlook of Chand. 7.1.4 (7.2.1,7.7.1) is materially broader than that of Biṛh. 2.4. 10 (4.1.2,4.5.11). *Taittirîya* in its essential part is still later than *Chândogya*; cp. Chand. 6.2. (three elements) and Taitt. 2. 1 (five elements). *Aitareya* is later than *Chândogya* (in Chând, 6.3.1 there are three kings of organic beings, in Ait. 3.3 four), and then *Taittirîya* (cp. Taitt. 2.6, "after that he had created it he entered into it," with the more elaborate description Ait. 1.3.12). *Kaushîtakî*, finally, is later than all those named; for Kaush. 1 is less original than Chând. 5.3. f. Bṛih. 6.2, and Kaush. 3 must be later than Ait. 3.3, Kaush, 4 than Bṛih. 2. 1. Kena stands on the border-line of this period, and by virtue of its first metrical portion already belongs to the succeeding epoch.

The Metrical Upanishads.—The transition is made by Kena 1.13 and the verses Biṛh. 4, 4 8-21, undoubtedly a later addition. There follow-

Kâṭhaka
Îśâ.
Śvetâśvatara.
Muṇḍaka.
Mahânârâyaṇa.

The last-named makes use of *Muṇḍaka*, and *Muṇḍaka* appears to use *Śvetâśvatara*. Îśâ seems on the whole to be less fully developed than *Śvetâśvatara*, and to be freer from sectarian bias; but in numerous instances it is found to be dependent on *Kâṭhaka*. That *Śvetâśvatara* is later than *Kâṭhaka* is not open to doubt; on the contrary, it is very probable, on the evidence of several passages, that *Kâṭhaka* was directly employed in the composition of *Śvetâśvatara*.

The difference between this period and the preceding a very great. The connection with the Śâkhâs appears sometimes doubtful, sometimes artificial, and in any case is loose. Allegories framed after the manner of the Âraṇyakas are wanting. The thought of the Upaniṣhads is no longer apprehended as in course of development, but appears everywhere to have been taken over in its entirely. Individual verses and characteristic phrases constantly recur. The phraseology is already formed. And the language is almost throughout metrical.

III. The Later Prose Upanishads—
Praśna.
Maitrâyaṇiya.
Mâṇḍûkya.

In this period the composition returns again to prose, but a prose which is markedly different from the archaic language of the ancient Upanishads, although it does also take on, especially in the *Maitrâyaṇiya*, an archaic colouring. The style suggests that of the later Sanskrit prose; it is complex, involved, and delights in repetitions. The dependence of the thought on that of the earlier Upanishads is made manifest by numerous quotations and adaptations. That *Praśna* is later than *Muṇḍaka* is proved by the fact that the latter is quoted in Pr. 3.5; it is older, however, than *Maitrâyaṇiya*, for it is itself quoted in Maitr. 6.5. The position of *Mâṇḍûkya* is difficult to determine, owing to its brevity; yet the theory concerning Om in Mâṇḍ. 3 seems to be more advanced than that of Maitr. 6.4. The great umber of the Upanishads hitherto mentioned have found admission, sometimes with very doubtful right, to a place in the three older Vedas. Only three of them—namely, Muṇḍaka, Praśna, and Mâṇḍûkya—appears to have belonged from the beginning to the Atharvaveda, the two first-named certainly as the original legitimate Upanishads of this fourth Veda. These two are ascribed to Śaunaka and Pippalâda, the founders of the Śâkhâs of the Atharvaveda. The later collections of Atharva Upanishads begin as a rule with the Muṇḍaka and Praśna, and these two alone can be proved to have been known to and employed by Bâdarâyana and Śankara.

IV. The Later Atharva Upanishads—Later theological retain still the form of Upanishads as a convenient method of literary composition that carries with it a degree of sanctity; while the thought concerns itself partly with the continuous development of older themes, or refrains from deviating from the beaten tracks *(Garbha, Prâṇâgnihotra, Piṇḍa, Âtma, Sarvopanishatsâra, Gâruḍa)*, partly turns its attention to the glorification of the Yoga *(Brahmavidyâ, Kshurikâ, Cûlikâ, Nâdabindu, Brahmabindu, Amṛitabindu, Dhyânabindu, Tejobindu, Yogasikhâ, Yogatattva, Haṁsa)*, or of the Sannyâsa *(Brahma, Sannyâsa, Âruṇeya, Kaṇthaśruti, Paramahamsa, Jâbâla, Âśrama)*.

The difference between the two tendencies shows itself also in the fact that almost without exception the Yoga Upanishads are composed in verse, those of the Sannyâsa in prose with occasional verses inserted. A further class of Upanishads is devoted to the worship of Śiva *(Atharvaśiras, Atharavaśikhâ, Nîlarudra, Kâlâgnirudra, Kaivalya)*, or of Vishṇu *(Mahâ, Nârâyaṇa, Âtmabodha, Nṛisiṁhatâpaniya, Râmatâpaniya*, and endeavours to interpret these in the light of the âtman doctrine. They are composed for the most part in prose with an intermixture of verse. All of these Upanishads were received into the Atharvaveda, but met with no recognition from the leading theologians of the Vedânta.

The Upanishads in Bâdarâyaṇa and Śankara

The earlier traces of a collection of Upanishads are found within the books themselves. Thus the mention in Śvet. 5.6 of "the Upanishads that form the mystical portion of the Veda" *(veda-guhya-upanishadah)*, and also the passage Śvet. 6. 22, "in former times in the Vedanta was the deepest mystery revealed," seem to look back to the older Upanishads as a self-contained whole which already claimed a certain antiquity. A similar inference may be drawn from a thrice recurring verse which speaks of ascetics

(*yatis*) who have "grasped the meaning of the Vedânta doctrine." Still more clearly do the Upanishads appear as a complete whole when, in Maitr. 2.3, the doctrine concerning Brahman is described as "the doctrine of all the Upanishads" (*sarva-upanishad-vidyâ*). That in so late works as the Sarva-upanishad-sâra or the Muktikâ Upanishad the Upanishads are assumed to be a whole is therefore of no further importance.

It was undoubtedly on the foundation of older and earlier works that Bâdarâyaṇa formally undertook an epitome of Upanishad doctrine in the *Brahmasûtras*, foundation of the later Vedânta. He shows that Brahman is the first principle of the world, *samanvayât*, "from the agreement" of the Upanishad texts, and proclaims the fundamental proposition "that all the texts of the Vedanta deserve credence" (*sarava-vedânta-pratyayam*). Which Upanishads, however, were recognised by him as canonical cannot be ascertained from the sûtras themselves owing to their brevity, but only from Śankara's commentary, and the decision therefore remains in many instances doubtful, since we do not know how far Śankara followed a reliable tradition.

Only in the first *adhyâya* is it possible to determine with greater certainty the Upanishad texts which Bâdarâyaṇa had in his mind, where he undertakes to establish the teaching concerning Brahman in twenty-eight *Adhikaraṇas* (sections) based on as many passages of the Upanishads.

Here, as in his entire work, the number four plays a decisive part in the arrangement of the material. Of the twenty-eight fundamental passages, twelve are taken from the Chândogya, four from the Bṛihadâraṇyaka, four from the Kâṭhaka, four from the Taittiriya and Kaushîtaki (two from each), and four from the Atharva Upanishads, namely, three from the Muṇḍaka and one from the Praśna. The following scheme shows that the order of the passages, as they are found within each of the Upanishads which he employs, is strictly observed, while in other respects the passages appear interwoven in a manner for which we seem to be able to find a reason here and there in the close connection of the subject-matter.

The striking preference for the Chândogya suggests that an earlier work due to the school of this Upanishad was already in the hands of Bâdarâyaṇa, into which he or one of his predecessors worked sixteen extracts of importance derived from another Śâkhâ, being guided further by the principle that the original order of the extracts should be maintained. Besides the Upanishads named, Bâdarâyaṇa may with some confidence be shown to have used the Śvetâsvatara, Aitareya, and perhaps Jâbâla. With regard, however, to the formula of imprecation quoted in Sût. 3.3.25, which according to Śankara should find a place "At the beginning of an Upanishad of the Âtharvaṇikas," and which is nowhere known to exist, I would now suggest (since throughout their works Bâdarâyaṇa and Śankara make use only of the Muṇḍaka and Praśna from the Atharva Upanishads, consequently recognise none but these, and since they appear to recognise the authority of the Upanishad that follows the imprecation formula), that the suspected formula may once have stood at the beginning of one of these two, perhaps of the Muṇḍaka Upanishad; somewhat after the manner in which the Sânti formulas precede the Upanishads in some manuscripts, and in others are wanting.

To the Brahmasûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa is attached the great commentary of *Śankara* (*circa 800* A. D.), to whom are ascribed,

besides other works, the commentaries on the *Bṛihadâraṇyaka, Chândogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya, Śvetasvatara, Îśâ, Kena, Kaṭha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka and Mâṇḍûkya*, which are edited in the *Bibl, Ind.*, vols. ii., iii., vii., viii. Commentaries therefore of Śankara are missing on the *Kaushîtaki*, which was first elucidated by *Śankarânanda* (a teacher, according to Hall, Index, p. 98. 123, of Mâdhava, who flourished 1350 A.D.), and on the *Maitrâyaṇîya*, which *Râmatîrtha* expounded. The commentaries, however, on the eleven Upanishads named are to be attributed in part probably not to Śankara himself, but merely to his school, since the explanations given in the Upanishad commentaries often fail to agree with those in the commentary on the sutras. The commentary on the *Mâṇḍûkya* which is extant under the name of Śankara treats this and Gauḍapâda's *Kârikâ* as one, and seems to regard the whole as in no sense an Upanishad (p. 330: *vedânta-artha-sâra-saṅgraha-bhûtam idam prakaraṇa-catushṭayam 'om itietad aksharam' ityâdi ârabhyate);* and with this would agree the fact that the *Mâṇḍûkya* is not quoted either in the Brahmasûtras or in Śankara's commentary on them, while two verses from the *Kârikâ* of Gauḍapâda are cited by Śankara with the words, *atra uktam vedânta-artha-sampradâyavidbhir âcâryaiḥ*. In his commentary on the Brahmasûtras only the following fourteen Upanishads can be shown to have been quoted by Śankara (the figures attached indicate the number of quotations). — Chândogya, 809, Bṛihadâraṇyaka 565, Taittiriya 142, Muṇḍaka 129, Kâṭhaka 103, Kaushîtaki 88, Śvetaśvatara 53, Praśna 38, Aitareya 22, Jâbâla 13, Mahânârâyaṇa 9, Îśâ 8, Paingi 6, Kena 5.

Although Śankara regards the texts of the Vedânta which he recognises as a uniform and consistent cannot of truth, yet he seems still to have had in his hands no collection of Upanishads, since he looks upon the greater number of them as still forming the concluding chapters of their respective Brâhmaṇas, to which therefore he is accustomed to refer at the commencement of the Upanishad commentary. Thus in the introduction to the commentary on the *Kena* he quotes its beginning as "the beginning of the ninth adhyâya before it works have been thoroughly discussed; the acts of adoration also of the prana which serves as the foundation of all works were taught; and further those also which relate to the Sâman that forms a branch of the works. Next followed the consideration of the Gâyatra-sâman, and finally the list of teachers. All the above belongs still to works," etc. On *Chândogya*, p. 2: — "The entire ritual has been rehearsed, as also the knowledge of Prâṇa-Agni, etc., as divine." On *Taittirîya*, p. 2: — "The appointed works which serve to atone for trangressions that have been committed, as also the works desirable for those who covet a definite reward, have been rehearsed in the preceding parts of the book (*pûrvasmin granthe*)." On *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 4: "The connection of this (Upanishad) with the sphere of works is as follows," etc. On *Îśâ* P. 1: "The mantras *îśâ vâsyam*, etc., do not apply (as we should expect) to works, but reveal the nature of the âtman who is independent of works." On *Aitareya*, p. 143: — "The works together with the knowledge relative to the lower Brahman are remitted," etc.

As may be inferred from the comments quoted, all these Upanishads appear to have been still regarded by Śankara as the concluding portions of their respective Brâhmaṇas. On the other hand, a similar connection with the part of a preceding work is wanting in the case of the commentaries of Kâṭhaka and Śvetâś

vatara. So also with Muṇḍaka and Praśna, which are treated by Sankara as one. In the introduction to Praśna, p. 160, 2, he remarks:— "in order to examine further the subjects taught in the mantras (of the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, as it is rightly glossed), this Brâhmaṇa (the Praśna Upanishad) is undertaken." Since, however, the Muṇḍaka and Praśna exhibit no relationship at all, and since they are attached further to different Sâkhâs of the Atharvaveda (those of Saunaka and Pippalâda respectively), this unity under which Śankara treats of them is probably to be explained merely from the fact that as early as his time they were linked together as the first beginning and foundation of a collection of Atharva Upanishads. At the time probably the collection consisted only of these two, for otherwise it is hardly likely that the others would have been ignored by Śankara so completely as was in fact the case. It is true also that the annotator *Ânandajñâna* remarks at the beginning of Śankara's commentary on the *Mâṇḍûkya:* "Beginning with the Brahma Upanishad (he intends probably the Brahma-vidyâ Upanishad) and the Garbha the Atharvaveda. Since, however, they are not employed in the Śârîrakam (the Brahmasûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa), he (Śankara) does not expound them". But the reason assigned is perhaps not conclusive; for which Upanishads are found in the Śârîrakam, and which not, could only he determined by tradition or them Śankara himself. It must therefore have been tradition of Śankara himself that excluded other Upanishads from the Canon, whether because they were yet unknown, or because they were not yet recognised qas Upanishads. And thus in fact Śankara describes the Mâṇḍûkya, upon which nevertheless, together with Gauḍapâda's Kârikâ, he had himself commented, not as an Upanishad, but as "a literary composition containing the essence of the Vedânta (*vedânta-artha-sâra-saṅgraha-bhûtam-prakaraṇam).*

The most important Collections of Upanishads

The further history of the Upanishad tradition is for a time shrouded in darkness, and only conjecturally are we able from the existing collections of Upanishads to draw some conclusions as to their origin. These collections or lists fall from the outset into two classes, in far as they either contain the Upanishads in their entirety, or limit themselves (at least as far as the original design is concerned) to the Upanishads of the Atharvaveda. Of the former class is the Canon of the Mukitkâ and the Oupnek'hat, of the latter that of Colebrooke and Nârâyaṇa.

Since the Upanishads of the three older Vedas continued to live in the tradition of the Śâkhâs, as long as these survived the secure transmission of the Upanishads concerned was assumed. It was otherwise with the Atharvaveda, which was not employed at the sacrifice, and in consequence had no such firmly established tradition of the schools as the text of the three older Vedas upon which to rely for its preservation. This is shown not only by the indifference from which is Saṁhitâ has suffered, but also by the freedom with which it admitted new composition. The latter would assuredly have been impossible as long as the tradition was under the protection of regular Vedic schools, maintaining themselves from generation to generation according to the rules of their guild. Hence is to be explained the extensive irruption of newly composed Upanishads into the Atharvaveda. As early as Śankara we find the *Muṇḍaka and Praśna* united together (*sup.* p. 32), and on these as foundation a collection of Atharva Upanishads appears

to have been gradually built up, which eventually comprised 34 pieces from *Muṇḍaka* to *Nṛisiṁhatâpanîya*, and included also some whose claim to the name of Upanishads had never been previously recognised; just as—in the judgement of Śankara the Kârikâ of Gauḍapâda on the Mâṇḍukya Upanishad, and indeed this treatise itself (*sup.* pp. 30, 33), had no claim to the position of an Upanishad. These 34 primary Upanishads of Colebrooke's list were later extended to 52 by the addition not only of a number of recent compositions, but most remarkably by the side of and among them of seven of the recognised texts of the older Vedas, viz. — 35-36 *Kâṭhaka*, 37 Kena, 39-40 *Bṛihannârâyaṇa* (=Taitt. Âr. x) 44 *Ânandavallî* (=Taitt. Up. 2), and 45 *Bhṛiguvallî* (=Taitt. Up. 3). In this manner the collection of 52 Upanishads first made known by Colebrooke originated, the strange combination of which we attempted to explain on the hypothesis that at the time and in the region where this collection was finally put together the three older Vedas were cultivated only in the Śâkhâs of the Aitareyins, Tâṇḍins (to which the Chândogya Upanishad belongs), and Vâjasaneyins. Accordingly the Upanishads of the remaining Śâkhâs (with the exception of the *Kaushîtaki*, *Śvetâsvatara*, and *Maitrâyaṇîya*, which were perhaps already lost or not recognised) were inserted in the existing collection of Atharva Upanishads with a view to their safe preservation.

The collection of Nârâyaṇa is in exact agreement with that of Colebrooke, apart from a few variations in the order of the later treatises. The 52 Upanishads of Colebrooke are however reduced to 45, seven sectarian texts being then added to form Nos. 46-52, viz. -two *Gopâlatâpanîya*, *Kṛishṇa*, *Vâsudeva* with *Gopîcandana*, *Svetâśvatara*, and two *Varadatâpanîya*. This inter-relation is to be explained on the theory that the number 52 had already gained a kind of canonical authority before the desire was felt to insert seen additional texts, which had now for the first time come into existence or obtained that had originally belonged together, and so reducing the existing 52 numbers to 45. Thus room was found for the seven new texts within the number of the 52, thereby facilitating the recognition of the complete list as canonical.

The collection of 103 Upanishads, which the Muktikâ itself regards as later, appears to belong to an entirely different region (probably the south of India), and to a considerably more recent time. This collection includes all the treatises of Colebrooke (except the *Nîlarudra*, *Piṇḍa*, *Mahânârâyaṇa*, *Âśrama)* and of Nârâyaṇa (except the *Varadatâpanîya*), although for the most part under different names and sometimes expanded by later additions to thirty or forty times their original extent. Added to these are the 11 Upanishads of the three older Vedas complete, with the exception of the Mahânârâyaṇa. and about seventy new texts found nowhere else. The circumstance that in this collection the Upanishads of the three older Vedas also find a place, and that at the very beginning of it, points to a time and region in which a living and reliable tradition of the Śâkhâs no longer existed; of which fact a further and yet stronger proof is the bold attempt, made without a shadow of justification, to assign 10 of these 108 Upanishads to the Ṛigveda, 19 to the White and 32 to the Black Yajurveda, 16 to the Sâmaveda, and 31 to the Atharvaveda, — a procedure against which the ancient Vedic schools would have strenuously protested. In other respects this collection is of great interest for the later history of the Vedânta (perhaps mainly or exclusively among the Telugu Brâhmans), and deserves closer

examination now that it has been made accessible in the Devanâgarî edition of 1896. Previously there had existed only an edition in the Telugu character. It is worthy of note also that Śankarânanda's readings often agree with those of the 108 Upanishads against those of the 52 and of Nârâyaṇa.

A position apart both from the 52 and the 108 Upanishads is occupied by that collection of 50 Upanishads which, under the name of *Oupnek'hat*, which was translated from the Sanskrit into Persian in the year 1656 at the instance of the Sultan Mohammed Dara Shakoh, and from the Persian into Latin in 1801-02 by Anquetil Duperron. The Oupnekhat also, like the Muktikâ collection, professes to be a general collection of Upanishads. It contains under twelve division the Upanishads of the three older Vedas, and with them twenty-six Atharva Upanishads that are known from other sources. It further comprises eight treatises peculiar to itself, five of which have not up to the present time been proved to exist elsewhere, and of which therefore a rendering from the Persian-Latin of Anquetil is alone possible. Finally, the Oupnekhat contains four treatises form the Vâj-Saṃh. 16. 31. 32. 34, of which the first is met with in a shorter form in other collections also as the *Nîlarudra Upanishad*, while the three last have nowhere else found admission. The reception of these treatises from the Saṁhitâ into the body of the Upanishads, as though there were danger of their otherwise falling into oblivion, makes us infer a comparatively late date for the Oupnekhat collection itself, although as early as 1656 the Persian translators made no claim to be the original compilers, but took the collection over already complete. They seem, indeed, to have regarded it as originating in a period long past. Owing to the excessive laterality with which Anquetil Duperron rendered these Upanishads word by word from the Persian into Latin, while preserving the syntax of the former language, — a laterality that stands in striking contrast to the freedom with which the Persian translators treated the Sanskrit text, — the Oupnekhat is a very difficult book to read; and an insight as keen as that of Schopenhauer was required in order to discover within this repellent husk a kernel of invaluable philosophical significance, and to turn it to account for his own system.

An examination of the material placed at our disposal in the Oupnekhat was first undertaken by A. Weber, Ind, Stud., i., ii., ix., on the basis of the Sanskrit text. Meanwhile the original texts were published in the Bibliotheca Indica in part with elaborate commentaries, and again in the Ânandâśrama series. Max Mûller translated the twelve oldest Upanishads in *Sacred Books of the East*, vols, i., xv. The two longest and some of the shorter treatises have appeared in a literal German-rendering by O. Böhtlingk. And my one translation of the 60 Upanishads (Leipzig, 1897) contains-complete texts of this character which, upon the strength of their regular occurrence in the Indian collections and lists of the Upanishads, my lay claim to a certain canonicity. The prefixed Introductions and the Notes treat exhaustively of the matter and composition of the several treatises, and there is therefore no necessity to enter here further into these literary questions.

P

PAIṄGALA-UPANISHAḌ

Paiṅgala, having served under Yājñavalkya for twelve years, asked him to initiate him into the supreme mysteries of Kaivalya. To which Yājñavalkya replied thus : "O gentle one, at first, this (universe) was Saṭ (Be-ness) only. It (Saṭ) is spoken of as Brahman which is ever free (from the trammels of matter), which is changeless, which is Truth, Wisdom, and Bliss, and which is full, permanent, and one only without a second. In It, was like a mirage in the desert, silver in mother-of-pearl, a person in the pillar, or colour, etc., in the crystals, mūlaprakṛṭi, having in equal proportions the guṇas, red, white, and black, and being beyond the power of speech. That which is reflected in it is Sākshi-Chaiṭanya (lit., the witness-consciousness). It (mūlaprakṛṭi) undergoing again change becomes with the preponderance of Saṭṭva (in it), Āvaraṇa Śakṭi named avyakṭa. That which is reflected in it (Avyakṭa) is Īśvara-Chaiṭanya. He (Īśvara) has Māyā under his control, is omniscient, the originala cause of creation, preservation, and dissolution, and the seed of this universe. He causes the universe which was latent in Him, to manifest itself through the bonds of karma of all creatures like a painted canvas unfurled. Again through the extinction of their karmas, he makes it disappear. In Him alone is latent all the universe, wrapped up like a painted cloth. Then from the supreme (Āvaraṇa) Śakṭi, dependent on (or appertaining to Isvara, arose, through the preponderance of Rajas, Vikshepa Śakṭi called Mahaṭ. That which is reflected in it is Hiraṇyagarbha-Chaiṭanya. Presiding (as He does) over Mahaṭ, He (Hiraṇyagarbha) has a body, both manifested and unmanifested. From Vikshepa Śakṭi of Hiranyagarbha arose, through the preponderance of Ṭamas, the gross Śakṭi called ahaṅkāra. That which is reflected in it is Virāt-Chaiṭanya. He (Virāt) presiding over it (ahaṅkāra) and possessing a manifested body becomes Vishṇu, the chief Purusha and protector of all gross bodies. From that Āṭmā arose ākāś; from akas arose vāyu, from vāyu agni, from agni apas, and from apas pṛṭhivī. The five ṭanmāṭras (rudimentary properties) alone are the guṇas (of the above five). That generating cause of the universe (Īśvara) wishing to create and having assumed tamo-guṇa, wanted to convert the elements which were subtle ṭanmāṭras into gross ones. In order to create the universe, he divided into two parts each of those divisible elements; and having divided each moiety into four parts, made a fivefold mixture, each element having moiety of its own original element and one-fourth of a moiety of each of the other elements, and thus evolved out of the fivefold classified gross elements, and many myriads of Brahmāṇdas (Brahmā's egg or macrocosm), the fourteen worlds pertaining to each sphere, and the spherical gross bodies (microcosm) fit for the (respective) worlds. Having divided the Rajas-essence of the five elements into four

parts. He out of three such parts created (the five) prāṇas having fivefold function. Again out of the (remaining) fourth part, He created karmenḍriyas (the organs of action). Having divided their Saṭṭva-essence into four parts, He out of three such parts created the anṭaḥkaraṇa (internal organs) having fivefold function. Out of the (remaining) fourth part of Saṭṭva-essence, he created the jñānenḍriyas (organs of sense). Out of the collective totality of Saṭṭva-essence, He created the ḍevaṭās (deities) ruling over the organs of sense and actions. Those (ḍevaṭās) He created, He located in the spheres (pertaining to them). They through His orders, began to pervade the macrocosm. Through His orders, Virat associated with ahaṅkāra created all the gross things. Through His orders, Hiraṇyagarbha protected the subtle things. Without Him, they that were located in their spheres were unable to move or to do anything. Then He wished to infuse cheṭana (life) into them. Having pierced the Brahmāṇda (Brahmā's egg or macrocosm) and Brahmaranḍhras (head-fontanelle) in all the microcosmic heads, He entered within. Though they were (at first) inert, they were then able to perform karmas like beings of intelligence. The omniscient Īśvara entered the microcosmic bodies with a particle of Māyā and being deluded by that Maya, acquired the state of Jīva. Identifying the three bodies with Himself, He acquired the state of the actor and enjoyer. Associated with the attributes of the states of jāgraṭ, svapna, sushupṭi, trance, and death and being immersed in sorrow, he is (whirled about and) deluded like water-lift or potters wheel, as if subject to birth and death,

Paiṅgala again addressed Yājñavalkya thus: "How did Īśvara, who is the creator, preserver, and destroyer and the Lord of all the worlds, acquire the state of Jīva?" To which Yājñavalkya replied: "I shall tell in detail the nature of Jīva and Īśvara, together with a description of the origin of the gross, subtle, and kāraṇa (causal) bodies. Here attentively with one-pointed mind.

"Īśvara having taken a small portion of the quintuplicated mahā-bhūṭas, (the great elements), made in regular order the gross bodies, both collective and segregate. The skull, the skin, the intestines, bone, flesh, and nails are of the essence of pṛṭhivī. Blood, urine, saliva, sweat and others are of the essence of āpas. Hunger, thirst, heat, delusion, and copulation are of the essence of agni. Walking, lifting, breathing and others are of the essence of vāyu. Passion, anger, etc., are of the essence of ākās. The collection of these having touch and the rest is this gross body that is brought bout by karma, that is the seat of egoism in youth and other states and that is the abode of many sins. Then He created prāṇas out of the collective three parts of Rajas-essence of the fivefold divided elements. The modifications of prāṇa are prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, and samāna; nāga, kūrma, kṛkara, ḍevaḍaṭṭa and dhanañjaya are the auxiliary prāṇas (Of the first five), the heart, anus, lavel, throat and the whole body are respectively the seats. Then He created the karmenḍriyas out of the fourth part of the Rajas-guṇa. Of ākāś and the rest the mouth, legs, hands, and the organs of secretion and excretion are the modifications. Talking, walking, lifting, excreting, and enjoying are their functions. Likewise out of the collective three parts of Saṭṭva-essence, He created the anṭaḥkaraṇa (internal organ). Anṭaḥ-karaṇa, manas, buḍḍhi, chiṭṭa, and ahaṅkāra are the modifications. Saṅkapla (thought), certitude, memory, egoism, and anusanḍhāna (inquiry) are their functions. Throat, face, navel, heart, and the middle

of the brow are their seats. Out of the (remaining) fourth part of Saṭṭva-essence, He created the jñānenḍriyas (organs of sense). Ear, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose are the modifications. Sound, touch, form, taste, and odour are their functions. Ḍik (the quarters), Vāyu, Arka (the sun), Varuṇa, Aśvini Ḍevas, Inḍra, Upenḍra, Mṛṭyu (the God of death), Prajāpaṭi, the Moon, Vishṇu the four-faced Brahmā and Śambhu (Śiva) are the presiding deities of the organs. There are the five kosas (sheaths), *viz.*, annamaya, prāṇamaya, manomaya, vijñānamaya, and ānanḍamaya. Annamaya sheath is that which is created and developed out of the essence of food, and is absorbed into the earth which is of the form of food. It alone is the gross body. The prāṇas with the karmenḍriyas (organs of action) is the prāṇamaya sheath. Manas with the jñānenḍriyas (organs of sense) is the manomaya sheath. Buḍḍhi with the Jñānenḍriyas is the vijñānamaya sheath. These three sheaths constitute the lingasarira (or the subtle body). (That which tends to) the ajnana (ignorance) of the Reality (of Atma) is the anandamaya sheath. This is the karana body. Moreover, the five organs of sense, the five organs of action, the five pranas and others, the five akas and other elements, the four internal organs, avidya, passion, karma, and tamas—all these constitute this town (of body).

"Virāt, under the orders of Īśvara having entered this microcosmic body, and having buḍḍhi as his vehicle, reaches the state of Viśva. Then, he goes by the several names of Vijñānaṭma Chiḍābhasa, Viśva, Vyāvahārika, the one presiding over the waking gross body and the one generated by karma. Sūṭrātmā, under the orders of Īśvara, having entered the microcosmic subtle body, and having manas as his vehicle, reaches the Ṭaijasa state. Then he goes by the names of ṭaijasa, prāṭibhāsika and svapnakalpiṭa (the one bred out of dream). Then under the orders of Īśvara, he who is coupled with avyakṭa, the vehicle of Māyā having entered the microcosmic kāraṇa body, reaches the state of prajñā. He goes then by the names of prajñā, avichchinna, and pāramārṭhika and sushupṭhi-abhimñānī (the presider over sushupṭi). Such sacred sentences, as Ṭaṭṭvamasi (That art thou) and others, speak of the identity with the Brahman of the Pāramārṭhika-Jīva enveloped by ajñāna, which is but a small particle of avyakṭa; but not vyāvahārika and prāṭibhāsika (Jīvas). It is only that chaiṭanya which is reflected in anṭaḥkaraṇa that attains the three states. When it assumes the three states of jāgraṭ, swapna, and sushupṭi, it is like a water-lift as if grieved, born and dead. There are five avasṭhās—jāgraṭ, swapna, sushupṭi, mūrchchhā (trance), and death. Jāgraṭ avasṭhā is that in which there is the perception of subject, of sound, etc., through the grace of the ḍevaṭā presiding over each of them. In it, the Jīva, being in the middle of the eyebrows and pervading the body from head to foot, becomes the agent of actions, such as doing, hearing and others. He becomes also the enjoyer of the fruits thereof; and such a person doing karma for the fruits thereof goes to other worlds and enjoys the same there. Like an emperor tired of worldly acts (in the working state), he strives to find the path to retire into his abode within. The svapna avasṭhā is that in which, when the senses are at rest, there is the manifestation of the knower and the known, along with the affinities of (things enjoyed in) the waking state. In this state Viśva alone, its actions in the waking state having ceased, reaches the state of Ṭaijasa (of ṭejas or effulgence), who moves in the middle of the nādīs (nerves), illuminated by

his lustre the heterogeneity of this universe which is of the form of affinities, and himself enjoys according to his wish. The sushupṭi avasṭhā is that in which the chiṭṭa is sole organ (at play). Just as a bird, tired or roaming, flies to its nest with its stomach filled, so the Jīva being tired of the actions of the world in the waking and dreaming states, enters ajñāna and enjoys bliss. Then trance is attained which resembles death, and in which one with his collection of organs quails, as it were, through fear and ajñāna, like one beaten unexpectedly by a hammer, club or any other weapon. Then death avasṭhā is that which is other than the avasthas of jāgraṭ, svapna, sushupṭi, and trance, which produces fear in all Jīvas from Brahmā down to small insects and which dissolves the gross body. The Jīva, that is surrounded by aviḍyā and the subtle elements, takes with it the organs of sense and action, their objects, and prāṇas along with the kāmio karmas and goes to another world, assuming another body. Through the ripening of the fruits of previous karmas, the Jīva has no rest like an insect ion a whirlpool. It is only after many births that the desire of emancipation a rises in man through the ripening of good karma. Then having resorted to a good Guru and served under him for a long time, one out of many attains moksha, free from bondage. Bondage is through non-inquiry and moksha through inquiry. Therefore, there should always be inquiry (into Āṭmā). The Reality should be ascertained through aḍhyāropa (illusory attribution) and apavād (withdrawal) or recession of that idea). Therefore, there should be always inquiring into the universe, Jīva and Paramāṭmā. Were the true nature of Jīva and the universe known, then there remains Brahman which is non-different from Praṭyagāṭmā,

Then Paiṅgala asked Yājñavalkya to offer an exposition on the mahāvākyas (sacred sentences of the Veḍas). To which Yājñavalkya replied: "One should scrutinise (the sacred sentences), Ṭaṭṭvamasi (That art thou), Ṭvamṭaḍasi (Thou art That), Ṭwam-brahmāsi (Thou art Brahman) and Ahambrahmāsmi (I am Brahman). The word 'Ṭaṭ' denotes the cause of the universe that is variegated beyond perception, has the characteristics of omniscience, has Māyā as His vehicle and has the attributes of Sachchiḍānanḍa. It is He that is the basis of the notion 'I' which has the differentiated knowledge produced by anṭaḥkaraṇa; and it is He that is denoted by the word 'Ṭwam' (Thou). That is the undifferentiated Brahman which remains as the aim (or meaning) of the words Ṭaṭ and Ṭvam after freeing itself from Māyā and Aviḍyā which are respectively the vehicles of Paramāṭmā and Jīvāṭmā. The inquiry into the real significance of the sentences Ṭaṭṭvamasi and Ahambrahmāsmi forms (what is called) śravaṇa (hearing—the first stage of inquiry). To inquire in solitude into the significance of śravaṇa is manana. The concentration of the mind with one-pointedness upon that which should be sought after by śravaṇa and manana is niḍiḍhyāsana. Samāḍhi is that state in which chiṭṭa having given up (the conception of the difference of) the meditator and the meditation, becomes of the form of the meditated like a lamp in a place without wind. Then arise the modifications pertaining to Āṭmā. Such (modifications) cannot be known; but they can only be inferred through memory (of the samāḍhi state). The myriads of karmas committed in this beginningless cycle of rebirths are annihilated only though them. Through proficiency in practice, the current of nectar always rains down in diverse ways. Therefore, those who know Yoga call this samāḍhi, ḍharma-megha

(cloud). Through these (modifications of Āṭmā), the collection of affinities is absorbed without any remainder whatever. When the accumulated good and bad karmas are wholly destroyed, these sentences (Ṭaṭṭvamasi and Ahambrahmāsmi), like the myrobalan in the palm of the hand, bring him face to face with the ultimate Reality, though It was before invisible. Then he becomes a Jivanmukṭa.

"Īśvara wished to produce non-quintuplication (or involution) in the fivefold differentiated elements. Having drawn into their cause Brahmā's egg and its effects of worlds, and mixed together the subtle organs of sense and action and the four internal organs and dissolved all things composed of the elements into their cause, the five elements, He then caused pṛṭhivī to merge into water, water into agni, agni into vāyu, and vāyu into ākāś, ākāś into ahaṅkāra, akaṅkāra into mahaṭ, mahaṭ into avyakṭa, and avyakta into Purusha in regular order. Virāt, Hiraṇyagarbha and Īśvara being freed from the vehicle of Māyā, are absorbed into Paramāṭmā. This gross body composed of the five differentiated elements and obtained through accumulated karma, is merged into its subtle state of non-quintuplicated elements, through the extinction of (bad) karma and increase of good karma, then attains its kārṇa, (causal) state and (finally) is absorbed into its cause, (*viz.*,) Kūtasṭha-Praṭyagāṭma. Viśva and Ṭaijasa and Prājña, their upāḍhi (of aviḍyā) having become extinct, are absorbed in Praṭyagāṭmā. This sphere (of universe) being burnt up by the fire of jñāna is absorbed along with its cause into Paramāṭmā. Therefore, a Brāhmaṇa should be careful and always meditate upon the identity of Ṭaṭ and Ṭvam. Then Āṭmā shines, like the sun freed from the (obscuration of the) clouds. One should meditate upon Atma in the midst (of the body) like a lamp within a jar.

"Āṭmā, the Kūtasṭha, should be meditated upon as being of the size of a thumb, as being of the nature of the jyoṭis (light) without smoke, as being within, illuminating all and as being indestructible. That Muni (sage) who meditates (upon Āṭmā always) until sleep or death comes upon him passes into the state of (Jīvanmukṭi) emancipation like the immovable state of the wind. Then there remains that One (Brahman) without sound, touch free from destruction, without taste or odour, which is eternal, which is without beginning or end, which is beyond the Ṭaṭṭva of Mahaṭ, and which is permanent and without stain or disease".

These Paiṅgala addressed Yājñavalkya thus : "To the wise, what is their karma? And what is their state?" To which other possessions (or virtues), enables twenty-one generations to cross (to Āṭmā). One through his being a Brahmaviṭ alone enables 101 generations to cross. Know Āṭmā to be the rider and the body as the chariot. Know also buḍḍhi as the charioteer and manas as the reins. The wise say the organs are the horses, the objects are the roads (through which the horses travel) and the hearts are the moving balloons. Mahārshis say that Aṭma, when associated with the sense organs and manas, is the enjoyer. Therefore it is the actual Nārāyaṇa alone that is established in the heart. Till his prārabḍha karma is worn out, he exists (in his body) as in the (cast-off) slough of a serpent (without any desire for the body). An emancipated person having such a body roves about like a moon galddening all with no settled place of abode. He gives up his body whether in a sacred place, or in a chaṇḍāla's (outcaste's) house (without any distinction whatever), and attains salvation. Such a body (when seen by a

person) should be offered as a sacrifice to ḍik (the quarters) or should be buried (underground). It is only to Purusha (the wise) that sannyāsa (renunciation) is ordained and not to others. In case of the death of an ascetic who is of the form (or has attained the nature) of Brahman, there is no pollution (to be observed); neither the ceremonies of fire (as burning the body, homa, etc.); nor the piṇda (balls of rice), nor ceremonies of water, nor the periodical ceremonies (monthly and yearly). Just as a food once cooked is not again cooked, so a body once burnt (by the fire of wisdom) should not be burnt (or exposed to fire) again. To one whose body was burnt by the fire of wisdom there is neither śrāḍḍha (required to be performed), nor (funeral) ceremony So long as there is the upāḍhi (of non-wisdom) in one, so long should be serve the Guru. He should conduct himself towards his Guru's wife and children as he does to his Guru. It being of a pure mind, of the nature of immaculate Chiṭ and resigned, and having the discrimination arising from the attainment of wisdom "I am He," he should concentrate his heart on Paramāṭmā and obtain firm peace in his body, then he becomes of the nature of Jyoṭis, void of manas and buḍḍhi. Of what avail is milk to one content with nectar? Of what avail are the Veḍas to him who has known his Āṭmā thus? For a Yogin content with the nectar of wisdom, there is nothing more to be done. If he has to do anything, then he is not a knower to Ṭaṭṭva. Praṭyagāṭmā though far (or difficult of attainment), is not far; though in the body, he is devoid of it (since) he is all-pervading. After having purified the heart and contemplated on the One without disease (*viz.*, Brahman), the cognizing of 'I' as the supreme and the all is the highest bliss. Like water mixed with water, milk with milk, and ghee with ghee, so Jīvāṭmā and paramāṭmā are without difference. When the body is rendered bright through wisdom and the buḍḍhi becomes of the paratless One, then the wise man burns the bondage of karma through the fire of Brahma-jñāna. Then he becomes purified, of the nature of the non-dual named Parmeshvara and the light like the stainless ākāś. Like water mixed with water, so Jīva (-Āṭmā) becomes upāḍhiless (or freed from the bonds of matter). Āṭmā is, like ākāś, of an invisible form. (Therefore) the inner Āṭmā is invisible like vāyu. Though he is within and without, he is the immovable Āṭmā. Through the torch of wisdom, the internal Āṭmā sees (or knows).

"A wise man, in whatever place or manner he dies, is absorbed in that place like the all-pervading ākāś. It should be known that Āṭmā is absorbed as truly as the ākāś in the pot (when broken). Then he attains the all-pervading wisdom-light that is without support. Though men should perform ṭapas standing on one leg for a period of 1,000 years, it will not, in the least, be equal to one-sixteenth part of ḍhyānayoga. One desirous of knowing what jñāna (wisdom) and jñeya (the object to be known) are, will not be able to attain his desire end, even though he may study the Śāsṭras for 1,000 years. That which is alone should be known as the indestructible. That which exists (in this world) is only impermanent. (Therefore) after having given up (the study of) the many Śāsṭras one should worship that which is saṭya (truth). The many karmas, purity (of mind and heart), japa (the muttering of manṭras), sacrifice and pilgrimages—all these should be observed till Ṭaṭṭva is known. For Mahāṭmās (noble souls) to be always in (the conception of) 'I' am Brahman' conduces to their salvation. There are two causes (that lead) to bondage and emancipation. They are

'mine' and 'not mine'. Through 'mine' creatures are bound, whereas through 'not mine', they are released from bondage. When the mind attains the state of Unmani (above manas, *viz.*, when it is destroyed), then there is never the conception of duality. When the Unmani state occurs, then is the supreme Seat (attained). (After which) wherever the mind goes, there is the supreme Seat (to *it*, *viz.*, the mind enjoys salvation wherever it is). That which is equal in all is Brahman alone. One may attain the power to stroke the ākāś with his fist; he may appease his hunger by eating husks (of grain), but never shall be attain emancipation who has not the self-cognition, 'I am Brahman'.

"Whoever recites this Upanishaḍ becomes as immaculate as Agni. He becomes as pure as Brahmā. He becomes as pure as Vāyu. He becomes like one who has bathed in all the holy waters. He becomes like one who has studied all the Veḍas. He becomes like one that has undergone all Veḍic observances. He obtain the fruit of the recitation of Iṭihāsas, Purāṇas and Ruḍramanṭras a lakh of times. He becomes like one that has pronounced Praṇava (Om) ten thousand times. He purifies his ancestors ten degrees removed and his descendants ten degree removed. He becomes purified of all those that sit with him for dinner. He becomes a great personage. He becomes purified from the sins of the murder of a Brāhman, the drinking of alcohol, theft of gold, and sexual cohabitation with Guruṣ wife, and from the sins of associating with those that commit such sins.

"Like the eye pervading the ākas (seeing without effort everything above), a wise man sees (always) the supreme Seat of Vishṇu. The Brāhmaṇas who have always their spiritual eyes wise upon praise and illuminate in diverse ways the supreme Seat of Vishṇu. Om: This Upanishaḍ is truṭḥ.

PHILOSOPHY

If the Vedas, including the Upaniṣads, are true, it follows that there cannot be any conflict between different portions of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, or between any passage of the Vedas and any passage of the Upaniṣads. It is well-known that some passage of the Upaniṣads appear to support the advaita doctrine, while there are passages which to support the viśiṣṭādvaita or the dvaita doctrine. But Rāmānuja or Mādhava cannot refuse to accept any passage of the former class while Śamkara cannot refuse to accept any passage of the latter class. Every ācārya must accept all the passages and suitably interpret these passages which appear to go against his doctrine.

I have observed before that according to the views of our ancient scholars like Śamkara and Rāmānuja there cannot be any conflict between any passage of the Vedas and any passage of the Upaniṣads. This is also the view of Vyāsa and Vālmiki, Manu and Yājñavalkya who all hold the entire Vedas as infallible. Curiously enough most of the Western scholars hold the opposite view. They hold that the main doctrine of the Vedas (excluding the Upaniṣads) is that the Vedic sacrifices should be performed because by performing them one can go to heaven, while the main doctrines of the Upaniṣads are that Vedic sacrifices are useless and should not be performed, that minor deities do not exist there being only Supreme Deity called Brahman and that one should try to attain salvation by acquiring the knowledge of Brahman. If what the Western scholars say is right then there is clear conflict between the

Vedas and the Upaniṣads and all our ancient scholars are wrong and the Vedas being self-contradictory there is no safe foundation of Hindu religion. I shall try to show that what the Western scholars say is not correct and that there is no reason for concluding that our ancient scholars were all wrong.

I shall first quote the relevant passages of Western scholars to show that they really hold the views which I am attributing to them.

Max Muller writes, "In these Upaniṣads the whole ritual or sacrificial system of the Vedas is not only ignored but directly rejected as useless, nay as mischievous. The ancient gods of the Vedas are no longer recognised" (*Origin of Vedānta*, p. 16). Deussen writes, "The *Atman* doctrine is fundamentally opposed to the Vedic cult of the gods and the Brāhmaṇical system of the ritual" (*Religion and Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 21).* Macdonell writes, "Through the *Upanishads* generally form a part of the *Brāhmaṇas* they really represent a new religion which is in virtual opposition to the ritual or practical side." (*History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 215). Winternitz writes, "While the *Brahmins* were pursuing their barren sacrificial science other circles were engaged upon those ithest questions which were at last treated so admirably in the Upanisads" (*History of Indian Literature, p. 237*). Grabe writes that "*the Brahmin* priest is proficient only at excogitating sacrifice after sacrifice and hair-splitting definitions and explanations of senseless ritualistic hocus posus. All at once lofty thoughts appear on the sense. A passionate desire to solve the riddle of the universe and its relation to oņes own self holds the mind "The captive". Hertel says, "*Kshattriyas* unable to believe in the Vedic gods substituted instead the idea of nature powers and propounded a philosophy which was essentially a monism,—atheistic, materialistic and morally indifferent." Dr. Robert Ernest Hume writes, "No longer is worship or sacrifice or good conduct the requisite of religion in this life or of salvation in the next. Knowledge secures the latter and disapproves the former. The whole religious doctrine of different gods and of sacrificing to the gods is seen to be a stupendous fraud by the man who has acquired metaphysical knowledge of the monistic unity of the self and of the world in Brahman or *Atman*," (*The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 53). It will be seen from the above passages that according to these scholars there is conflict between the Vedas and the Upaniṣhads in two main points. (1) The Vedas say that by performing Vedic sacrifices one can go to heaven. The Upaniṣhads did not believe in this doctrine. (2) The Vedas say that there are many gods. The Upaniṣads deny the existence of these gods and assert that there is only one Brahman. To these two may be added a third point of conflict, viz., the Vedas enjoin that sacrifices should be performed while the Upaniṣads say that sacrifices should not be performed. I shall now show that these conflict do not really exist, I shall show that the Upaniṣads have said (like the Vedas) that by performing sacrifices one can go to heaven, the Upaniṣads accept the existence of minor gods as well as the supreme God or Brahman and the Upaniṣads also enjoin that sacrifices should be performed. The Upaniṣads have no doubt said that by performing sacrifices one cannot attain salvation, and that salvation can be attained by attaining the knowledge of Brahman. But from such passages it cannot be inferred that according to the Upaniṣads Vedic sacrifices are useless or should not be performed. For even though

Vedic sacrifices might not enable one to attain salvation they might enable one to attain heaven and the Upaniṣads say clearly that by performing these sacrifices one can attain heaven, and that sacrifices should be performed. Similarly because the Upaniṣads declare that there is one Supreme Brahman it cannot be inferred that according to the Upaniṣads minor gods do not exist. I shall now quote passages from the principal Upaniṣads in which it is explicitly stated that by performing sacrifices one can go to heaven, that minor gods do exist and that sacrifices should be performed.

In the Iśopaniṣad it is stated that one should wish to live for a hundred years always performing good acts. We also find in Iśopaniṣad a prayer to the god of fire to lead the soul by a nice path after death.

In the Kenopaniṣad it is stated that the gods Agni, Vāyu and Indra surpass the other gods as they touched Brahman from the nearest place. It is also stated that austerities, self-control and good acts are the basis of Brahmajnāna, the Vedas are its body, truth is its resting place. The Kaṭhopaniṣad consists mainly of a dialogue between Nāchiketa and the god of death (Yama). We also find therein that Nāchiketa addresses Yama as follows:

> "Oh god of death, you know how god of fire is to be worshiped so that one may attain heaven. Please teach it to me. I have full faith in you."

When Nāchiketa asks about Brahmajñāna, Yama says, "In the past of the gods also wanted to know it." Again Yama says, "All the minor god rest in Him (Brahman). Again the Kaṭhopaniṣad says, "Out of fear of Brahman the god of fire gives heat, the sun also gives heat, Indra, Vāyu and the fifth god Yama perform their respective functions".

The Praśnopaniṣad says, "Those who perform sacrifices and excavate tanks go to the heaven which is in the moon".

The Muṇḍakopaniṣad begins by saying that of all the minor gods Brahma first came into existence. This Upaniṣad also definitely asserts the truth of the Vedic sacrifices for its says, "All this is true, the rituals which were revealed to the sages and which were inherent in the mantras. The Muṇḍaka also enjoins on the performance of Vedic sacrifices: "You should constantly try to perform these sacrifices with the desire for attaining the ultimate truth." Again the Muṇḍaka says, "They (who perform sacrifices) enjoy the fruits thereof in heaven and are born again in this world, or even in lower worlds." "The minor gods were created out of the Supreme God (Brahman)" The Taittirīya Upaniṣads enjoins on the performance of sacrifices: "You should not neglect to perform the rites in honour of gods and ancestors." The rites for the gods are the sacrifices. The rites for the ancestors are Śrāddha and tarpaṇa. Again the Taittirīya Upaniṣad says, "Pursue the path of religion" in the commentary of which Śamkarācārya writes, "So long as one does not relaise oneṣ identity with Brahman, one should carefully perform the rites laid down in the Vedas and Smṛtis." The Chāndogya Upaniṣad says, "The path of religion can be divided into three parts. Sacrifices, study and gifts constitute the first part."

The Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad says, "It is this Brahman whom the Brahmins desire to know by the performance without attachment of sacrifices, gifts and austerities."

Commenting on this passage Śamkarācārya writes, "Those persons whose minds are purified by the performance of karma can know without hindrance Brahman as revealed by the Upanisads."

I have quoted passages from practically

all the principal Upaniṣads from which it will appear that minor gods do exist, that by performing sacrifices one can go to heaven, and further that sacrifices should be performed.

It may be asked if the aim of the Upaniṣads is attainment of salvation and not attainment of heaven why should the Upaniṣads enjoin on the performance of sacrifices which enable the performer to attain heaven? The reply is that the performance of sacrifices involves a course of self-discipline. For performing a sacrifice one has to fast, take a bath, utter many mantras, take care that they are pronounced correctly, contemplate over the meaning of the mantras, think of the gods worshipped and spend money freely. If this course of discipline is undertaken with a desire for attaining heaven, one can attain it, at least, that is the Vedic doctrine. But if this course of self-discipline is performed without any desire for enjoying the pleasures of heaven, it enables the performer to purify the mind and thus be fit for the realisation of Brahman. This is the doctrine of niṣkāma karma which has been elucidated in the Bhagavadgitā. The world anāśakena (अनाशकेन) in the passage quoted from the Bṛahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad in footnote 18 refers to the selfless method of performing pious acts. The word satyakāma (सत्यकाम) in footnote 11 also refers to the same selfless method. In the Cāndogya and Bṛahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads we find that those who are engaged in performing sacrifices also discuss philosophical questions. They are not separate groups as imagined by Winternitz in the passage quoted above.

It is necessary to refer to the passages which are quoted from the Upaniṣads by those who maintain that the Upaniṣads did not believe in the existence of minor gods or the efficacy of sacrifices. In this connection the following passage is generally referred to:

> These sacrifices are like fruit crafts in which there are 18 items of works. Those ignorant men who consider them as the best become victims again of old age and death.

All that is stated here is that by performing sacrifices one cannot attain salvation, and hence they are born again. That the men who perform sacrifices do attain heaven is clearly stated in the same chapter of the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* in the passage quoted in footnote (12), viz.,

नाकस्य पृष्ठे ते सुकृतेऽनुभूत्वेमं
लोकं हीनतरं वा विशन्ति

"They enjoy the fruits of their good acts on the top of the heaven and are born again in this or in still inferior world."

In the passage quoted from the same Upanisad in footnote (ii) viz.,

तन्यचरथ नियतं सत्यकामाः

has been enjoined that sacrifices should be performed.

It cannot, therefore, be inferred from this passage that sacrifices are useless or should not be performed.

Another passage quoted in this connection is given below:

> Those who worship gods are like bests to the gods.

As the subsequent passage shows, it is meant here that as beasts are useful to men, so the worshippers of gods are useful to the gods. The existence of gods is asserted in this passage. It is not stated here that the performance of sacrifices is useless. As other passages have been quoted before in which it has been stated that by performing sacrifices one can go to heaven it must be concluded that such is the view of the Upaniṣads.

The conclusions made by the Western scholars are based on the theory of evolution of knowledge. They thought that when the mantras were composed the

knowledge of the authors was very little, they could not conceive of the Supreme Brahman, and they thought that by propitiating the minor deities by making sacrifices they could get more enjoyment of senses. Gradually as they became wiser they could conceive of the Supreme Brahman. They then discarded the belief in the minor deities and also belief in the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices. But as a matter of fact we find in the Upaniṣads very great regard for the wisdom in the earlier mantras portion of the Vedas. We often find that in the Upanisad a statement is made and then some passage is quoted from mantra portion introducing it by a remark, "thus it is stated in the ṛks of mantras." In fact the truths of the Upaniṣads are not paraded as new discoveries but are referred to as wisdom handed down from the ancient seers. That the entire Vedas were recealed is clearly stated again and again in the Upaniṣads.

It is only reasonable to suppose that if the Upaniṣads considered the earlier Vedas to be revealed they could not contradict the statements made therein, nor consider them as foolish.

Just as the Upaniṣads contain references to the minor deities, so also the mantra portions of the Vedas contain references to the Supreme Brahman. A few instances are quoted below.

"At that time (during universal destruction or *pralaya*) that thing (Brahman) alone existed. Māyā (the power of Brahman) remained merged in Him.

"The ruler of the universe remains in the transcendental region."

"The commands of the Supreme Brahman are obeyed by the minor deities".

"(Brahman) in His majesty became the one only kind."

"Who was the One God over all the gods."

"He has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a thousand legs, (i.e., the heads, eyes and legs of all beings are His heads, His eyes and His legs). He covers the entire universe and also transcends it by the greater portion of his being."

All this universe is Brahman. All that was, all that is, all that will be (is also Brahman)."

"It is that One Being whom the wise call by various names,—Indra, Yama, Vayu etc."

"He who is our father, creator and ruler."

There are many other passages in which there are references to the Supreme God. From the quotations made it will be clear that is cannot be maintained that the Vedas mention various gods because the seers could not conceive of One Supreme Being. It may be observed also that the conception of minor gods is not untenable with the conception of a Supreme Deity.

It is sad to reflect that the mistakes made by Western scholars have been repeated by the foremost modern scholars of India. Thus Dr. Radhakrishna says regarding the origin of the Upaniṣad, "Men sat down to doubt the gods whom they ignorantly worshipped. From princitive polytheism to systematic philosophy it is a long, long way (*India Philosophy* Vol. I pp. 71-72).

As observed before the Upaniṣads refer to the Samhitā portion of the Vedas with great veneration, and not as product of ignorance. The Upanisads also are polytheistic. Both contain, references to the minor gods as well as the Supreme Deity.

Dr. S.N. Das Gupta writes, "The Upaniṣads are an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature, as indicating the path of knowledge as opposed to the path of work. The Upaniṣads do not require the performance of any action but only reveal the ultimate

truth and reality." (*History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. I., p. 28).

Prof. Hiriyanna writes, "The Upaniṣads primarily represent a spirit different from and even hostile to ritual" (*Outline of Indian Philosophy*, p. 48).

Prof. Ranade writes, "The spirit of the Upaniṣads is on the other hand, barring a few exceptions here and there, entirely antagonistic to the sacrifical doctrine of the Brahmanas." (*Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, p. 6*).

Sir. R. G. Bhandarkar in his book *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and other Minor Faiths* traces of origin of the Upaniṣads to disbelief in rituals.

In the *Vedic Age* by the Bhāratiya Vidyā Bhavan it has been stated that the Upanisads originated from doubts concerning the efficacy of the priestly cult and the current belief in gods. (p. 493).

I cannot conceive of any other reason for such gross mistakes made by so many eminent India scholars except that they did not consider it necessary to critically examine the statements made by Western scholars.

PHYSIOLOGY

The gross body which the soul abandons at death as the mango fruits its stalk, must be distinguished from the subtle body, which in its capacity as vehicle of the psychical organs accompanies the soul on its wanderings up to the time of its release. We propose here by way of appendix to collect all that the Upanishads have to say on the body, its organs and functions.

The body is the prāṇas habitation, of which the head forms the roof, in which it is bound to the breath as posts by food as the rope. It is the âtman "consisting of the juice of food," *annarasamaya*, in which is enclosed the *prâṇamaya âtman*, in this again the *manomaya*, in this the *vijñânamaya*, and in this as the innermost the *ânandamaya*.

Only later is the *ânandamaya* âtman also described, like the rest, as a sheath kośa of the soul. Usually following Brih. 2.5.18, and especially Chând. 8. 1.1, the body is described as the city of Brahman (*brahmapuram*), heavenly, desirable, the highest dwelling of Brahman, in which as a house the lotus flower of the heart abides, in which during sleep the fires of the prâṇa keep watch. This city of the body has eleven, or more usually nine gates, viz., the nine openings in the body, to which when eleven are reckoned the navel and the Brahman orifice (*brahma-randhram*) are added. The latter is an imaginary orifice of the skull on the top of the head, through which, according to Ait. 1.3.12, Brahman entered into the body, and by which the soul, or according to the more usual view only the souls of the emancipated, having ascended by the hundred and first vein (subsequently named, following Maitr, 6.21, *sushumnâ*), attains to union with Brahman.

Thus the conception is old. The name *brahmarandhram* is first found in Hansa Up. 3 in connection with the six mystical and imaginary regions on the body that occur there for the first time (the regions of the belly, loins, navel, heart, neck and eyebrows). It is perhaps an anticipation of this when, in Ait. 1.3.12, eye, manas and the ether of the heart (as the scholiast reckons them), are distinguished as special stations of the purusha, or in Brahma Up. 4, eye, throat, heart and head (in Brahma Up. 2, navel, heart, throat, heart and head (in Brahma Up. 2, navel, heart, throat and head). From him who forms the light within men proceeds also, according to Chând. 3. 13. 8, the warmth of the body and the noises in the ear. The latter like digestion are ascribed by Bṛih.

5.9 to the Vaiśvânara fire in men, which when we bear in mind Śatap. Br. X. 6. 1 amounts to the same thing. The passages Mahân. 11. 10, Maitr.2.6, 6, 27, 6.31 depend on a combination of the other two.

Descriptions of the body and its parts, usually with a pessimistic colouring, are first found at a later period. "In this evil-smelling unsubstantial body, shuffled together out of bones, skin, sinews, marrow, flesh, seed, blood, musus, tears, eye-gum, dung, urine, gall and phlegm, how can we enjoy pleasure?" "This body, originating from copulation, grown in the pit (of the mother's womb) and issuing forth through the passages of the excretions, is a collection of bones daubed over with flesh, covered with sink, filled full with dung, urine, phlegm, marrow, fat and grease, and to crown all with many diseases, like a treasure store crammed with treasure." A definition of the body is given by Âtma Up. 1:— "That self, in which are skin, bones, flesh, marrow, hairs, fingers, thumbs, spine, nails, joints, belly, navel, pudenda, hips, things, cheeks, brows, forehead, arms, sides, head, veins, eyes, and ears, and which is born and dies, is called the external self."

The most complete elucidation of the body and its relations is furnished by the late and unfortunately very corrupt Garbha Upanishad. Its explanations are attached to a verse, which we quote, inserting the explanations the follow it:— "Consisting of five (earth, water, fire, wind, ether), ruling in these groups of five (the so-called five elements, or the five organs of knowledge, or the organs of generation and evacuation with buddhi, manas, and speech), supported on six (the sweet, sour, salt, bitter acid and harsh juices of food), endowed with six qualities (unexplained), made up of seven elementary substances (the white, red, grey, smoke-coloured, yellow, brown, pale fluid in the body which is produced from the juice of the food), made up of three kinds of mucus (unexplained, probably the three *dosha*, humours, viz., — *vâyu* wind, *pittam* gall, *kapha* phlegm), twice-begotten (from the father's seed and the mother's blood), partaking of various kinds of food (that which is eaten, drunk, licked and sucked up) is the body." On the parts of the body and their importance the Upanishad declares at the close:

"The head has four skull-bones, and in them there are (on each) side sixteen sockets. (In the body) there are 107 joints, 180 sutures, 900 sinews, 700 veins, 500 muscles, 360 bones, and 4-1/2 crore (45 million) hairs. The heart weighs eight pala (364 grammes), the tongue 12 pala (546 grammes), the gall a prastham (728 grammes), the phlegm an âḍhakam (2912 grammes), the seed a kuḍavam (182 grammes), the fat two prastha (1456 grammes; the dung and the urine are indeterminate, depending on the quantity of food."

The head is compared in a verse from Atharvav. X. 8.9 to a goblet titled sideways, the opening of which is formed by the seven openings of the organs of sense as seven ṛishis. The same verse with the addition of speech as an eighth organ is repeated and explained in Bṛih. 2.2.3. According to this passage the eyes are two ṛishis, although immediately before the red black and white in the eye with the pupil, the homour, and the upper and lower lashes, had been inconsistently described as seven gods remaining in attendance on the eye. Of the purusha in the eye as the symbol of the âtman we have already spoken. According to Bṛih. 4.2. 2-3, Indra and Virâj dwell in the right and left eye; they are nourished from the heart through the veins *hitâḥ*, and are, by virtue of their "union" in the ether of the heart, he individual âtman identical with the

supreme.

As an appropriate punishment for arrogance in questioning or for the darkness of false knowledge there frequently occurs in the Upanishads the bursting of the head. The expression may perhaps have its origin in the sensation of bursting which attends any excessive rush of blood to the head. This is indicated by Bṛih. 1.3. 24 also, where the reference is to a bursting of the head caused by indulgence in soma. As a rule this punishment is only threatened. Only once is it actually inflicted.

The heart more than the head occupies the attention of the thinkers of the Upanishads. It is there that the vital breaths reside. Not only the five pranas, but also eye, ear, speech and manas originate from the heart. The heart and not the head is the home of manas; and the former therefore is the centre also of conscious life. In sleep the organs of the soul remain in the heart, and there also they gather at death; "through the heart we recognise forms" through the heart we recognise faith, beget children, know the truth, on it speech also is based, while the further question on what the heart is based is angrily rejected. Not the organs however alone, but all beings are based upon and supported by the heart; and even setting aside the actual definition of the heart as Brahman, it is yet the empirical home of the soul, and therefore of Brahman:— "here within in the heart is a cavity, wherein he resides, the lord of the universe, the ruler of the universe, the chief of the universe." The heart is called *hṛidayam*, because "it is he" who dwells "in the heart" (*hṛidi ayam*, Chând. 8.3.3), small as a grain of rice or barley; an inch in height the purusha dwells in the midst of the body, as the self of created things in the heart.

On the ground of Chând. 8.1.1 the heart is frequently in the later Upanishads compared with the hanging cup of a lotus flower, or even with banana blossom; and is more fully described in Mahânâr. 11.8, Dhyânab. 14-16, Yogat. 9, Mahâ 3. In this lotus flower of the heart there is a small space, in which, according to Chând. 8.1.3, heaven and earth, sun, moon, and stars are enclosed, in which "the lights of the universe shine enclosed," which is "the strong support of this universe." Into this space the soul enters in sleep, in it the immortal golden purusha abides. It is the cavity (*guhâ*), so often referred to, in which Brahman lies concealed, and from which he issues in the meditation of yoga, when he pushes on one side the ether of the heart, or forces his way through it.

Several accounts found of the veins that originate from the heart and surround it, and these are related in a peculiar and hardly definable way.

Bṛih. 4.2,3:— The veins called *hitâḥ*, fine as a hair a thousand times subdivided, have their home in the heart, and nourish the individual soul. A special vein leading upwards is the path on which it travels.

Bṛih. 4.3.20:— The veins called *hitâḥ*, fine as a hair a thousand times subdivided, are filled with white, grey, brown, green and red fluid. They are the abode of the soul in deep sleep.

Bṛih. 2.1. 19:-The veins called *hitâḥ*, 72,000 in number, ramify from the heart outwards into the pericardium (*purītat*). They are the abode of the soul in deep sleep.

These passages are in essential agreement; and Kaush. 4.19 appears to be derived from a combination of them :— "The veins called *hitâḥ*, fine as a hair subdivided a thousand times, surround the pericardium. They are the abode of the soul in deep sleep. They are filled with brown, white, black, yellow and red fluid, All this is like the passages from Bṛih.,

only that the succession and names of the colours agree with Chând. 8.6.1.

Chând. 8.6.1 connects the idea of the brown, white, gray, yellow and red "veins of the heart" with the theory of the rays of the sun similarly five coloured, which form the continuation of the veins unto the sun, thus uniting heart and sun, like two villages by a high road. In deep sleep the soul glides into these veins, and through them becomes one with the heat. At death the soul ascends to the sun by way of the veins and the sun's rays. The wise gain the sun, the ignorant find the entrance to it closed.

The verses Bṛih. 4.4.8-9 may perhaps he derived from this passage. They describe an ancient path, extending even to the individual man, which leads up to the heavenly world, and is white, gray, yellow and green. On this the soul of the wise man travels, after it has become heat, *taijasa*. The expression *taijasa* recalls the passages quoted from the Chândogya; the colours are as in the Bṛihadâraṇyaka. In the main point all the passages hitherto cited agree.

A different view however seems to attach to the verse (perhaps derived from Bṛih. 4.4.2), which is appended to Chând. 8.6.6 and recurs in Kâṭh. 6.16:—

> The veins of the heart are a hundred and one.
> Of these one leads to the head;
> By it he ascends who wins immortality.
> The others issue forth on all sides.

According to this verse only one vein leads upwards to immortality, while according to the preceding prose all the veins are connected with the sun's rays, and therefore lead to the sun, where first a separation takes place.

Later passages all depend on a combination of the theories of the 72,000 and the 101 veins. Thus on the basis of them Praśna 3.6 enumerates 101 chief veins, each with 100 branch veins, to each of which again there are 72,000 tributary branch veins, making a total of 101 + 101 × 100 × 100 × 72,000 = 727,210,201, *i.e.* 72 crores, 72 lacs, and 10,201 as the commentary correctly reckons. According to Maitr. 6. 30, countless white, not white, blackish yellow, gray, reddish, brown, and light-red rays proceeds from the heart, of which one leads to the sun, 100 to the abodes of the gods, and the rest downwards to the ordinary world. Kshurika 15-17 mentions the 72,000 veins, of which 101 are the most important. Through alal these veins, which are grouped around the 101st, named *sushumnâ*, as round a cushion, the yogin forces his way, when conducted on the *sushumnâ* to Brahman. Similarly Brahmavidyâ 11-12 describes how the syllable Om (*i.e.* that on which he meditates) ascends on the vein of the head which is attached to the sun, and breaks through the 72,000 veins and the head, in order to unite with Brahman. These and other fancies depend upon a combination of the passages quoted from Bṛih. Up. with the verse cited from Chând. 8.6.6.

The body consists on the usual hypothesis, which is traceable back to Bṛih. 4.4.5, of the five elements. In Chând. 6. 5 also, where only three elements (food *i.e.* earth, water, and heat) are assumed, it is shown how the body and the psychical organs originate from the most dense, the medium, and the finest parts of them according to the following scheme:-

	Densest.	Medium.	Finest.
Food . . .	faces	flesh	manas
Water . . .	urine	blood	prana
Heat . . .	bones	marrow	speech

In this case, just as with the milk when churned to butter, the fine parts float to the top. In proof of the statement that manas is composed of food, prâṇa of water, it is declared that if a man abstains from food but drinks water the life (*prâṇa*) is

maintained, but thought (*manas*) fails. In Bṛih. 4.2.3 also it is declared that the individual soul is nourished by the mass of blood in the heart, and that it therefore, as the bodily self, "has a choice food' (*pravivikta-âhâra-tara*). From this is derived the doctrine that the waking ātman "enjoys that which is gross" (*sthûlabhuj*), the sleeping on the contrary "enjoys that which is choice" (*pravivikta-bhuj*).

Hunger and thirst, which according to Ait. 1.2.5 make their home in men as demoniac powers, are explained in Chând. 6.8 on etymological grounds on the supposition that in hunger (*âśanâyâ*) the waters carry off (*aśitam nayante*) the food that is eaten (to build up the organism), the water that is drunk (likewise to build up the organism), while in thirst (*udanyâ*) the heat carries away (*udakam nayate*) the water that is drink (likewise to build up the organism). When then in hunger and thirst the food becomes water, the water heat, they only return to the source from which according to Chând. 6.2 they were derived.

The states of waking, dreaming, deep sleep and death will have to be discussed in the immediately following chapters. Here we propose merely to summarise the most important teaching of the Upanishads on the origin of organisms (which collectively are the wandering souls).

Organisms are divided according to their origin into four classes, viz.—born alive, born from an egg, born from moisture (insects and the like), and born from a germ (plants). This classification, which was universally adopted with a few modifications by later Indian writers, depends solely upon two passages of the Upanishads. The first is Chând. G. 3. 1:— In truth, these beings have here three kinds of seeds, born from the egg, born alive, and born from the germ." In Ait. 3.3 where a fourth class is added, and the enumeration is "born from an egg, born from the mother's womb, born from moisture, and born a shoot," the impression is conveyed of a later origin and of apparent dependence on the former passage.

In harmony with the *doctrine of transmigration*, generation is not the birth of the soul for the first time but is only its return from the moon, where it has received the fruit of the works of its earlier existence. According to the principal text of the doctrine of transmigration, the stations through which the soul passes on its return from the moon are ether, wind, smoke, mist, clouds, rain, plants, seed and the mother's body. Hence is derived the description of Muṇḍ. 2.1.5; and the verses also of Kaush. 1.2, in which the soul on its return from the moon directs its course through the bodies of father and mother, are connected with these ideas. Perhaps the obscure passage Prâṇâgnihotra Up. 2 is to be explained in a similar way. According to it the expiatory fire "by means of the brilliancy of the moon" effects generation. The last receptacle of the soul on its descent from the other world to enter into a new body is the father's seed; this is the essence of men, "the power gathered together from all the limbs," it is the propagation itself; its home is in the heart; Prajâpati created the woman as its dwelling-place; into her the man pours forth his own self, and causes it thereby to be born:— "then enters he into the very essence of the woman, as though he were a limb of hers; therefore, it is that he does her no harm; she however, after that this his âtman has come to her, cherishes it; because she cherishes it, therefore is she to be cherished." According to this it is the soul of the father, which is born again in the child, while, according to the principal text of the doctrine of transmigration

quoted above, the child is a soul on its return from the moon, and consequently in its view both the father's seed and the mother's womb are only stations on the road. The myth ascribed to Yâjñavalkhya in Bṛih.1.4.3-4 is not in agreement with either of these views, when it explains procreation as the desire for re-union of the two halves of one and the same being, originally belonging together, but divided by Prajâpati into man and woman. This myth, like that analogous to it in the Symposium of Plato, departs from the truth only to the extent that it places in the past what lies in the future. For the being that brings together man and women is indeed the child that will be born (cp. *Deussen, Elements of Metaphysic,* 153).

To beget is represented as a religious duty. In Taitt. 1.9 it is enjoined side by side with studying and teaching the Veda. Frequently it is allegorically described as an act of sacrifice. In Taitt. 1.11 the pupil dismissed from study is charged, — "After having delivered to the teacher the gifts of affection, take care that the thread of thy race be not broken." "He who in his lifetime rightly continues to spin the thread to posterity thereby transfers his guilt to the fathers; for it (begetting) is the transference of his guilt." By the son his continued life is assured in the world of men, he is admitted to the fathers to consummate his righteous deeds; "and if anything whatever has been committed perversely by him, his son will expiate all; therefore is his name 'son'; by the son that is to say he continues to exist in this world, Particular directions are given in Bṛih. G. 4 how to proceed in order to beget a son or a daughter of a definite disposition. This chapter forms the conclusion of the Upanishad, and therefore probably the close of the religious instruction imparted to the student all the end of his student life.

In contrast with these views, which include the act of procreation within the sphere of religious duties, an ascetic tendency gradually prevailed which rejected it altogether. In Bṛih. 1.4.17 the five natural objects of human endeavour (self, wife, child, kingdom, action) are replaced by five phenomenal forms of the âtman (manas, speech, breath, eye and ear, body). In Bṛih. 3.5.1 it is said of Brâhmans who have known the âtman that they hold aloof from the desire for children, possessions, and the world. Similarly in Bṛih. 4.4.22, where it has been said previously:— "This our ancestors knew, when they ceased to desire offspring, and said,— 'What need have we of offspring, we whose soul this universe is.' " If these assertions are put into the mouth of Yâjñavalkhya, who nevertheless himself had two wives, this is only an additional proof that Yâjñavalkhya is a mere name, to which the loftiest and noblest thoughts of the school of the Vâjasaneyins were assigned. Whether in the wish also of Chând. 8.14:— "May I not, the glorious of the glorious, enter upon old age toothless," the expression "toothless, grey, slobbery" is to be understood of a fresh entrance into the mother's womb (as the scholiast takes it), or of a possibly long period of trial before old age and its troubles are reached may be left undecided. Of later passages only Mahân. 62. 7, 11, 63. 8, 13 need be cited, where self-renunciation is exalted above parentage, and Prasna 1.13, 15, where the *prajâpativratam* is still permitted on the condition that it is not practised by day, but the world of Brahman is promised only to those "who mortify themselves, in whom true chastity is firmly established, That the later Sannyâsa Upanishads are full of this spirit needs no proof. Sacrifice to Prajâpati, which is enjoined in them on the

Sannyâsin at his entrance, but is elsewhere forbidden, appears to denote a symbolical release from the duty of propagation.

The length of the stay in the mother's body is estimated in Chând. 5.9.1 at "ten (lunar) months, or as long as it is." Detailed information on the development of the embryo is given in Garbha Up. 2-4:— "The embryo is developed from the union of seed and blood, ...from this union at the periodical time after one night a nodule arises, after seven nights a cyst, within half a month a lump, within one month it hardens, after two months the head is formed, after three months the parts of the feet, in the fourth month the ankle-bones, belly and hips, in the fifth the spine, in the sixth, mouth, nose, eyes and ears, in the seventh the embryo is furnished with the soul (*jiva*), in the eighth it is complete in all its parts. If the male seed is in excess a male is born, if the female a female, if both are equal a hermaphrodite; blind, lame, bent and dwarfed are the results of lack of power. If the seed on its entrance is divided by the pressure of the wind on either side into two parts, the body also becomes twofold, and twins are born.... Finally in the ninth month it is complete in all its parts, and also in knowledge; then it recalls (as long as it remains still in the mother's body, like Vâmadeva, Ait. 2.4) its former births, and has knowledge of its good and evil deeds:.... when however, arriving at the gates of the sexual parts, it suffers pain by the pressure, is with difficulty and in great anguish born, and comes into contact with the Vaishṇava wind (the wind of the external universe), it is unable any longer to bethink it of its births and deaths, and has no further knowledge of its good and evil deeds." Voltaire's mockery (Ep. XIII. sur less Anglais) has reference to similar ideas in the later Western philosophy, but it applies also to the Indian *a priori* imaginations:-je ne suis pas plus dispose que Locke a imaginer que, quelques semaines apres ma conception, j'etais une âme fort savante, sachant alors mille choses que j'ai oubliées en naissant et ayant fort inutilement possédé dans l'utérus des connaissances qui m'ont échappé dés que j'ạì pu en avoir besoin et que je n'ai jamais bien pu reprendre depuis.

PLANT AND ANIMALS

Having become conversant with the face of the land as well as climatic and weather conditions, it will do well to turn to life-forms, known to the ancients. The whole range of life-forms is recorded in the following sentence:
"..manuṣya...pasunsca vayạ̄nsi ca tṛiṇavanaspatiṅs vāpadānyākīṭapataṅgapipīlikam..." "Man, animals, birds, herbs, vegetation, wild animals, worms, gnats, ants...." (CHH., 7.2.1).

Evidently, life-forms in to disclose both path and animal realms. In vegetation species, distinction seems to have been made between herbs and vegetation and in animals realms, in addition to man animals, birds, wild animals, worms, gnats are separately mentioned.

An endeavour has been made in this chapter to throw light on the varied and varying species of vegetation and their uses to the contemporary people. It needs hardly to be told that the whole of India, including Southern India, had a dense, heavy and close cover of vegetation with scattered patches and small and extensive blocks of arable land in forest enclosures.

Vegetation Species

Vanaspati and alternatively *virudha* are in use in Sanskrit for the

vegetation cover. In general, the plant-life has been categorised as "*Vrikshapuṣpaphalalatāgulmikā*" i.e. trees, flowers, fruits and bushes. The vegetation world comprises trees, plants (*pādapa*), creepers (*latā*), herbs, (*triṇa*), etc. Vegetation may be classified in two categories, namely, natural and artificial. Largely, natural vegetation is met with in forests.

Two common Sanskrit words for forest are *Vana* and *Araṇya*. There is one Upaniṣad named after *Araṇya, viz., Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Bṛihad* stands for deep and extensive. *Naimiṣāraṇya* and *Vrindāvana* are two famous forests of ancient India. *Vrindā* has been regarded as the habitat of *Tulasī* (Holy Basil plant). The word *Vanaspati* is very common in Upaniṣads.

(a) Trịṇa: It has been pointed out that a small flame of fire can set ablaze herbs and grasses to cause universal destruction (KR., 3.6). Other allusions to *trina* are as follows:
(i) I., 1.1 *(ii)* BRAH., 1.5.2 *(iii)* Ibdi., 1.5.2 *(iv)* CHH., 7.2.1 *(v)* Ibid., 6.7.5 *(vi)* MAITRA., 1.4 *(vii)* GAR., Sa., p. 414 *(viii)* SI., 12 *(ix)* KE., 3.6/10 *(x)* KAT., 1.1.3 *(xi)* SAT., 21 *(xii)* M., 2.43; Ibid., 4.12, Ibid., 4.131.
These numerous references suggest extensive extents of land with grass cover. *Tṛināvarta* (G.,9) is highly meaningful and suggestive nomenclature for grassland.
Apart form these, there is a pointed and direct reference to *harita tṛiṇa* or green and fresh grass. *Usira (Andropogon Muricatus)*, a species of aromatic grass of *Kāsmira* deserves a special mention (BRAH., 3.27). *Muñja* grass (Saccharum Sara) had been in use for girdle round the waist. A single allusion to a reed of *muñja* grass (*muñjādiveṣikām*) is not easy to spot out. *Darbha* has been considered precious for use in worship and religious ceremonies (RP., 22). Among the species of grasses the names of (1) *Dūrvā* and (2) *Kuśa* also find place.

(b) *Pāpada* (Plant): This world in Sanskrit is more meaningful than its equivalent in English, namely, plant, 'Pada' in Sanskrit means foot and 'short' vegetation intermediate between 'tall' trees and surface grass of a metre of so in height is denoted by it.

(c) *Vṛiksha* (Tree).

(d) *Vallī* (Creeper): This has been mentioned in the context of vegetation.

(e) *Gulma* (Shrub/bushes): The *Vṛindāvana* has been designated as the playground of *Radha Devi* (RAD., last sentence). Likewise, *Naimiṣāraṇya* was famous in ancient times as hermitage of great seers (NU., *Prathamopadeśaḥ* 1).

(f) *Kaṇda* (Bulb): There appears to be a single allusion to this.

(g) *Kaṇtaka* (Thorn): In regard to *rudrāksha* it is said that the same is of the superior quality if it is having no thorn.

The solitary aquatic plant alluded to is *Kamala* (lotus). In these two reference, it has been pointed out that leaves of lotus do not absorb water to get damp or muḍdy in contact with mud. The blue lotus has also been noticed.

Among tall tress, one comes across *Nimba—Azadirachta Indica* (M., 5.140). During religious worship or observance, *Pippala! Aśvattha-Ficus Religiosa* (CHH., 8.5.3), as implied in its botancial name, is of special significance. *Piṣapala* or fruit of was eaten. *Audumbara—Ficus Glomerata* may be considered as falling in this foregoing category. *Vṛta or Nyagrodhya (Ficus Bengalensis)* seems to be mentioned

in particular for many seeds in its fruit. *Nyahgrodha*, meaning growing downwards, has been gleaned from only a single Upaniṣad (DA., 12). A few among remaining trees are (1) *Śala-Vatica Robusta; (2) Dāru (Devadāra)—Pinus Indicus* (GAR., SA., p. 414); (3) (*Tata/ Tāḍa*)— *Phoenix Dactylitera*. Belonging to species of palms (M., 5.140); (4) Tāmalaka-Bamibusa (Ibid); (5) Bilva or *Bela-Aegle Marmelos* (ARU., 5); (6)*Palāśa-Butea Frondosa* (CHH., 5.2.3); (7) *Rudrāksha-Elaeocarpus Ganitrus; (8)Candana-Sirium Myrtifoliuum* (9) *Āmra -Mangifera Indica; (10) Dhātriphala*—the fruit of *Emblica Officinalis; Dāvānala* and *Dāvāgni*, meaning forest fires, have been recorded as destroying vegetation cover.

To emphasize the significance to *Tulasī* an independent Upanisad entitled *Tulsyupaniṣad* has been deveoted to it *Vṛindāvana* has been designated as its original habitat.

Rudrāksha Trees bear beeds of four kinds: (1) *Brāhmaṇa* (white), (2)*Kshatriya* (red), (3) *Vaiśya* (Yellow), and (4) *Śūdra* (black).

Tāmbūla—Piper Betel or chewing leaves: In India, the practice of chewing *pāna* is coming down to us since ancient times. Betel leaves are raised in special types of gardens.

Flowers

Flowers are mentioned under three synonyms as under:

(1) *Puṣpa:* The specific allusion to *gandhapuṣpa* (fragrant flower) by implication suggests the existence of non-fragrant flowers also.
(2) *Sumana*,
(3) *Kusumar.*

The term, *Sṛinkā*, (many-fold flowers) is indicative of flowers of single-fold (KAT., 1.1.16). *Raktapuṣpa*, red flowers, (GAN., 12), not unlike the lotus flower, denotes flowers of various colours (BRA.,*Prathama Brāhmaṇa*). *Puṣpagandha* (sent of flowers), evidently implies flowers with scent. Perhaps, the lotus and its flowers were most widely known, as evidenced by many cited references under various appellations such as:

(1) *Kamala;*
(2) *Puṣkara;*
(3) *Padma;*
(4) *Padmaka;*
(5) *Paṅkaja;* Literally meaning growing in mud or *paṅka*.
(6) *Saruha;*
(7) *Sarabha;*
(8) *Abja*

Manifestly, the lotus reminds one of the regions of abundant stagnant bodies of water, associated with plenty of rainfall and impervious bed rock to retain water over it and able to generate mud for the growth of the plant. The lotus flowers were and are of various colours of which white, blue, red, and golden (yellow) are categorically mentioned as below:

(a) *Pundarika*: White lotus.
(b) *Nilotpala*: Blue lotus; *Puskara* is also blue lotus, (see *Supra*).
(c) *Raktotpala*: Red lotus.
(d) *Hemāmbuja*: Golden Yellow lotus.

Mahāpadma, meaning big lotus, is suggestive of small and medium sized flower of the species. The acquaintance with various parts of the lotus plant, viz., *Padmapatra; Padmakośa* cell of the lotus; *Mṛiṇāla / Mṛiṇālatantu*, fibrous roots of the lotus plant ; *Padmasūtra*, thread of the lotus plant (T., 67) and *Padmaraja*, pollen of the lotus.

In other flowers rank *Kadalī, Flos Reginae; Champaka or Champā;* white *Kunda or Kundenu*, a kind of jasmine (GAR., 8), and *Kadamba* or ball-like flowers. Unlike the lotus plant, other flowers plants are trees are non-aquatic, growing in gardens and forsts.

Fruit-bearing Vegetation

In the logical sequence to flowering plants follows fruit-bearing vegetation. The word *phala* (fruit) needs to be noticed first. *Jambīra* (lemon), belonging to the citron group *Āmalakā*, falling in Emblica family or popularly known as *Anvala* and also known by its alternative name as *Dhātṛiphala* (R., 8) and *Bilva*, commonly known as *Bela*, *Aegal Marmelos* are reputed to be in use for medical purposes. *Badarīphala*, *Zizyphus Jujuba*, is commonly known as *bera* and is an exception to the foregoing fruits.

Besides fruits, even leaves of some species of vegetation are in common use still today. *Tāmbūla*, *Piper Betel* deserves a specific mention here whose leaves are chewed after meals in India but are forbidden to ascetics or those leading a spiritual life which they opt after their retirement from house-holders life.

Some Species of Trees

Flowers, fruits stems, branches, roots, bulbs and seeds of various species of vegetation are not directly and explicitly mentioned, though the word *mūla* (root) appears at least once. *Palāśa (Butea Frondosa)* seems to have been in use. Some forest trees, it may be safely conjectured yielded useful products.

Now, it may be advisable to examine some of the uses of forest trees. (*Tāda or Tāla); Phoenix Dactyletera; Vanśa; Shorea Robusta; Śala: Vatica Robusta* etc. have been mentioned but use other trees are not specified anywhere. *Rudrāksha: Elaeocarpus Gonitrus* yields hard nuts.

It will do well to bear in mind the geographic distribution of *Jambīra* (lemon), *Kadamba*, *Śāla* and *Vanśa* in the regions of *Mahendra*, *Malaya* and *Sahya* mountains. Banole has been considered to be *Bera—Zizyphus Jujuba* by the translator.

Apte's Sanskrit-English Dictionary does not contain this word. According to the translator, *Dvāvādau* is known as *Baheḍa* in Hindi which is equivalent to *Myrabolesm Phyllanthus Emblica*. This word is also not incorporated in the above-mentioned dictionary. *Agaru*, *Aquilaria Agallocha*, and *Soma* from which *Somarasa* is obtained round off the list of useful trees mentioned in Upaniṣads.

Forest Produce

We shall mention only those in this respect which have remained unnoticed in *Supra*. A brief areal distributional pattern of some forest vegetation has been also examined above. Among it, we have already referred to bamboos. However, honey has been omitted above.

Woods of every-day use could be procured from forests, known by several appellations: (1) *Indhaṇa* (fuel) for domestic use (2) *Araṇi* or fuel; (3)*Samidhā* as sacrificial wood; (4)*Kāṣṭha* literally meaning wood; etc. In addition to this, ascetics procured walking staff (TUK., 1) usually from *Palaśa, Butea Frondosa; Bilva, Aegle Marmelos; Gulara, Ficus Glomerata* and so on. Perhaps, staff of wood was used for supporting oneself while walking. *Audumbara daṇḍa* is explicitly mentioned for making rods. *Kāṣṭha daṇḍa* obviously signifies rods of wood.

The provision of fodder is of interest in relation to domestication of certain animals. Seats or mats, made out of grass, *Darbhāsana*, might have been in common use. Besides wood, leaves, (*paraṇa*) roots (*mūlka*), or (*Mūla*), sap of vegetation (rasa) might have been used for various purposes. There were groves of trees, possibly for recreational purposes.

The numerous references to *auṣadhi* (medicines) can easily lend support to the extensive use of medicines. *Tṛitīya*

Khanḍa; Ibdi., These can be easily further multiplied. 'Groves of *Bilva*' have been mentioned *Piṣpalaśa* (fruit of Pippala trees) is eaten by birds.

The extensive list of cited allusions to medicines manifests the close study and knowledge of medicines and medical remedies for the upkeep of human health. *Auṣadhirasa*, the essence of medicine (chemico-therapy), seems to be quite well-advanced. From various terms scattered throughout Upaniṣads, it may be summarised that the natural items of medicines seem to have been processed for oral administration, *e.g.*, *Thūkaḍa (Snhi)* (YO., 2.29). It hardly beeds to multiply any additional citations on medicine, *Vanauṣadhi* (forest medicine) is worth remembering in this context (SI., 15). Similarly, one's attention may be easily attracted by the term *'Auṣadhi vanaspatayo'* (medical vegetation, literally). At tne end, we may also refer to *Guñjā*, *Abrus Precatorius* which is highly poisonous. Some medical herbs were also in use for surgical wounds.

Cultivated Vegetation

So far, we have taken stock of natural vegetation. We shall do well to turn attention to agricultural crops raised by cultivation. The relevant references to grains have been listed below. *Dhānya* is the Sanskrit equivalent for grains, used mostly for human consumption (SAN., 1.2). The following four extracts incorporate some cultivated crops:

(1) "*Brthervā yāvadvā sarṣapādvā śyāmākataṇḍulā*' That is, *Brithi* (rice), barley, mustard, śyāmākataṇḍulā (rice)."

(2) "...*Brihiyavā auṣadhivanaspatayastilamāṣā....*" "Rice, barley, medical herbs sesamum, *Urada*, etc,

(3) "....brīhiyavāstilamāṣaṇuriyango godhūmāśca masūrāśca khalvāsca...Khala Kutaśka "....Rice and barley, sesamum and beans, millets and panic seeds and wheat, and lentils and pulses and vetches".

(4) "....*godhūmamudgaśālya*...., "....Wheat, *mūnga* and rice...."

The grains, embodied in Upanisads, may be listed as follows:

(1) Godhūma: Wheat, *Triticum Vulgare.*
(2) *Brihi:* Rice, *Oryza Sativa.*
(3) *Śyāmalaka Taṇḍula:* Wild rice/self grown rice, *Oryza Fatua.*
(4) *Taṇḍula:* Rice-after threshing and winnowing-*Oryza Sativa.*
(5) *Yava:* Barley, *Mordeum Vulgare.*

The list of pulses has been compiled as given below:

(1) *Māṣa:* A bean, *Phaseolus Radiatus.*
(2) *Masūra: Ervum Hirustum.*
(3) *Caṇaka:* Chana, *Cicer Abientimum*—known as chick-pea or Bengal Gram.
(4) *Mudga:* Munga, *Phaseolus Mungo.*
(5) *Kula:* A kind of pulse.

Oil-seeds are mentioned as follows:

(1) *Tila:* Sesamum, *Sesamum Indicum.*
(2) *Sarṣapa:* Sarson, mustard-seed, *Brassica Campesteris.*
(3) *Atasi: Alasi*, linseed-oil *Linum Usitatissimum:*
It may be borne in mind that the fibres of the *Atasi* plant is used for the manufacture of cloth, called *Kshauma* in Sanskrit which can be identified with linen. "There is a direct reference to *Kshauma* in *Rudrākshajābālopaniṣad* at *Śloka* No. 15.
(4) *Eraṇḍa: Aṇḍi*, Castor, *Ricinum Communis* or Palma Christi.

Minor grains or crops are mentioned as given below:

(1) *Prakaṅgu*: Millets
(2) *Khalva:*
(3) *Khala:*

(4) *Kula:*

Flavouring substances are two and they are as follows:

(1) *Lasuna*: Garlic
(2) *Śleṣmātaka: Ginger, Zingiber Officinale*

Vegetables are found as follows:

(1) *Palāṇdu*: Onions,. *Allam Cepa*
(2) *Śigru*: Drumsticks.
(3) *Viḍvarāha*: A sort of vegetable.
(4) *Arvalāba*: Gourd.

Fibres are three in number.

(1) *Tantu* (fibre) has been explicitly mentioned.
(2) *Tūla*: Cotton, *Gossypium*.
(3) *Atasī*: Alasī (D., 30).

Others are given as under:

(1) *Ikshu: Sugar-cane, Saccharum Officinale Pauṇḍraka.*
(2) *Tāmbūla:* Betel leaf. This may be considered as an allied cultivated creeper. Its leaves are chewed in India since times immemorial. It is a garden creeper.

Conclusion

The large variety of natural species in forests and cultivated crops in arable lands lends support to the valid conclusion that the country has different climatic conditions in its various parts. In *Supra*, climatic feature have been mentioned *in passim*. Rice, for example, is a crop of heavy rainfall as contrasted with barley and wheat sown in regions of moderate rainfall.

Animal Life

After dwelling on the surface of the earth, climate, vegetation and agriculture, in sequence follows the discussion animal life. In general, rainfed natural vegetation and cultivated support and protect bodies of animals and human beings. Some animals feed on other animals. In the universe, animals are reckoned to be *care*, i.e. mobile.

The words *bhūta* (creature) in singular and *bhūtāni* (creatures) in plural tend to demonstrate the animal realm *in toto*. However, some other alternatives such as *Prajā*, *Jantu* and *Jīvajantavaḥ* (living creatures) are also used (KAT., 1.2.20). Lastly, the English translators have indicated a marked preference for the word 'creature' to express the relative Sanskrit words.

Life Forms

The three-fold origins of life-forms are eggs, uterus, and seeds the last-named origin vegetation falls. However, a four-fold origin of life-forms also obtains as follows:

(a) Seeds, eggs, ulerus and sweat.
(b) Eggs, sweat, seeds and uterus.

At some other places life-forms incorporated in Upaniṣads are:

(a) ....herb, forest (*Vanaspati*), plants, insects, flies, ants.
(b) ....man, creatures, birds, herbs, vegetation wild animals, insects, gnats, flies, ants....

From a comparative study of the above lists, it emerges that both vegetation and creatures are mentioned in them. The last is enlightening in indicating man, bird, and wild animals (beasts of prey) in addition to other creatures. A few allusions may be culled out on the origins of life-forms: (a) *Udbhija*—Sprung up from seeds. This specifically refers to plant-life; (b) *Aṇḍaja*—Born from egg (Ibid); *Svedaja* - Born from uterus.

From the mention of wild animals (beasts of prey), one can draw the inference that there were domesticated and tamed animals too. *Paśu* is a quite frequently used generic term for animals and beasts meaning of *pasu* as cattle can be made out from the specific context in which it is used. Beasts of forests in the afternoon or before the sun-set are at large. "Therefore, when they see a man, they approach

(*upadravanti*) a hiding place as their holeṣ.

Animal Taxonomy

At this juncture, an attempt may be made at a broad and general taxonomy of animals, based on the data, available in Upaniṣads:

(1) (a) Biped (*dvipada*) and (b) Quardruped (*Catuṣpāda*) *Catuspada* is explicity mentioned as well as *dvipāda*.
(2) (a) Wild and (b) Domesticated: Animals that live in forests and those that are kept at home.
All animals living in forests are not beasts of prey—*śvāpada*.
(3) (a) Land and (b) Aquatic (Denizens of water).
(4) Bovine (Cattle).
(5) Ovine (Goat, Sheep, etc.).
(6) Feline (Cat family: tiger, lion, etc.).
(7) Reptiles (Serpent family).
(8) Rodents (Rat family).
(9) Aves (Bird family).
(10) (a) Herbivorous (feeding on vegetation).
(b) Carnivorous (feeding on flesh and non-vegetarian products).
(11) (a) Wooly/Hairy (TAIT., *Sikshāvalli*, 4).
(b) Non-wooly/Non-hairy.
(12) Insects.
(13) (a) Sacrificial (*Yajña paśu*) and (b)Non-sacrificial animals. If the translator's interpretation be correct, this has to be treated as a special category in the contemporary society.

This taxonomical grouping of animals can hardly claim to be scientific in strict sense. It can suit the purpose of the present exposition. However, spatially speaking, animals fall into denizens of (a) Sky (birds); (b) Arable land, in association with human beings mostly; (c) Forests (wild); (d) Water (fish, frog, turtle, etc.), and (e) Both land and water.

Evidently, *paśu* is a specific term for cattle which occurs with well-marked frequency and Manu a for man is embodied in Upaniṣads

Cattle

Domesticated animals play a vital role in the everyday life of human beings whereas some of wild animals are also tamed or else encountered occasionally in deep forests. Man claims descents from monkey, whose names in Sanskrit occur as *plavaga* and *vānara* and female monkey is referred to as *markaṭikā*. But we have to turn our attention to cattle. In Upaniṣadic and Purāṇic times, cow had continued to be of an outstanding significance in everyday life. There are numerous references to milk, cow-dung, urine, etc. of cattle in Upaniṣads. Bulls were employed for ploughing fields and pulling carts in those days. References, pertaining to cows, under various nomenclatures, may be cited for assessing their significance.

(1) (a) *Gau*,
(b) *Dhenu*,
(c) *Revatī*,

The allusion to a thousand cows in reward serves to reveal their significance.

In milch-cow or *dogdhrī* is implicit the indication of dry cows or those unable to yield milk. A reference is a sad commentary on bony and weak cows in a herd of numerous ones. This speaks of indifferences with which they were tended. Species of cows have also been elaborated.

(2) *Vṛiṣabha* (Bullock/Bull) has relatively less numerous references than those of cows. They are as follows:
(a) *Vṛiṣa*.
(b) *Vṛiṣabha*
(c) *Govatsa* (Calf) is also discerned in Upaniṣads.

Cows of three colours, namely, *kapila* (tawny), *dhavalā* (white) and *alame* (gray) may be of interest to the reader. Mahadhenu, big cow (MAI., Prathama Prapāṭhaka, 5) and *Mahāvṛiṣa*, large bull

point indirectly to small sized cows and bulls respectively. *Vatsa*, calf is intimately associated with the cow. *Gomaya*, cow-dung is indicative of extensive use for domestic purposes. Gobhūmi (literally, land of cows) seems to be a separate preserve of land for herds of cows.

(3) *Mahiṣa*.

Other Livestock

(1) (a) *Aśva* (Horse): *Duṣṭāśva* has a direct reference to *Sadaśva* (good-tempered horse) (KAT., 1.36). Car-horses demonstrate has use of horse for harnessing to a chariot *Rathayoga* serves to endorse the above statement. *Saptāśvarathina* bears evidence to yolking several horses to a chariot. In the basin of the Sindhu (Indus) river well-framed fine horses known as *Saindhavaḥ* are obtained. *Haya* (Horse) as an alternative is also noticed in some Upaniṣads *Suhaya*, perhaps, refers to a powerful horse. Other references to the horse-family are:

(b) *Vadvā* (Mare)

(2) (a) *Gardabha* (Male Donkey);

(b) *Gardabhī* (Female Donkey);

(3) (a) (i)*Aśvatara*.

(b) (i) *Aśvatari*

(ii) *Niṣkamaśtara* (Mule).

Other quadrupeds noticed in Upanisads are:

(1) (a) *Aja* (He-goat).
(b) *Ajā* (She-goat).

(2) *Meṣa*, *Meṣi* (Lamb Eve).

(3) Dog:
(a) *Kūkura*.
(b) *Śvāna*.
(c) *Kukula*
(d) *Śva*.
(e) *Kauhyaka*.

(4) (a) *Mārjāra:* (Cat):
(b) *Dhātārchhara* (Cat):

(5) *Muṣaka* (Rat) may be mentioned as a prey of the cat.

(6) (a)*Varāha* (Pig/Boar);
(b) *Sūkara* (Pig/Boar); Female pig is referred to as:
(c) *Sūkari:*

(7) (a)*Hariṇa* (Deer):
(b) *Mṛiga* (Deer):. This word is indivisibly associated with *Mrigatriṣnā* or mirage in the desert wilderness *Mriga* is also a common noun, equivalent to *Paśu* or animal. *Sāraṅga (citala)* belongs to the family to deer.

(8) *Uṣṭra* (Camel):

(9) *Mātaṅga/Gaja/Hastin* (Elephant). Though domesticated, the elephant is found wild in forest thicknesses. The female of elephant is referred to as *Hastinī* (Su., I).
(a) *Mātaṅga:*
(b) *Gaja:*
(c) *Hastinī:*

There are two other synonyms in Sanskrit for the elephant:
(d) *Śarabha;*
(e) *Nāga:*

A separate Upaniṣad, entitled *Śarabhopaniṣad* has to be particularly seen

Wild Beasts

After this, ones attention may be drawn to beasts of prey. Among these the principal ones are lions and tigers.

(1) *Sinha* (Lion): *Sinho uīratamaḥ* conveys the import of this animal being of the highest prowess among animals. It is, therefore, entitled as *Kesarī* Likewise, *Sinhendra* connotes the lord of lions.

(2) (a) *Vyāghra* (Tiger):
(b) *Śardūla* (Tiger).

We may now turn attention to the family of the dog:

(1) *Vṛika* (Jackal):

(2) *Jambūka* (Jackal).

Reptiles (*Dandaśūka*, Stinging creature).

(1) *Sarpa* (Serpent): It is a crawling

creature, living in depressions, crevices, among vegetation, on trees, in water-river, well, tank, lake etc. and elsewhere. Other references are cited below:

(2) *Bhujaṅga:* Another word for serpent in Sanskrit. the female of *bhujanga* is called *bhujaṅgi.*

(3) *Nāga* (Cobra);

(4) *Faṇindra:* Literally means the lord among the hooded snakes. Does it also refer to the King Cobra? *Duṣṭanāga* implies a vile Cobra. *Mahānāga* suggests that there were small cobras. *Seṣanāga* is the mythological cobra on whose hood the earth is supposed to rest.

(5) *Karkota:* One of the eight varieties of cobras.

(6) *Ajagara (Python Melorus)*;

(7) *Nāgaka* (Nāgapati/Nāgasvāmi): It is considered to be the lord of serpents.

(8) *Ahi*

The casting off of the slough by snake has been observed and recorded.

There is a pointed reference to the person, called *Sarpavid* conversant with the deep knowledge of snakes.

Two small-sized animals may be added to the enumerated list. *Kumūṣikā* or ill-tempered she-rat, followed by *Kṛikalāsa* or chameleon.

Apart for the foregoing two creatures, one of the stinging creature, namely *Vṛiścika* (Scorpion) remains to be mentioned. It is a poisonous creature, quite familiar to most of us.

Aquatic Creatures

This discourse on animals may be rounded off with the mention of aquatic creatures, discerned in Upaniṣads as follows:

(1) *Matsya* (Fish): On uttering the term *Mahāmatsya* (big fish) small and medium-sized fishes appear in the focus of our a attention.

(2) (a) *Kūrma* (Tortoise/Turtle): Tortoise can draw in the outer parts of its body.
(b) *Kūrmi* (Female tortoise/turtle) is also mentioned.

(3) (a)*Bheka* (Frog): It is a common and familiar creature which lives on both land and water.
(b) *Maṇḍūka* (Frog) is a synonym for *Bheka*.

(4) *Śankha* (Conch). Derived from shelly creature, living in water.

In a nutshell, Upanisads embody names of commonly acquainted creatures. An endeavour has been made to enumerate them as systematically as possible. Bony cows, cows without their calves and dry cows, the afflicted ones, have been mentioned in passing. The uses of cow-dung cakes, ashes of the cakes, salts obtained from dung and urine (?), horns, etc. have also been listed. The consumptions of beef (*Gomānsa*) was forbidden to ascetics and those observing religious vows.

Aves

Pakshī (Birds). After dealing with land and aquatic creatures, we may turn to winged ones, with ability to fly in the sky, which are called *Pakshī* (birds) *Pakshiṇī* recalls to mind a female bird (SANY., 2.45). The other alternative nomenclatures are as follows:

(a) *Khaga: Khagaṇḍa* refers to an egg of the bird. *Mahākhaga* signifies a big bird and is suggestive of birds of varied sizes.
(b) *Vihaga:*
(c) *Vāya*
(d) *Suparṇa* (Strong/powerful winged): The female counterpart is known as *Suparna.*
(e) *Pataṅga.*
(f) *Śakuni.*

Hansa is also used as generic term for

the Aves family. The different species of birds, discerned in Upaniṣads, are set forth below:

(1) *Śyena* (Hawk):
The epithet *Suparṇa* added to *Śyena*, conveys the sense that it has powerful wings to fly high in the sky.

(2) *Garuḍa* is the king of birds and vehicle of Viṣṇu. An Upaniṣad has been composed in the honour of *Garuda* entitled *Garuḍopaniṣad*. In *Mahāgaruḍa* it is implicit that small sized *Garuḍas* also exist. *Tārkshya* is alternative term for *Garuḍa*. *Garuḍa* has been designated as *Pakshīnkra or Indra* (Lord) among birds .

(3) *Gṛidhra* (Vulture). The synonym for *Gṛidhra* is also *Śakuni*.

(4) *Krauñca (Sārasa)* is the Indian crane. *Baka* is another synonym for *Krauñca*.

(5) *Kukkuṭa* (Hen).

(6) *Kāka* (Crow).

(7) *Ulūka* (Owl).

(8) *Nīlagrīva* or (*Nīlakaṇṭha*). Blue-necked Jay.

(9) *Śikhaṇḍin* (Peacock) means literally bearing a tuft (NI., *Prathama Khaṇḍa; Dvitīya Khaṇḍa)*.

(10) *Gulika* (Sparrow).

(11) *Śuka* (SUK., the title of the Upaniṣhad): The parrot is described as green in colour with red eyes—*Harito-lohitāksha*.

(12) *Vaṭahāṇḍira* (Vampire).

(13) *Kulāya* (Cuckoo).

(14) *Hansa* (Swan):

(15) *Madgu* (Driver bird).

Three Upaniṣads have been devoted individually to *Garuḍa (Garuḍopaniṣad)*, *Hansa (Hansopaniṣad)* and *Śuka* (*Śukarahasyopaniṣad)*.

In conclusion, it may be safely said that except for *Madgu* (Driver-bird), the names of birds, occurring in Upaniṣads, are commonly familiar in general.

Insects

Kīṭa, Kīṭaka, Pataṅga, etc. It will do well to take notice of tiny creatures which cover:

(1) *Kīṭa* (Insect)

(2) *Kītaka* (Worm).

(3) *Pataṅga* Tiny creatures able to fly.

(4) *Makshikā* (Fly). It is a common noun for tiny creatures with ability to fly. Microscopic creatures are named as *Jantu*. Honey bee has numerous allusions scattered far and wide in Upaniṣads. CHH., 3.5.1; SAN., 2.84). The substitute for this is also *Makaranda*.

(5) *Kośakāra* (Silk worm).

(6) *Urnana* (Spider): Also known as *Tantunābha* and *Latikā*.

(7) *Khadyota* (Fire fly, *Jūganu* in Hindi).

(8) *Maśaka* (Mosquito).

(9) *Makarand* (A large black bee): *Bhramarakīṭaka* is its synonym.

(10) *Madhumakshikā* and *Madhukṛita:* stand for honey bee.

(11) *Matkuṇa*.

(12) *Pipīlikam* (Ant): Related ant hills are also alluded to as *Valmīka*.

(13) *Indragopa* (Beatle);

(14) *Śarabha* (Locust?)

(15) *Gokāma* (Caterpillar):

(16) *Kṛimi* (Worm):

(17) *Plaviṇa* (Gnat).

(18) *Danśa* (Stinging worms/insects)?

Animal Products

We shall, now, enumerate animal products. At the outset, the products obtained from the cow may be compiled. The directly available product is milk with various names:

(1) (a) *Dugdha*
(b) *Kshira*
(c) *Paya:*
(d) *Raya:* "*Rayo madhye yatha*

Ghṛitam" "just as *ghee* (Clarified butter) is in milk"

We may, now, turn to milk-products:

(2) *Dadhi* (Curd).

(3) *Ghee* (Clarified butter) has alternative terms such as *Ghṛita, Ajya, Sarpis:* but they have different shades of meaning:
  (a) *Ghṛitam.*
  (b) *Ajya*
  (c) *Sarpis:*

Ghee was not only consumed as an item of diet but was also used on the occasion of religious worship. The liquid form of this was known as *Ājya* and on solidification it was called *Ghṛita.*

Other animal products encompass:
  (4) (a)*Aṇḍa* (Egg).
  (b) *Khagaṇḍa* (Egg of a bird)
  (5) Meat of animals and also beef.
  (6) *Madhu* (Honey).

The widely mentioned honey had been in daily use.

The aforesaid products are obtained from animals but some of them were considered taboo on the occasion of religious vows.

There references are cited below:
  (a) *Meat:*
  (b) *Beef:*

The eating of beef was thought highly condemnable for those who had opted *Samnyāsa* and were called to be ascetics. They were advised to consider it as the urine of a dog; honey as wine; oil as the urine of a pig. Edibles with garlic, *urada (Phraleclus Radiatus)* and its products etc. were also forbidden. It cannot be understood why nutritious diet was forbidden to the ascetics. Amidst animal products ranked eggs of birds. Apart from all these, *carma* (animal skin) was of everyday use. *Krisṇājina* (deer skin) and *Ajinavāsa* (clad in deer skin) speak of the use of leather and skin for bodily covering.

Animals not only held a prominent place in the overall scheme of the nature, some of them also provided food as well as body coverings against the rigours of weather conditions.

Prashna-Upaniṣad

May our ears hear the good. Lords! inspiration of sacrifice! May our eyes see the good. May we serve him with the whole strength of our body. May we, all our life, carry out his will. May peace and peace be everywhere.

Welcome to the Lord!

Sukeshā Bhāradwāja, Satyākama Shaibya, Souryāyanee Gārgya, Kousalya Āshwalāyana, Bhārgawa Waidarbhee and Kabandhee Kātyāyana, students and devotees, brought their offerings and their faith to Sage Pippalāda.

The Sage said: 'Stay with me for a year, practise faith, austerity, continence; then ask what questions you like.

At the end of a year Kabandhee Kātyāyana said: 'Lord! Who created all things?'

The Sage said: 'The Creator, His mind's eye on the world made a couple in meditation, life and matter, thinking they would do the rest.

'Sun in life. Moon matter; World moveable and immoveable is matter, all shape matter.'

'The sun looks into the east, then into the other quarters, then above and below, enlivening, lighting.

'He, all-prevalent life, first shows himself as Light. Here is my authority:

"The wise know Him, the all pervading, all illuminating, all knowing, the One, upholder of all, and say that He rises as the sun that He may warm everything, go into everything, its particular life."

'The year is the Creator— There are two paths, the southern and the northern. Those that are content with alms-giving and ritual preferring the life of the family, go to their ancestors by the southern path,

attain the lunar world and are born again. All there is matter.

But those who seek the Self through austerity, continence, faith, knowledge, go by the northern path, attain the solar world. It is living, immortal, beyond fear; it is the goal. Once there, there is no return. It is the law. Here is my authority:

"Some call the sun our protector, with five seasons or feet, twelve moons or bodies, who lives beyond the sky and sends the rain. Others call Him the year, reckoner of time, who rides in the chariot of seven colours or seven horses, and of six wheels considering that the number of seasons."

'The month too is the Creator, its bright half is life, its dark half matter. Wise couple men perform their rituals in the bright half; fools in the dark.

'The round of day and night is the Creator; day life, night matter. Those that couple with a woman by day, waste life; those that couple by night, preserve it.

'Food is the Creator. Food makes the seed; all things are form seed.

'Those who obey God as Creator, get all that life and matter can give. Those who practise austerity, continence, veracity go beyond these into Heaven.

'They that are neither crooked, nor hypocritical, nor lying, go beyond into pure Heaven.'

Bhārgawa Waidarbhee asked: 'Lord! What powers have knit the body? What powers give it life? Which is the greatest?'

The Sage said: 'The powers are: air: fire, water, earth, speech, mind, light, hearing. All these said aloud that they had knit the body.

'Life, greater than these, said: you deceive yourselves. It is I alone, dividing myself into five streams, knit and enliven the body. But they would not believe.

'Life, to vindicate himself, rose as through he wanted to leave the body. But as he rose, others knew that they too must rise. When he returned they returned. As bees follow their queen when she goes out; return when she returns; speech, mind, light, hearing returned: they began to praise life.

'Life burns in the fire, shines in the Sun, Rain, cloud, air, earth, are life. Matter is life. All that has shape or no shape is life. Life is immortality.

'Everything is fixed in lie, as are spokes in the hub of a wheel—the three Wedas, all sacrifices, all soldiers, all priests.

'Life, Lord of Creation, moving in the womb, there bringing yourself to birth, master of the five streams! All things offer you their tribute.

'You carry the offerings to the gods and the fathers; even breath and sense your handiwork.

'Life! Creator, Protector, Destroyer! Sun in heavenly circuit! Master of stars!

'Pour down the rain, let all things find their food, thrive, rejoice.

'Life itself? Purity itself! Fire itself, Eater, Master! All the world your food, Father in Heaven!

'May your body be in our speech, hearing, sight, mind, make us lucky, and never forsake us.

'May Life, Master of the three worlds, protect us as a mother protects her children. Grant us wisdom, grant us luck.'

Kousalya Āshwalāyana asked: 'Lord! when does life begin; how does it get into the body; how does it life there after dividing itself; how does it get out of the body; how does it support all that is outside, all that is inside?'

The Sage said: 'You ask weighty questions: you dig into the root. Here is my answer:

'Life falls from Self as shadow falls from man. Life and Self are interwoven, but Life comes into the body that the desires of the mind may be satisfied.

'As the king portions out his kingdom under different officials, life portions out the body under five living streams.

'The organs of excretion and generation under the downward stream Apāna; eye, ear, where He lives himself under Prāna, which passes out through mouth and nose; the middle of the body under the equalising stream Samāna, distributor of food, kindler of the seven flames.

'Self lives in the heart. There are a hundred and one arteries, from every artery start one hundred veins, from every vein seventy-two thousand smaller veins-all these He has put under the diffusing stream Wyāna.

'Climbing through one of these the upward stream Udāna leads the meritorious man to his reward; the sinful man to his punishment; if his merit and demerit are mixed, back to the world.

'Rising sun is the symbol of life; sun maintains Prāna of the eye; earth draws down Apāna; air, filler of all, maintains Samāna; wind, Wyāna.

'Light maintains Udāna. When that light is out, sense dissolves in mind, man is born again.

'Udāna united to the minds desire at the moment of death, returns of Life, and Life, Udāna lighting the way, brings the soul to whatever place it deserves.

'The man who knows this, knows the meaning of life; his children are never lost. Here is my authority:

"He who knows the source and power of Life, how it enters, where it lives, how it divides itself into five, how it is related to the Self, attains immortality; yes, attains immortality."

Souryāyanee Gārgya asked: 'Lord! Who in mans body wakes, sleeps, dreams, enjoys? On whom do these depend?'

The Sage said: 'As the rays of the setting sun gather themselves up into his orb to come out again at sunrise, so the sense gather themselves up into the mind, master of them all. Therefore, when a man does not hear, see, touch, small, taste, speak, receive, give, move, enjoy, we say that he sleeps.

'Only the living fires are then awake. The living fire Apāna corresponds to the everlasting sacrificial Gārhapatya fire of the householder; the living fire Wyāna corresponds to the sacrificial Anwār-hapachan fire that faces south and the southern path; the living fire Prāna, lit from the fire Apāna, corresponds to the sacrificial Āhawaneeya, fire lit from the everlasting Gārhapatya fire that faces east and the rising sun.

'The living fire Samāna is called the equalising fire, because it balances those oblations, the outgoing and the incoming breath. Mind is the sacrificer. The reward of the sacrifice is the living fire Udana, the deep sleep that again and again leads mind to Self.

'The dreaming mind enjoys its greatness. What it has seen it sees again; what it has heard it hears again; what it has enjoyed in different countries and climates it enjoys again. Whatever is seen, unseen, heard, unheard, enjoyed, unenjoyed, real, unreal, here and there, it knows; it known everything.

'When mind is lost in the light of the Self, it dreams no more; still in the body it is lost in that happiness.

'My son! All things fly to the Self, as birds fly to the tree for rest.

'Earth, its quality of scent; water, its quality of taste; light, its quality of beauty; wind, its quality of touch; air, its quality of sound; eye, what it sees; ear, what it hears; nose, what it smells, tongue, what it tastes; skin, what it touches; voice, what it says; hand, what they handle; generation, what incites it; excretion, what is excreted; feet, what they tread upon;

mind, what it imagines; intellect, what it discriminates; pride, what swells it; thought, what is thought; light, what is lit; life, what depends upon it; all these fly towards the Self.

'This is the Self who sees, touches, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, discriminates, acts. The personal self and the ultimate imperishable, impersonal Self, are one.

'My son! Who knows the impersonal Self, wherein the personal self, the living fires, senses, elements live, he knows all; lives in all. Here in my authority:

' "He who finds the imperishable Being where the individual self, sense, vitality and elements live, he knows all; pervades all." '

Satyakāma Shaibya asked: 'Lord! Where does the man go after his life, if he meditates on Ôm all his life?

The Sage said: 'Ôm is the conditioned and the unconditioned Spirit. The wise man with its help alone attains the one or the other.

'If he meditates on the syllable A alone he is soon born again on this earth. If he has chanted the Rig Weda, he is born among men, a great, austere, self-controlled, God-fearing man.

'If he meditates on the two syllables A and U, and has chanted the Yajur-Weda, he goes to the moon and, after enjoying its pleasure, returns to the earth again and again.

'He who meditates on the three syllables A, U, M, as upon God, is joined to the light of the sun. Peeling his evil off, as the snake peels off its skin, he goes through that light, with the help of Sama-Weda chants, to the Kingdom of Heaven, to the God greater then the greatest of all creatures though living in our body. Here is my authority:

' "If man meditates on the three syllables in separation, it is the emblem of mortality; but if he meditate upon all together, inseparable, interdependent, the three conditions, physical, mental, intellectual, reward him; he goes beyond mortality.

' "Rig-Weda brings man to earth, Yajur-Weda sends him to the sky, but only the Seer knows the world which Sāma-Weda brings. The wise man with the help of Ôm goes there, beyond decay, death, fear; attains peace." '

Sukeshā Bhāradwāja said : 'Lord! I was asked this question by Hiranyanābha, Prince of Koasala: "Bhāradwaja! Do you know God and his sixteen phases?' —I said to the young man: "I do not. I will not lie about it, for I know what happens to the liar. If I did, I would tell you." The Prince mounted his chariot, and went away without a word. Now I ask: "Where is that God?"

The Sage said: 'My son. that God and his sixteen phases are in this body.

'God thought to himself: "What is that which compels me to got if it goes, to stay if it stays?"

'He then crated life; from life, knowledge; from knowledge, air; from air, wind; from wind, light; from light, water; from water, earth; from earth, sense; from sense, mind; from mind, food; from food, vigour; from vigour, austerity; from austerity, revelation; from revelation, karma; from karma, world; from world, the names.

'When rivers mingle with the sea they lost their names and shapes and people speak of the sea only, so these sixteen phases, when they mingle with God, lose their names and shapes and people speak of God only; man becomes the phaseless, the timeless. Here is my authority: ' "God is the hub of the wheel where the sixteen phases are the spokes, know Him and die no more,

'What I have told you is all that is known about Spirit.'

They worshipped the Sage and said: 'You are indeed our father. You have led us to the further shore.

'All bow down to you, Great Sage!
Bow down to the Great Sages!'

Prayer and Grace

The social intercourse between the Supreme person and the finite soul is the very nerve of the theistic interpretation of reality. The God of theism is deeply concerned with the amelioration of the human destiny and this is why such a personal relationship strengthened by the divine care for the finite self dispels all his agonies, pains and sights of the heart. In the later Upaniṣads such as the *Śvetāśtvatra*, *Kaṭha* and *Muṇḍaka*, the impersonal recedes into the background. We have here, in all these texts, an ennobling, soul elevating personal character of the Godhead. In the course of the whole of the Upaniṣad we find meditation upon God enjoined as the dispeller of all evils and sorrow. The word meditation itself occurs several times in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. The refrain that by knowing the Lord, the finite soul is freed from all fetters occurs several times but it is worth while to note that knowledge in all such cases connotes meditation which is clear from the two terms occurring side by side. Prayers to God promising untold blessings to man are not uncommon. The worshipper supplicates God not only negatively, not only to make him withdraw from injuring man or beast (Svet., III-6) but positively also for the achievement of worldly ends like children, longevity, cattles and also for entrance into Brahma and endowment with clear intellect. Persons desirous of emancipation seek the shelter of God. The adorable God who abides in oneṣ own thought' is to be worshipped' as the manifold, the origin of all being.'

A very careful and dispassionate reading of the different passages of these later Upaniṣads spires the fact knowledge meditation and prayer are interchangeable expressions and all these connote man's devotional relation with the God-head. Even the word 'bhakti' occurs and worship seems to be not unknown.

The doctrine of grace is of cardinal importance in Rāmānujaṣ theistic philosophy. Although theism lays stress on persistent individual endeavour for the attainment of spiritual consciousness, nevertheless, the final fulfilment itself is reckoned as the outcome of divine grace. It is believed that there is no way other than the Divine Grace for being favoured with the blessed vision. Thus, it is said that God is not attainable either by instruction or by intellectual power or even by much hearing. Only by Him, whom He chooses, is He attained, He reveals Him nature to such a person alone. It is important to remember God and not the individual self is the theme of discussion in all such contexts and of the majority of texts for the passage immediately proceeding it attributes opposite characteristics to Him.

Even the cognition of oneṣ self is the gift of Divine Grace. As the theme of discussions the human self, certainly to cognition of it in this context is acknowledged to be the result of the grace of the Supreme. That the cognition of the self is due to nothing except divine grace is obvious from another similar passage in the *Śvetāśvatara* where too the soul's mysterious nature is emphasised along with its cognition being due to God's grace.

The creaturely character and imperfections and disabilities of the individual souls are outlined and it is said that only 'when favoured by Him (God) 'he'

attains immortality. The doctrine of the grace of God is the characteristic feature of the Upaniṣad.

The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* asserts that one is able to teach the doctrine by the grace of God.

One more thing needs to be emphasised in connection with the theistic thought of the Upaniṣads for without it, it will not be possible to trace the anticipations of Rāmānujaṣ theistic philosophy of religion in early Indian philosophical and religious literature. Rāmānuja, is an ardent advocate of personal immortality. Since the prevailing opinion about the philosophy of the Upaniṣads is that it teaches identity of the human soul with the Universal Self and therefore, the dissolution of the personality and individuality of the finite self in the ultimate state i.e. the state of mokṣa, it seems necessary to examine the correctness of such a view.

Surely, it can no doubt be admitted that although for some thinkers such a view was unassailable and unquestionable, other philosophers, as we have just seen, were confident of the reality and therefore, of the difference of the world and the individual soul from each other. They were no doubt dependent upon Brahman but the dependence was all the more a ground of the distinction of the former from the latter. Consequently, in contexts where it is affirmed that human salvation is a divine gift, one can easily surmise that the human soul must maintain its uniqueness and individuality even in the ultimate state. In the Upaniṣadic eschatology, we certainly find ample evidence for the continued existence of the soul even in the state of *mokṣa*. We have already seen that even in the early Upaniṣads there is unquestionable warrant for the doctrine of personal immortality. As a matter of fact, it was only as a natural consequence of the continuity of the Vedic tradition that personal immortality should have been enthusiastically and vigorously upheld by the Upaniṣadic thinkers.

Thus, wherever in the later, Upaniṣads, we meet with the injunctions for the knowledge of Brahman, we have following closely upon them the description of the state of the experience of communion with God. 'Knowing the bliss of Brahman, he does not fear anything. By knowing him alone, one surpasses death.' 'What sorrow, what delusion is there for him who perceives this unit.? In passages such as these God the object of knowledge is distinguished from the individual self who experiences the bliss of knowing Brahman. The object of religious knowledge is distinct from the subject of it. There is no question of the absorption of the subject of knowledge into the object of it. Radhakrishnan rightly thinks that "the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* makes out that the liberated soul feels his oneness with God but it is not absorbed in the Absolute. It is unity of spirit but not of substance. If Brahman and Ātman are distinct principles, they must continue to retain their independent identity for ever. In the state of *mokṣa* thus, the Jīva is acknowledge to enjoy universal lordship and the accomplishment of all his desires. Mokṣa is a state not only of freedom from all fetters but of constant enjoyment also.

Yama, the God of Death, while teaching Naciketā the mystic symbol, tells us that one who knows it has all his desires fulfilled and become happy in the world of Brahman. The highest reward of the cognition of one's self as the chariot-driver is said to be consisting in dwelling in the abode of Viṣṇu. Those wise persons who succeed in knowing the 'inner soul of all things, the controller of both nature and man are blessed with eternal happiness.

Our brief survey of the Upaniṣads has thus made it plain so far as the development of the theistic thought and the foreshadowings of the religion of Rāmānuja are concerned, that there is absolutely no warrant for the prevailing opinion that the Upaniṣads teach one single doctrine and that doctrine is absolute monism. Modern researches also support the view that the Upaniṣads teach different systems of thought. Broadly speaking, however, we can hazard the conclusion that the view most popularly and passionately held in the time of the Upaniṣads was that linked up with theism of which monism was only a method. We have already seen that monism as a tendency of thought was in vogue during the Vedic period and that theism had already risen into prominence. There were other people, however, endowed with power of abstract thinking, whose privilege, therefore, it was to indulge in abstractions of speculative heights concerning the nature of ultimate reality, thus being the source of those they very conceptions which are cardinal in an absolutistic system of thought. The theistic view or attitude to the world, however, was dominant religious current of thought firmly engrained in the psychological constitution of the people at large. Of course, there was much of anthropomorphism but the fact is undeniable that anthropomorphism is indissolubly bound up with human nature. People could not easily get rid of the religious conception involving humanising tendencies.

That the tendency to humanize gods and establish personal relationship with them was the characteristic feature of the religion of the Vedas and that the performance of sacrifices was only an expression of this personal mode of worship are matters that cannot be disputed. It is difficult to think of the utter extinction of this personal attitude involved in man's attitude to the Deity when strees is laid more and more on the transcendence of God. It has been remarked more than once that monism and monotheism cannot be separated in the manner abstract logic obliges us to do. For the Vedic and Upaniṣadic thinkers there is no dividing like between the two conceptions of ultimate reality. Hence when we pass from the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas to the Upaniṣads, we need not think that the teaching of the latter are diametrically opposed to those of the former and that the personal strain in the Vedic thinking is altogether swept away or eclipsed by the Upaniṣadic thinkers. Theism, Hiriyanna rightly maintains was already in progress in the time of the Upaniṣads (*Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 85). I have already dealt with this problem at some length and have endeavoured my best to show that even the early Upaniṣads do not seem to be antagonistic to theism. There are explicit indications of emphasis on the conception of ultimate reality which is of self-manifesting and self-revealing nature which is the inextricable mark of personality. The early and later Upaniṣads, therefore, can be distinguished from each other only in terms of the degree of emphasis on personality and not in the sense that their views are completely opposed to each other so that in passing from the early to the later Upaniṣads we can say, we are in the process becoming denizens of an altogether different world of thought. Instead thus of saying that in the earlier Upaniṣads we have Absolutism and theism, we could better say, there is *absolutism-theism* or *theism-absolutism*. The growing abstraction perhaps led to the formulation of the Absolutistic and Impersonalistic views. The law of *Ṛta* might

have stimulated thinking of the phenomena of the world in terms of impersonal power. All these circumstances, perhaps contributed to the rapid growth of Absolutism as a closed, self-sufficient school of thought. It cannot be doubted, however, that it was due to the powers of abstract thinking, that it emerged out as a self-sufficient system in later days out of theism which is the core essence of man's confrontation with God. The outcome of all this was that the Upaniṣads began to be understood and interpreted especially from the time of the rise of the Buddhist speculation onwards on absolutistic lines alone. Thinkers, influenced perhaps by the Buddhist thought in their anxiety and zeal for harmonizing the different passages of different imports began to treat the various views as lower and higher approaches to the problem of the ultimate Reality.

From the survey of the Upaniṣadic thought I feel myself driven to the conclusion, that it cannot be denied that theism of the type Rāmānuja advocates was popular with the upaniṣadic thinkers for their emphasis falls invariably on the immanence of God in all forms of beings. There is no doctrine upheld by the Rāmānujist religion that is not in some way or other present in the earlier Upaniṣads. I have called attention to all the relevant texts bearing on Rāmānujas claims to the Upaniṣadic authority for his philosophical and religious doctrines and tenets.

The view that early Upaniṣads are monistic rather than theistic misses the whole point for it may be granted that they are nearer to theism than to absolutism. It cannot be held, therefore, that the majority of the Upaniṣadic passages lend support to Absolutism.

It would certainly be a gross misrepresentation of the teachings of the Upaniṣads if we take them to be argumentative or polemical treatises speaking in the language of logic, whereas as was characteristic of the development of the later Vedāntic doctrine and principles relating to the nature of the world, Man and God, adherence to the strict canons of reasoning led the thinkers to keep them in water-tight compartments.

Modern Studies in the Upanisads

Modern studies in the Upaniṣads have also lent additional support to the view we have taken respecting the nature of their teachings. Radhakrishnan for instance, does not accept the interpretations of the Upaniṣadic philosophy on abstract lines. He discredits Deussen's monistic interpretation of Upaniṣads. The method of abstraction according to him has its own disadvantages. It is true that he interprets the Upaniṣads with the outfit of Hegelian idealism and even contends that the Upaniṣads do not teach abstract monism but rather concrete monism. But we may ask, is not concrete monism only another name of theism? The language and the drift of Radhakrishnan's view in regard to the Upaniṣads reveal that they teach that (i) Brahman is not an abstract unity but an organic whole, the simple identity differentiating Himself in His inseparable diverse manifestations in Man and Nature, (ii) The world is real though its reality is not the same as that of Brahman. In other words, it has an existence distinct from Brahman though just because, in point of fact, it is inseparable from Brahman, it must be supposed to be unreal in the sense that its reality is derived from Him. Unreality of the world is the same as lacking in self-sufficiency. (iii) Brahman is both determinate and indeterminate in the sense while the negative terminology aims at establishing Brahman's freedom from

imperfection, the positive attributes emphasise His perfection. He goes the length of asserting that the impersonality of the Absolute is not its whole significance, that impersonality and personality are not arbitary constructions or fictions of the mind. They are the two ways of looking at the Eternal. The Supreme in its absolute self-existence in Brahman, the Absolute and as the Lord and Creator, containing and controlling all is Iśvara the God.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EDUCATION

Upaniṣadic teachers endeavoured to make their students useful members of the society and to establish a healthy social order for the preservation and furtherance of the cause of learning in the society, and how the ancient educators turned their attention to the development of intellectual climate conducive to cultural pursuit. It is also interesting to note that they did not overlook the impact of psychology in the scheme of their educational structure; rather, along with their metaphysical speculation they developed side by side some principles of psychology as well. When we intend to say something about any system of education, we cannot totally ignore the question of psychology for it is an established fact that any system of education worth its name rests upon some psychological principles no matter how much they are scientifically accurate and sound.

Further, it is interesting to note that the sages of hoary antiquity were conversant with the fundamentals of psychology and they developed some of its principles which proved to be accurate and strikingly modern in its out look. The ancient thinkers anticipated some of the modern theories of educational psychology though there was no experimentation as in modern times. It is our common knowledge that in those days love of learning was a matter of universal interest among the upper classes of the society, particularly among the *Brāhmins*. The considered it to be their religious duty to study the *Vedas* and to keep the light of learning ever burning to dispel nescience and attain the knowledge of the *Self*. In order to achieve this end they were required to undergo a rigorous course of discipline to prepare their minds for the abstinence from all sorts of sensual impulses, to regulate their habits and to inculcate certain attitudes for virtues and wisdom. The regulations laid down for the students otherwise known as *Brahmacārina* have been given in detail in the text books of *Dharmaśāstra* of later days.

The teachers of the *Upaniṣads* helped the young students to acquire creative abilities, thereby enabling them to adjust themselves to social environment effectively, and this could be done, they considered, not by any other means but the evolution of the physic. The educational system succeeded in establishing the relationship between man and man. The teachers of the *Upaniṣads* were fully aware of the psychological reactions that took place in both physical and spiritual out-look of the pupil at the early ages of their lives. The psychological changes leads to spiritual change. They noticed the change and formulated certain steps to make a slow but sure progress till the body and mind are completely transformed in a way conducive to build up their character and personality. The ancient educators were conscious of psychological reactions that might affect the minds of the youth when they passed from boyhood to adolescence in the forms of passion and temptation. They paid sufficient attention to the rational controlling of premature awakening of

sexual inclination in the young and laid great stress on the environmental influence. Therefore, as soon as, the mind began to develop, the child was sent from his home to an environment which could not breed sexual ideas in his mind and where there was little room for the evil thoughts to generate. On the contrary he could breath there freely moral healthy atmosphere leading to unfolding of spiritual life which the educator prized more than anything else. The tranquillity of the environment of the hermit school, the peace that reigned there, and the purity and orderly life of its indwellers were stimulating to the favourable development of a healthy and pure life in the student. Like Rousseau they did not believe in the theory of withdrawal of the child from society and tradition to allow them to grow up in natural freedom.

The *Upaniṣadic* teachers put great emphasis on the mental discipline of the students in their schools which existed primarily as cultural influence. The teachers of the *Muṇḍaka* says that weakness, negligence, falsehood, indulgence of senses are to be purged as a course of disciplinary manner before one desires to pursue for Higher knowledge in life. The cleansing of oneself is difficult because of the inherited tendencies. The old habits are to be controlled, and changed and are to be replaced by new ones. It has been said that without austerity there can be no achievement of knowledge par excellence or perfection of works. The teacher realised physical strength should precede the spiritual strength; physical strength is the basis of building up the spiritual strength.

"So essential was this virtue of continence", remarks Venkateswara, "that Brahmacharya came to denote both continence and discipleship. All our texts agree that discipline is more important than study. Agni granted Gaya the power to know the *Vedas* without study, simply as the result of his austerity, chastity, observances, vows and the grace of the *Gurus*". *Brahmacarya* is the essential preliminary stage through which every student must pass to prepare for higher spirituality. The importance of *brahmacarya* is fully realised by the ancient educators when the character of the students are still in the making when the power of temptation is great and when the power of obstruction in the way is no less significant.

In the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* the teacher clearly states that the control of mind is essential for the cultivation of knowledge. When one is said to have controlled his mind (which is primary) the control of other sense organs becomes self-evident so says the *Upaniṣad*

parāñci khāni vyatṛṇat svayambhūḥ
tasmāt parāṅ paśyati nāntarātman
kaścid dhiraah pratyagātmānamaikṣad
avṛttacakṣuramṛtatvamicchan

"God created the sense organs so as to go out. Hence, a man sees only outward objects without turning his eyes inward to the self. A rare wiseman (*dhīraḥ*) however, seeking immortality, turning his eyes inward saw the *ātman* in the inmost recess of himself".

Here the teacher points out that for spiritual wisdom one is to withdraw his attention from the world and put his senses under full control. He should turn his eyes inward to attain unalloyed bliss in life.

Vidyāraṇya Svāmin in his *Pañcadaśī* has enumerated the means of mind control as

taccinanaṁ tatkathanaṁ anyonyam
tatpravodhanam
etadekapaaratvañ-ca brahmābhyāsaṁ
vidur budhāḥ

Always contemplate about, speaking about it, conveying it to each other, being intent on it only is termed by the wise to be the mark of *Brahmābhyāsa*.

This means that without diverting the attention to any other thing one should carefully listen to the teaching of the *Upaniṣads* when taught by a competent teacher and their meaning should be meditation upon, the same should be expounded to others, which will lead to mutual enlightenment. No other thought of contrary nature should come to the mind and there must be a continuous flow of akin ideas. Such mental process known as *nididhyāsana* will lead one to final emancipation. By adopting this process one should strive with concentration to achieve one's ultimate goal in life.

Thus the an ancient educators, with a psychological insight organised a through training in self-control amongst the students by introducing the institution of *brahmacarya* during the period of their adolescence when the sex and the similar instinct were manifest in them. By following the rules relating to brahmacarya the students were able to lead a purer and more self-controlled life which helped them in shaping their character and habits.

Again, in the residential schools which were absolutely free from any artificiality and completely dominated by moral virtue, the students by undergoing a course of discipline were able to develop their minds and to make their bodies fit to perform the duties that were obligatory to them. Further, they learnt to control their passions and temper and by taking active part in the sacrificial rites of the teacher, they received the training in self-abnegation, endurance, loyalty and devotion which had a psychological effect in the subsequent stages of their lives outside the academy.

The educators of the *Upaniṣadic* age spared no pains in training the will of their disciples during their stay with them. The preceptors endeavoured to satisfy the growing inquisitiveness of the young learners by supplying more and more information and items of knowledge. In the *Chāndogya* we find that the son asked the father-cum-teacher to enlighten him with still more facts and the father consented and began to elucidate the fact to quench his thirst for further information. It is a common psychological truth that the teachers should help and encourage in developing the mental aptitudes of the young learners which are so natural with them at this stage of their lives.

The teacher further recognised that the mental faculty remains dormant in human beings in their infancy and begins to develop gradually with the development of the body. The power of the mind which remains latent in childhood begins to manifest itself in adolescence. It has been pointed out in the *Chāndogya* that in infant stage, the mind remains undeveloped "Just like infant whose mind is not yet developed but living with the breath, speaking with the organ of speech seeing with the eyes, and hearing with the ears."

The Hindu thinkers considered the mental faculty of the human being to be inborn that develops steadily with the physical growth of the child and reaches its maturity at adolescence. So the child having attained the stage of youth will not only grow in bulk, but alos in intelligence. They also realised that, as the body is built up by suitable physical exercises so the mind can be improved by some mental exercise when rightly selected. Further, they held the view that the human being could not develop his mind beyond the limit of the capacity with which he is born. It is, therefore, the task of psychology and of education to make an endeavour to

develop the natural powers in each individual in a harmonious way so as to enable him to attain the desired goal of human life.

The seers of the *Upaniṣads* realised that intellect is not the only means of knowledge but there are also other faculties latent in man which when developed can lead to a higher knowledge.

dṛśyate tvagrayayā buddhya
sūkṣmayā sūkṣma-darśibhiḥ

He can however be seen by those who poosesd a subtle vision with (the aid) of a subtle and keen understanding.

The *Brahman* is to be sought, known and realised progressively on any or each of the successive levels of His manifestation. Thus the teacher of the *Maitrī* declared.

Brahman is to be apprehended by *vidyā*, by austerity, by meditation.

'A resolute attempt' observes Pandit must be made to change the direction of the senses and the energies behind them; the body must be trained to become more and more conscious inward than outward the life energy discouraged from its unchecked flow to outgoing activities and the mind and emotions freed from their mechanical preoccupations and turned and centred round the soul. The eye must be turned inward and only those movements which help this orientation of consciousness must be cultivated, the others being gradually eliminated.

Man is to make use of the stock that he has acquired from the past. They believed that man could not increase the inherent capacity for immediate use until he could add by his action rightly pursued in this life, something to the inherent stock. Like Locke, the Hindus did not consider the child's mind as a *tabula rasa*; or, as a piece of blank sheet of paper waiting to be inscribed on but believed in the innate ideas good or bad, derived as the result of experience in previous lives. They did not entertain the view of Rousseau who says that man are born stupid. Even if a man is born stupid it is because of his error committed in his previous life. Thus the Hindus with the help of the doctrine of *Karma*—explain the different abilities displayed by different individuals. Thus the *Upaniṣadic* teacher like a true psychologist paid individual attention to each of his disciple to develop his mental faculties according to his abilities and aptitude. Never-the-less they recognised the innate capacities or potentialities of the children and believed that they could not develop in him which did not exist potentially in them. Further, they also recognised the value of a suitable environment viz., the *brahmacaryāśrama* which is consciously designed to mould the life of an individual in a disciplined way and which unconsciously tends to shape his habits, belief and behaviour.

Heredity and Environment

Thus the educators of the *Upaniṣadic* age took into consideration the importance of hereditary and environmental influence in the scheme of their education—a matter of controversy among the educators, both ancient and modern. The Hindu thinkers held that the human beings are born with mental capacity and faculties pre-determined and they cannot be developed beyond the limit of the capacity with which he is endowed with. Thus in respect of the efficacy of environment we see from the story in the *Chāndogya* where the *rkāṣasa* king Virocana went to *Brahmaloka* for *brahmajñāna* and was taught by *Brahma* Himself, yet he did not realise the *ātman* as his mind was not endowed with the capacity to grasp the same. This shows the inherent capacity of the person, not the place of instruction, is the efficient means to acquire real education. The great educationists and psychologists of modern

age like Herbert and Locke are the opinion that it is not heredity or nature but environment or nurture that determines the fate of man. Man is born with an empty mind bereft of any impression like his naked body at the time of birth. It is the education which we receive and the environment in which we are born which are responsible for the formation of our character and the development of our capacities.

An ideal environment is essential for the development of the mental capacities while a poor environment can mar the essential features of the intellectual capacities. In the *Chāndogya* we find that Satyakāma was accepted as a student on the ground of his mental traits which where the product of a good heritage. Conduct indicates the parentage of a man just as his speech the land of his birth.

It is the environment which helps in the development of the social intelligence of a man, the capacity which cannot develop either in a backward environment or in isolation.

The *Vedas* were studied in a family endowed with high native ability and not otherwise, and in the *gurukulas* due attention was paid to the proper development of the mind and the body as also the attitude. The education whether imparted either in a family or in the *gurukulas* was based on the physical, emotional and mental growth of the young educand.

Thus, the educator of the ancient India took into consideration the innate tendencies of the individuals and the far-reaching effect of the external influences in the education of the students for their all-round development. The teachers tried to stimulate the intelligence of the students with both internal and external influences to help the young aspirants in achieving the desired goal of life.

Psychological Basis of the Curriculum

The curriculum followed in the *gurukala* was psychologically sound and planned in a manner so as to fit in the scheme of the mental growth of the young student. The *Upaniṣadic* teachers realised that the faculties of the child should be cultivated from the very early stage of his life. From the varied nature of the curriculum, comprising both religious and secular subjects, followed in the hermit school as can be seen from the *Chāndogya* which includes among others the three *Vedas*, eighteen sciences, etc., it has been made absolutely clear that the teachers of the *Upaniṣads* were fully aware of the fact that to confine one's study to a particular branch of knowledge in which one was anxious to attain proficiency was not always the best way either to develop the mental faculties or to stimulate imagination of the pupil. A perfect knowledge of the world is considered to be necessary for spiritual attainment.

In the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* we find that the teacher expressed the need of studying both *aparā* and *parāvidya*. To get a comprehensive knowledge of the *parā-vidyā* one is to go through the course of *parā-vidyā* which consists of the vocational knowledges and those of sciences and arts. People born in the society hold to work for its stability and progress. Thus finishing the study of *parā-vidyā* first the students were allowed to enter into the realm of *parā-vidyā* step by step to attain the unalloyed bliss in life.

It is however evident that the same curriculum was not universally followed everywhere ; it varied from place to place. The variation was made to suit the local conditions. The *Upaniṣadic* educator maintained carefully a balance between the curriculum of studies and the physical, mental and spiritual fitness of the recipient of education which started at home with

parents as teacher.

Psychological Approach in the Method of Teaching

The methods of instruction were confined to the training of the will of the students in three different ways, viz.,

(i) oral instruction or recitation,
(ii) sacred environment, and
(iii) the daily religious performances.

The principal method, however, was learning the text by heart and the pupils like it most out of their natural liking for rhythmical recitation. In fact, the education was started with the recitation of the *gāyatrī* to stimulate mental strivings and activities. The text is explained and the pupils were taught to think, understand, and ask questions to get new and more lights and to remove the doubts arising out of the discussions. The students were given the opportunity to make observation, experimentation and discrimination so that they might turn out as complete men with the capacity of original thinking. From the teaching imparted by the father to his son in *Bhṛgu Valli* of the *Taittirīya* it can be observed that the teacher wanted to stimulate the imagination, reasoning and judgement of the students.

'The old *Vedic* teacher', observes Venkateswara, 'was at least in the *Vedāntic* period no victim of a Faculty Psychology. He did not regard the pupil's brain as a *tabula rasa* in which facts were stored or ideas instilled. He had come to look on the advanced brain as a veritable dynamo which needed guidance for the exercise of its natural reactions, and improved with every such exercise. Self education was regarded as the best and highest king of education." The teacher in his teaching process, was mentally alert to adjust his teaching to the mental equipment of the student to produce the desired effect. If the instruction failed in the first instance to produce the desired effect, the teacher repeated the instruction again and again. Ācārya Śaṁkara the great teachers of the world stressed this point in his *Upadeśa sāhasrī* as '*Parikṣitāya bruyāt punaḥ punaḥ yāvat grahaṇaṁ dṛadhībhavatī*'.

That the importance of repetition to ensure the effectiveness of teaching upon the minds of the students was realised by the teacher, is evident from the *Chāndogya* where we find that Aruni instructed Śvetaketu the importance of *Tattvamasi* repeatedly for seven times to impress his instruction upon the green mind of the young pupil. The method of repetition in the process of teaching is also supported by Kapila, the author of the *Sāṁkhya-Sūtra*, Goutama and Badarāyana, the celebrated authors of the *Nyāya-Sūtra* and the *Brahmasūtra* respectively.

Thus it is evident that the process of education in ancient India was based on a knowledge of the psychology of human nature. In the process we notice that the student not only repeated the instruction of his teacher but also imitated him. In fact, intelligent imitation played an important role in the education of the pupil in learning the scripture.

In the absence of any written document it was but natural the teachers of ancient India had to solely rely upon speech—the medium of instruction being absolutely oral. The students were required to imitate to what the teachers uttered so that they might not falter in any manner. Not only that, the students imitated their way of living, habits and manners as a living ideal before them to achieve the same goal like their teachers. Even the modern educators recognise the importance of imitation in the process of learning. So remarks Nunn the renowned educationst, "The connection between imitation and 'originality' has much

importance for education. Teachers of a modern tendency sometimes discourage imitation on the ground that it 'cramps self-expression.' This is a mistake. The most original minds find themselves only in playing the sedulous ape to others who have gone before them along the same path of Self-assertion. In his earlier works we cannot distinguish even the voice of Shakespeare from the voice of his contemporaries. Imitation is, in fact, but the first stage in the creation of individuality, and the richer the scope for imitation the richer the developed individuality will be."

It can also be observed that it is not only the teachers who were active in imparting instruction till it becomes effective but the students also were equally attentive to receive the same from the teachers. The importance of attention in the process of learning was fully realised. Attention depends on the training of the mind for fixing it upon some specific object and without the proper training of the mind proper attention cannot be achieved. In the *Chāndogya* we find that the mind is at the root of all actions, mental and physical. Again, it has been said in the same *Upaniṣad* that the mind functions through the will which urges thinking and speaking powers of the mind. Will had been recognised as the modification of mind or for a particular functioning of the internal organ, the function which consists in determining and discriminating what should be done and what should not be done. It is only when a subject has been duly discriminated and determined upon, there comes reflection first and then the desire to do.

Reflection or '*manana*' is important in grasping the import of the teaching of the preceptor. Mere listening (*śravaṇa*) to the instruction of the preceptor cannot be effective without reflection. This is evident from the account of the student life of Indra and Virocana as given in the eighth chapter of the *Chāndogya*. Even though there was the same delivery of instruction from Prajāpati, the preceptor, Virocana, out of the two pupils misconceived the teaching due to the absence of reflection. Hence reflection is necessary on what is instructed by the preceptor. It is the source of higher knowledge. It is the process by which one can rise from sensuous to the super-sensuous plane. Meditation and reflection are necessary and important in the unfoldment of spiritual consciousness. It has been said in the *Chāndogya* that man is a creature of reflection, whatever he reflects upon in this life he becomes the same hereafter, therefore, he should reflect upon *Brahman*. Again in the same *Upaniṣad* we find the process of meditation on the syllable *Om* which has been shown in different ways to ensure its understanding firmly in the minds of the young learners.

Psychological Aspect of Memory and Attention

The teachers of the *Upaniṣads* laid great stress on the faculty of memory. Like the modern psychologist they believed that the matter impressed upon the mind daily at a stated hour is remembered well and by recognition of this fact they introduced in their system that the text be recited at regular intervals to produce a greater effect on the mind of the students. Prof. James, the celebrated psychologist, commends the practice and efficacy of morning and evening prayers among the Hindus. Not only does it help to train the boy in the right moral conduct, but also to stimulate his preconscious thought. It has a wholesome effect of the physical constitution. This same practice was probably at the bottom of the thoughtfulness of the Hindus, and the sacred nature of the whole learning influenced many minds to

take to literary pursuits. Memory played a very vital role in the scheme of *Vedic* education as art of writing was unknown and everything had to be committed to memory.

The Hindu thinkers do not admit that there is any line of demarcation between the conscious and preconscious brain activity nor do they admit that a small part of the brain is in conscious activity. They hold that the power of the mind affects the other faculties of the individual as by walking a man improves his generala halth though incidently walking may tend to develop his legs more than any other parts of his body.

Memory was recognised to be source of knowledge and it was as it were the store-house of learning, and it played an important role in the mental life of an individual. Whatever, they learnt, they learnt it thoroughly and were able to carry it in their minds; thus they were able to reproduce any part of any scripture whenever necessary. In fact, they were able to carry their learning with them wherever they might go and could serve the society as a moving library. The method of teaching was so intensive that the students retained in their mind whatever they learnt, and thus quality was aimed at rather than the quantity. The student not only understood the text thoroughly, but their reasoning power was also developed and by virtue of the reasoning power they could take up the study of any other subject easily. They believed in the improvement of memory by what is called in modern psychology drilling. They believed in overlearning by repetition which is an acknowledged method in modern times as well.

The *Upaniṣadic* teacher realised that the memory played an important role not only in the field of education but also in our day to day life as a social being. In the *Chāndogya* it has been said, "Therefore, even when there would assemble many persons, if they had no memory, they could not hear anyone, they could not think, they had memory, they had memory, they could hear, they could think they could know. It is by memory that one knows his son, and it is by memory that one knows his cattle."

Thus is can be seen that memory is essential not merely to education but also to the practical activities of life, for memory of the past events serves as a model for tacking the future events without difficulty. It is through the faculty of memory that we can know things, the objects of our experience. The things which are not remembered are as good as non-existent and hence they cannot perform the function of a really existing thing.

The ancient educators fully realised the value of memory in the intellectual life of a man specially when there was no facility to go through any written document. It should, however, be noted that blind memory work amounting to cramming was discarded and discouraged by the teacher. The *Upaniṣadic* teachers laid stress on *śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana* for acquisition of knowledge. From this it can easily be guessed that the teachers did not put emphasis on memory at the cost of intelligence. No doubt they cultivated the power of memory but they did not sacrifice intelligence at the altar of blind memory work. They tried to stimulate in the minds of the students both interest and intelligence to make their education sound and perfect.

In can be seen from the *Chāndogya* that understanding (*Vijñāna*) is more important in grasping the meaning of the Vedas, the *Itihāsa*, the *Purāṇas* and other branches of learning, sacred or secular.

Pestalozzi, the celebrated psychologist

who wanted to psychologize education put emphasis on understanding rather then the memory and held that all education should begin with perception, he further held that the development of the physical power is necessary for the development of the mind, and the aim of education should be fitness for life, preparation for independent action. Like the Hindus, he declared "everything that is imperfect in the germ will be crippled in its growth, in the outward development of its parts. This is as true of the products of your mind, as of products of your garden."

In this connection the observation made by An Anglo-saxon Mother is worth quoting "Oral methods have always played a most important part in Hindu education, and are employed far more than books as a means of imparting knowledge, the result of which is that, without being literate, the Hindu is often much better educated than the Western observer, accustomed to consider illiteracy as ignorance, can possibly imagine. It may be noted that many eminent Western writers have emphasized the importance of training, the understanding in preference to acquiring mere arudition. Montaigue, for example, gives his opinion strongly that judgement is of no use if understanding be not with it. The poet Royalists, who in the seventeenth century had such a brilliant reputation as educationst in France, made a point of learning books as far as possible, and laid great stress upon conversation as a means of developing the mental faculties. Locke's dictum was: Instruction is but the least part of education....That which very gentleman desires for his son is contained in these four things—Virtue, Wisdom, Breeding, and Learning", a list in which we note that learning comes last. Rousseau declared that "too much reading serves only to make presumptuous ignoramuseș. In this, in all probability unconsciously, these western educationists followed the Hindu method. The Hindus believed that if the understanding is cultivated well then all other faculties will naturally be improved along with it. Further, they believed that the understanding would generated imagination and feeling in the minds of the students and by these they would form the habit of thinking without any strain; thereby they would acquire the reasoning faculty which will continue throughout their life as a natural consequence.

The sages of the *Upanișads* fully realised the importance of imagination in the process of education. Our knowledge of the internal world is gained not merely by the senses but by the sense perception and imagination. The activity of the senses becomes fruitful only with the help of imagination. Imagination is the lasting cognition of things in our mind gained through sensory organ.

The importance of imagination was felt by the teacher specially in connection with the method of teaching. The *Upanișadic* teachers resorted to profuse use of similes and story telling to stimulate the imagination of the pupil as a means of effective teaching. In the *Brahmasūtra* it has been said that the stories which do not form the part of *Pāriplavas* (the stories which the sacrificer with the members of his family are expected to hear at intervals of the horse-sacrifice which lasts for a year are called *Pāriplavas*) are intended to introduce the *vidyās*. The stories are used to attract imagination of the students, and thereby they will be more attentive to the teaching in hand. The *Upanișadic* teachers who taught their students *upāsanā*—the religious meditation, considered the role of imagination, to be immense in forming the image of the object of worship.

It is not possible within the limited scope of our study to discuss the various

types and forms of *Upāsanā* in detail as prescribed in the *Upaniṣads*. But the fact remains true that the *Upaniṣadic* teachers emphasised the utility of *Upāsanā* in their system of education. *Upāsanā* is a process of continuous concentration of the mind on a particular idea, conception or word prescribed by the scripture without permitting intrusion of any thought dissonant or alien to it which can ultimately lead to *vidyā, darśana or vijñāna*. *Upāsanā* is a mental act and it must be directed towards an object which will bring about results which are as good as liberation itself. *Upāsanā* purifies the sense organs which in turn become illuminative of the true nature of the reality. *Upāsanā* has got some definite substratum as their object and thereby it becomes easier to achieve sucess in it. It is perhaps for this reason Śaṁkarācārya wants to emphasize that *savikalpaka* form of meditation is more useful for the realisation of *Brahman*. All the activities of man including meditation were regulated by religious result and as a matter of fact the religious bindings had some effect on the intellect and free thinking of the people in the society. The *Upaniṣadic* sages realised that meditation could help in uprooting the evil impulses of the human mind, and in transforming the mind itself. It could keep the interior untouched by any undesirable elements and brings about internal freedom and happiness to individual and the society as well. According to the Hindus the real happiness of the individual and the society rests on the peace of mind and the perfection of the interior rather than in the sharpness of intellect and the exuberance of the exterior. They could thus enjoy that kind by happiness both individual and social. The combination of the two was the aim of their education of which they could beast in view of its practicability and perfection.

That the *Upaniṣadic* sages along with their metaphysical speculations, developed certain principles of psychology in evident from the following discussion. They considered that the body is the city of *Brahman*. *Brahman* is *Ātman*. It is the psychic principle. It is the inner self in man.

The individual self has three different characters, namely, the physical, the psychical and the ethical. The embodied soul born in this world has a three fold body, namely, the gross (*sthūla*), the subtle (*sūkṣma*) and the causal (*kāraṇa*).

The gross body of the self is composed of five physical elements viz., the earth, water, fire, air and ether and has got nine gates open, namely, two eyes, two ears, two nostril, mouth, anus, genital organ, and two more closed, namely, navel and the *brahmarandhra or brahmaorifice* at the top of the skull. The individual self has got five kosas or sheaths. The *Taittirīya* describes the five sheaths of the individual self by the successive analytical steps.

The bodily self or the gross body is nourished by food and therefore, is described as the selfs *annamaya-koṣa* or food sheath. Here the self is identified with the body and its organs. But they took no time to outgrow this view and realised that above this bodily sheath there is within it the vital sheath *prāṇamaya koṣa*. The vital self is dependent on vital breath. The vital forces constitute its parts and animate the body. Passing through this stage also they realised that within the vital sheath there is the mental sheath—*manomaya koṣa*. The mental self is dependent on *manas* Volitions constitute the mental sheath and fulfil the selfish ends. Higher than the mental sheath there is within it the intellectual sheath—*Vijñānamayakoṣa*. The intellectual self is dependent on the intellect. Intellectual knowledge which is

discriminative and can bring about the distinction between subject and object constitute the intellectual sheath. Higher than the intellectual sheath there is within it the blissful sheath, *ānandamaya-koṣa.* Supreme bliss constitutes the blissful sheath and it is a state of being subject-objectless transcendental consciousness. In fact, *ānanda* does not constitute a sheath of the individual self. But it constitutes the very essence of the self. This is an unique contribution of the *Upaniṣadic* teaching that *ānanda* or in other words love, is the ultimate reality of the universe at which they arrived at by successive steps of analysis of the constitution of the universe.

It can, therefore, be said that to realise *Brahman* one has to pass through the first sheaths into the fifth. The seers of the *Upaniṣads* have attached more importance to the heart than the head. They regarded the heart to be the seat of breath and the mind.

The sages recognised four states of the individual soul, namely, the waking the dream, the deep sleep and the fourth stage called *turīya.*

The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* though it speaks of the four stages of the soul is mainly concerned with the *turīya* state where human consciousness freed from all the modifications attains a state pristine purity. The process of arriving at such a state is considered by this *Upaniṣad* in its four-fold aspect.

The first condition of the individual soul is the waking state of outward moving consciousness. The individual soul in waking condition is called the *'viśva'* which knows and enjoys the external objects. The characteristic of the waking state the *jāgrata is āpti* or attainment. The waking state is the normal consciousness of man in which impelled by certain motives he makes his choices and plans for achievement. The impelling power of action is originated from memory which resides in the sub-conscious level of the mind. Thus in the waking state there are the conscious and the sub-conscious layers of the mind of which the former supplies the pattern of behaviour and the later the impelling power of action. From the waking state the teacher now passes on to the second condition of the individual soul which is called the dream state of inner moving consciousness. The individual soul in the state of dream is called *taijasa* or the shining light which knows and enjoys subtle internal objects or cognitions. The characteristic of the dream state is *utkarṣa* or upsurge as *āpti* or attainment is that of the waking state. The dream being inner moving consciousness is not affected by the external objects but by internal factors. It is a state of inner modification. It is a state which may not have any relationship with objective reality but stands are real as an objective experience so long the dream lasts. The experiences of dream state come to a man when he is in deep moments of absorption. In the dream state there is the absorption rising out of choicelessness and hence it is called '*taijasa*'—coming as bright and shining.

Now the teacher of the *Upaniṣad* speaks about the third state of consciousness which is of deep sleep,of silent consciousness, where there is no desire—where there !s no beholding even of dreams. It is a state of oneness and designated as *'prajñā'* or the wise one who frees himself from the movement of outward or inward consciousness, and reverts to his pristine state of bliss. It is called '*prajñānaghana*' a state of homogeneous mass of consciousness and bliss. It does not apprehend external objects or internal cognition.

Regarding the state of deep sleep or *suṣupti*, the teacher of the *Upaniṣad* says

that it is characterised by *apti* on final end. It is indeed a state where man is approaching the realm of truth, where movements come to an end. The consciousness of man, with the cessation of all movements only can visualise the absolute nature of the thing. In the silence of dreamless deep sleep he almost realises his real-self.

The state in which the truth reveals itself is what the *Māṇḍūkya* calls the fourth state—the *turīya* state where all things exist in their original nature. When man arrives at his original state then alone he is truly integrated. It is a state of super-consciousness where the perception of the *Ātman* comes in, where the mind is freed from the pulls of the past and the anticipation of the future. The individual soul in the *turīya* condition is called the *Ātman* which is one universal consciousness (*ekātmapratyayasāra*) which knows neither gross objects nor internal cognition which is not a mass of consciousness which is neither consciousness (*prajñā*) nor non-consciousness (*aprajñā*). It is one non-dual, non-empricial transcendental consciousness. the Ātman is the universal consciousness. Thus the teacher of the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* speaks that the man who desires to enjoy the eternal bliss in union with the *Brahman* must cultivate his reason by thinking of the real nature of the external world and his activities therein, secure inner freedom and lead a pure and chaste life. The German philosopher and educationists Froebel says—"To be wise it the highest aim of man.... By education the divine essence of man should be unfolded, brought out, lifted into consciousness, and man himself raised into free conscious obedience to the divine principle that lives in him and to a free representation of this principle in his life...."

The Real Self: Prajapatis Instruction to Indra Concerning

Now we are introduced into another important aspect of this subject, namely, the stages of consciousness. You may call these the stages of the realisation of the Ātman which manifests itself through the conditions known as waking, dream and deep sleep, a subject which is elaborately discussed in the Mandukya Upaniṣad. Here also, it is discussed in an equally important and interesting manner by means of an anecdote which is very famous in the Upaniṣads.

On one occasion, Prajapati made an announcement. He was in his assembly hall. He loudly proclaimed a great truth in the presence of all people. All could hear what he spoke. And what did he speak? What was the announcement that he made that is mentioned here?

This was the proclamation made by Prajapati in an open assembly. "This Atman is free from every kind of evil. It is unaffected by old age or decay of any kind. It has no connection with death. It is free from mortality. Death cannot touch it. It is immortal. It is free from every kind of grief, turmoil or trouble we see in this life. It has no hunger and no thirst. These do not affect It in any manner. Its will is truthful. Its wishes are immediately materialised. All the desires arising from here are immediately fulfiled without any limit of space or time. This Ātman is to be investigated into. This Ātman is to be known. Whoever investigates into this Atman and knows the nature of this Atman attains all the worlds and fulfils all desires. This is the great benefit accruing to the knowers of the Ātman."

Thus did Prajapati make an announcement. Loudly was it told and everyone heard what was said. Well, the meaning is very clear. It does not require much explanation. What is the content of

this proclamation is well-known. It excited the curiosity of many who heard it. The gods and the demons both heard this proclamation made in that celestial assembly.

The gods hurried back to their homes and held an conference among themselves with Indra as their chief. They said: "Brahma has told us such an interesting thing! Whoever knows the Ātman has mastery over all the worlds and has the capacity to fulfil every wish or desire. We must know this Ātman. Some of us should be deputed for getting training in the school of Brahman. We must get initiated into this mystery of the Ātman." The gods chose Indra, their chief as the proper deputy and sent him to Brahma. They said to him, "Go and have training under Brahma and know this Ātman, because he has already made an announcement, that if we know it such wonderful result would follow."

Similar was the reaction of the *Asuras*, the demons. They also heard this. They went back to their world and then held a conference. They said, "This Ātman is a very wonderful thing and we must know this Atman". So they deputed their chief, Virochana, for the purpose. They told him, "You go to Brahman and have training in this wisdom of the Ātman, so that we too will be benefited by this knowledge as was proclaimed". This was the outcome of this announcement.

Both Indra and Virochana met each other, perhaps on the way, but one did not speak to the other about the purpose for which he was travelling. Each one was keeping the idea as a secret. Indra and Virochana are deadly enemies. They did not say anything to each other as they were very much preoccupied with the objective for which they were travelling. So, both went to Brahma's place and approached him as humble disciples with the sacred offering of *samit*. And having gone there, it does not appear that they said anything. From what the Upaniṣad says, it appears that they stayed there for thirty-two years without saying anything, observing austerity, controlling their senses and living a very disciplined life. They lived in the abode of Brahma, having said nothing either between themselves or to Brahma himself.

Then after thirty-two years of this kind of living there, Brahma seems to have observed their stay and asked them: "What is the matter with you? Why are you staying here for so many years observing self-discipline? What do you want? Then both of the them said the same thing, "We are here for some purpose". "What is that purpose?"—queried Prajapati. They replied: "O Great Lord, we have heard your great proclamation. You made an announcement that the knower of the Ātman fulfils all desires, has mastery over all the worlds and is unaffected by pains of any kind. In search of the knowledge of the Atman have we come here.

This is the purpose of our visit and for this reason it is that we have been living here for thirty-two years observing austerity." "O, that is very good," said Prajapati. And inasmuch as they had already undergone some discipline, Brahma did not ask them to undergo any further vow or any other formality. He immediately started giving initiation: "You want to know the Ātman? Here is this knowledge." He gave a very pithy and precise instruction which could be interpreted this way or that way. It was like the statement, "The Greeks the Romans shall conquer". No one knows what the exact meaning of the statement is. It may mean that Romans shall conquer the Greeks, or the Greeks shall conquer the Romans. Prajapati's instruction was enigmatic.

"That Being which you see in your eye in the Ātman" said Prajapati. It was a very strange statement indeed. This was all the instruction. There was no further explanation whatsoever. He is right in what he said, but it can be very easily misconstrued. "That Purusha, the Being that you see in your eyes, that is the Atman. Are you satisfied? I have give you an initiation. This is the immortal, this is the abode of fearlessness, this is the Absolute,

Immediately the whole instruction was misconstrued by both the disciples, just as any one of us would have done. They at once came to the same conclusions regarding the reflection seen in the eye. We know what is seen in the eye. A body is reflected. What can be reflected in the eye except a body? "O, I see, this is the Ātman. What is reflected in the eye is the Ātman."— thus concluded both Indra and Virochana. "Then, what is reflected in water, is that the Ātman?"— they asked. "That which is reflected in the mirror, is that also Ātman?" They were so happy that the Ātman is so easy to reach. So they want to get this instruction confirmed by asking, "Which is Ātman, that seen as reflected in the water or that seen as reflected in the mirror? Is that also the Ātman? Is it true? Is it so?" They queried Brahma, and his answer was very simple. He said, "It is seen in every kind of reflection." 'Well, is it in the water?' they again asked. "Yes in water also, It is reflected everywhere", he replied.

A very short instruction! And both were very happy. The disciples felt tha. they had known the Atman. Actually the teacher must have felt pity for the ignorance of these disciples who immediately misunderstood the whole teaching and thought the physical body could be the Atman, because that alone can be reflected in this manner. What else can be reflected if not an external object!

PSYCHOLOGICAL SYMBOLISM

Mind is one of such symbols. In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* it is recounted how Bhṛgu, in course of his *tapas* practised under the direction of his father Varuṇa, arrives at the idea that mind itself in Brahman. As the ground for the identification is given a certain functional akinness of mind with Brahman. The definition given by the father to the son for his guidance envisages Brahman as the source, support and final resort of the creation.

In course of his *tapas*, Bhṛgu eventually came to realize that what his father had given him as the definition of Brahman was fully applicable to mind itself. The world, according to his latest realization by that time, was born of mind, dwelt in mind and wad destined to return to mind.

Needless to point out that mind serves as the indispensable centre of awareness of the world. The world is there existing independently of mind, no doubt, and disappearance of a certain individual with all his mental functions does not affect the world in its existence anyway. But, at the same time, it is not less true that if made bereft of mind, the world would definitely lose al;l its existential value. Thus, by virtue of forming the source of the cognition of the world, mind is understood provisionally as the source, support and final resort of the world. Since the world is not merely its awareness in mind, the above understanding cannot be final. It is why Bhrgu had to go beyond it later on in his quest for the Reality. But, being fully convinced of the view for the time being, he took mind itself as the Ultimate Reality. And until he reached the higher stage, the conviction served him well in his search. Though utterly provisional, the conviction left mind as a symbol or Brahman for the

later generations. What was a provisional substitute of Brahman for Bhrgu, the pioneer investigator, became a symbol for his followers.

Another instance of symbolization of Brahman by mind is to be found in the teachings of Sanatkumāra as imparted to Nārada. When the teacher had already asked him to understand speech as Brahman, Nārada expressed his curiosity if there was anything higher than speech which could be regarded as the same. It was in response to this query that the teacher put forward mind as Brahman. The ground for the equation, as provided by the teacher, is comprehension and control of mind over name and speech. As regards comprehension, the teacher brings to bear upon it the image of a petty fruit capable of being held easily inside a closed fist. He observes:

> Just what a closed first experiences about a pair of *āmalaka, kola, or akṣa*, the same does mind experience about speech and name.

This image is adduced to show parity between Brahman and mind on the ground of comprehension. Since Brahman literally means the most comprehensive reality, representation of its by mind, in preference to name and speech, was quite legitimate. Name is a very comprehensive phenomenon, and so also or even more than that is speech. But mind is still more comprehensive. If speech is the vocalized form of our understanding about the world, mind is the very source of that understanding. Indeed, our whole existence in this world and the possibility of the same in the other world are determined by mind. On account of this, mind say well be regarded as the essence not only of our own being but also of the world. What constitutes the essence of both, the subjective and the objective, must naturally be regarded as equivalent to the Supreme Reality which is Brahman. Due to this functional equivalence, it is suggested to Bhṛgu that he should meditate on mind as Brahman.

It is interesting to not here while in the *Taittirīya* the same mind as a symbol of Brahman was discovered by the student himself through *tapas*, here it is simply suggested by the teacher. Obviously, the *Taittirīya's* account refers to the earlier stage in the history of the symbol. Does it also suggest an earlier date for the relevant portion of the text?

Besides this, there is a theriomorphic reason given elsewhere in the *Chhāndogya* for the use of mind as a symbol of Brahman. It establishes symbolic equivalence of mind with Brahman on account of both being seemingly four-footed. As an animal moves on its our legs, so Brahman is supposed to move in the form of the world on its four legs of fire, air, the sun and the directions. Obviously, the four entities are the means of manifestation of Brahman in the form of the world on the physical plane. In view of its functioning through speech, *prāṇa*, eyes and ears, mind also may very well be imagined as an animal having the three organs and the *prāṇa* as its four legs.

Indispensability of mind in life has formed another reason for the symbolization in the *Bṛahadāraṇyaka*. This is referred to in connection with Satyakāma Jābāla's view of Brahman as made known to king Janaka. Just as mind is indispensable for man's adjustment to his circumstances, so Brahman is indispensable for his as well as for the world's existence. Yājñavalkya, however, does not consider this symbol as adequate. In his view, since Brahman is not merely a function, the latter alone cannot represent it adequately. A being can be represented suitably only by a being. According to him, if mind is to be used as

a symbol of Brahman,it must be given the shape of a being. For his, one would have to find out the abode and the support of the symbolic being. As regards mind, Yājñavalkya considers mind itself as its abode, space as support and delight as essence. Thus, in his view, delight is the essential principle which, when poured into space, assumes the form of mind. It is form this original mind that our functional mind arises. It is this mind as delight which is to be meditated on as Brahman and not the commonplace mind which is only a phase of it.

The position of mind as a symbol of Brahman further deteriorates in what the water-bird taught to young Satyakāma Jābāla. Here mind is demoted not only from full representation of Brahman but alaso from full representation of one of the four feet of it. It is taken to stand for only one-fourth of one of the four feet of Brahman known as *āyatanavat*, "one having an abode." If we admit that Satyakāma Jābāla of the *Chhāndogya* is the same as his namesake in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* we would mark a clear development in his view of mind as a symbol of Bahman. It consists in the fact that while the water-bird put mind before him as one-fourth of one of the four feet of Brahman, he himself suggested it to king Janaka as a complete symbol of the whole of Brahman. The third and probably the final stage in the development of his philosophy is reached in his teachings imparted to Upakosala where he rises above even mind and takes *puruṣa* in the eye as Brahman.

Apart from shedding light on the relative dates of the relevant texts, the above account bears out the introvertive tendency of the sage as evinced in his quest for Brahman. He took mind as a partial symbol of Brahman from the water-bird. He practised meditation on it possible quite for some time until he realized it as a complete symbol of Brahman and taught it as such to king Janaka. Further, in his mellow age, he transcended even mind and reached the person in the eye as the most suitable symbol of Brahman and taught it as such to Upakosala. A particular symbol may change its signification with development in the thought and in due course it is prone even to be transcended and substituted by a more comprehensive one.

When a symbol is trascended and left behind as obsolete, it has some possibility of being used hence onward as an indicator or sign of the same object. As regards mind, a beautiful example of it is found in the *Kena*. Here Brahman is pointed out as that towards which mind seems to move and by which, indeed, it moves. Particularly the latter of these two ideas is put elaborately in another mantra of the same Upaniṣad according to which:

> That which is not thought by mind, but mind itself is thought by which, know that alone as Brahman and by no means what is meditated on here.
> Use of a symbol as sign is the very undoing of it. This is what mind is destined to become at the height of realization of Brahman.

Will

Will is another psychic suggested as a symbol of Brahman by Sanatkumāra in suppression of mind. The ground for the preference is the relatively more primary character of it. According to the sage,

> It is only when one wills, that one reflects, speaks and utters it in name; it is in name that mantras are unified and in mantras the sacred deeds.

On account of its primacy over mind, will is taken to serve as a more intimate symbol of Brahman. It is to be noted here that contrary to the modern usage

according to which mind is inclusive of willing and feeling as well as knowing. Sanatkumāra takes it only in the last sense and there also specifically in the sense of reflection.

His will, however, it not only independent of mind or, indeed, reflection, but is immensely much more comprehensive. It works not only in conscious beings but in the whole of the world, both organic ad inorganic. What to talk of the human, animal and vegetable kingdoms, even the heaven, the earth, air, space, water heat and all the rest seem to be based on will. If will were not operative in them, the earth could not be sustained in her place, space could not hold itself, air, water, and heat could not remain what they are. Even the very existence of these entities is supposed to be due to will. Otherwise, how could such heterogneous entities as the heaven, the earth, air, space, water, and heat come together and co-operate in bringing down rain? It is will which, working in the form of shower of rain, results in the production of food. Moreover, the transformation of food into *prāṇa* is, indeed, a further extension of the field of operation of will. Concretization of *prāṇa*, leading to the emergence of organic being as obvious centres of will, is another step onward in the manifestation of it. It is from amid these organic beings that there is evolved ultimately man with his capacity to serve as the medium of revelation of the mantras. The latter themselves are just embodiments of the original will which finally manifests itself in the form of actions enjoined by the mantras. As the manifestation of will, human actions combine in the building of the human world. According to Sanatkumāra, the entire creation in all its aspects and departments is only a manifestation of will which, though passing from one stage to another, sometimes imperceptively even, maintains the constancy of its flow throughout. It is the most fundamental principle of creation operating from the biggest to the smallest, from the mightiest to the tiniest, from the inorganic to the organic all at once. Under its impulsion, the inorganic evolves into the organic and the organic recreates the inorganic in its own way.

The will Sanatkumāra, of course, is very well comparable to that of Schopenhauer. The Schopenhauerian Will is the "sum-total of all physical and organic processes" on the one hand and "thought processes and conscious processes" on the other. It is the original force lying at the root of the world, the latter being only a manifestation of it. It not only operates in "man and animal as their inmost nature" but may be recognized as the force.

> "Which germinates and vegetates in the plant, and indeed the force through which the crystal is formed, that by which the magnet turns to the north pole, the force whose shock he experiences from the contact of two different kinds of metals."

It is an impersonal cosmic force which is immanent in the world and at the same time constitutes the inmost being of the individual. It is personal as well as impersonal, cosmic as well as extracosmic, microcosmic as well as macrocosmic. It is the undivided and uncaused cause of everything. As the primeval cause, it gives rise, first of all, to ideas. Ideas are genera antecedent to particulars. Thus, as regards the ideas, Schopenhauer seems to be indebted to Plato. But, so far as the Will is concerned, he stands almost alone in the entire Western philosophy. It is, therefore, quite likely that for his view of it, he is indebted particularly to this passage of the Upaniṣad. In fact, his Will

seems to combine in it the Upaniṣadic Ātman as the thing-in-itself, *kāma* as the creative urge and *Saṅkalpa* as the conative push.

Schopenhauer's Will as the thing-in-itself admitted whether under the impact of the Upaniṣad or independently by himself, bears out the inestimable potentiality of the Upaniṣadic concept of will. It was rightly suggested as a symbol of Brahman by Sanatkumāra even in supersession of mind or reflection. As reflection is subservient to will even by modern standards, it was perfectly in the fitness of things that mind gave way to will in the quest for more and more excellent a symbol of Brahman.

Thought

In supersession of will is suggested thought as a symbol of Brahman by Sanatkumāra. The ground for the supersession as given here is its relatively greater comprehensiveness. The criterion of the judgement is the priority of its over will. It is only after one thinks about something, maintains the teacher, that one wills about it. At stated earlier, reflection, speech, designation and action only follow will consecutively. Conversely, all of them, including will, are liable to be merged in thought. The simple illustration given here to prove the point is the case of a man who, though well-informed, is thoughtless. His whole learning become a suspect as soon as people come to know that he is thoughtless. As against it, the teacher refers to the case of another person who, though not well-informed, shows signs of thoughtfulness. In view of his thoughtfulness, people do scarcely doubt that he is not well-informed. Such a man automatically commands respect in the society in preference to the highly educated but thoughtless. Thus it is evident that learning will reflection, speech, nomenclature and action derive their value from thought and are evaluated with reference to it. It is the source and final resort of all these functions. It comparison to all the lesser functions, thought is regarded as most fundamental and comprehensive. In view of this, it was legitimately adopted as a symbol of Brahman in supersession of will even.

Meditation

The next symbol in Sanatkumāra's scheme of things is meditation. The ground for its supersession of thought is the same primacy of its over the latter. The criterion of judgement applied here is the same as indicated in the preceding case. According to Sanatkumara, the whole world is meditative. As he puts it:

> The earth meditates, as it were. The atmosphere meditates, as it were. The heaven meditates, as it were. The waters meditate, as it were. The mountains meditate, as it were. Gods and man meditate, as it were.

Thus, in his view, meditation is the most comprehensive principle of things whether physical, human or divine. It may be conceived as the principle of permanence operating from within the flux. Bereft of it, the world have been a sheer flux, without anything tangible and discrete in it. Meditation, indeed, is the *tapas* which is responsible for bringing out the egg of tangible and discrete creation from the womb of Nature. It constitutes the background against which thought and other lesser principles operate. Thought is only an uprush of the meditative state. The more meditative a man, the more thoughtful he is. Accordingly, he commands a higher esteem in the society. As against it, the less meditatie a man, the less thoughtful he is. Consequently, he is given more and more to quarreling, abusing and slandering. Meditation brings

thoughtfulness and greatness to man. In view of being more comprehensive and fundamental, it is aptly suggested as a symbol of Brahman in supersession of thought.

It is worth nothing here that Sanatkumāra's symbolization of Brahman by meditation is something unique. It is usual to find thinkers searching for the root of the idea of the Supreme in some natural phenomenon, organic being and psychic function, such as instincts, emotions and ideas. But the same has probably never occurred to anyone with regard to meditation, though the fact is that great sages of all times have searched for the Supreme consciously or unconsciously in the state of meditation. The inevitable necessity of it in the realization of the Supreme is indicative of the fact that the latter has necessarily to do something with meditation. If the Supreme is the permanent in the fleeting on the universal scale, meditation is the permanence in the flux of psychic functions. As such, Sanatkumāra's trust in it as a more appropriate symbol of Brahman than thought, cannot be regarded as misplaced.

Understanding

Understanding is another symbol of Brahman suggested by Sanatkumāra in suppression of meditation. The ground for the supersession is the understanding's comprehension of what meditation brings to the fore. If the earth, the atmosphere, the heaven, the waters, the mountains, gods and men take recourse to meditation, understanding comprehends them as such. Beside this, it comprehends the knowledge of these entities as embodied in the four Vedas, in the history, in the Purāṇas, in grammar, in the science of the Fathers, in mathematics, in the science of portents, in the science of time, in logic, in ethics, in the science of gods, in the science of knowledge, in the science of rulership, in astronomy, in the science of snake-charming and in the arts. If knowledge is higher than the object of knowledge and if understanding of the sources of knowledge is higher than the sources themselves, as the Upaniṣads axiomatically admit, understanding should be regarded as the highest of them all. Herein lies the reason for its choice in supersession of meditation.

The *Taittirīya* also makes use of this symbol and gives a twofold ground for its formation. As one of the grounds, it refers to the intimate instrumentality of understanding in the sacrificial performance. Since the performance involves certain things which are wholly imperceptible, materialization of them depends entirely on understanding. In the second place, the mysterious process of fruition of the *saṁskāras* in an altogether different world is also a matter of comprehension by understanding. Indeed, the whole science of sacrifice would have been impossible if it were not guided by understanding. Since gods form a part of the sacrificial phenomenon, they are said to meditate on understanding as Brahman.

There is another instance in the Upaniṣad which proposes understanding as a symbol of Brahman on account of serving as the source, support and final resort of the creation. This efers to the relaization of Bhṛgu. What the exact steps of this realization were, is not given explicitly there. But, from the setting of the whole account, it can safely be inferred that the symbolization was based on the experience that at the stage beyond mind, the physical, the vital and the mental seem to arise from understanding, dwell in it and finally merge in it. It is, of course, extremely paradoxical that though, on the materialistic assumption, all the finer layers of the human personality arise from

grosser principles, the direct psychological experience is that the grosser arise from and are subservient to the finer. Thus, if the materialistic reasoning leds us to the conclusion that we are the products of the physical, the direct psychological experience gives us the impression that the physical is only a vibration of the psychological. Whether it is the reasoning that is at fault or the experience that has become delusive, we are not going to decide here. What is relevant is the fact that the Upaniṣads uphold the priority of the psychological. In view of this, it was natural for them to have taken the psychic as the root, support and final resort of the physical. From among the psychic also, they regard the relatively subtler as the same in relation to the grosser. According, the *Taittirīya* records how Bhṛgu, advancing further from mind, arrived at understanding as Brahman.

But, while the *Taittirīya* goes ahead of understanding and conceives of delight as the next and final form of Brahman, Sanatkumāra makes a recoil on this juncture and falls back upon a few gross and grosser principles in succession. He considers strength as more comprehensive and fundamental than understanding. As the first ground for the preference, he refers to the fact that even a single strong man can make a hundred man of understanding tremble. As the second ground, he notes the fact that understanding develops on the basis of strength. For, it is only the strong who can approach a wise man, serve him, seek insight from him, listen to him, think over what he says, gain wisdom, do accordingly and understand things. As the third ground, he refers to the universality of strength. The earth, the atmosphere, the heaven, the mountains, men, gods, animals, birds, grass, trees, beasts, worms, flies, ants or, indeed, the entire organic and inorganic world is marked as dependent on strength. Accordingly, he regards strength as a more appropriate symbol of Brahman than understanding. The simple test for adjudging the primacy of strength over understanding, as suggested by the sage, is to observe the consequence of confrontation between the two. What usually happens is that even hundreds of man of understanding are prone to run away from a solitary strong man.

Sanatkumāra makes a further recoil in suggestion food as a symbol of Brahman in suppression of strength. The following is the reason given by him for the choice. If one were not to take food continuously for ten days, one can neither see, nor hear, nor think, nor know, nor do, nor understand anything. If the same person were given food again, he would have all these functions revived in him. This shows the dependence of these functions on food. He turns still backward in suggesting water, heat and space consecutively in suppression of food as better and better symbols of Brahman. Since these have already been discussed in an earlier chapter, we found content ourselves here only with the observation that while suggesting these latter symbols the sage takes to a route which is radically different from the earlier one. While in the case of the earlier symbols he moved from the subtle to the subtler, here he falls back from the subtle to the gross and then again to the subtle. Thus, while the former route is purely spiritual, the latter is mixed. For, it recoils from the spiritual to the material to some extent and then again moves towards the spiritual.

Memory

In course of the third movement, the sage, in supersession of space, refers to memory as a still better symbol of

Brahman. The reason for the choice is the indispensability of memory in dealing with psychic processes and matters dependent on them. For instance, transmission of sound is the most fundamental; function of space. Now, even if there were a large number of persons sitting in a small space and trying to talk to one another, they would obviously fail in their effort if they have lost their memory. Thus it is evident that space is dependent on memory in carrying out its most primary function. In view of this, the sage gives priority to memory as a symbol of Brahman.

Hope

On Nārada's inquiring for a still more comprehensive symbol, the sage refers to hope. The reason is obvious. While the psycho-physical principles mentioned prior to memory constitute the present phase of the reality,—memory itself forming the entire past of it,— hope represents its future. If the present is liable to be truncated into nullity when bereft of the past, it is prone to be rendered meaningless when made short of its possible future. To put it in the idiom of the sage himself,if due to lacking in memory we are not in position to recognize our own sons and cattle, lacking similarly in hope we would not even desire for them, to talk the least of owning them. Thus, if memory outbalances the entire psycho-physical reality, hope outbalances both of them put together. In view of this comprehensive role of it, memory is suggested as the most appropriate symbol of Brahman referred to so far in the series.

PRĀṆA

When Nārada asks if there is anything more comprehensive than hope which can serve as a symbol of Brahman, Sanatkumāra refers to *prāṇa*. According to him, it is so comprehensive as to include in it all the fourteen entities and principles mentioned above in the same way as the hub of a chariot's wheel makes all the spokes to converge towards it. Though one, it manifests itself in diverse forms. It assumes the form of the giver on the one hand and that of the receiver on the other all at the same time. It is the gift as well. It assumes the form of father, mother, brother, sister, teacher, priest and the rest. Secret of the above relationships lies in the diversification of *prana*. The simple device suggested by the teacher for adjudging the truth of the above proposition is to observe that while the above relatives are alive, even a harsh word used towards anyone of them is prone to bring defamy to the person concerned. But, when all of them are left by their *prāṇas*, even piercing their dead bodies with a spear is considered to be immaterial. Thus it is *prana* which assumes the form of these relatives. Since the society consists of these relations, the whole of it or, indeed, the totality of existence is just a manifestation of *prāṇa*.

The world is a field of interrelated objects and principles. The relationships can broadly be taken to be fourfold. In the first place, we have the relationship of the subject, the object and the connecting link. This relationship is illustrated in the Upaniṣad through the connection among the giver, the receiver and the gift. Secondly, there is the causal relationship. It is illustrated by mutual relations obtaining among the father, the mother and the child. The third form of relationship is the one obtaining between the parallels. It is exemplified by the mutual relations obtaining between brothers and sisters. The fourth form of relationship is cognitive. It interrelates the source of knowledge, the knower and the knowledge. It is illustrated here by the link existing among the teacher, the taught and the teaching. While the first and the last

forms of the relationship are psychic, the second is temporal and the third spatial. But, howsoever divergent, these relationships, according to the sage, are operated by *prāṇa*. Where the relationship has become organic, it works from within the father, the mother, the child, the brother, the sister, and the teacher. But, where it has remained inorganic, it works as the law of causality, conservation and pervasion. Since it is *prāṇa* which serves through all these forms of relationship whether psychic, temporal or spatial, there is nothing, according to Sanatkumāra, which can be regarded as a better symbol of Brahman.

It is evident from the above details that *prāṇa*, as used here, is not merely the physical function of breathing. It is something deeply psychic, having breathing etc., as only its outer manifestations. And yet it is just an approximation of the Ultimate which is the real object of the Upaniṣadic quest. Though extremely interior, so such so, of course, as to have the entire world centred in it, it is only a representation and by no means the original. Now, when everything else in the world has been withdrawn and merged in *prāṇa* the problem is how to go beyond *prāṇa* itself so as to make the final transition from the symbol of what is sought to be symbolized which, in the present case, is Brahman.

It is with a view to explaining the psychology of the final transition that the sage introduces the discussion of the next section of the Upaniṣad. As the transition involves a leap beyond all the manifestations of the world, the sage calls the aspirant of this knowledge *ativādin*, transcendentalist. The first requisite for the transition that he points out is the desire for knowing the truth. As the knowledge of truth needs understanding, the latter is put as the second requirement. Similarly, thinking, faith, stability, action and joy are regarded respectively as the third, the fourth, the fifth, and sixth and the seventh requirements. Since all the seven factors are put here in a progressive causal order, joy is to be regarded as the most fundamental among all of them. Thus, if *prāṇa* is the most powerful symbol available to man for representing Brahman, joy is the most fundamental psychic principle capable of bringing out the required transition from the symbolic to the symbolized or from *prāṇa* to Brahman. As soon as the alchemy of joy is applied to *prāṇa*, the latter makes transition to what the sage calls *bhūman*, and infinite. Having come within the purview of *bhūman*, joy also undergoes transformation. It becomes immortal delight. When the finite touches the psychic bed-rock of delight, it gets transformed into the Ātman. Realization of the latter reveals to the seeker how all the symbolic entities referred to above are just offshoots of it. *Prāṇa*, hope, memory, space, heat, water, food, strength, understanding, meditation, through, will, mind, speech and name, all are realized simply as different manifestations of the Ātman. Indeed, all the Vedas and universal entities or, in other worlds, the whole of the world in its subjective as well as objective form, is visualized by the transcendentalist as rooted in the Ātman.

And the Ātman, indeed is Brahman. Having reached the limit in objective extension as well as subjective depth, when the series of symbolic entities culminates in infinity and delight, it transports the seeker from the world to the Reality. When viewed pre-eminently from the standpoint of the subjective depth and intensity, the Reality assumes for us the form of the Ātman. On the other hand, when visualized pre-eminently from the

viewpoint of objective extension, it comes to be known as Brahman. This, however, does not mean any bifurcation between the two forms. One without the other is an impossibility in the same way as extension without intensity or *vice versa* is an impossibility even on the physical plane. The inevitability of either of the two dimensions is brought out succinctly elsewhere in the same Upanisad in its famous observation:

Prāṇa is Brahman, delight is Brahman, space is Brahman.

It is to be noted here that the idea expatiated so comprehensively in the discourse of Sanatkumāra, has been put succinctly not only in the above passage of the Upaniṣad but also twice in the fourth chapter of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. As already discussed in the preceding chapter, in course of his conversation with Yājñavalkya, king Janaka mentions how one Śaulbāyana told him that *prāṇa* was Brahman. As the ground for the definition was suggested the indispensability of *prāṇa* in life. But Yājñavalkya was not satisfied with this definition. He characterized the *prāṇa* Brahman as one-footed and, in order to make it four-footed, he referred to *prāṇa*, space and dearness as the rest of its feet. Now, while *prāṇa*, space and dearness of this account are almost the same as *prāṇa*, space and delight of the fourth chapter of the *Chhāndogya*, they also bear resemblance to *prāṇa*, *bhūman* and joy as suggested by Sanatkumāra to Nārada in the present context. The basis feature of all the three accounts is common. It lies in symbolizing Brahman by *prāṇa* as supported by extension and marked by a certain hedonics value. *Prāṇa* itself is considered to be extensive as well as hedonic. But there is a limit to it in both the respects. In extension it is limited to the universe while in its hadonic value it is confined to the individual. It requires, therefore, to be expanded on either side. By way of attempting to give expression to a still greater extensiveness, the sage brings in space. Similarly, by way of tracing joy of its utmost depth, he comes to delight.

Almost the same position is held by the passage quoted above from the fourth chapter of the *Chāndogya*. But Sanatkumāra develops the symbol further on both the sides. As regards extension, leaving space and *prāṇa* behind, he comes to *bhūman*. *Bhūman* denotes something much more than spatial extension which is the literal meaning of *kha*. Moreover, if the earlier passage equates *kha* with *ka*, Sanatkumāra brings *sukha* on a par with *bhūman*. The addition of *su* to *kha*, as is evident in the formation of *sukha*, is indicative of Sanatkumāra's attempt to go beyond the earlier definition. "What is infinite, that is a greater delight", is suggestive of a higher state of things than what is implied in "what indeed is delight that verily is space, and what indeed in space, that verily is delight." The "Infinity-Delight" is obviously an improvement upon the "Space Delight" as an expression characterizing Brahman. This improvement upon the expression does not only suggest Sanatkumāra having presupposed the philosophy of the fires, but also shows how the sage attempts to make a smooth transition to the Reality.

Delight

Delight is the last psychic symbol used for Brahman as well as for the Atman in several of the Upaniṣads. Brahman is put as *kam* besides *prāṇa* and *kham* in the teachings of the fires imparted to Upakosals as recounted in the *Chāndogya*. Sanatkumāra also, after having left behind him a series of symbols, ultimately come to *bhūman* as the best possible form in which Brahman can be meditated on and

characterizes it as joy. The joy of the Infinite is the Supreme Delight itself. Apart from these and several other cases of indirect symbolisation, there is one in the *Taittirīya* which is direct and much more detailed. Here delight is found out as lying inside *uijñā* which is said to be filled with it. It is described as of the shape of a person.

The apparent personality of the individual is said to be fashioned after his inmost personality of delight. Dearness is regarded as its head, joy as its right wing, happiness as its left wing, delight itself as its self and Brahman as its tail on which it sits. What is envisaged as the inmost and most comprehensive view of the Ātman here, is discovered as Brahman by Bhṛgu, as recounted in the last part of the Upaniṣad. After having gone beyond *vijñāna*, he comes to delight and declares it as Brahman. The ground for his conclusion is the same well-known definition which characterizes Brahman as that form which all these creations arise, in which they are sustained and to which they are destined ultimately to return. Since delight is experienced by him as possessed of all these characteristics, he decides in favour of it as Bahman. Moreover, it is significant to note that unlike in the case of food, *prāṇa*, mind and *vijñāna* which have been transcended one after another leading ultimately to delight, here, reaching the latter, the seeker has no other sheath to penetrate. This bears out the fact that delight is the last conceivable psychic principle in terms of which the Supreme Being can be understood.

As is obvious from our discussions so far, delight, as a symbol of Brahman, is reached after having passed through the dense forest of the external nature, the allurements of the organic functions, the misgivings of the lower mind and the synoptic deliberations of *vijñāna*. This achievement is by no means the consequence of the *sādhanā* of a certain Bhṛgu, Ypakosala, Sanatkumāra, Nārada and the like exclusively. Rather it is the result of the cumulative spiritual efforts put in for aeons. The efforts, however, are crowned ultimately by the *sādhanā* of integration practised by these sages.

The *sādhanā* might naturally have taken recourse to all possible avenues of introversion. To ascribe its beginning specifically to the phenomena of dream and sound sleep, as Deussen, of course, does, is arbitrary. It is probably under the impact of Plato and Shakespeare, whom he quotes in his support, or in keeping with the Western way of thinking as a whole that he attributes the idea of delight in the Upaniṣads originally to these phenomena. For, though it is true that the Upaniṣads make frequent reference to the phenomena of dream and sound sleep in connection with the idea of delight and that some of these references occur as early as in the fourth chapter of the *Bṛahadāraṇyaka* to which specifically Deussen attributes the introduction of the idea and even in the second chapter of the same Upaniṣad, yet, at the same time, it too is to be noted that in the same chapter of the Upaniṣad delight is also associated with the phenomenon of sex. To go still far back and, indeed, in its first and sole occurrence in the *Ṛgveda*, the world *ānanda* is associated with the experience of drinking Soma. As such, it would not be justifiable to associate the idea with a particular mode of experience, to the exclusion of the rest.

On the contary, what is most probable is that man from the very beginning tended to have more and more of joy. Initially he would have sought it in those objects which proved favourable and pleasant to him. But, by and by, he would have become conscious of the role of his

subjective being in the act of feeling rejoiced. While the act of drinking Soma etc. would have given him the opportunity to experience unusually intense pleasure in the contact of something external, the state of introversion induced whether through sound sleep or meditation, would have led him to the feeling of joy even in complete absence of anything external. Coming down to the Upaniṣads, meditation ultimately prevailed over other ways of experiencing joy. The other ways are introduced in the Upaniṣads as analogies to the path of meditation. This is evident from various accounts of meditation given in the texts.

As regards the psychology of meditation, needless to observe that it consists in diving and deeper into the interior of the human psyche. The deeper one moves, the more one gets rid of the compulsions and tensions of the exterior. Meditation on the external world as Brahman does not only purify the mind of the meditator but also rarefies the world for him. It is made worth of assimilation to oneself. It is made the food of the physical sheath of the meditator, as it were. The next course of meditation is meant for rendering the physical sheath, along with its external counterpart, into the vital. The rendering and the consequent assimilation also may be put in terms of digestion. On the third step, all the above three factors get rarefied and assimilated to the sheath of *vijñāna*. The last course of meditation further rarefies all the above factors into delight and gets them assimilated to the sheath of delight. The final transformations also may be put in terms of the act of eating. Just as the food, by passing through different stages of digestion, become more and more subtilized so as to forego all the sense of otherness and becomes one with the body ultimately, even so the process of meditation renders the entire exterior into the sheath of delight. Just as the food, reaching the point of final assimilation to the body, becomes exactly of the same quality as the body, so the entire exterior, being assimilated to the sheath of delight, becomes delight itself. This analogy may further be extended to make out the point that just as the body is not the same as the food assimilated to it on a particular occasion, even so the Supreme Delight is not merely the product of the assimilation of the exterior to the inmost being.

To review the Upaniṣadic accounts in the light of the above analogies, it may be noted that the *Taittirīya's* description of the assimilation of the different sheaths successively one to the other and finally of all of them to the sheath of delight is exactly of the above sort. What it calls *upasaṅkramaṇa* of the exterior into the interior, is simply the taking over of the former, rarefying and assimilating it to the next interior sheath. If the whole account is replete pre-eminently with references to food, it is not only due to emphasizing the importance of food in life but also for the sake of bringing out by means of the physical analogy the spiritual processes of rarefication and assimilation. This is how we can explain the relevance of the *sāman* mantras chanted by one who, having rarefied and assimilated the lower sheaths, has ultimately reached the sheath of delight. He feels that he is the eater and the food as well as the agent associating with each other the first two. This is simply a figuratively way of saying that he realizes himself as the subject and the object as well as the link connecting the two. In this threefold capacity he realizes himself as the first-born of Ṛta and thus as the centre of immortality. He considers himself to be the food and the final eater of himself. Thus he feels as if he comprehends the

whole of the world within him. One feeling like the above must have established one's identity with the Ātman or Brahman which in the *Kaṭha* is described as the Supreme Eater eating everything with the aid of Death itself as the sauce. The *Taittirīya* further describes this state of consummate self-realization to be as brilliant as the sun. It is that supreme psychic state which elsewhere is said to constitute the finest golden sheath containing taintless and pure Brahman within it.

On the other hand, the last psychic state of interiorization serves also as the starting point of the process of exteriorization. This is borne out by the following passage of the *Taittirīya* according to which.

> Non-existent verily was in the beginning. From it verily was born existence. It created the Ātman by itself. On account of this, it is called *sukṛta*. What verily is *sukṛta*, that verily is *rasa*. For, having obtained the *rasa*, indeed, he becomes delighted. For who, indeed, could live, who could breathe, if there was not this delight in space.

It is evident from the above that in the eye of the sage, *svayaṅkṛta*, *sukṛta* and *rasa* mean one and the same state of self-creation. What is created by oneself out of oneself is said to be *sukṛta* which expressly has an aesthetic connotation in addition to the essential psychic one. Aesthetic beauty coincides with harmony. When the essential, psychic and harmonious reality is sought to be expressed in gross symbolic form, it is put *rasa*. The symbol is taken from the process of eating, digesting and assimilating to oneself a particular item of food. When the same *rasa* is considered from the affective viewpoint, it is called *ānanda* or delight. Thus delight is the essential, psychic and harmonious reality described from the affective viewpoint. It is said to be the state of absolute fearlessness. As regards fear, the same Upaniṣad, as well as the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* considers it as caused by the feeling of otherness. Thus the state of absolute fearlessness must be the state of self-being.

The same is also suggested by the gradation of delight as given in both, the *Taittirīya* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. According to both of them, a self-contented student of the Veda experiences the delight of Brahman. This statement is interesting particularly in view of the fact that the delight experienced by the student is, indeed, the delight of the Ātman, which is reached through the inward path of interiorization and relinquishment of desires while the delight of Brahman is measured by multiplying innumerable times the joy experienced by a noble, young man, well read, most optimistic, stout, energetic, and having possession over the whole of the earth with all her wealth. This bears out the equivalence of the delight experienced by utmost introversion on the one hand and expansion of the other. The introvertive is the delight of the Atman while the opposite of it is the delight of Brahman.

Yet, both are essentially one and the same. It is the fundamental principle of creation which, as Ṛta, is being drunk by the Ātman and Brahman both in the world of *sukṛta* lying in the cave of the highest abode of the upper half, as the *Kaṭha* puts it. It is the principle of immortality which, when offering itself to the flux of the world, assumes the form of mortality. To put the same figuratively, it is the *rasa* felt at the initial stage intrinsically by the poet himself and made manifest secondarily in the form of a poem portraying an array of characters spread in the objective world and imbued with all shades of feelings which get arranged and harmonized so as

to produce the same *rasa* within the reader.

Thus, by virtue of constituting the inmost driving force as well as the highest aim of our spiritual being, delight is aptly chosen as the inmost and most comprehensive symbol of Brahman. Here, however, the question may arise whether delight is only a symbol of Brahman or an essential attribute of it. One may argue that since a symbol is treated as identical to the object it symbolizes only analogically and by no means actually, delight, as a symbol, ought to be treated as identical to Brahman only that way. But the counter-argument also may be advanced that since the aim of the symbol is to take us to the object it symbolizes as intimately as possible and since in the present case the whole process of symbolization ends with the arrival at delight, the latter should be treated as a real attribute of Brahman. If the former argument is supported by Upaniṣadic statements propounding uncompromising transcendence of Brahman, as is evident in *neti neti* and kindred statements, the latter finds support in several such axiomatic statements in which Brahman is described as delight. The ineliminability of delight in the context of Brahman as also in that of the Ātman, is evident not only from the fact that the *Taittirīya* stops with the sheath of delight but also from the fact that while recounting the Ātman Brahman in terms of almost all those symbols as are used by Sanatkumāra, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* does not refer to delight. Can it not be taken to mean that the sage did this here under the assumption that delight is the ineliminable essential attribute of the Reality?

Rationale of Physic and Physical Symbols

The passage referred to last is interesting also inasmuch as it presents a beautiful summary of the entire symbolic exposition of Brahman and the Ātman as discussed above, though almost in a reversed order. The passage reads as follows:

> Brahman verily is this Ātman (which is) of the nature of understanding, of the nature of mind of the nature of *prāṇa*, of the nature of eye, of the nature of ear, of the nature of earth, of the nature of water, of the nature of air, of the nature of space, of the nature of heat, of the nature opposite to heat, of the nature of desire, of the nature of desirelessness, of the nature of anger, of the nature of angerlessness, of the nature of *dharman*, of the nature opposite to *dharman*, of the nature of all.

It is evident from the above passage that Brahman and the Ātman are one and the same. Consequently, whatever symbols have been used for the Ātman, should be valid for Brahman and *vice versa*. If the Ātman is represented by understanding, Brahman also should be represented by the same. This can be said equally well of the rest of the symbols also. Thus, the present passage shows that Brahman be put in the garb of symbols taken from the psychic as well as from the organic and physical phenomena. The physical symbols of the Ātman or Brahman, as enumerated here, are earth, water, heart, air, and space while in the discourse of Sanatkumāra they are food, water, heat and space. As regards the organic, only there most typical ones have been adduced here. There are *prāṇa*, eye and ear. So far as the psychic is concerned, instead of being represented by a long list of as many as nine principles, as in the discourse of Sanatkumāra, here it is introduced only by understanding and mind as, of course, supplemented by desire, anger and righteousness. But, howsoever meagre in

number these symbols are quite representative and bear out Yājñavalkya's through familiarity with the whole array of symbols related to Brahman as well as to the Ātman. Moreover, his characterization of the Ātman and Brahman both as of the nature of coldness as well as heat, desire as well desirelessness, anger as well as angerlessness, righteousness as well as unrighteousness, this as well as that and, indeed, of the nature of all, shows how he was capable of cognizing these identical principles obtaining even amid extreme polarities of the physical and psychic worlds.

In a certain sense, one forms the concepts of Brahman and Ātman by way of looking through the changing objects of the world and passing of life respectively. Brahman seems to expand in space while the Ātman appears to continue in time. Accordingly, it would have been easy to symbolize Brahman purely in spatial terms and the Ātman in temporal ones. Earth, water, light, air and space would have been natural symbols of Brahman while mind, *prāṇa*, ear, will, thought, understanding etc. would have formed suitable symbols of the Ātman. But, as against this hypothetical possibility, what we find actually is that Brahman has been symbolized in temporal as well as spatial terms while the Ātman has been symbolized in spatial as well as temporal terms. This interchange of symbolic forms seems to have been made possible due to the mutual relationship between time and space. The fact is that when we think of space, we necessarily have time as the background and conversely when we think of time, we cannot afford to ignore space. Thus, spatial ideas tend to become temporal while temporal ideas tend to become spatial. This mutual requirement of the two sets of ideas results in the processes of interiorization and exteriorization. The Ātman seeks to expend in the external world while Brahman is sought to be brought inward. In course of these converse movements of the related ideas, the Ātman comes to acquire physical symbols while Brahman the psychic. When the Ātman projects itself into the external world, it assumes the form of vegetations, organic beings, physical forces and objects. Conversely, when the idea of Brahman is interiorized, it is rendered into name, speech, mind, will, thought, meditation, understanding, memory, hope, *prāṇa* and delight. In the beginning these entities and principles themselves are held to be the Ātman and Brahman. But, with eventual dawn of discretion, they remain identified with these only provisionally. Being perforated by provisionality, the blind block of necessity in regard to the relationship between the Ātman-Brahman on the one hand and the external-internal on the other, brings up from within it an array of symbols representing the Ātman and Brahman.

Due to traversing the same path, though, conversely, they come to have those very common symbols associated with them, though with a difference in priority. It is the commonness of the symbols bringing out perfect experiential rapport between the Ātman and Brahman which is the central theme of the present exposition of Yājñavalkya's.

When the idea of Brahman arrives at the end of interiorization, it gets identified with the Ātman and, conversely, when the idea of Ātman reaches the acme of exteriorization, it become one with Brahman. When the Upaniṣad says "All this verily is Brahman," if, indeed, refers to the fundamental idea of Brahman. But when it adds "This Ātman is Brahman," it

virtually, refers to the interiorized from of Brahman. Conversely, when it says:

This Ātman inside the heart is smaller than a grain of rice, than a grain of barley, then a mustard seed, than a grain of millet, it refers to the fundamental idea of Ātman. But when it adds, This Ātman inside the heart is greater than the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the sky, greater than these worlds, it virtually refers to the exteriorized from of the same, coinciding ultimately with Brahman: "This is Brahman."

This dual process of interiorization and exteriorization, however, is by no means an arbitrary choice of the Upaniṣadic sage. It is rooted in the very grain of creation as conceived by him. Whether the primeval reality was Ātman or Brahman, the *Bṛhādaraṇyaka* presents both the probabilities and with the same result. It gives us the option to think that the reality was Brahman. Even then, it would have to be admitted that this Brahman was of the nature of consciousness. For, if it were not so, it would have been impossible to develop consciousness out of it. But, what would have been the object of the consciousness at the stage? Obviously, it could not be anything except Brahman itself. Thus the primeval consciousness must have been the nucleus of self-consciousness in the Being. As soon as we admit the nucleus, we cannot avoid admitting the Ātman as parallel to Brahman.

In fact, in any act of consciousness, a polarity of the conscious being and what it is conscious of is an inevitable necessity. One without the other is an impossibility. Howsover, we might go behind the subject-object dichotomy, admittance of the elements of both is the minimum requirement of any sensible view of reality. If Brahman was there primarily, it must have been a being rather than a mere entity. Hence, it must have been aware of itself. Here lies the ground for the presupposition of the Átman. If, one the contrary, the Atman was there primarily, it also, as the centre of self-consciousness, must have been a being. A centre of consciousness must obviously be conscious of something, even though of itself. What it is conscious of, must be extensive, even though in the consciousness itself. Thus, any admittance of being presupposes the field as well as the nucleus of consciousness. From among them, the centre must take cognizance of the field and the field must hold itself around the centre. While the act of cognizance would imply exteriorization, the act of holding to the centre would involve interiorization. Creation, indeed, is an interaction between these two tendencies. It is the field of search where Brahman is seeking for the Atman and the latter is seeking for Brahman. When man becomes aware of this nature of the reality, he plays the role either of Brahman searching for the Ātman or that of the Átman searching for Brahman. In both the case, the same steps would have to be taken, though conversely. This is why common symbols have been used for both the beings.

That Brahman and the Atman are two aspects of one and the same reality and that the creation of the world and realization of Brahman by the individual are sheer manifestations of the polarity between the two aspects, are obvious in the second and the third chapter of the *Taittirīya*. The second chapter starts with the proposition that the knowledge of Brahman leads to the Supreme. As regards Brahman, the Upaniṣad gives the following definition:

Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinity.

As its abode is pointed out the cave of the highest space. But, how is it possible for us to attain to this loftiest of all the goals? The clue is offered in the form of the suggestion to take to the path of the Ātman. As regards the metaphysical basis for the authenticity of the suggestion, it is provided in the form of the cosmogonic view that the creation has proceeded from the Ātman. Thus the Ātman is said to have given rise to space, the space to air, the air to fire, the fire to water, the water to earth, the earth of vegetations and the vegetations to the person. It is interesting here to note that instead of attributing the creation to Brahman which obviously was more in accordance with the context, the Upaniṣad ascribes it all to the Atman. This sudden shifting from Brahman to the Ātman suggests that the author of the Upaniṣad was inclined more to the Ātman than to Brahman in accounting for the creation. In his view, Brahman represents the ideal goal which for its attainment requires the agency of the Ātman. Since an *ātman* has to travel up to it, the Ātman, in his view, ought to have prepared the path for the travail. The substitution of Brahman by the Ātman and the ascription of the creation to the latter suggest that the sage regarded the Atman as the creative centre of Brahman. This is confirmed by other Upaniṣads also which, though regarding Brahman as the sole source of creation, introduce mostly the Ātman when the creation is actually to be brought about.

Being a manifestation of the Ātman, a particular *ātman*, as embodied in an individual, seeks to regain its original status through its own efforts. The efforts consist in retracing the steps taken by the Atman or Brahman in the course of manifestation. It is, indeed, a psychic recovery of the cosmic projection. The main landmarks left here serve as rest houses in the course of recovery. It is these landmarks which have been adopted as symbols of Brahman by the seeker.

Being the closest source, subsistence and resort of the *ātman*, food is taken as the first symbol of Brahman in this series. After being adopted as a symbol of Brahman, food is raised above the individual limitations and is viewed as a universal principle. It is conceived as the earth itself lying as food in the belly of space. Thus it becomes matter itself.

When one has established oneself fully on the plane of food, it is natural to took beyond food and see if it is not born of something subtler, more comprehensive and more fundamental. Withdrawing oneself from the material body, when one dives deeper within oneself, one comes to *prāṇa* and considers it for the time being as Brahman. Just as on the physical plane the body is considered as Brahman and the physical consciousness as the Atman, so on the plane of *prana* the vital body is considered as Brahman and the vital individual takes himself as the Ātman. On both these planes, the relationship between Brahman and the Ātman is one of the circle and the centre. If the circle is essential for the centre, the centre is essential for the circle. Likewise, if Brahman is essential for the Ātman, the Ātman is essential for Brahman.

The plane of *prāṇa* appears to be the highest only for the time being. Having established oneself full on it, when one looks still inward, one finds mind as subtler, more fundamental and comprehensive than *prāṇa*. Since mind seems to be the source, support and final resort of everything, it is aptly regarded as Brahman. This is what Bhṛgu realizes in the form of Mind Brahman.

If one dares go still inward, one is destined to reach understanding. On this plane, one feels the earlier steps as subordinate to it. To him the whole seems to arise out of it, stay on its support and be destined to merge in it. It is, therefore, rightly regarded as Brahman. It is said that gods meditate specially on understanding as Brahman, since it is understanding which makes one undertake sacrifice which is their feeder.

Moving still inward, one finally arrives at delight which is the inmost stratum of the human psyche. When one takes one's stand on it, everything seems to arise our of it, stay on its support and be destined to get dissolved in it. As such, it is rightly regarded as Brahman. This is what Bhrgu realizes as Delight-Brahman.

PSYCHOLOGY

Psychology is, integrally related to metaphysics. The Self in its essential nature, is the knower, one without a second, is beyond intellect. Still for practical purpose, it is involved as the subject, (rather witness), in all acts of cognition, volition and recollection. The transcendent state of the absolute unity of the Self defies description in any manner. But hypothetically the Self is to be conceived as the knower (subject), and as consisting of consciousness. This is sought to be established through a critical interpretation of the state of deep sleep. The apparent loss of consciousness in this state is ascribed to the essentially non-dual character of the transcendent principle of subjectivity. The light of consciousness is empirically felt only in relation to an objective reference. The absolute non-duality of the Self rules out the possibility of such objective reference:

> "That it does not know in that state is because, although knowing then, it does not know, for the knower's ability of knowing can never cease, because he is immortal. But there is no second(entity) separate from him which he can know" (IV. 3. 30).

The unity of the Self is transcendental and not empirical. This is made clear by terms like "*salila, ekaḥ* and *advaitaḥ*" in a significant passage which reads: "He (the Self) is (transparent) like water, is one, is the seer and is non-dual. This is the world of *Brahman*, this is its supreme attainment, this is its supreme glory, this is its highest world, this is its supreme bliss". (IV. 3. 32). The absolute transcendence of the Self, *sui-generis*, admits no empirical considerations like one and many, seer and seen, subject and object, knower and known: "Where there is duality, as it were there one smells, sees, hears, speaks, thinks of or knows another. But where everything has become just one's Self, then whereby and whom would one small, see, hear speak, think of or know? Whereby would one know him by means of whom one knows all this? By whom, O, Maitreyi, would one know the knower?" (II. 4. 14).

The Self, the principle owning to which all this is known, is thus beyond the ambit of duality wherein the relationship of subject and object—the premise of all psychological considerations and of epistemology—prevails. It, therefore, appears that psychological discussion has no basis or scope. But this apparent difficulty is overcome when one recalls that the state of complete transcendence of the self is real only for the rare individual who has realised *Brahman* and consequently for whom everything has become the Self. Though the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* holds that this realisation is possible for all even today: "And even to this day whoever in like manner knows it as 'I am *Brahman*', becomes all this" (I.4.10) until such realisation, the perception of distinction

persists as it is natural. The assertion, therefore: 'It is your *Ātman* which is within all" (III. 4.4) points to the everpresent possibility of Self-realisation. The statement of Deussen, therefore, that the text of the oldest Upaniṣads do not recognise two souls, but only one is not accurate since the oldest Upaniṣads do recognise duality at empirical level. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* pragmatically asserts that somehow *(as if)* the state of duality arisen when one does smell, see, hear, speak, think of the know the other. This state of duality is very real to most of the people for whom exposition of psychology as an independent branch of knowledge can be of great and real benefit.

Ātman as the Subject

The Self, being non-dual by nature, can not properly be described as the subject. For subject presupposes it antithesis, the object, both being mutually dependent. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, therefore, for the purpose of providing a valid basis for all consideration implicating duality, postulate the theory of two forms of *Brahman*: '*Brahman*, verily, has two forms: the formed and the formless, mortal and immortal, unmoving and moving, define and undefined', (II. 3. 1) and (11. 3. 5) posits the *prāṇa* and the space, *ākāśa* in the body, to be the subtle, immortal, moving and undefined. The Being or *puruṣah* in the right eye is said to be the essence of the subtle, immortal etc. This is how the *Brahman*, though not definable, become involved in the state of duality and consequently lends itself to be the subject in all psychological experience. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, moreover, presumes 'desire' referred to at I. 4. 17 to be responsible for the manifestation of the superlative ego—the seed of personality of the Self—that assumes the role of subject. Max Muller observes with regard to the subject: European philosophers, whatever they may hold about the soul, always speak of it as something that an be known and described and, therefore, may form a possible object. If the Hindu philosopher is clear on any point it is this that the subjective soul, the witness or knower or the Self can never be known as objective but can only be itself and thus be conscious of itself".

Regarding the antithesis of subject and object Prof. S.C. Sen says: "To comprehend the nature of the knowing Self or subject, it is necessary that we should regard it as the spirit, the conscious principle or the *Atman*, by whose light all things are lighted up. It is knower or subject in all experience and is in association with an object which it knows. Yet the two, the subject and the object are antithetical and sharply opposed. The essence of the subject consists in knowing, i.e., consciousness and the essence of the object consists in being known i.e., absence of consciousness".

It may be pointed out that both these scholars have not distinguished between the transcendent Ātman, the infinite Being ad the finite subject posed over against the object. The former is non-dual and its status is that of an unaffected witness, as indicated in "The seer of seeing, the knower of knowledge" etc. (III. 4. 20) and *asaṅgo hyayaṁ Puruṣaḥ*" (IV. 3. 15, 16.) who above all is the first principle for the world, 'by knowing which all this (universe) becomes known'. (II. 4. 5). Whereas the latter is the conditioned being, a manifestation of the former and as such is finite and it involved in all empirical experience as the subject. The realisation of the former as witnessing consciousness, as the transcendent principle of subjectivity renders the imperial subject an object amenable to deconditioning and merger into the infinite Being. Moreover, in

the *Ātman*, the antithesis of subject and object is transcended and resolved, as suggested in "When, indeed, everything has become one's own Self, then, whereby and whom would one see etc." (II. 4. 14). This hypothetical differentiation of the non-dual Self in the dichotomy of subject and object provides the necessary condition for the emergence of mind and prepares the ground for the discipline of psychology. As will be made clear later on, the perception of the absolute unity of the Self in whom the antithesis of the subject and object is resolved, is stated to be the aim of the analysis of the experience of three states of consciousness undertaken in this Upaniṣad.

Ontogenesis

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* consistently maintains that the *Brahman*, the transcendent Being is involved in all experience, assuming the role of subject or the knowing self in the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. *Brahman* is eternal and unborn. The Self, being identical with *Brahman*, is also 'taintless, beyond space, *unborn*, great and constant' (IV. 4. 20). Moreover, 'Verily, he is the great, unborn Self who is this person consisting of knowledge among the *prāṇas* (senses)' (IV. 4. 22). The unborn, beginningless Being, because of a teleological element inherent in it, undergoes the process of individuation.

The Self, though unborn by nature, when in the process of individuation comes into contact with the principle of concealment and eventually with the sensorium, is said to be born. The cause of this contact resulting in conditioning, and bondage and also freedom from it is the presence and absence of the element of 'desire'. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* states: "In the beginning this (world) was just the Self, one only. He desired, 'would that I had a wife, then I may have offspring. Would that I had wealth, then I would perform rites.' This much indeed is the (range of) desire". (I. 4. 17). This Self as Being is said to be juxtaposed with non-Being or 'Nothing,' covered by Death or Hunger which creates the mind as its first body. It further desired to have second self or body: "There was nothing whatever he in the beginning. By death, indeed, was this covered, or by Hunger, for Hunger is Death. He created mind, thinking, "let, me have a self or form (body)". Moreover, "He desired, 'let me have a second self' (body or form)" (I. 2. 4). In this manner the Self created all that exists. The creation of two selves (or bodies) is thus due to desire. The first body or mind may safely be described as the subtle body. And the second body is the physical one. This is the mode of ontogenesis, or the birth of the soul according to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.

'Desire' is responsible not only for the birth of the individual soul, but also determines his good or evil character, actions and behaviors, which in turn determine his becoming good or evil during his transmigrations. Casting off all desires, therefor, makes him what, in reality, he had always been, viz. *Brahman:* "This self is, verily, *Brahman*, consisting of (or identified with) intellect, *vijñānamayaḥ*, it is mind, vital breath, sight, hearing, earth, water, air, ether, light and no light, desire and absence of desire, anger and absence of anger, righteousness and absence of righteousness and all things. This is what is meant by saying: — (It) consists of this (what is perceived), consists of that (what is inferred). According as one behaves, so does one become. The doer of good becomes good, the doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action. Others, however, say that a person, verily, consists of desire. As is his desire

so is his will; as is his will, so is the deed he does, whatever deed he does, that he attains. Regarding this there is the following verse: "The object to which the mind is attached, the subtle self goes together with the deed, being attached to it alone. Exhausting the results of whatever works he did in this world, he comes back from that what world to this world for (fresh) work'. This is undeed (for) the man who desires. But the man who does not desire, he who is without desire, who is freed from desire, whose desire is satisfied, whose desire is the Self; his breaths do not depart. Being *Brahman*, he merges in *Brahman*. Regarding this there is the followin verse: 'When all the desires that dwell in the heart are cast away, then does the mortal become immortal, then he attains *Brahman* here (in this very body)'. Just as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead, cast off, even so lies this body. But this (disembodied) immortal *prāṇa* (life-breath) is *Brahman* only, is, verily, light only". (IV. 4. 5, 7).

These passages very clearly state the real nature of the self, and also provide the *raison-d' etre* of his embodiment and becoming good or evil, his transmigratory wanderings and this final deliverance. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* maintains that the self is *Brahman* and that his embodiment and transmigration are due to desire. The state of embodiment does in no way prevent his regaining his real identity. It can reasonably be argued that, since the emancipation of the self from his conditioned finite state can be secured through elimination of desire, his involvement in transmigratory existence must have a limit. That the career of the Self as a conditioned soul is a temporary affair, however, long it may be, is taken for granted. But the Upaniṣad does not state that it (the state of his being a finite soul) is unreal. As compared with the absolute reality of *Brahman*, the reality of the conditioned self may be said to be relative. But to say that "the entire individual soul as such as no reality, and yet the system cannot avoid treating it as a reality, and discussing in detail its organs and attributes, its wandering and final deliverance" is to miss the spirit of the text.

PRAṆA, MIND AND SENSES

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II. 3. 1. postulates, as stated earlier, two forms of *Brahman*, of which the *prāṇa* of life-breath is its formless aspect: — "Now the formless is the life-breath and the space which is within the self. This is immortal, moving and undefined. The essence of this formless, immortal, moving and undefined is this person who is in the right eye, for he is the essence of the undefined". (II. 3. 5).

This passage seeks to establish that the person in the right eye, i.e. the individual soul consists of the essence of *prāṇa* which is the formless and immortal aspect of *Brahman*. When, by complete elimination of desire, the mortal or embodied soul becomes immortal and disembodied, it becomes again *prāṇa* which is said to be the *Brahman*, or light that is pure consciousness (IV. 4. 7). Thus among the essential constituents of the conditioned soul, *prāṇa* represents the *Brahman* in its immortal aspect. All other constituents, except *prāṇa* and the space within the self, are the formed and mortal aspect of *Brahman:* "Now with reference to the Self; Just this is the formed, what is different from the life-breath and the space within the self. This is unmoving, this is defined. The essence of this formed, mortal unmoving and defined is the eye, for it is the essence of the defined" (II. 3. 4). The eye stands for all sense-organs and the organism which represent the formed and

mortal aspect of *Brahman*. The conditioned soul, therefore, though finite, contains in him the Infinite Being, responsible for his very 'being'.

Thus, it is *Brahman* or Self (Ātman) that has entered the body to the tips of the nails as fire in wood. But being hidden, the Self remains unseen, whereas the senses—this visible and functional manifestations-give a clue to his presence: "He (the Self) entered here (the forms) even to the tips of nails, as a razor is (hidden) in the razor-case, or fire in the fire-source. Him they seen not for (as seen) he is incomplete. When breathing he is called *prāṇa* or the life-breath, when speaking speech, when seeing the eye, when hearing the ear, when thinking the mind. These are merely his functional or formal names". (I. 4. 7).

This passage indicates that the senses, including *prāṇa*, are the manifest and functional aspect of the Self. One cannot, therefore, know the true nature of the senses, till one meditates on and knows the Self, in whom they are unified: 'He who meditates on one or another of them (aspects) does not know, for he is incomplete with one or another of these (characteristics). The Self is to be meditated upon, for in it all these become one. The Self is the foot trance of all these, for by it one knows them all, just as one can find again by footprint (what was lost)." (I. 4. 7).

Among the senses or the functional aspects of the Self, *prāṇa* is the supreme, for it functions constantly and still does not get tired like other senses. In fact, it is *prāṇa* that sustains all other senses, which are in a way its aspect. All the senses, therefore, are known by the common name, *prāṇas*. Moreover, in order to get over the evil of death, the Upaniṣad advise one to observe the vow of breathing-in and breathing-out in a regulated manner: "Now next a consideration of the vow. Prajāpati produced the conative senses. They quarreled with one another. Speech resolved 'I will go on speaking'. They eye 'I will go on seeing'. The ear 'I will go on hearing'. And thus the other organs, each according to its function. Death, having become weariness, laid hold of them. It took possession of them. Having taken possession of the them, death held them back from their work. Therefore, speech becomes weary (gets tired), the eye becomes weary, the ear becomes weary. But death did not take possession of him who is the middle breath. They (the senses) sought to know him and said, 'This is, verily, the greatest among us, since (it), whether moving or not moving, is not pained, is not injured, let us all assumed it form'. Of him indeed they became a form. They (the senses), therefore, are called after it as '*prāṇāḥ*'. Regarding this, there is the following verse: 'From whom the Sun rises and in whom it sets; in truth from *prāṇa* it rises and in *prāṇa* it sets. Him the deities made the law or *Dharma;* he is only today and he (remains) tomorrow also'. Verily, what (vow) they (the deities) performed of old, even that they do today. Let a man, therefore, observe one vow only. He should breathe-in and breatheout, wishing, 'let not the evil of death overpower me'. And when he performs it, let him try to complete it. Thereby he wins complete union with that divinity and residence in the same world with him".

Among the essential constituents of the conditioned soul, while mind, the offspring of desire, through its attachment to objects, perpetuates its transmigratory existence, as mentioned earlier, the *prāṇa* helps to promote control of mind, concentration and expansion of awareness to the extent that one attains union which the Divine, i.e. regains his Self-hood.

After securing immortality for the senses, the *prāṇa*, next, secured food for

himself by chanting. But on request, it distributed that food equally among the senses, which entered it and become its essential parts: "Then it (the life breath) obtained food for itself by chanting. For whatever food is eaten is eaten by him alone, in *prāṇa* it is established. These deities (the senses) said, 'Just this much is whatever food there is and that you have obtained for yourself by chanting. Now let us have a share in this food' he said, 'then sit around facing me (enter into me). ' 'So be it'. They entered into him on all sides. Therefore, whatever food one eats by *prāṇa*, they (the senses) are satisfied by it' (I.3.18).

Moreover, *prāṇa* is called *ayāsya aṅgirasah*, as it resides in *āsya* or mouth and is the essence of all *aṅgas* or limbs: "He is called *a āsya aṅgirasa* for he is the essence of the limbs. Verily, life-breath is the essence of the limbs. Therefore, from whatever limb the *prāṇa* departs, that, indeed, dries up; for it is, verily, the essence of the limbs." (I. 3. 19).

The *prāṇa* is closely related to speech. It is, therefore, said to be the singer of *udgītha*, a chant of *Sāman;* even it is identified with *udgītha*. It is said to be supported by food: "And this (*prāṇa)*, verily, is *Bṛhaspati*. This speech is *bṛhatī* and this is its lord. Therefore, this is *Bṛhaspati*. Speech, verily, is its support, for when supported by it, the *prāṇa* chants. But some say it is supported by food". (I. 3. 20, 27). The *Bṛhadārnyaka*, V. 15. states that *Gāyatrī* has three feet, each consisting of eight syllables. *Prāṇa*, *apāna* and *vyāna* make eight syllables, which constitute one foot of the *Gāyatrī*. Its fourth foot is said to be the Sun that shines beyond darkness of *rajas* (V. 14. 3). The *Gāyatrī* is based on the Self. *Gāyatrī* protects the *gayas;* the *gayas* are the *pranas* or life-breaths. Because it protects the *gayas*, therefore, it is called *Gāyatrī*, (V. 14. 4).

The *prāṇa* and food are interdependent and when united they sustain life. "Food is *Brahman'* say some. That is not so, for food becomes putrid without *prāṇa*. *'Prāṇa* is *Brahman'* say some. This is not so, for *prāṇa* dries up without food. But these two deities, when united, attain there highest state". (V. 12. 1). Thus *prāṇa*, though a psychical element is supported by material substance. This may be termed as the psychology of alimentation.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II. 2. 3. quotes as verse from the *Atharva Veda*, X.8.9. which describes a *camasa* or a drinking bowl with its opening at the side below and its bottom at the top. The text further explains that the head it that *camasa*, mouth being its opening and its bottom at the top. Seven sages dwell at its edges. They are seven *prāṇas* or sense-apertures, viz., the two ears are Gotama and Bhāradvāja, the two eyes are Viśvāmitra and Jamadagni, the two nostrils and Vasiṣtha and Kaśyapa and the tongue is Atri as it eats *(atti)* food.

This may be regarded as the beginning of the enumeration of the senses. It should be noted that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* does not use the world *indriya* for senses but the common name *prāṇāh* is used to denote all the senses.

The world *'indriya'* is used to denote semen, which is considered as the essence of man. It also denotes luster, virility and glory. It is also used in the sense of the organ or generation. From that is seems gradually to have been used to denote sense-organ in general.

Deussen states: "In *Chānd*. 3.1.3. and *Bṛih*. 6.4.5 ff. the world *indriyam* has still the meaning of "force" it is first employed by *Kauṣ*. 2. 15, *Kaṭha*. 3.4. as a name for the organs, as the physical force in man".

As can be seen in the light of the text like *"indriyeṇa te retasā reta ādadhāmi"* (VI. 4. 11) the statement of Deussen is inaccurate. It would be proper to trace the formation and use of that world. The world *prāṇa*, which

is used generally for all senses, is stated to be equivalent to the world *'aṅgirasa'* as it is the essence of all the *aṅgas*. (I.3.19). Next the *Prāṇa* acquired the equivalence with semen, the essence of man *'puruṣasya retaḥ (rasaḥ)*, (VI. 4.1). From that it came to suggest both semen and the organ by which semen is deposited or withdrawn. This is evident by the juxtaposition of the world *'indriyeṇa'* and *'retasā'*. Thus *prāṇa* in its capacity as the essence of *aṅgas* is called *'aṅgirasaḥ'* and it is also the same as *'retaḥ'*. At VI. 4.5. the world *'indriyam'*, *'tejaḥ'* and *'bhagaḥ'* all denoting lustre and power, are used as synonymous with the world *'retaḥ'*, *(idamaham tadreta ādade, punaramāmaitu indriyaṁ punarbhagaḥ)*. More significant is the text: *'punaragnirdhiṣṇyāḥ yathāsthānaṁ kalpantām'* (VI. 4.5.) i.e. "Let the fire and the altars be established again in their usual place" for it conceives the physical organ and the sense, located therein as distinct and used for it the analogy of alter and fire. At. IV. 4.1. the senses are called *tejomātrāḥ* or 'particles of light'. Thus the sockes of eye and the person located therein are different. That person is called *'indhaḥ'* because it is resplendent itself and also it illumines its object. *'indha'* is indirectly called *'indra'* (IV. 2.2).

This seems to be the source of the world *"indriya"*, which was preferred to the earlier common word *'prāṇa* or *'aṅga'* or even *'akṣan'*, for it conveyed the exact meaning of light and also a combined sense of divinity.

Prāṇa is thus trans-personal, present across the total personality of men and animals and even beyond it. In its completeness it is a bio-psycho-metaphysical principle. In the present chapter, however, attention will be focused on its psychic character.

As has been stated earlier, all the senses are essentially related to and are nourished and sustained by *prāṇa*, (I.3.18). The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* I.5.14-15 states that man who represent Prajāpati in his character as *saṁvatsaraḥ* or the year—the time principle measured by the sixteen digits of moon—has sixteen parts. Fifteen parts are called *vittam* or wealth that wax and wane, but the sixteenth part is *dhruvā kalā* or constant digit which is the same as *prāṇa* or Self. At I.4.17, it is stated that the eye is human wealth and the ear divine wealth. The eye and ear in this context represent all the senses, which are the wealth or the means of expansion of the Self. The senses are, therefore, said to be united into and protected by *prāṇa* at the time of sleep:— "Guarding his low nest with *prāṇa* the immortal (self) moves out of the nest" (IV.3.12). At the time of death, the senses get untied and become one, *'ekībhavanti'*, with the self who descends into the heart. And when the self departs, first the *prāṇa* departs; after it follow the other senses: "When this self gets to weakness, gets to confusedness, as it were, then the *prāṇas* gather round him. He takes to himself those particles of light and descends into the heart. When the person in the eye turns away, then he becomes non-knowing of forms. It gets united, 'he does not see,' they say. Similarly he does not smell, taste, speak, hear, think touch or know, they say. The point of his heart becomes lighted up and by that light the self departs either through the eye or through the head or through other aperture of the body. When he thus departs, *prana* departs after him. All the (other) *prāṇas*, senses depart after after it". (IV.4.1-2). This shows that the *prana* is one with the immortal Being and has post-mortem existence. This topic will be dealt with in the chapter on eschatology.

Thus the *prāṇa* is the nave in which all the senses are yoked, tied or organically joined. This fact of the *prāṇa* being the

controller of all senses is illustrated on the ground of the experience of sleep— "When this being falls asleep thus, then the person who consists of intellect, having by he virtue of his intelligence taken to himself all the *prāṇas* (senses), rests in the space within the heart. When the person takes-in these (senses), he is said to be asleep. When the *prana* is restrained, speech is restrained, the eye is restrained, the ear is restrained, the mind is restrained". (II.1.17).

The *prāṇa* is the chief among all the senses. The supremacy of *prāṇa* is brought home by two similar parables at I.3 and VI. 1.The former seeks to establish the greatness of *prana* by showing it to be, unlike other senses, invulnerable by the evil (of death). It is said that he gods defeated the Asuras by successfully making this *prāṇa* (in mouth) sing the *udgītha* or a *Sāman-chant*, which the other senses, viz., speech, breath (nasal), eye, ear and mind could do due to their selfish tendency and consequently being pierced with evil by the Asuras.

The latter parable at VI. I establishes the supremacy of *prāṇa* by sowing its presence necessary for continuance of life in the body. The senses disputed for self-superiority and went to Brahmā for a decision. The Brahmā said that the one is the greatest you after whose departure the body is thought to be worse off. To prove their greatness, the speech, eye, ear, mind and semen departed in turn and remained absent for one year, but the body could live without them as the dumb, blind, deaf, stupid and impotent persons do. But when the *prāṇa* was about to depart all the senses were pulled up like the pegs to which a stallion is tied, when it tries to move with force. All the senses, then, realised and recognised the greatness of *prāṇa* and their excellence as being dependent on that of the *prāṇa*.

It is noteworthy that in these parables, the senses of touch and taste are not mentioned but speech and mind are.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, VI.1.14. significantly designated speech as *vasiṣthā* or most excellent, the eye as *pratiṣṭhā* or basis, the ear as *sampat* or prosperity, the mind as *āyatanam* or abode, and the semen as procreation. It may be presumed that these senses with ideation and virility are the means of attaining excellence, basis, prosperity and progeny. The mind, begin the most powerful and nearest tool of perception for the self, is said to be its abode.

At I.4.17. the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* corroborates the earlier conclusion that the self is represented by mind, *'mana evāsyātmā'* and the other senses are either his members or instruments helpful in fulfilling his desires: "In the beginning this (world) was just the Self, one only. He desired, 'would that I had a wife, then I may have offspring. Would that I had wealth, then I would perform rites.... So long as he does not obtain each one of these, he thinks himself to be incomplete. Now his completeness is as follow: mind, verily, it his self, speech his wife, *prāṇa* his offspring, the eye is his human wealth, for he finds it with the eye, the ear his divine wealth, for he hears about it with his ear. The body, indeed, is his work, for with his body he does word, so fivefold is the sacrifice, fivefold is the person".

The mind speech and *prāṇa*, among all the faculties of the self, are nearest to him. In fact, the self is said to be consisting of them: "Three (foods) he made for himself, mind, speech and *prāṇa*, these he made for himself... Verily, the self consists of of speech, mind and *prāṇa*. (1.5.3).

The fivefold division of *prāṇa* into *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*, is known to this *Upaniṣad*. The body and the self are said to be supported on *prāṇa*,

that an *opāna;* till *samāna* is said to be the support of all: "On what you (your body) and yourself are supported:', 'on the *prāṇa* (inbreath).' 'And on what is *prāṇa* supported?', 'on he *apāṇa* (the outbreath)'. 'And on what is the outbreath supported?', 'on the vyāna (the diffused breath)'. 'And on what is the diffused breath supported'? 'on the *udāna* (the upbreath)', 'on what is the upbreath supported?,' 'on the *samāna* (the equalising breath) (III.9.26). Moreover, the subtle functional ramifications of mind, its power to know things independent of the senses and its central position with regard to all cognitions are clearly stated: "(They say) 'my mind was elsewhere, I did not see it, my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear it.' It is with the mind, verily, that one sees. It is with the mind that one hears. Desire, determination, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, intellection, fear, all this is truly mind. Therefore, even if one is touched on his back, he discerns it with the mind". (1.5.3). Mind, if properly disciplined and directed consistently, may acquire para-normal powers of extra-sensory perception.

This passage throws a flood of light on the central position of mind, so far as the inner faculties of the self are concerned. It is also of great psychological value, for it conceives mind as involved in all cognitions like seeing, hearing etc. which are the specific functions of different senses, such as the eye, ear and others. Without the mind's association or co-operative attention, the senses are rendered helpless, whereas the mind can discern or comprehend object even without the actual employment of the senses. This suggests the possibility of telepathy, clairvoyance, clairaudience etc. treated in great detail in later treatise on *Yoga*. It may, therefore, be safely stated that the mind with its properly developed powers, is the most potent instrument at the disposal of the self, through which he can not only fulfil his desires and aspirations but can work wonders and an discover the secrets of existence.

So far as the number of the sense-organs is concerned, it may be stated that I.3 and I.4, as well as VI. 1. mention the speech, the breath (nasal), the eye, the ear and the mind. All these five are generally named as *prāṇāḥ*.

But the fourth section of the second chapter which describes the dialogue of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyi, contains a passage giving the name of the five sensory-organs with their objects and the five motor-organs with their respective functions. The mind and the heart are mentioned in between these two groups of *jñānedriyas* and *karmendriyas*, indicating the fact that not only their names and respective objects were known, their grouping in two sets of sensory and motor organs too was an established manner of referring to them: "As the ocean is the one centre of all waters, as the skin, *twak*, is the one centre of all king of touch, as the nostrils, *nasike*, are the one centre of all smells, as the tongue, *jihvā*, is the one centre of all tastes as the eye, *cakṣuh*, is the one centre of all forms, as the *ear*, *śrotram*, is the one centre of all sounds, as the mind is the one centre of all determinations *saṅkalpas*, as the heart is the one centre of all forms of knowledge, as the hands are the one centre of all acts, as the organ of generation, *upastha*, is the one centre of all pleasure, as the excretory organ, *pāyuḥ*, is the one centre of all evacuations, as the feet are the one centre of all movement, as speech is the one centre of all *Vedas*, even so the Self is the one centre of all." (II.4.11) and (IV.5.12).

I am inclined to think that it was Yājñavalkya, to whom are expressly

ascribed the ideas set forth in the 3rd and 4th chapters of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, and who correctly named and grouped the senses and their corresponding objects for the first time, knew the exact functions of the sensory-organs of conveying the sense-data of the self (heart) through the medium of the mind. Mind, then, directs the motor-organs to execute the resolves of the self. This is clear from the order in which he has mentioned them. To make the point clear, it is necessary to note that he first mentions the *jñānendriyas*, followed by mind, the centre of all resolves or *saṅkalpas*, and the heart, he centre of all knowledge. This suggests that the data supplied by the senses are converted into resolves by the mind, but it is the self abiding in the heart that conceptualises and organises knowledge by co-ordinatinng, that is by accepting certain percepts and rejecting others. Immediately after mind and heart are mentioned the five motor-organs, suggesting their legitimate function of carrying out the resolves of the mind into action. This puts the subject the mind, the senses and their respective objects in their correct order and perspective and shows that Yājñavalkya's knowledge of psychology was ahead of his times and accords well with the principles of modern psychology. Kant's concept of unity of apperception seems to be anticipated by Yājñavalkya.

Hiriyanna rightly observes that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I.5.3, after giving a list of several such faculties, avers, "All these are *manas* only". As the central organ of consciousness, it is one, however widely its functions may differ. It controls both sensory and motor organs. It co-ordinates the impressions received from outside through the former and also resolves upon acting with the organs of action. The relation of *manas* to these to sets of organs has been compared to that of brain to the sensory and motor nerves.

The discussion of the psychological categories in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* was not meant merely to be descriptive but suggestive of the need to exert control and to seek redemption from the oppressive and recurring demands of the senses for their temporary, selfish (I.3.2-7) gratification. Such indiscriminate gratification gives rise to lingering evil tendencies *(Ibid)* and renders the senses susceptible to the devilish influence, which, in its negative value is nothing less than death for them. (I. 3.10). *Prāṇa* alone is the saviour of senses from such death. The binding nature of the senses is indicated by describing them as *grahas* or seizers and their objects as *atirahas* or over-seizers. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III. 2.2-9 states that the organs of small, speech, tongue, eye, ear, mind, hand and skin are *grahas*, or seizers (of the soul) which are themselves fettered by the oversizers, *atigrahas*, viz. smell, name, taste, form sound, desire action and touch. Deussen rightly suggests that the later conception of the 'bands of the heart' is derived from this passage and that *graha* and *atigraha* tie the knots, which are destroyed only on deliverance.

The Three states of the Self

The metaphysical character of the self is established by a critical interpretation of experience of the three states of consciousness, viz., waking, dream and deep sleep. A brief and superficial analysis of these states is introduced at II. I.17-19, with the query 'Where was this person (self) consisting of intelligence, when a man is asleep and whence does it come back?' Similarly another detailed and analytical scrutiny of these states at IV.3.9-32. also begins with the question 'When the Sun and moon have set and the fie has gone out and speech is stopped,

(i.e., in the state of dream), what light does a person have?'

The ineffable experience during the universally experienced phenomenon of sound sleep is a theme of absorbing interest with great philosophers like Yājñavalkya and the kind Ajātaśatru, who show almost supre-human insight through which they penetrate into this apparently inaccessible region of consciousness, called in modern parlance (thoroughly) unconscious, and analyse it.

The topic of the three state is introduced to determine the nature of *Ātmā* as self-luminous and non-dual seer. In the absence of the elemental light, even the light of speech, one moves and does work in the light of the Self (IV.3.6). This *Ātmā* is identified as the person, consisting of intellect, *vijñānamayaḥ*, among the senses, the light within the heart. His transcendence or trans-physical nature is asserted by saying that his movements and thoughts are apparent only. He remains unaffected while wandering along the two world of states (of waking and sleep) seeming to think and move. On entering the state of sleep, he transcends this world and the forms of death (IV.3.7).

His waking state is commensurate with this world, wherein he comes into temporary contact with body and gross objects of senses. He is said to transcend them on becoming asleep, i.e., getting into the other world. These to states are said to be the two worlds in which he moves by turn as a big fish would move along both banks of a river. The *Bṛhadāranyaka* states, "Verily, this persons, when he is born and obtains a body, becomes connected with evils. When he departs, on dying he leaves all evils behind." (IV.3.8).

Waking and deep sleep are the two main states, *(sthāne)* of the Self. The state of dream is an intermediate one, stationed wherein he sees both these states. There is a define way leading to the state of being in the other world. On obtaining that way, the Self sees both the evils of the world and the joys of the other (IV.3.9).

In dream-state the self-luminous nature of *Ātman* becomes evident. Unlike the state of waking, the objects seen in the dream are created by him, though the material is taken from the waking state: "When he goes to sleep he takes along the material of this all-embracing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up; he sleeps (dreams) by his own brightness, by his own light. In that state the person becomes self-illuminated". (IV.3.9).

Moreover, the dream-objects are created by the self for the sake of his enjoyment: "There are no chariots, no horses, no roads. But he creates (from himself) chariots, horse and roads. There are no joys pleasures and delights. But he creates joys, pleasures and delights. There are no tanks, no louts-pools, no streams. But he creates tanks, lotus-pools and streams. For he is creator. Regarding this, there are the following verses: 'Striking down in sleep what belongs to the body, sleepless, he looks on the sleeping (senses). Having taken to himself light, their return to his place, the golden person, the one spirit or swan, *haṁsaḥ*. Guarding his low with *prāṇa*, the immortal moves forth out of his nest. He goes wherever he pleases—the immortal, the golden person, the long spirit.

> "In the state of sleep, going aloft and alone.
> A god, he makes many forms for himself,
> Now, as it were, enjoying pleasure with women,
> Now, as it were, laughing and even seeing fearful sights.
> People see his sport. Him no one sees at all".

"Therefore, one should not wake him

suddenly, 'they say. Difficult is the care of a man to whom he (the self) does not return". (IV. 3. 10-13).

This is a record of a contemporary theory that in the dream state, the self moves out of the body, sees things in distant places and then returns to it. This returning may, at times, be hard and consequently may endanger life. This theory is at variance with the earlier assertion that the self creates the objects in dream, within the body itself.

As has been pointed out earlier, the Self enters the dream state, taking the material, *mātrā*, from the world of waking (IV.3.9). But it is the self that effects the disconnection with this world and constructs the dream-world from his own light, earning the name *'svayaṁjyotiḥ'* or sel-luminous. There is, thus a remote relation of the self with the world of waking even when he is in dream.

All see his sport but none sees him as the source of light that illumines the dream-objects. Yājñavalkya (who expounds this theory) is, therefore, of the opinion that the thesis which holds the dream-state to be the same as waking, since the things perceived in both are similar, is not logical. In sleep, he argues, there exists no other entity but the self:—"Now some people say: 'That is just his waking state, for whatever things he sees when awake, those too he sees when asleep.' (This is not so for) there (in sleep) the person is self-illumined (IV.3.14).

The regular movements of the self in the ever-shifting states of deep-sleep, dream and waking through the nerve-channels with which he is acquainted are a recurring phenomenon. But the self ever remains unaffected by what he sees in those states: "After enjoying, roaming and seeing good and evil (in dreams), he stay in the state of sound sleep *saṁprasāda*, and comes back by the inverse path to the dream-state. He is not followed (that is remains unaffected) by whatever he sees in that state, for this person, verily, is unattached (by nature). After enjoying and roaming in the dream-state, and seeing good and evil, he returns by the inverse path to the waking state. He is not followed by what he sees in that state, for this person, verily is unattached. After enjoying and roaming in the waking state, and seeing good and evil, he returns by the reverse path to the dream-state (or dreamless sleep): "As a big fish moves along alternately to both the banks (of a river) Eastern and Western, so does this person move about both these states—that dream and waking." (IV.3.15-19)

The waking state is, thus, the result of the connection of the self with the body and the external world, which implicate him in the play of evil and the forms of death, that is, ever-changing and perishable objects. In dream-state his independence and luminous nature are revealed. But still he is subject to delusion and unhappy experience, due to the impressions of waking state which he takes with him in the sub-conscious. The state of sound sleep reveals the true nature of the spirit as the non-dual *draṣṭā* or seer beyond desire, delusion and grief: "As a falcon or a bird having flow around in the sky becomes weary, folds its wings and is borne down to its nest, even so this person hastens to that state where he desires no desires and sees no dream" (IV.3.19).

This passage describes the state of deep sleep as the net, i.e., the home or natural state of the self, to which he must return either temporarily and unconsciously (as in sleep) or permanently and consciously as in liberation. The states of waking and dream lead him away from his real and natural transcendent state causing weariness and fatigue. This

fact has to be evaluated in the sharp contrast with the statements of Keith and Gough who maintain that the Self has no consciousness, as it essentially involves subject-object relationship and an objectless consciousness cannot be described as consciousness. The experience to deep sleep is a universal phenomenon which proves the possibility of objectless pure consciousness. The apparent lack of consciousness in that state cannot be taken as its destruction, since the subsequent emergence of the waking state conclusively proves its continuance.

Experience of unhappiness and fear even in the state of sleep (more exactly in dream) is due to ignorance of the real nature of the non-dual Self and the impressions of the state of waking: "In him verily, are those nerves called *hitā*, which are as fine as a hair split, into a thousand parts, and filled with white, blue, yellow, green and red (serums). Now when (he feels) as if he were being killed or overpowered, or being pursued by an elephant, or falling into an abyss, he imagines through ignorance wherever fear he had experienced in the waking state. But when he thinks that he is a god, as it were, that he is king, as it were, that I am all this, that is his highest world". (IV.3.20).

It is clear from this passage that dream is caused by the impressions of the waking state and both waking and dream states own their existence to the ignorance of the real and natural state of the Self as the transcendent infinite Being. As such, he is the ground of both the subjective and objective aspects of existence. When the Self realizes his true nature, he attains his transcendental non-dual state, free from desire, fear and distraction, there being no contrasted objects, separate from himself: "This, verily, his his form which is free from craving, free from evils, free from fear. As a man in embrace of his beloved wife knows nothing without or within, so the person when in embrace of the intelligent Self *(prajña ātman)* knows nothing without or within. That verily, is his form in which his desire is fulfilled, in which the Self is his desire, in which he is free from desire, free from grief. Here (in this state) a father ceases to be a father, a mother ceases to be a mother, the world cease to be the worlds, the gods crease to be the gods, the Vedas cease to be the Vedas. Here a thief cease to be a thief, a murderer ceases to be a murderer, a *cāṇḍāla* ceases to be a *cāṇḍāla*, a *pulkasa* ceases to be a *pulkasa*, a monk ceases to be a monk, an ascetic ceases to be an ascetic. He is not followed (affected) by good, he is not followed by evil for then the passed beyond all the sorrows of the heart." (IV.3.21-22)

This description of the state of deep sleep indicates that Self does not only exist in that state but is at-one-ment with all that exists. In his true nature as the transcendent principle of Being all empirical distinctions and particulars are resolved. As the all-comprehensive, all-encompassing principle of subjectivity, the Self includes all, leaving nothing, get over against him which could be contrasted or cognised. His bliss too being completely exalted and perfect leaves nothing to be desired or sought after.

In addition to existence and bliss, absolute consciousness in another dimension of the Self in deep sleep state: "Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep he does not see, he is, indeed, though seeing, does not see, for there is no cessation of the seeing of the seer, because of his imperishability. There is not, however, a second, nothing else separate from him that he could see." (IV.3.23).

Similarly he does not smell, taste,

speak, hear, think of, touch, and know another for there is nothing separate from him, no second to him.

This discussion aims as bringing out the non-dual, *sui-generis,* unattached and transcendent nature of the Self, who in his embodied career has to pass through the three state regularly. The Upaniṣad undertakes a close examination of these thee universally experienced state. Such a rational critique of human experience shows reason's applicability to the analysis of the structure of man and arrives at certain very important conclusions. The inmost Self is a metaphysical principle, appearing as psyche, the pseudo subject of dream-experience and also the body the pseudo-subject of the waking state. Through his spiritual nature is never lost, he, by turn, assumes psychical and physical forms. The critical analysis of the data provided by experience in the three states, clearly renders and ultimate metaphysical reality accessible to reasoned thought and logical approach, which otherwise would have remained an article or religious faith. The psychology of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, therefore, is primarily rational psychology; not so much of the soul as the *Ātman*, frequently touching the boarders of metaphysics, since the principle involved is simultaneously the final metaphysical reality and the subject of experience in the three states. This makes separation of psychology from metaphysics impossible.

The significant observation that everyone sees his sport but "none sees him' *na tam paśyati kascana'*, suggests the need to discriminate in order to realist the Self, between the light (awareness) of the self-luminous Self, (in which the objects of dream are seen) and the object which are created by him. This involves turning one's attention from the 'seen' to 'Seer'. This requires practices of remaining detached, neutral and aware in all experience without identifying the Self with pseudo-subject of dream and waking states, through which, one finds, that the psychic body or mind which is the subjects of the dream experience derives from the light of the Self who is the real *draṣṭā*, the Seer of the deep sleep experience. The nothingness or non-cognition of objects experienced in deep sleep state, called *'avidyā*, in order to be cognised and recalled on awakening, needs to be presented to the subject who, himself sleepless, looks on those (senses) that sleep *'asuptaḥ suptañ abhicākaśīti'* (IV.3.11). This *avidyā* is the germinal state from which the subject-object correlations of dream and waking states are derived. The non-perception of objects and the consequent peace or bliss of deep sleep presuppose the transcendent principle of subjectivity which can be realised through a conscious process of interiorisation of subjective consciousness to the inner-most point. In modern terminology this process may be called a probing of sub-conscious and the unconscious that leads one from conditioned subjectivity to the universal consciousness, the light without which the light of the Sun, moon, fire and speech remain uncognised. This is the hidden significance of Janaka's question 'in what light a man moves, works and returns when the sun and moon, have set, when the fire is no more and the speech also ceases?' In reply Yājñavalkya expounds the Self that is *'svayaṁjyotiḥ* or self-luminous, implying thereby that all other lights are not self-luminous and, therefore, stained in need of the light, i.e., consciouss that cognizes them. The thesis *'esse est percipi'* of Berkeley postulates the universal Mind as the indispensable perceiving principle, without which the conception of any objective existence would involve al absurdity of abstraction.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* tackles the problem of this transcendent subject, the universal *draṣṭā* or seer successfully.

Because the subject of waking does not accept the moral responsibility for the experiences of the subjects of dream, according to Raju the division into subject and object in dream is different from the division into subject and object in the waking state. These two subjects that mutually nullify each other are not to be confounded with the real subject in relation to whom they are, in fact, subjects. There being mere semblance of subject is proved by their fleeting nature, for the real subject can never cease to perceive: "There is no cessation of the seeing of the seer for he is imperishable". (IV. 3.23).

The common inability to discriminate between the fugitive subject of the waking state from this transcendent Self, is responsible for the misdirected efforts of conceiving the process of evolution of the universe on the basis of the data of the waking consciousness alone. In fact, the world is rooted in the Self, the innermost reality, the kingdom of heaven within. It is only that rare individual who, having ascertained the apparent subject of waking and dream as unreal, succeeds in releasing his oneness with the light of the Self beyond the state of deep sleep that can perceive the process of creation of the world from the Self.

Ajātaśatru, the king of *Kāśi* pointed out defects in the twelve theories of *Brahman* including the subjects of dream and waking, advanced by Gārgya Bālāki. He, then, expounded the theory of real Self, the person consisting of intellect and resting in the heart. He asserted that the world evolved from the Self: "As a spider emits the thread, as small sparks issue forth from fire, even so from this Self come forth all breaths, all worlds, all gods and all beings." (II.1.20).

As stated earlier, the psychological discussion in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* presupposes the transcendent Self involved in experience as the subject. Kant also postulates a transcendent principle, in order to explain ordinary experience. But the relation in which it is connected with experience is inferred logically. Whereas the *Ātman* spoken of in this Upaniṣad, in his relation to the subject object phenomenon, is not only inferred logically but can be experienced directly in an intuitive communication. The methodology of this knowledge is enjoined by saying. *'tasmādevamvit, śānto dānta uparatastitikṣuḥ samāhito bhūtva ātmani evātmānam paśyati, sarvamātmānaṁ paśyati'.* " Therefore, he who knows it as such, having becomes calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, patient and collected sees the Self in his own self, see all in his self" (IV.4.23). The chief interest of this Upaniṣad is not the establishment of an abstract intellectual category called and subject but to indicate the definite 'conditions for the possibility of experience' of the Self, the unaffected witness of all experiences and mental states, without whose light no experience is possible.

The Power of Knowledge

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* makes of point of great psychological import, regarding the power knowledge. Practically at the conclusion of every momentous revelation or statement of mystic importance, it, as a rule, makes the observation: "He who knows this attains or possesses such and such a thing." For example, it is said that he who know the *prāṇa* to be the post and food to be the rope, his food does not diminish. (II.2 1-2). Or : "vāk is *Atri* for by speech food is eaten. He who knows this becomes the eater of all, everything becomes his food. (II. 2.4). The results that accrue by knowing a particular truth or

mystic significance of something or the secret process of a happening, are most varied and comprise from trifling thing like getting food or drink to attaining glory or ascendance over one's kinsmen, or victory over enemies or attainment of highest world and even conquest of death and union with divinity or becoming *Brahman* or all that exists.

The history of this concept that knowledge is all-powerful and an indispensable means for any attainment is co-evil with the Vedic literature. *Brahman* originally in the *Ṛgveda* meant 'prayer' or 'holy world' or 'utterance.' The word *veda* is synonymous with *Brahman* and denotes knowledge. It then signified wisdom of knowledge embodied in the holy utterance. It was the power of this wisdom contained in a world or prayer that pleased gods and consequently brought about desired results. In the time of *Atharvaveda* the psychology of knowledge assumed greater importance. The knowledge of an end became a prime means of gaining it. If one knew the name of a herb or an assembly, he could control a disease or that assembly. In the Brāhmans too knowledge of the procedure of a ritual was deemed as mystically related to the procedure itself. The knower, therefore, by virtue of his knowledge, is said to possess power over the thing known.

The Upaniṣads recognised the power of knowledge as being capable of bringing about the fulfillment of desires. It will not be wrong to suggest that this idea is equivalent to the modern psychological concept of mental power or power of thought being superior to physical power as evidenced by the phenomenon of hypnotism. It is evidently the superiority of intelligence through which man has gained control over the material environment.

But the distinguishing characteristic of the Upaniṣadic idea of mystic power of knowledge is its association with truth. If the knowledge of an entity or a procedure was not true, then, instead of bringing about the desired object, it may lead to dire consequences, especially when it was asserted as being true. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* states: "Brahmadatta Chikitāyana, while drinking *soma* said: "Let this king, that is, *soma* strike off this man's (my) head, if I say that *ayāsya aṅgirasa* chanted the *udgītha* with any other means than this vital-breath and speech". (I.2.24). Since what he asserted about the breath was true, his head did not fall off.

Asking questions regarding the entities about which one is completely ignorant also can bring about evil results. Śākalya questioned Yājñavalkya about *Ātman*, without knowing him, with a view to defeating him in the contest. His head fell of as a result of want of knowledge. (III. 9.26).

Thus true knowledge alone possesses the mystic power of releasing desirable ends. Knowledge, being power, if misdirected through untruth, wrought evil.

Para-Psychology

As stated earlier, the *puruṣa* or the Self has two states of being in this world and that of being in the other world, that is, the states of waking and deep sleep. The state of being in the other world may be equated with death, as it involves the disconnection of the Self from the body and bodily correlations.

The state that is said to be the intermediate one is the dream-state—the third state—stationed wherein the self sees the other two states. This third state does not only intervene between the waking and deep sleep states but also between two embodied existence, and thus forms and content of the self's transmigratory period. The way leading to the worlds attained after death, and the way back to this world

is a proper subject of para-psychology but will be taken up for discussion in the chapter on eschatology.

It is interesting to know that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* adduces a proof to the fact that some scholars engaged themselves in the field of psychic research. AT III.3.1 ff. and III. 7.1 thee are two interesting dialogues between Bhujyu Lāhyāyani and Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka Āruṇi and Yājñavalkya. Bhujyu told Yājñavalkya: "We were travalling among the *Madras* as wanderers. We went there to the house of Patañcala Kāpya. He had a daughter possessed by a *Gandharva*. We asked him 'Who are you?' He said 'I am Sundhanvan, a descendent of Aṅgiras'. While we were asking him about the ends of the earth, we asked him, 'What has become of the Pārikṣitas?" Yājñavalkya, on being asked the same question, replied that the Pārikṣitas have gone to the world where the performers of horse-sacrifice go. The other narration at III.7.1. also deals with a case of possession by a *Gandharva*.

This indicates that some scholars were visiting those person who were cases of abnormal psychological phenomenon, such as mediums possessed by spirits from whom the knowledge about problems related to para-normal phenomena could be gathered.

Summary of Results

To epitomize the results arrived at through the deliberations in this chapter, it may be stated that the psychological discussions in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* presuppose the Self—the metaphysical principle—as the premise. Because of this, the psychological discussions are often punctuated by matters related to metaphysical principles and spiritual practices. The Self, through transcendent and non-dual, becomes the psyche involved as the subject in all experience. The Self, moreover, is the same as *Brahman*. As such, it is eternal and unborn. Still desire is said to be responsible for ontogenesis or the birth of the soul. Desire thus begins the mundane career of the soul and also determines his character during his transmigrations, making him happy or unhappy. It sands to reason, therefore that elimination of desire is the primary condition that ends the conditioned, transmigratory existence of the soul and helps him to awaken to his true transcendent nature.

The second important point is the supremacy of *prāṇa*. The *prāṇa* in its concrete aspect is the vital-breath, the principle of life *Prāṇa*, represents *Brahman* in its formless aspect. On elimination of desire, when the soul regains his original autonomous status, he is said to become he all-pervasive *prāṇa* i.e., *Brahman*. *Prāṇa*'s commanding position is illustrated by the fact that the individual continues to live in the absence of all other congnitive and conative senses and organs, as blind, dumb, deaf do live, but if *prāṇa* departs, all senses necessarily depart too. During sleep when all senses, being tired. sleep, the *prāṇa*, sleepless and entering, guards the body. At the time of death, after the departure of the soul, it is the *prāṇa* that follows him first and then follow the other senses. But the *prāṇa* of a realised soul does not depart. The *prāṇa* eats food and distributes it to other sense-organs. Its location, therefore, is said to be mouth (earning him the name *mukhya*) and is, thus, closely relate to speech. It is the essence of all sense-organs, and, therefore, called *angirasa*. All senses, in fact, are yoked to the *prāṇa*. They may safely be said to be different functional aspects of *prāṇa*. All senses, therefore, are generally called by the common name *prāṇa*. A spiritual practice in the form of a vow of regulating the respiration through

watching the flow of *prāṇa* which later on was developed as an effective means of meditation called *prāṇāyama*, is said to lead one to the identity with the divinity. The *prāṇa* is thus trans-personal, permeating the whole personality of an individual and extending even beyond. It is the immortal factor which survives the disintegration of body and regulates the movement of even the departed psyche in its disembodies state. The five fold division of *prāṇa* is known to the present Upaniṣad.

The mind is said to be the *ātmā* or the core of one's personality. Mind, in association with other senses of perception, obtains knowledge and regulates the functions of the motor-organs. A passage III.4.11 mentions the five sensory organs, mind, heart and five motor-organs. The order of the senses in the passage is very significant, for it suggests that the mind receives the information provided by sense-data, organises it into conceptual knowledge with the help of the soul residing in the heart and then issues orders to the motor-organs that carry out its resolves. This *modus-operandi* or the psychological apparatus is confirmed by the discoveries of modern psychology.

The characterisation of the senses and sense-objects as seizers and over seizers respectively, suggests that they constitute bondage of the soul. Freedom from the pull exercised by the sense-objects and from the tendency of the senses to gravitate towards them, leads the soul to its ever-detached and transcendent state of immortality, as the infinite Being.

The next important psychological discussion relates to a critique of experience of the three state of the Self, viz., waking, dream and deep sleep. The discussion is mooted with the question: 'When the lights of the sun, moon, fire and even speech are not available, that is, in the state of dream, what is the light with the help of which an individual moves, goes, returns and does his work?' The answer provided to this question is that it is the light of the Self, that makes all cited transactions possible. This proves that the Self is self-luminous, whereas elemental lights are not. Self is the person consisting of intellect (consciousness), present among the senses, abiding in the heart as the inmost light. He, in his essential nature, remaining unaffected, moves about in the states of being in this world and being in the other world, i.e., in the states of waking and deep sleep. Dream is conceived to be an intermediate state, stationed wherein he sees both the miseries of the world and the joys of the other world. The state of waking is the result of the Self coming into contact with the body and the world. In the state of sleep and death he transcends the forms of death, i.e., assumes temporarily his essential disembodied and immortal nature. In the state of dream, the Self constructs an new world by his own light from the material (subtle impressions of experiences) of the waking state which he carries with himself. The master key to realise the Self is to discriminate between the light (of awareness) and the object seen in that light. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* suggests this paramount necessity by stating that everyone sees his sports in dream state but none sees him:— *ārāmamasya paśyanti na taṁ paśyati kaścana*, (IV.3.14). The implication is that the Self is pure light (of consciousness) bereft of objects seen in and through it. It is this light of the spirit that is indispensable in the cognition of all objects of dream and waking state including the physical lights of the Sun, moon etc.

The spirit (Self), with light of consciousness as its nature, does not cease to exist in the state of deep sleep. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, in fact, makes the state of deep sleep the facial point of its

critical approach and arrives through its analysis to the ineluctable conclusion that it is in this state that the essential metaphysical nature of the Self, as free from desire and its attendant distractions, fears, sorrow and evils, is revealed. The apparent loss of consciousness is ascribed to the absolute unity and transcendence of the Self. There is no object existing as contrasted against the seeing Self, existing apart from himself, separated from himself, that he could see. This spiritual light of non-dual and autonomous consciousness beyond deep sleep, ascertained by the critical interpretation of the experience of the three psychic states in the true nature of the Self. The Self, that is, the knowledge of the transcendent infinite Being is not one's birth-right but has to be realised through detachment, calmness and deep contemplation. Rejection of all that is non-Self by the formula *'neti neti'*, not this, not this, is the only path leading to the realisation of the real subject, in relation to whom the fugitive pseudo subject of the dream and waking states together with their corresponding objects, lose their finality and self- validity. This is the objective of the psychological discussion undertaken in this Upaniṣad.

The final point made in this chapter is the mystic power of knowledge. Practically at the conclusion of every important statement regarding some truth, it is declared that he who knows thus, ya *evaṁ veda*, obtain such and such objective. This attainments thus realised, vary from obtaining food, or supremacy over kinsmen or vanquishing rivals, to attaining higher worlds, immortality and even oneness with divinity and *Brahman*. The word *Veda* denotes knowledge or wisdom embodied in the holy word or holy utterance—the *Brahman*. The holy utterance which expresses knowledge is the primary means of propitiating gods and consequently of obtaining desired objects. The history of this concept is traced through *Ṛgveda*, *Atharvaveda*, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. In substance it is the theory of the supremacy of intellect, mental power or power of thought over physical objects as evidenced by the phenomenon of hypnotism. It is further pointed out that the power of knowledge is associated with truth. The power of knowledge, if misdirected through untruth, envy or malevolent motive, could cause annihilation of the person using it. Illustrations of this are found in the events of falling-off of the head of persons involved in misdirected questioning, e.g., Śākalya, (III.9.26) and others.

The chapter is concluded by the statement of the fact that during the times of this Upaniṣad, some scholars undertook journey to distant provinces to visit the persons who were cases of abnormal psychological phenomenon, such as, mediums possessed by spirits of seraphs, *Gandharvas*.

Through such mediums valuable knowledge as regards para-normal phenomena could be obtained. The fate and condition of departed souls were known this way.

R

RALPH WALDO EMERSON (1803-1882)

Of the host of American thinkers of the nineteenth century famous for their prodigious contribution, Emerson is one who holds an illustrious position for his keen interest in the moral and spiritual development of man. In his long and eventful life Emerson composed a good number of poems and essays which bear the mark not only of his literary talent, but of the depth of this religious and philosophical thinking as well. His poems, however, contain some stylistic and structural defects which a more meticulous craftsman would have avoided. As a matter of fact Emerson cared very little for prosodic perfection or melodic effects as he was intent primarily upon the idea he wanted to convey. But in spite of the structural defects of his poems Emerson holds a central place among American men of letters because of message he wanted to communicate to mankind remains as vital and stimulating to day as it was to the men of his day.

Idealistic outlook

Emerson's was a theory of spiritualistic idealism. Strongly resenting the barbarism and materialism of the age he berated the people of his time when they in their mad materialistic pursuits were oblivious of the need of their moral and spiritual uplift. He believed with all his heart and accordingly asserted repeatedly through his essays and lectures that spirit overlies nature and that man has only one proper choice. Alive and with which man comes in regular contact, Emerson nursed no hostility to Nature. To quote him : "I do not wish to fling stones at my beautiful mother, nor soil my gentle nest. I only wish to indicate the true position of Nature in regard to man". Natural objects were thus only the mediate things to him and not ultimate realities. The telling observations he made in course of his lectures on Nature point to the fact that his choice of the ideal over the material or mind over matter as presenting the higher reality, was considered and deliberate. This way of thinking made Emerson what we call an idealist. It must be noted however, that his thoughts and ideas as reflected in his essays give rise to a hot controversy among the critics, and he has been interpreted and re-interpreted in various ways since his time down to the present day. Emerson's views lying scattered in his works are largely responsible for generating this controversy. Prof. H.A. Pochman and G.W. Allen have elaborately dealt with this point. "His (Emerson's) idealism was subtle enough to accept both mind and matter, even while endeavouring at various times during his life, to reconcile or identify the two with each other. An unhappy dualist, he sought throughout his life to unify this world, — to make it monistic — to reduce the dualistic enigma of mind and matter to unity. To this end he searched the scientists from ancient to modern times no less than the idealistic philosophers from Plato to Kant and

and religion or as he put it to make his 'religion philosophical' and his 'philosophy religious'. In the process he rejected neither the natural nor the spiritual. ......But he alienated both the orthodox theologian and the strict scientist. Neither forgave him for what he conceded to the other. To the theologian he was a heretic, infidel, atheist; to the scientist, a transcendental dreamer, a mystical soothsayer. an impractical idealist.

These irreconciled elements in Emerson are not the only faults that men have found with Emerson. There are other inconsistencies that he did not bother to harmonize. He had no patience with what he called 'foolish consistency'. He declared: 'I delight in telling what I think, but if you ask me how I dare say so, I am the most helpless of mortal men'. ..... He defined tradition and authority, and he wrote in the mood of the moment, from inspiration. ...... Hence it often turned out that what he said in one connection contradicts what he said in another. Accordingly the seekers after paradox have found it easy matter to make him out 'conservative or liberal, or radical, orthodox or infidel, moralist or amoralist, belligerent or pacific, patriot or traitor. And on the basis of a single or isolated passages, he is all these and more too." But whatever difficulties Emerson the lecturer or the essayist presented to his followers, and however many conflicts he failed to settle in his own mind, he was consistent on one point. He believed implicitly in the moral principle as supreme and absolute. His God seemed to many people of doubtful divinity, but no one doubted Emerson's faith in goodness. In deed goodness and Godliness were very nearly synonymous with Emerson".

What, in fact, Emerson never relinquished was his genuine faith in goodness, in the distinction between right and wrong, and in the Supreme Spirit inherent in man. 'His exaltation of man is praise to the God in man, and the self he describes is the higher self whose paternity is divine. What he rhapsodizes in the 'Essays' are his occasions of spiritual enlargement. A self-realization of this high order provides the thematic unity of the essays, and gives them their electric and liberating effect'. Hence without entering into the quagmire of controversy, what is relevant for us is to analyses some of his remarkable writings where the gleanings of his thought can be discovered to have profound kinship with Indian scriptural texts. In our analysis it will also be evident that Emerson makes no pretension in candidly acknowledging his debt to the Indian scriptures.

Emerson and the Upaniṣads

We shall first take up Emerson's famous poem 'Brahma'. In the first four lines of the poem he voices almost literally a verse from the Bhagavadgitā and the Katho' panisad. He who considers this self as a slayer or he who thinks that this self is slain, is mistaken in grasping the truth, for 'It' does not slay nor is 'It' slain. The entire poem explains the concept of Brahman in the spirit of the Upaniṣads. It is, as in the Upaniṣads, a unifying and all-pervading spirit. This interpretation stand corroborated not only by Emerson himself, but also by the observations made on the poem by certain other eminent scholars and critics. Prof. Frederic J. Carpenter points out that the concept of 'Brahma' was developed by Emerson out of snatches of the ancient Hindu scriptures. Prof. Norman Foerster has observed that the poem is both easier and harder than it is commonly regarded: easier because, as Emerson said of people who are puzzled, "If you tell them to say Jehovah instead of Brahma they will not find any perplexity, and harder because it requires

for a full understanding, a richer religious and metaphysical background than most people possess". Emerson himself liked the interpretation give to the poem by an unnamed 'little girl' of Concord who declared that she found no difficulty in understanding the poem. "It simply menas", he said', "God everywhere". Emerson again says elsewhere that in all nations there are minds which incline to dwell in the conception of the fundamental unity. This tendency finds its highest expression in the religious writings of the East, and chiefly in the Indian scriptures.

As in the poem 'Brahma' so also in many essays Emerson hinges upon the concept of an all-comprehensive Soul, and here we find direct references to the different sayings of the Upaniṣads. He concludes his essay on 'Immortality' with a reference to the Yama-Naciketā episode of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and this amply illustrates his breadth of vision and also his courage of conviction in recognizing and acknowledging his debt to the Upaniṣadic conception of Reality and the way to realize 'It'.

A way of life that Emerson time and again defended was to live sincerely and become 'a genuine man'. He sketched long before in the notes of a sermon that a genuine man must (i) believe in himself, (ii) speak the truth, (iii) think the truth and (iv) act the truth. In fact 'Truth' and 'Spirit' are the dominant words of Emerson's essays and the horizon they extend before us fades into the 'Reality' that alone promises man a true fulfillment. His entire work is a diary of a continuing discovery of self - to find within oneself, in inner experience the current of the 'Universal Being'. It is to partake of spirit to act with the power of God. For self-reliance, Emerson assures us, is nothing if it is not a dependence on and obedience to this overwhelming tide. The essay, therefore, that complements this essay wherein his central thought has been given remarkable exposition.

The very title of the essay viz. 'Oversoul' indicates that it is almost a literal translation of the Sanskrit term "Paramātman' (Supreme Self) and there can not be even a speck of doubt that Emerson was strongly imbued with the spirit of the Upaniṣads. The thought contained in the essay is akin to the thought found in the different ancient Upaniṣads. Referring to this Oversoul Emerson writes:

"I dare not speak for it. My words do not carry its august sense; they fall short and cold. Only itself can inspire whom it will, and behold, their speech shall be lyrical and sweet and universal as the rising of the wind". In similar words Yama, the Lord of Death speaks to Naciketā in the Kaṭho' Upaniṣad. One who does not develop the higher spiritual faculties or has not turned away from evil conduct, whose senses are uncontrolled, who is not tranquil, whose mind is not at rest, can not attain the 'Self' simply by intellectual knowledge. Again there are passages where Emerson says: "The philosophy of six thousand years has not searched the chambers and magazines of the soul. In its experiments there has always remained, in the last analysis, a residuum it could not resolve. Man is a stream whose source is hidden. Our being is descending into us from we know not whence. The most exact calculator has no prescience that somewhat incalculable may not baulk the very next moment. I am constrained very moment to acknowledge a higher origin of events than the will I call mine. .... We live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within man is the soul of the whole, the wise silence, the universal beauty, to which every other part and particle is equally related, — the

eternal 'One' And this deep power in which we exsit, and whose beatitude is all accessible to us, in not only self-sufficing and perfect in every hour, but the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object are one. We see the world piece by piece, as the sun, the moon, the animal, the tree; but the whole of which these are the shining parts is the 'Soul"'. Here the relation between the phenomenal world and the Supreme Self is demonstrated in the Upaniṣadic spirit. Swami Paramānanda has explained this point with adequate clarity. "The ancient Vedic scriptures abound in passages describing almost in identical terms the relation of the phenomenal world with the unseen One and the connection of the soul with its origin-the one without a second. Nowhere does Vedānta deal with the universe as a combination of unrelated fragment; it sees all things as parts of a great whole and it tries to bind all these parts together in that whole, yet without destroying the entity of each individual soul". Emerson thus follows the Upaniṣadic pantheism in its true spirit.

Emerson again follows closely the Keno' paniṣad when he records his thought thus: "All goes to show that the soul in man is not an organ, but animates and exercises all the organs, is not a function like the power of memory, of calculation of comparison, but uses these as hands and feet; is not a faculty but a light; is not the intellect or the will, but the master of the intellect and the will, is the vast background of our being in which they lie, — an immensity not possessed and that can not be possessed....." The Keno' paniṣad begins with almost the same definition of Ātman or Self. According to this Upaniṣad Self is 'the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, the speech of the speech, the life of the life, the eye of the eye. It is that which can not be thought by mind, but by which the mind is able to think; that which is not seen by the eye, but by which the eye is able to see; that which can not be heard by the ear, but by which the ear is able to hear. In order to bring out the nature of 'Oversoul' and its relation to man, Emerson says, "What we commonly call man, the eating, drinking, planting, counting man — does not, as we know him represent himself, but misrepresents himself. Him we do not respect; but the soul whose organ he is, would he let it appear through his action, would make our knees bend". All that Emerson means to say is that to the eating, drinking or sleeping man his entire life is contained in his physical being, and 'that' by which he is living, acting or thinking is overlooked. This state of consciousness inevitably misrepresents us leading us to all selfish desires and passions, egotism and vanity, competitions and rivalry. But the real man within knows that his true being is of God. Emerson reflects and quite precisely, the spirit of the śvetaśvatra Upaniṣad in the following passage: — "The influence of the senses has in most men overpowered the mind to that degree that the walls of time and space have come to look solid, real and insurmountable; and to speak with levity of these limits is, in the world, the sign of insanity. Yet times and space are but inverse measures of the force of the Soul. A man is capable of abolishing them both". ...."See how the deep, divine thought demolishes centuries and millenniums, and makes itself present through all ages. Is the teaching of Christ less effective now than it was when first his mouth was opened ? The emphasis of facts and persons to my soul has nothing to do with time. And so, always the soul's scale is one; the scale of the senses and the understanding is another. Before the great

revelations of the soul Time, Space and Nature shrink away". Emerson here sounds very much the teachings of the Śvetāśvatra Upaniṣad which holds that prior to creation (i.e., revelation of Self), there was no day, no night, neither existence nor non-existence....... When He (Ātman) shines everything shines after Him; by His light everything is lighted. He makes all, He knows all, self-caused, the knower, the regulator of all time.

Emmerson, like the Upaniṣadic sages, had a conviction that theoretical knowledge is not dependable in so far as it leads to an ever-increasing tangle of diversity, while direct vision or even a small amount of knowledge based on direct apprehension leads to fundamental unity. Emerson thus declares: "The mind is one and the best minds who love truth for its own sake think much less of property in truth. Thankfully they accept it everywhere, and do not label or stamp it with any man's name, for it is theirs long before-hand..... The action of the soul is of turner in that which is felt and left unsaid, than in that which is said in any conversation" (Oversoul'). Emerson here sounds the same universal note which runs through all Vedic teaching, that 'truth' is not the exclusive property of any one group of people, but is the common property of the entire human race and is equally open to all who claim it. As to the direct vision or realization of the Supreme Self Emerson, as we have already indicated, speaks in deference to the Upaniṣadic message. Man, he says, never seeks communion with the Supreme soul with a view to attaining any worldly success, — health, wealth or prosperity. A strong urge or love for the soul leads him Godward. The ignorant always resorts to the way that bring immediate and tangible result. He moves outward while the wise moves inward. Thus corresponding to two paths—one leading to God and the other them Emerson reflects thus: "One class speak from within or from experience as parties and possessors of the fact; and the other class, from without as spectators merely or perhaps as acquainted with the fact on the evidence of third persons. It is of no use to preach to me from without. I can do that too easily myself. Jesus speaks always from within and in a degree that transcends all others. In that is the miracle".

This attitude as envisaged by Emerson has been emphatically demonstrated by the Indian sages since the Vedic age till the present day. Erudition has never been considered by them an essential qualification of a spiritual teacher. He must be one whose brain should not be loaded with theories about God. On the contrary he is required to have a direct acquaintance with truth. To quote Emerson: — "The tone of seeking is one, the tone of having is another". Emerson, in fact, has written copiously on the fact that so long as man is conscious of his little self, he remains self conceited and hankers after earthly 'possession'. But when his consciousness expands and he comes to discover the cosmic self within him, when in other words, spiritual seeking becomes an all-absorbing passion of his soul, he is inevitably released from all the doctrinal and creedbound beliefs and is brought face to face with the cosmic soul. Emerson reiterates his conviction that the eternal self resides in the heart of every mortal. In the spirit of the Upaniṣads he holds again: "Ineffable is the union of man and God in every act of the soul. The simplest person, who in his integrity worships God, becomes God. ...... When we have broken our God of tradition and ceased from our God of rhetoric, then may 'God' fire the heart with His presence". In

the Upaniṣads we find a similar passage— 'When the mind is concentrated and turned within, the mortal perceives he glory of the immortal self and rejoices because he has obtained that, which is the cause of all true joy'.

What appears from our foregoing analysis is that the kinship in thought between the Upaniṣads and many of Emerson's writings is not a matter of inference only. Emerson himself frequently acknowledges his debt to the ancient Indian scriptures. In his essay —'Worship' he says : "We owe to the Hindu scriptures a definition of Law which compares well with any in our western books : 'Law it is which is without name or colour or hands or feet, it is which is without name or colour or hands or feet, which is smallest of the least, and largest of the large; all and knowing all things; which hears without ears, sees without eyes, moves without teet and seizes without hands'. This is a free rendering of a passage of the Śvetāśvatra Upaniṣad.

Emerson reviews the mighty attainments of ancient Greece and Rome and also of ancient and mediaeval Europe and writes in his essay — 'Progress of Culture' :— "But if these works still survive and multiply, what shall we say of names more distant, or hidden through their very superiority to their co-evals, — names of men who have left remains that certify a height of genius in their several directions not since surpassed, and which men in proportion to their wisdom still cherish,— as Zoroaster, Confucious, and the grand scriptures only recently know to the western nations— of the Indian Vedas, the Institutes of Manu, the Purāṇas, the poems of the Mahābharata and the Rāmāyana"? This pregnant interrogation put by Emerson is a distinct mark of his appreciation of ancient Indian thought. Swami Paramānanda has aptly observed that Emerson was thoroughly imbued with the message of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads and accordingly he recognized the loftiness and beauty of their pantheistic outlook and ethical teachings.

In fine it must be noted that Emerson had discovered certain profound truths in his own soul, and because of his personal experience it was easy for him to accept and appreciate with delight the same truth he discovered elsewhere. Like the ancient sages of India Emerson felt in his heart of hearts that the discovery of 'Paramātman' in all beings together with the realization of this Supreme Cosmic Being helps one develop a unitary outlook and Steer clear of all barriers due to caste, colour and creed, and enjoy Supreme 'Bliss' and 'Infinitude'. At this stage man becomes free from all pangs of earthly life such as disease, death and bereavement. This evidently indicates a faithful reflection of the Upaniṣadic spirit. Hence Emerson's indebtedness to the Upaniṣads is beyond all doubt.

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

Modern writers on Psychology give no attention to Rational Psychology; they consider it either useless or metaphysical. As Prof. James Ward points out, modern psychologists vie with each other in writing a psychology *bhne Seele*. The ancient conception of Soul has evaporated, and in its place we find a self, which is regarded as a "centre of interest," and which is supposed to be generated when a' new interest springs up and destroyed as soon as the interest terminates. The *impasse* into which such a view brings the Psychologists may be realised at a glance when we consider that some of them have been forced to recognise the continuance of such a bloodless self even after the

death of the body, and in place of the old-world view of an immortal Soul we find the idea of a "centre of interest" which survives (!) after the death of the body when the interest is not fulfilled in the person's life-time. The old-world view, as in Plato so in the Upaniṣads, planted itself squarely on the recognition of the Soul as an entity which was free to take on a body, as it was also free to go away and transmigrate. Whatever the limitations of such a view, it was a view which one could at least understand; but the modern notion of an anemic "centre of interest," which could continue to exist after the death of the body, passes absolutely beyond the comprehension of anybody except a metaphysician who makes such concessions to naturalism as to make an entire forage of his philosophical ideas.

The Question of the Seat of the Soul

The first question with which a Rational Psychology may be concerned is the question of the seat of the soul. And when this question is asked, it is not unusual to answer it by taking a spatial view of the habitation of the soul. it is likely to be ignored that the soul is an unextended entity, and that as such it is bereft of all spatial connotation. And yet, Rational Psychology, has concerned itself with a discussion of the part or parts of the body with which the soul comes more directly into contact. Prof. James says: "In some manner our consciousness is present to everything with which it is in relation. I am *cognitively* present to Orion whenever I perceive that constellation, but I am not *dynamically* present there. I work no affects. To my brain, however, I am dynamically present, inasmuch as my thoughts and feelings seem to reach upon the processes thereof. If, then, by the seat of the mind is meant nothing more than the locality with which it stands in immediate dynamic relations, we are certain to be right in saying that its seat is somewhere in the cortex of the brain." The views that have been held in regard to this question have been many and various. I.H. Fichte, as we know, supposed that the soul was a space-filling principle. Descartes imagined that the seat of the soul was the pineal gland, while Lotze maintained that the soul must be located somewhere in the "structureless matrix of the anatomical brain-elements, at which point.... all nerve currents may cross and combine." We have already seen the opinion of Prof. James that if the soul's activity is to be referred to one part of the body more than to any other, it ought to be referred to the cortex of the brain. Aristotle supposed that the seat of the soul was in the heart; and he came to this conclusion by observing, "(1) that the diseases of the heart are the most rapidly and certainly fatal, (2) that psychical affections, such as fear, sorrow, and joy cause an immediate disturbance of the heart, (3) and that the heart is the part which is the first to be formed in the embryo." The Upaniṣadic psychology agrees which with the Aristotelian in locating the soul in the heart. We have already seen how important a part the "pericardium" plays in the Upaniṣadic psychology of sleep. The Upaniṣadic philosophers felt no difficulty in locating the soul in the heart; and it is not ill we reach a later ear in the evolution of Indian thought that we find that the seat of consciousness is transferred from the heart to the brain. It is only in the Yogic and the Tāntric books that the cerebro-spinal system comes to be recognised, and it is there that consciousness comes to be referred to the brain instead of the heart.

The Heart and the Brain as Seats

In one important Upaniṣadic passage,

however, we already find an incipient transition from the one view to the other. Though in the Upaniṣads as a whole we find that the heart is regarded as the seat of the soul, in a passage of the Taittiriya Upaniṣhad, in a very cryptic style and with a good deal of prophetic insight, the Upaniṣad-seer gives his reflections as to the way in which the soul in the heart moves by a passage through the bones of the palate right up to the skull where the hairs are made to part, and on the way greets the Brahman who is his lord and master. It is important to remember that while the soul in the heart is characterised as the *manomaya purusha*, the Brahman that resides in the brain is called *manasaspati*, the soul's overlord. "What we know as the space inside the heart, therein is this immortal golden being, namely mind (or soul). What we know as hanging like a nipple between the bones of the palate, thought it is the entrance to the Lord on the passage right up to the skull where the haris are made to part. *Bhūḥ...Bhuvaḥ...Suvaḥ....Mahaḥ* — when these (mystic) words are uttered, the soul moves right up to Brahman. The soul gains autonomy, joins the Ruler of mind (or soul), becomes the lord of speech, the lord of sight, the lord of hearing, the lord of knowledge, becomes (in short) the Brahman who bodies himself forth in space" (S. 15).

A great deal of difficulty has been experienced in the interpretation of this passage. The passage no doubt tells us that the sense-centres as well as the intellect-centre are to be referred to the brain, inasmuch as it says that the soul can obtain mastery over these only by moving to the brain from the heart; yet, the actual path which has been indicated in the above passage cannot be traced without difficulty. What is the "nipple-like" appearance of which the Upaniṣad speaks? Is it the uvula, or the pituitary body?

Deussen and Max Müller have both understood it to be the uvula. Are we then to understand that the Upaniṣad-philosopher was so struck by the inexplicably hanging uvula that he regarded it to be the door to the overlord of soul, and are we to understand that Deussen and Max Müller took into account the experiences of the mystic who regards the uvula as the medium by which he comes to taste the nectar which oozes in the state of ecstasy from the ventricles of the brain into the pharynx? Or, are we to suppose that the Upniṣad-philosopher was so fortunate as to witness a skull dissected open and to observe that the pituitary body is situated just above the pair of bones of the hard palate, and then to be able to suppose that the soul in the heart could travel along the course of the pituitary body, and through it move further to its overlord in the lateral ventricle, around which, in the grey matter, are situated the various special sense centres? The latter interpretation is not improbable; but one does not know whether the Upaniṣad-philosopher knew anatomy enough to trace the actual path, or was interested in occultism enough to see the path with his mental eye!

The Relation of the Body and the Soul

However this may be one the physiological side, we may that the Upaniṣadic philosophers definitely raised the psychological question of relation between body and soul. The Maitri Upaniṣad, though it is a late Upaniṣad, raises the question of an efficient cause, and in Platonic fashion endows the soul with the power of motion. It tells us that there were certain sages in ancient times called the Vālakhilyas who went to the Prajāpati Kratu and asked him who was the driver of the chariot of the body: "The

body, venerable Sir, is verily like an unmoving cart; may your Honour be pleased to tell us if you know who is the mover of it." And the Upaniṣad tell us that the answer which they elicited from the Prajāpati was that the mover of the body-chariot was the soul, "the pure tranquil, imperishable, unborn entity who stands independently in his own greatness" (S. 16. a).

Moreover, the Kaushītaki Upaniṣad tells us that the soul must be regarded as the master of all bodily faculties, the lord of the sense-functions : "As a razor is placed in the razor-case, or fire in the fire-hearth, similarly does this conscious self pervade the body up to the very haris and nails. These senses depend upon the soul as the relatives upon the rich man. As the rich man feeds with his kinsmen, and the kinsmen feed on the rich man. As the rich man feeds with his kinsmen, and the kinsmen fed on the rich man, even so does this conscious self feed with the sense and the senses feed on the self" (S. 16. b). This passage tells us how the various bodily senses are dependent on the self and how the self is immanent in the whole body.

The History of the Spatial Extension of Soul

The passage quoted above leads to the view that the soul fills the whole of the body, a doctrine which is not unlikely to have led to the Jaina doctrine that as large as the body is, even so large is the soul,— that the soul of the elephant is as large as the body of the elephant, while the soul of the ant is only as large as the body of the ant— "*hastipudgalam prāpya hastipudgalo bhavati, pipīlikāpudgalam prāpya pipīlikāpudgalo bhavati*". This is the *reduction ad absurḍaṃ* of a belief in the extended nature of soul, which will not allow us to think of the soul except under spatial limitations. The history of the doctrine of the space-filling nature of the soul as advanced in the Upaniṣads is a very interesting one. In the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad we are told that "the intelligent luminous self in the heart is as small as a grain of rice of barley, and yet it is the ruler of all and lord of all, overruling all this and whatsoever else exists" (S. 17. a). In a passage of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, as well as elsewhere, we find that the soul is not longer conceived as of the size of a mere grain of rice or barley, but is thought to be of the size of a thumb— an idea which plays a very important part in the Upaniṣads: "The soul, who is the lord of all things that have been and that are to be, and is therefore over-awed by none of them, is of the measure of a thumb and dwells in the mid-part of the body (that is, in the heart)" (S. 17. b). In a passage of the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, the soul is understood as not of the size of a thumb, but of the measure of a span (S. 17. c). The should is here called "prādeśamātra" and "abhivimāna." These words have occasioned a very great difficulty to the commentators. Śaṅkarāchārya, who understands the soul as all-pervading, cannot bring himself to be reconciled to the statement that the soul should be merely a span long, prādeśamātra. Now the word pradesa is really an important word. In the Amarakosha, it is understood as meaning a span, as also in the Medinikisha. Śaṅkarāchārya himself know that the word prādeśa was "elsewhere" used in the sense of a span, which his scholiast Ānandagiri explains as being the meaning of the word in Jābālaśruti. According to Śaṅkara, the word prādeśa elsewhere signified not merely a span's-length but *the* span's length from the forehead to the chin. This is a very significant fact as we shall presently see. In the Mahābhārata, Bhīmasena had been described as being a span's length taller than his younger

brother Arjuna. In the Maitri Upaniṣad, the word prādeśa has manifestly the same meaning. Under these circumstances it is but natural that the word prādeśa in the passage which we are discussing may be taken to mean a span, especially, as Śaṅkara points out, *the* span's length between the forehead and the chin. The word 'abhivimān" has also caused a great deal of difficulty. The interpretation which Śaṅkarāchārya has put upon it, and with which Deussen, Max Müller and Rajendralal Mitra have all agreed, seems after all to be an unnatural interpretation. Thus Śaṅkara explains the word as meaning one who knows himself — the Kantian "I am I" — an interpretation which does not come out of the expression "abhivimāna." Deussen translates the whole passage in a way which only support the meaning of Śaṅkara so far as the word "abhivimāna" is concerned: "Were ber deisen Ātman Vaiśvānara so [zeigend] als eine Spanne grow auf sich selbst *(abhi)* bezogen *(vimāna)* verehrt, der isst die Nahrung in allen Welten, in allen Wesen, in allen Selbsten." Max Müller translates "abhivimāna" as, "identical with himself," while Rajendralal Mitra says it means "the principle object indicated by the pronoun I." All these interpretations err in understanding too much by the preposition *abhi*. By no manipulation, however clever, could the meaning of "self" be extracted out of it as Deussen and others have tried to do. Would it not be much more natural to understand "abhivimāna" as meaning simply "measuring"?

The expression "prādeśamātram abhivimānam" could then be understood as equivalent to "measuring the span's length for the forehead to the chin," and the interpretation of the whole passage becomes easy: "He who worships the Self as measuring the span's length from the forehead to the chin, and as existing in all men, he enjoys food in all worlds, in all beings, and in all selves." In fact, we are asked in this passage to worship the Soul who resides in the span's distance between the forehead and the chin, and who is therefore the master of the head, which by a consensus of opinion is recognised in Hindu thought as the "uttamanga" or the best part of the body. No wonder that Prof. James could trace the feeling of Self in certain cephalic movements of his, and say that "the Self of selves, when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the head, or between the head and the throat.

The Soul Both Infinitely Large and Infinitely Small

We have hitherto seen some of the stages in the logical, not necessarily historical, evolution of the idea of the extension of the soul. Being first regarded as merely of the size of a grain of rice or barley, it was then regarded as of the size of a thumb, and later of the size of a span, while we have also seen that the Kaushitaki Upaniṣad speaks of the soul as filling the whole extent of the body and being hidden in it as the razor is hidden in a razor-case. We now come to treat of the idea of the soul as not being restricted to any part of the body, but being verily infinite and occupying all space. The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad speaks of the "eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, subtle, and imperishable Soul who is the origin of all beings, and whom the wise alone can perceive," and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad lends its support to this statement by saying that "the wise man ceases to grieve when he has know this great all—pervading Soul" (S. 17. d). The Maitri Upaniṣad, not being able to choose between the rival theories about the size of the soul, offers an easy eclecticism by combining all of them together in a promiscuous

statement. It tells us that a man "reaches the supreme state by meditating on the soul, who is smaller than an atom, or else of the size of the thumb, or of a span, or of the whole body" (S. 17. e).

In this promiscuous statement it is difficult to make out which theory this Upaniṣad advocates. An alternative interpretation of the passage can also be offered as it has been offered by Cowell and Max Müller, following the commentator Rāmatīrtha, but to say as Rāmatīrtha says that the soul is "of the size of the thumb in the span-sized heart in the body" does not lessen difficulties. That the Upaniṣadic philosophers felt the necessity of reconciling such contrary statements as that the soul is only of the size of a grain of rice or barley, and that it is all-pervading and omnipresent, may be seen from a passage in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad which asks us to believe the contradiction that "the soul of the living being is subtler than the subtle, and yet greater than the great, and is placed in the cavity of the heart," —a statement which, with equal seeming contradiction, is corroborated by the ·hilosopher of the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad who says: "My soul in the heart is smaller than a grain of rice or barley, or a mustard or a canary seed; and yet my soul, which is pent up in the heart, is greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than the heaven, greater than all these worlds" (S. 17. f). The nemesis of the theory which attributes a spatial extension to the soul lies just in these contradictions, and there is no way out of the difficulty except on the supposition that the soul transcends all spatial limitations.

Analysis of the States of Consciousness

And yet, so far as the soul comes to inhabit the body, it must be recognised as passing through certain psychical states: and the analysis which the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad makes of the four states of consciousness must be regarded as very acute, and considering the date of its production, wholly extraordinary. The credit which a modern psychologist gives to Swami Vivekānanda for having introduced the conception of the "superconscious" in psychology must be rightfully given to the author of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. There are not merely the three obvious states of consciousness, says the philosopher of this Upanisad, but a fourth must also be recognised, which corresponds to what is usually called the "superconscious." But the word superconscious in our opinion is an unhappy word to designate this fourth state : to speak of a "superconscious state of consciousness" is to utter a solecism. and so, we here propose to use the word "self-conscious" to designate this fourth state. The soul, then, according to the Upaniṣad, experiences four chief states, namely, those of wakefulness, dream, deep sleep, and pure self-consciousness: "This soul is four-footed (that is, has four conditions).

The first condition is that of wakefulness, when the soul is conscious only of external objects and enjoys the gross things, and then it is to be called Vaiśvānara. The second condition is that of dreaming, when the soul is conscious of internal objects and enjoys the subtle thins, the then it is called Taijasa. When the person in sleep desires no desires, and dreams no dreams, that state is to be called the state of sound sleep. Thus the third condition of the soul is that of sound sleep, when being centred in itself and being full of knowledge and bliss, it feeds on bliss : it is then called Prajña. The fourth state of the soul is that of pure self-consciousness, when there is no

knowledge of internal objects nor of external ones, nor of the two together: when the soul is not a mass of intelligence, transcending as it does both consciousness and unconsciousness; when it is invisible, incommunicable, incomprehensible, indefinable; when it is beyond thought and beyond the possibility of any indication being virtually the quintessence of self-intuition, in which all the five kinds of sensation are finally resolved; when it is tranquil and full of auspiciousness and without a second; it is then to be called Ātman" (S. 18).

The Microcosm and the Macrocosm

This recognition of four chief states of individual consciousness, the waking, the dreaming, the sleeping, and the self-conscious, as well as the names which are assigned to the soul in these states, namely those of Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, Prājña and Ātman, have played a very large part in the later more systematized Vedānta. This is the reason why the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad has been regard as a late Upaniṣad. But it is to be noted that the Upaniṣad does not make mention of the corresponding four states of the consciousness of the Cosmic Self. In later Vedānta, the Cosmic Self as it passes through *its* four states comes to be called the Virāj, Hiraṇyagarbha, Iśa and Brahman respectively. Corresponding to the four aspects of the microcosm, there come to be recognised the four aspects of the "makranthropos," a decidedly better word to use than "macrocosm."

The Cosmic consciousness comes to be regarded as corresponding state by state to the Individual consciousnes, and what is in the Individual comes to be found also in the World. Even though this idea is not fully brought out in the Upaniṣads, we already trace in them an incipient tendency towards that view. Leibnitz's theory of representation is already present in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad : Within this city of Brahman (this body), there is a small lotus-like place (the heart), and within it a small internal space; that which is within this small space is worthy of search and understanding.... Of the very kind as this outer space is, of the same kind is this internal space inside the heart; both heaven and earth are contained within it, both fire and air, both the sun and the moon, both the lightning and the stars;; (S. 19). Here we see the root of the theory that the individual is to be regarded as the world in miniature, and the world only the individual writ large, and that the individual object serves as a mirror in which the whole of reality is reflected — a theory to which Leibnitz gives expression when he says: "In the smallest particle of matter, there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies, souls. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like... a pond full of fishes."

The "Sheaths of the Soul"

Another interesting problem in connection with the Upaniṣadic psychology is the problem of the so-called sheaths or bodies of the soul. We all know what importance has been attached to the conception of these "bodies of man" by modern Theosophists. Corresponding to these bodies, they have also recognised seven different planes, on which, according to them, the several bodies of man keep functioning. Thus, the various planes which they recognise may be said to be respectively the physical, the astral, the mental, the intuitional, the spiritual, the monadic, and he divine. Let us see what justification there can be for such a view in the light of the theory which the Upaniṣads advance. In fact, the only Upaniṣad where we find mention of a theory of this kind is the Taittirīya

Upaniṣad. In the second chapter of this Upaniṣad, we are told that "within this physical body which is made up of food, is another body which is made up of vital air; the former is filled with the latter, which is also like the shape of man.

More internal than the body which is made up of vital air is another body which consists of mind; the former is filled with the latter, which is again like unto the shape of man. More internal still than the mental body is another body which is full of intelligence; the former is filled with the later, which is again like unto the shape of man. Finally, still more internal than this body of intelligence is another body consisting of bliss; of former is filled with the latter, which still is like the shape of man" (S. 20. a). Here we are told that various bodies are pent up within this physical body, — as if the physical body were like a Pandora's box, — that the wise man is how who knows that there are what may be called by sufferance the physical, astral, mental, intuitional, and beatific "bodies" of man, that every internal body is enclosed within an external one, and, finally that all these bodies have the shape of man. It was possibly such a passage as this which has been responsible for spreading such a notion as that of the "pañcha-kośas" of the five bodies of man.

Limitations of a Modern Interpretation

Among modern Theosophists, this theory has assumed quite an extraordinary importance. The etheric double, they say, is exactly like the shape of the human body, that it lingers a few days after the death of the physical body, that the etheric double of a child linger only for three days after its death but that in the case of an adult it may linger for a sufficiently long time to allow for period of mourning that in dreams while we are having the curious experience of flying like a bird in mid-air or swimming like a fish in the seas it is etheric double which by a kind of endosmosis is transmitting its experience into the physical body, that the scheme of the five bodies mentioned in the Upaniṣad is only a description of the "manifest bodies of man, and that over and above these, there are two more "unmanifest" bodies which may be called the Monadic and the Divine, the Anupādaka and the Ādi, or in Buddhistic terminology, the Parinirvāṇa and the Mahāparinirvāṇa.

So far as we apprehend it, the general mistake of this theory consists in taking words for things, in refusing to see that what are by sufferances called the "bodies" of man in the Upniṣads are nothing more than mere allergorical representations of certain psychological conceptions. Man is made up of a physical body, of vital air, of mind and intellect, and of the faculty which enables him to enjoy an ecstatic φεωρτα. This only is what is meant by the passage in question. To ignore its mere psychological aspect and to proceed to erect and occultist philosophy upon the doctrine is hardly justifiable. The great Śaṅkara did recognise the "kośas," but he understood them as having merely an ideal existence. We have to discriminate in thought *(viveka)*, he says the five different kośas, and to find our true Self beyond the physical body, beyond the φυχ' or vital principle, beyond the mind and intellect, and beyond even our beatific consciousness. He wavers, however, in deciding as to whether we should identify the Brahman with beatific consciousness, or whether we should even penetrate beyond it to find the Brahman; but in any case, he insists that the kośas or sheaths have no real existence, and that a theory which is built upon the conception of the sheaths is a theory which is "built upon ignorance."

The Problem of Sheaths, at Bottom the Problem of Substance

That the words "anna, prāṇ, manas, vijñāna, and ānanda" are not to be understood as meaning veritable *sheaths* may be seen by reference to a celebrated passage in the third chapter of the same Taittirīya Upniṣad, where the author is discussing what should be regarded as the αυσS of things' and he rules out of order the theories that "matter," "live," "mind," or "intellect" could be regarded as the principle of things, and comes to the consclusion that "intuitive bliss" alone deserves to be regarded as the source of reality. The seer of that Upaniṣad makes Bhṛigu approach his father Varuṇa, and ask him about the nature of ultimate reality. The father direct him to practise penance and learn the truth for himself; he only gives him the hint that the ultimate principle should be one "from which things spring in which they live, and into which they are finally resolved".

They boy after practising penance return to his father and tells him that food (or matter) may be regarded as the principle of things. The father is not satisfied, and asked him to practise penance again. The son comes back with the answer that vital air may be regarded as the principle, and so no. The father is not satisfied with the successive answers which his son brings him, namely, that the ultimate reality may be regarded as vital air, mind, or intellect, and when the son finally brings the answer that it may be beatific consciousness which may be regarded as the source of all thing whatsoever, the Upaniṣad breaks off, and we have no means of knowing whether the father was satisfied with the final answer. We are only told that this piece of knowledge shall be forever mysteriously known as the Bhāgavi Vāruṇī Vidyā and that this is "exalted in the highest heaven" (S. 20. b), meaning thereby that it is honoured even amongst the gods.

The Idea of Transmigration: an Aryan Idea

We now pass on to discuss the question of Transmigration in the Upaniṣads, but we cannot understand its full significance unless we see it on its background, namely the from which it takes in pre-Upaniṣadic literature. The question of Transmigration may fitly be regarded as the crux of Early Indian Philosophy. We have been often told that the idea of Transmigration is of a very late origin in Indian thought, that it did not exist at the time of the Ṛgveda, that it did not exist at the time of the Ṛgveda, that it was an un-Āryan idea, that, as Professor Macdonell puts it, "it seems more probable that the Aryan settlers received the first impulse in this direction from the *aboriginal inhabitants* of India," that even though "the Aryan Indian borrowed the idea from the aborigines, they certainly deserve the credit of having elaborated out of it the theory of an unbroken chain of existences, intimately connected with the moral principle of requital." Having said that the idea of Transmigration is of un Aryan origin and that it was received from the aborigines by the Indian Aryans, Professor Macdonell is obliged to account for the appearance of the same idea in Pythagoras by saying that, "the dependence of Pythagoras on Indian philosophy and science certainly seems to have a high degree of probability.... The doctrine of metempsychosis in the case of Pythagoras appears without any connection or explanatory background, and was regarded by the Greeks as of foreign origin. He could not have derived it from Egypt, as it was not know to the ancient Egyptians." Since the appearance of Herr Rohde's book on *Psyche*,

Seelenkult and *Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen* in 1894, we have come to see that the real source of a belief in transmigration among any people, under certain circumstances, lies in their own ethno-psychological development, and not in an unproven or unprovable inter-influence from one country to another. It is upon this fruitful hypothesis that we can see the upspringing and the continuance of the idea of transmigration among the Greeks from Homer downwards through Orpheus to Pythagoras in their own native land; it is upon the same hypothesis that we can see the development of the same idea among the Indian Aryans from the Ṛigveda through the Brāhmaṇas to the Upaniṣads, without invoking the aid of any unwarrantable influence from the aborigines of India. And thus, the idea of transmigration, so far from being merely an un-Aryan importation in Aryan thought, appears clearly to develop stage by state in Aryan though itself.

Transmigration in the Rigveda : The Xth Mandala

It is quite true that in the major part of the Ṛigveda, the idea of Transmigration seems conspicuous by its absence. The cheerful and joyous attitude of the Indian Aryans made it impossible for them to think too much of the life after death. They believed in the world of the gods, and they believed in the world of the fathers, and they did not care to believe in anything else. It was sufficient for them to know that the godly man went to a Heaven which overflowed with honey, and that the commonalty went to a world where Yama had the privilege first to go and to gather a number of men about him, — a not uncovetable place, it seems, "of which it was impossible that anybody could be robbed." Even though, then, we grant that the idea of Transmigration is not very conspicuous in the greater portion of the Ṛigveda, it remains at the same time equally true that, in certain other places, an approach is being made to the idea of Transmigration. The first stage in the evolution of this idea consists in taking an animistic or hylozoistic view of the world. In a verse of the 16th hymn of the tenth Maṇḍala which is devoted to the description of a funeral occasion, the eye of the dead man has been asked by the Seer to move back to the Sun which is its analogue in the makranthropos. The *anima* to the wind which is its analogue, and the *animus* has been directed to go to the heaven or to the earth according to its qualities *(dharma)*, or else to move even to the waters or the plants if it so suited it. This verse instead of expressing transmigration proper may be said to be putting forth certain hints towards an animistic or hylozoistic view of the world; but the word *dharma* which it introduces is a very significant word. It is the earliest trace of a theory of *karman*, especially as the soul is asked to go to heaven or to earth according to its qualities. But a still more definite passage is found in another hymn of the tenth Maṇḍala of the Ṛigveda, where a hylozoism is advocated with even greater stress. There we definitely know that the whole hymn is addressed to a departed spirit, and the poet says that he is going to recall the departed soul in order that it may return again and live. The poet says that the spirit which has gone far away to the world of death he will recall and make live once more. The spirit, he continues, "which may have gone to heaven or earth or to the four-cornered globe, which may have been diffused in the various quarters or have taken resort in the waves of the sea or the beams of the light, which may have ensouled the waters or the herbs, or gone to the sun or the

dawn, or rested on the mountains, or which may have spread through the whole universe and become identical with the past and the future"— that soul, says the poet, he will recally by means of his song, and make it take on a tenement. Too great a belief in the power of song ! But the fact remains that the whole human breathes an atmosphere of hylozoism, and the poet makes us feel that a soul is not wholly lost after bodily death, being mixed with the elements.

Transmigration in the Ṛigveda: the Ist Maṇḍala

But is hylozoism the final word of the Ṛigveda ? By no means. We have one very characteristics hymn of the Ṛigveda which, we fear, has not been noticed with even a tithe of the attention which it really deserves. The meaning which Roth, and Bōhtlingk and Geldner have found in at least two verse of the hymn has been strangely overlooked, and it is wonderful that people keep saying that the idea of Transmigration is *not* to be found in the Ṛgveda. The hymn were refer to is the great riddle-hymn of the Ṛigveda, i. 164. It consists of fifty-two verses and breathes throughout a sceptico-mystical atmosphere. It says that He who made all this does not himself probably know its real nature, and it sets such a high price on the mystical knowledge which it glorifies that any one who comes to be in possession of this knowledge, so the hymn proclaims, may be said to be his father's father.

It is no doubt that even though the hymn occurs in the first Maṇḍala of the Ṛgveda, it is not for that reason to be understood as belonging to the oldest part of the Ṛigveda. For example, it advocates a facile unity of godhood, which is only a later development of thought. It quotes the very same verse which we find in the celebrated Puruṣasūkta, which has been rightly recognised as one of the late productions of the Vedic period. It even contains the famous verse on the "Two Birds" which later plays such an important part in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad. All these things point unmistakable to the fact that the hymn of the Ṛigveda which we are considering must be regarded as a late hymn of the Ṛigveda, even though it has the privilege of being included in the canon of the first Maṇḍala.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the very important revelation which it makes on the subject of the idea of transmigration have been strangely neglected. In spite of the Herakleitean style in which the whole hymn has been composed, in spite of the fact that it obtains allusions to such various conceptions as those of the Fire, the Cow and the Calf, and the First-born of the Law, a psychological vein is ever present through the whole hymn, and among other things, the reference to the "Two Birds," namely the individual soul and the universal soul, makes it unmistakable that the poet is darkly expressing, in his own metaphorical way, his ideas about the nature of soul and the relation between the individual and universal souls. For example, the poet asks us, who has ever seen the precise mode in which he boneless soul, the very life-blood and informing spirit of the earth, comes to inhabit a body, tenement? And if a man did not know this himself, who has ever moved out of himself and gone to the wise man to receive illumination on it? Then the seer says categorically that this breathing, speedful, moving life-principle is firmly established inside these tenements of clay. Moreover, he tells us that the immortal principle, conjoined with the mortal one, moves backwards and forwards by virtue of its natural power; but the wonder of it is, the poet goes on to say,

that the mortal and immortal elements keep moving ceasellessly in opposite directions, with the result that people are able to see the one but are unable to see the other. These two last verses were regarded by Roth and Böhtlingk and Geldner as against Oldenberg to have supplied sufficient evidence as to the proof of the existence of the idea of transmigration in the Ṛigveda, as they rightly thought that the verses tell us that the soul is a moving, speedful life-principle which comes and goes, moves backwards and forwards, comes in contact with the body and then moves from it in the opposite direction. Oldenberg is evidently wrong when he understands verse 38 to refer to the morning and evening stars, as he must acknowledge that the verse speaks of the mortal and immortal principles. But the culminating point of the whole doctrine is reached when the poet tells us that the himself saw (probably with his mind's eye) the guardian of the body, moving unerringly by backward and forward path, clothed in collected and diffusive splendour, and that it kept on *returning frequently* inside the mundane regions. That this "guardian" is no other than the soul may be seen from the way in which verse 31 follows immediately on verse 30 which mentions the "breathing, speedful, moving life-principle"; moreover, the frequentative *(varīvarti)* tells us the *frequency* of the soul's return to this world. It was with this idea uppermost in his mind that the poet talks, in Herakleitean fashion, of those who come higher as those who are moving away, and those who are moving back as already returning higher, as Herakleitos should talk of the gods being mortals and the men immortals.

The Ethno-Psychological Development of the Idea of Transmigration

We have been obliged to make this long survey of the Vedic idea of life after death only in order to prove that the three chief moments in the idea of Transmigration, namely the passage of the soul from the body, its habitation in other forms of existence like the plants or the waters, and even its return to the human form, are all implicitly found even so far back as the times of the Ṛigveda; and when these are coupled with the incipient idea of the quality of action *(dharma)* which determines a future existence, we see that there is no reason why we should persist in saying that the idea of Transmigration is an un-Aryan idea, that the Indians borrowed it from the non-Aryans aborigines of Indian, and that in some inexplicable ways the idea found entrance in other countries and cults beyond India.

On the principles of ethic psychology, almost every nation contains within it the possibility of arriving at the idea of Transmigration from within its own proper psychological development; and there is no more reason why we should say that Greece borrowed the idea of Transmigration from India than we might say that Egypt herself borrowed it from India. If Prof. Keith acknowledges that the Egyptians themselves believed in the possibility of the dead man "returning to wander on earth, visiting the places he had loved in life, or again changing himself into a heron, a swallow, a snake, a crocodile or a girl," there is no justification for saying, as he does, that " this is indeed transmigration, but a different transmigrating from either that of Greece or Indian." Whenever, there is recognised the possibility of the soul coming to inhabit a body as a god-like principle from without, wherever it is supposed that the soul could likewise part from the body as it came, wherever, it is thought that the soul after parting from the body could lead a life of disembodied existence, and

wherever it is supposed to return again to the earth and inhabit any form of existence whatsoever, there is a kind of undying life conceived for the soul for which the step to actual Transmigration is not very far removed; while the crowning idea in transmigration, namely that of αναμνησιS is a product of very late growth, and even though it is found in Pythagoras and Plato and the indian system of Yoga, we have no reason to attribute it definitely to the Vedic seers or to the Upaniṣadic philosophers, unless perhaps we scent it in the rather unconscious utterance of the sage Vamadeva that he was in a former life "Manu or the Sun."

Trasmigration in the Upaniṣads: The Kathopaniṣad

We now come to deal with the question of the idea of Transmigration in the Upaniṣads themselves. We have already tried to prove that the idea of Transmigration has been adumbrated in the great riddle-hymn of the Ṛigveda. In the Upaniṣads, on the other hand, the idea has been most explicitly advanced. When the father of the other hand, the idea has been most explicitly advanced. When the father of Nachiketas told him that he had made him over to the God of Death, Nachiketas replied by saying that it was no uncommon fate that was befalling him: "I indeed go at the head of many to the other world; but I also go in the midst of many. What is the God of Death going to do to me ? Look back at our predecessors (who have already gone); look also at those who have succeeded them. Man ripens like corn, and like corn he is born again" (S. 21. a). Nachiketas is anticipating the gospel, and saying more than the gospel of St. John: "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." The gospel never says that the corn of wheat is reborn; but Nachiketas says that just as a corn of grain ripens and perishes and is born again, so does a man live and die to be born again.

Transmigration in the Upaniṣads: The Bṛihādaraṇyaka Upaniṣad

The *Locuś classicus*, however, of the idea of Transmigration is to be found in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, which goes into great details over the manner in which a man dies and is born again. We are first told how at the time of birth all the elements wait upon the approaching soul, their lord and king; and then we are told, how these wait again upon the soul to give him a send-of when he is about to depart "And as on the approach of a king, the policemen, magistrates, charioteers, and governors of towns wait upon him with food, and drink, and tents, saying 'he comes, he approaches, similarly do all these elements wait on the conscious self, saying this Brahman comes, this Brahman approaches; and again, as at the time of the king's departure, the policemen, magistrates, charioteers, and governors of towns gather round him, similarly do all vital airs gather round the soul at the time of death" (S. 21. b). Then follows a very realistic description of the actual manner of death: "When the vital airs are gathered around him, the Self collecting together all the portions of light moves down into the heart; and when the 'person in the eye' has turned away, then he ceases to know any forms. He becomes concentrated in himself, that is the reason why they say he is not able to see; he becomes at one with himself, that is the reason why they say he is not able to speak, or hear, or know. Then the tip of his heart is filled with light, and, through that light the soul moves out either by the way of the eye, or the head, or any other part of the body. As the Self moves out, life moves after it; and

as the life moves, the various vital airs depart after it. Him follow his knowledge, his works, and his former consciousness" (S. 21. c.).

It is important to notice that in this last sentence a doctrine of *karman* is being advanced, which becomes still more explicit almost immediately; "And as a caterpillar, after reaching the end of a blade of grass, finds another place of support and then draws itself towards it, similarly this Self, after reaching the end of this body, finds another place of support, and the draws himself towards it. And as a goldsmith, after taking a piece of gold, gives it another newer and more beautiful shape, similarly does this Self, after having thrown of this body and dispelled ignorance, take on another, newer, and more beautiful form, whether it be one of the Manes, or Demi-gods, or Gods, or of Prajāpati, or Brahman, or of any other beings. This Self, then, as his conduct an behavior has been, so does he became. He whose works have been good becomes good; he whose works have been evil becomes evil. By holy works, he becomes holy; by sinful works, sinful. It is for this reason that they say that a person consists merely of desire; as his desire is so is his will; as his will, so his work; as his work, so his evolution" (S. 21. d). This passage is important from various points of view. It tells us in the first place that a Soul finds out its future body it leaves its former one: in act, it seems that the passage calls in question a "disembodied" existence. The again, it tells us that the soul is a creative entity, and in Aristotelian fashion, creates a body as a goldsmith creates an ornament of gold. Then again, the passage says that the Soul is like a Phoenix which at every change of body takes on a newer and more beautiful form. Next, it regards the Soul as amenable at every remove to the law of *karman* and tells us that it receives a holy body if its actions have been good, and a sinful body if its actions have been bad. Further, the same passage tells us that "as to the man who has no desires left in him, who is desireless because he has all his desires fulfilled his desires being centered only in the Self, the vital airs do not depart: such a man being Brahman (while he lived) goes to Brahman (after death). Of that import is this verse: 'When a man become free of all desires that are in his heart, mortal as he is, he nevertheless becomes immortal and obtains Brahman.' And as the slough of a snake might lie on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, even so does his body lie. Being verily bodiless he becomes immortal; his vital spirit are (merged in) Brahman, and become pure light" (S. 21. e).

The Destiny of the Evil Soul

Of this immortal existence, however, we shall have occasion to speak presently. Before we do this, we must explain what was supposed by the Upaniṣadic philosophers to be the fate of the ordinary soul, and especially of the bad soul. To speak of the latter first, there are various passages in the Upaniṣads, for example, in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka, Īśa, and Kaṭha, Upaniṣads, which tells us that the Upaniṣadic philosophers believed that the wicked soul was destined to go to a "joyless" "demonic" region which was "enveloped in darkness." This conception—the belief in a Hades—the Upaniṣdic philosophers share with many other branches of the Aryan race. There is however, nothing on record in the Upaniṣads to show whether these bad souls had to suffer eternal damnation in this sunless region, or whether their stay in that region was only temporary. "Joyless indeed are the regions," says the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, "and also enveloped in pitchy darkness where

ignorant and unenlightened men go after death." "Demonic are the regions," says the Isa Upaniṣad, "and also enveloped in pitchy darkness, where those who have destroyed their souls are obliged to go." This same Upaniṣad adds that "those who worship what is not real knowledge enter into gloomy darkness," which dea is also elsewhere expressed by the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. While the Kaṭha Upaniṣad tells us that "those who make a gift of barren cows which have drunk water and eaten hay and give their milk, themselves go to the joyless regions "(S. 22). These passages show us that the Upaniṣadic philosophers believed in a sunless region where the ignorant, the unenlightened, the self-murdering, and the pseudo-charitable were obliged to go after death.

Eschatology in the Bṛihadaraṇyaka

As regards the other souls, a passage in the Bṛihadāranyaka Upaniṣad, which seems to be the oldest of its kind, tells us that a soul after death ascends through the regions of the wind and the sun and the moon, and comes at last to a region which is like the Platonic "Isles of the Blessed" and which is free from grief and snow, and here dwells through eternity: "When a man goes away from this world, he comes to the wind. There the wind opens for him a hole as large as the hole of a chariot-wheel. Through it he moves upward and comes to the sun. There the sun opens for him a hold as large as the hold of a 'Lambara'. Through it he moves upward and comes to the moon. There the moon opens for him a hole as large as the hole of drum. Through it he ascends and comes to a world which is sorrowless and snowless and there remains for aye" (S. 23). This passage must be regarded as one of the oldest of eschatological passages in the Upaniṣad. In the first place, the passage, in itself or in its context, does not make it clear whether such a fate is reserved for alal souls or for the good souls only; it speaks of souls without distinction. The eschatological passages in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, which we shall quote presently, must be regarded as of a later date, because that Upaniṣad goes into very great details over the respective fates of the ascetic or the householder, and consigns the one to the way of the Gods, and the other to the way of the Fathers. In fact, we find in that Upaniṣad a differential elaboration of the eschatological idea which is advanced in the passage from the Bṛihadāraṇayaka which we have already quoted. Secondly, it is remarkable that, as in the Upaniṣads generally, so in this Upaniṣad, the world of the moon is regarded as situated at a greater distance form us than the world of the sun. Thirdly, it is to be noticed what the Region of the Blessed of which the passage speaks is a region "without snow." Does this mean that the Upaniṣadic philosopher was tormented by too much cold in the region where he lived? And finally, the idea of "eternity" is already introduced in that important passage, and we are told that such a soul lives in these blessed regions for ever and ever.

Eschatology in the Chhāndogya: The Two Paths

In the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, on he other hand, as we have pointed out, the eschatological idea undergoes a deal of transformation. There we are told that there are two ways open to the mortals, the brigth way and the dark way, the "archirmārga" and the "dhūmamārga," the "devayāna" and the "pitṛiyāṇa" the Way of the Gods, and the Way of the Fathers. It is these two paths which were later immortalised in the Bhagavadgīta as they are already adumbrated in the hymns of

the Ṛigveda. As regards those who practise penance and faith in a forest, says the Upaniṣad, whether after their death people perform their obsequies or not, their souls enter the path of light, and they move successively "from light to day, from day to the bright half of the month, from the bright half of the month to the six months during which the sun moves to the north, for these months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, and from the moon to the lightning. There is a person not-human who carries them to Brahman. This path is known as the path of the Gods, or the path of Brahman. Those who proceed on this path never return to the cycle of human existences, yea never return" (S. 24. a). Over against this path, there is according to the same Upaniṣad another path reserved for those, who, living in towns, lad a life of charitable deeds and perform works of public utility. Such people do not indeed travel by the path of the Gods which is reserved only for the penance-performing ascetics of the forest. They travels by the path of smoke, "from smoke they go to night, from the night to the dark half of the month, from the dark half of the month to the six months, during which the sun moves to the south, but they do not reach the year. From these months they go to the world of the fathers, from the world of the fathers to the sky, from the sky to the moon. There they dwell till the time comes for them to fall down. Then they descend by this road: from the moon they come down to the sky, from the sky to the wind. Having become wind they become smoke; having become smoke they become mist; having become mist they become a cloud; having become a cloud they rain down. Then they are born as either rice or barley, herbs or trees, sesamum or beans. At this stage, verily the path is difficult to follow. Whoever eats the food or discharges the seed, like unto him do they become" (S. 24. b).

The Moral Backbone of Upaniṣadic Eschatology

It is not difficult to understand that these so-called paths are merely imaginary ways in which the primeval mind tried to express itself in regard to the eschatological idea; but they were not so understood for a great length of time, and dogmatic systematisers tried to justify them in one way or another, the most reasonable of these justifications being that the Sun and the Moon and the Smoke and the Night were regarded as presiding deities, and therefore the soul was understood as being given over in the charge of these deities who sent him whither he deserved. It is not difficult to see that the two paths which are spoken of in the above passage are merely mythological explanations of an insoluble problem. The great Ramadasa, the patron saint of the Deccan, said in his Dasabodha that one does not need to believe in the two paths. What becomes of the soul after death it is not given to man to understand; and if any credit is to be given to the author of the Upaniṣadic passage, it is not for having solved the problem but for having attempted the solution. Philosophically speaking, we are not much concerned with the actual stages of the ascent or descent of the soul, but only with the idea of ascent and descent. And looking at the problem in this way, one is filled with great deal of surprise and admiration when one sees that the ideas of ascent or descent were placed on no less than a moral foundation. "According as a man's works are, so does he become." It is this moral backbone of the Upaniṣadic eschatology that gives it a great philosophical value. In the passage of the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad just next to the one we have discussed, we are told that those

who have been of a "beautiful" character quickly attain to a covetable birth, that of a Brahmana or Kshatriya or Vaisya, and those who have been of an "ugly" character speedily attain to a miserable birth, as that of a dog or swine or pariah (S. 24. c), which statement is made still more definite in the Kaushitaki Upanisad where the law of *karman* is explicitly mentioned, and a soûl is said to take on the body of "a worm or a moth, a fish or a bird, a leopard or a lion, a serpent or a man, or any of these other creatures, according to his *karman* and knowledge" (S. 24. d).

Upanisadic and Platonic Eschatology

We have seen hitherto that the philosophers of the Upaniṣads believed in a region like the Platonic Hades in which the incurables ware possibly confined for ever; we have seen that they believed in a region like the Islands of the Blest, differing however from Plato inasmuch as they regarded life in this region as absolutely eternal; we have seen that they believed in the Path of the Gods which led stage by stage to the world of Brahman, whence they supposed there was no backturning while they also believed in the Path of the Fathers, which led the soul to supramundane regions where it lived so long as its merit was not exhausted, but when this came to an end, and soul had to descend in the shape of rain drops and take on a body according to the remnant of its works. On the other hand, we do not find that anything like the conception of the Tartarus of Plato or the purgatory to any of Dante was present to the mind of the Upanisadic philosophers. This could be explained on the simple hypothesis that to the Upaniṣadic seers, as to the later Indian philosophers, the world itself was a grand purgatory where the effects of sin were to be wiped out by good action. On there other hand, we find that creatures low in the scale of evolution were "sundered as with a hatchet" from the rest of creation: to them to Chhāndogya Upaniṣad denies the right to enter on the path of liberation, ordaining that they must for ever by fixed in the round of births and deaths. Neither on the path of the Gods, nor on the path of the Fathers, are these base creatures allowed to tread. They must keep up the round of coming and going: their rule is not "die to live" but "live to die" and it is wonderful that the Upaniṣad includes even "a tiger or a lion, or a wolf or a boar," in the same category with "a worm or a moth, a gent or a mosquito" (S. 24. e).

Variation in the Conception of the Path of the Gods

There is, however, a later phase in the development of the conception of the path of the Gods which we must not fail to notice. The Kaushitaki Upaniṣad makes a curious development in the conception of the Path of the Gods. It tells us that when a soul comes to the Path of the Gods, "he first goes to the world of Fire, then to the world of Wind, then to the world of Varuṇa, then to the world of the Sun, then to the world of Indra, then to the world of Prajāpati, and finally to the world of Brahman." It does away with the relays recognised in the Bṛihadāryanyaka Upaniṣad or the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad and substitutes new ones. Instead of such unmeaning conceptions as the "world of day," or "the world of the bright half of the month," or "the world of the six months during which the sun is moving towards the summer solstice," or finally "the world of the year," it substitutes "the worlds of deities" which are recognised as properly deities. Then it tells us, that "when such a soul has reach the world of Brahman, Brahman directs his attendants to run towards the soul and receive him with all the glory which is due to himself alone. He says that as the soul has reached the

Ageless river, he can never become old. Upon the command, five hundred celestial damsels move toward the soul— hundred with fruits, a hundred with ointments, a hundred with garlands, a hundred with clothes, and a hundred with perfumes; and they decorate the soul with all the ornaments which are due to Brahman. Being so decorated, the soul knowing Brahman, moves towards Brahman. He comes to the Ageless river which he crosses merely by the motion of the mind. He then shakes off this good deeds as well as his bad deeds. His beloved relatives partake of the good deeds, and unbeloved of the bad deeds. And as a man driving last in a chariot look down on the revolving wheels, so does the soul look at day and night, good and bad, and all the contrary Paris. Being free from good and free from evil, knowing Brahman, he moves towards Brahman" (S. 24. f).

Idea of Immortal Life

The culminating point, however, of the Upaniṣadic Psychology is reached when we come to the treatment of the idea of Immortal Life. This is one of the crucial points in the interpretation of Upaniṣadic doctrine, and expert opinion has been divided on this point for the simple reason that every dogmatic philosopher has wished to find nothing but his own doctrine in the Upaniṣads. We, who stand for no dogma in particular, know how to understand the Upaniṣadic passages on this head, because we want to take a merely historical survey of the doctrine, and not to press the passages into the service of any particular view to which we may be committed. Looking at the Upaniṣads from this point of view, we see that there is a systematic evolution that could be traced through them of the ideas that were held on the subject of Immortality. We are told in a passage of the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad that the best kind of eternal life that may be conceived for anybody is that he should be "lifted to the region of the deity" whom he has loved and worshipped during life, and that he should partake of all the happiness that is possible in that region (S. 25. a). Another passage from the Maṇḍaka Upaniṣad tells us that the best kind of eternal life should be regarded rather as the "companionship" of the highest God with whom the soul should be liberated at the time of the great end (S. 25. b). Not satisfied with a mere companionship, another passage declares that eternal life consists in attaining to an absolute "likeness" to God and enjoying life of personal immortality, a view which plays so large a part in the theology of Rāmānuja (S. 25 c). On the other hand, Śaṅkarāchārya would be satisfied the nothing short of an "absorption on divinity" and a life of impersonal immortality. As rivers which flow into the sea disappear in the mighty waters and lose their name and form, even so does the wise soul become "absorbed in the transcendent Person and lose its name and form. As when honey is prepared by the collection of various juices, the juices cannot discriminate from which tree they came, even so when the soul are merged in the Real they cannot discriminate from which bodies they came (S. 25. d). This is nothing short of a doctrine of impersonal immortality. Finally, an important passage from the Maṇḍaka Upaniṣad tells us that the soul of a man who has come to self-consciousness becomes mingled after death with the whole Universe (S. 25. e). Such a soul becomes a great diffusive power, whose voice is on the rolling air and who stands in the rising sun, and who may be seen in star or flower or wherever the eye may be cast. Or else to express it in the words of a poet of rare imagination:

"He *is made one with Nature:*

there is heard
His voice in all her music, from the moan
Of thunder to the song of the night's sweet bird;
He is a presence to be felt and known
In darkness and in light, from herb and stone,
Spreading itself where'er that Power may move
Which has withdrawn his being to its own;
Which wields the world with never wearied love,
Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it above."

REALITY

It has been the invariable custom with all the Indian systems of philosophy to enunciate the goal first, before exploring the way to attain it. They all feel that before the actual quest begins, the goal must be set forth as clearly as possible, because ignorance about the goal often leads to a half-way halt or an abrupt termination of the movement, originally initiated with a view to reaching the final truth of things. The danger of mistaking a relative truth for the final one is always there for one who makes the hazard of moving forward without a definite end or aim. The map must be drawn first of all, setting out the limit of the journey as well as marking off the boundaries. Of course, the map or picture differs one from another, according to the divergences of the minds that draw it. Thus the Sāṅkhya picture presents in broad relief the twin principle of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, the true knowledge of which is the whole endand aim of its seeking.

The Yoga picture while agreeing in essentials with the Sāṅkhya one, adds the concept of an Īśvara who is, however, only the first of all purusas. The Nyāya prefers to draw the picture in a wealth of details and hence the ultimate things or *padārthas*, whose, knowledge it seeks, are enumerated as sixteen. The Vaiśeṣika, though sharing and identical ideology with Nyāya, is a lover of brevity and so cuts down the figure from sixteen to six or seven. The whole picture of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā is devoted to the portrayal of the one essential thing that matters most according to it, viz., Dharma. Finally, the Uttara Mīmāṁsā or Vedānta tries to picture the unpicturable, to map the unmappable, through the help of the suggestions and symbols thrown out by the Upaniṣads about the nature of that supreme object, the Vast and the Infinite, viz. Brahman. Being the greatest thing, Brahman naturally includes within it all the innumerable fragments of the particular and so the conception of it too is, by its very nature, so comprehensive as to include all partial view-points in its all-embracing harmony. We must try to gather from the Upaniṣads themselves the picture, which they present, about the final goal and the judge its merits,

The Goal of the Upaniṣads

Now, what is the goal of the Upaniṣads? The *Īśopaniṣad*, one of the oldest in verse, in its very opening line gives the answer thus: *'Īśa uāsyam idam sarvam'*. On one side is *Īśa* or the Lord, while on the other is *'idam sarvam'*, all this, and they are to be joined together by the term *vāsyam'*. But immediately a problem arises in connexion with the meaning of the term *'vāsyam'*, which plunges us straight into the heart of the hardest metaphysical problem. As Sri Aurobindo in this book on the *Īśopaniṣad* points out: 'there are three possible senses of *'vāsyam'*, "to be *clothed*", "to be worn as a garment", and "to be *inhabited*". Śaṅkara adopts the first sense, while Sri Aurobindo

prefers the last one. The adoption of one sense or the other fundamentally determines the outlook of the chooser in regard to the nature of the relation he thinks to be subsisting between *'Īśa'* and *'idam*. In terms of modern philosophy, these two entities may be termed as the subject and the object and the whole aim and endeavour of philosophy, upto the present day, has been to determine the exact relation between these two terms. And the attempt to determine it has led to the division of the world of philosophy into two warring camps, each of which tries to assign superiority to one of the terms over the other. One denies the independent existence of the object apart from the subject and turns out an idealist, while the other vehemently denounces the reality of the subject and pins its faith in the reality of the object alone, calling itself a realist. Some of a compromising nature, have thought it wise to stand in the middle and effect a synthesis by giving scope to both, as well as admitting the reality of each o them. The whole history of philosophy is the story of this swing of human middle to effect a compromise.

Thus, being caught up in the net of division, we are seeking to bridge the gulf of the apparent division between *'Īśa'* and *'idam'*. Their mutual opposition is undeniable; otherwise, there would have been no need to seek a reconciliation between the two through *'vāsyam'*. Now, this reconciliation may be effected in various ways, as the difference in the interpretation of the term *'vāsyam'* itself indicates. Firstly, a reconciliation may be effected by denying the one and affirming the other; secondly, by denying both; thirdly, by affirming both; and, fourthly, by transcending both. Does the Upaniṣad seek to obliterate or efface *'idam'* altogether by enjoining that it should be *clothed* or covered totally by *Īśa* or does it ask the seeker to instal the *Isa* in the bosom of *'idam'* as the *inhabitant* without covering its existence altogether? In other words, is the world to be swallowed up by the Lord or inhabited by Him?

Before seeking the answer to this fundamental question it will be wiser to determine, first of all, the connotations of the two terms, whose reconciliation is to be sought, because the clearing up of the concepts will go a long way in helping the final solution of the problem. To determine the nature of the *Isa* is the one main pre-occupation of all the Upaniṣads. It is variously termed as *Brahman, Ātman, Puruṣa, Akṣara, Īśa*, etc. from different points of view Of these the most common appellation are Brahman and Ātman and their identity too is specifically stated by the Upaniṣad itself: *'ayam ātmā brahma'*. The Brahman or the Ātman is the sole pursuit of the whole *Brahmavidyā* in the Upaniṣads. 'Brahman is called the goal', 'That Immutable is the goal', 'That Ātman is to be seen', 'He is to be searched, He is to be enquired about', thus the Upaniṣads speak again and again.

Definition of Brahman or Ātman

The next question that comes to the mind is: What is signified by the term Brahman or the term Ātman? Here again we are confronted with a difficulty, for various passages in the Upaniṣads describe the Brahman or the Ātman in numerous ways, which seem conflicting and often inconsistent with one another. The two broad features of the conflicting nature of the statements are : (i) affirmation and (ii) denial, i.e. in some places it is described as identified with all existence, while in other places it is pointed out solely by the stripping off of all identifications whatsoever, by a drastic and relentless denial. 'All this is the Ātman,. All this is verily Brahman' and

such other statement unequivocally affirm the identification of all this with Brahman or Ātman. Again, 'He however, the Ātman, is not so, not so (*ne'ti, ne'ti*). He is incomprehensible for he is not comprehended: indestructible, for he is not destroyed: unaffected, for nothing affects him: he is not fettered, he is not disturbed, he suffers no harm', or 'That it is, O Gārgi, which the wise call the Imperishable (*akṣarm*): it is neither thick nor thin, neither short nor long, neither red (Like fire) nor fluid (Like water), neither shadowy nor dark, neither wind nor ether (space), not touched, without taste or smell, without eye or ear, without speech, without understanding, without vital force and without breath, without mouth or size, without inside or outside; never consuming anything nor consumed by any and such other statements vehemently deny all identification, with any aspect of existence. Shall we than say with Keith that "contradictions 'in adjecto' are the normal characteristic of the Upaniṣads" or that "the hopeless inconsistencies of the view of Yājñavalkya become painfully obvious"? Contradictions and inconsistencies no doubt confront us at every step but that is no reason why one should level things at that after pronouncing a mere hasty condemnation. If one seeks the solution of the contradictions patiently from the Upaniṣad itself, then there is no reason why it should not be forthcoming with the clearness of the morning light, dispelling all darkness whatsoever. It is our own bias and prejudice that always deprive us from getting the true solution. 'Spiritual books are written in the language of the Spirit and must be spiritually discerned. They yield a new sense at every reading and it is only after many years that most of us begin to realize the colossal nature of our own initial mistakes". The real spirit can never be taught, it must be caught through an attitude of sympathy with the true essence of the Upaniṣadic teaching. And so let us try our best to get in touch with it.

Two forms of Brahman

One Upaniṣad mentions that 'there are two forms of Brahman, the manifest as well as the unmanifest'. Another Upaniṣad speaks of the *Para* and the *Apara-Brahman*. The *Maitrī Upaniṣad* say: 'There are two *Para-Brahmans* to be contemplated, the *Śabda* as well as the *Aśabda*, the *Śabdabrahman* and that also which is *Para'*. Thus the two descriptions which appeared manifestly contradictory point in reality to two distinct forms of the one Brahman. The *mūrta* or the manifest is the form identified with manifestation, the *amurta* or the unmanifest' form is by its nature distinct from all manifestation. That form which is the active principle in all manifestation is called the *Śabdabrahman* or in the technical terminology of the later Vedānta, the *Īśvara*. The other which is not so engaged or connected with manifestation is the *Aśabda* or the *Para Brahman*. In terms of Western Philosophy, the one may be called the God, the other the Absolute. But the problem of problems remains: what is the relation between the *mūrta* and the *amūrta*, the *Śabda* and the *Aśabda*, the God and the Absolute? Are they identical or distinct? 'We are thus face to face with the ultimate problem which may be variously described as the problem of the Absolute and God, of the One and the Many, of Transcendence and Immanence, of Eternity and Time, of the Infinite and the Finite, of the Universal and the Particular. It is an ancient problem but it still remains as acute as in the days of Plato and Śaṅkara.

Brahman and Creation

The Upaniṣads are emphatic that at the root of the whole manifestation is

Brahman. 'That out of which all these things are born, by which they live and unto which they return and merge, that is Brahman'. Nay, the very root meaning of the term' 'Brahman' signifies its creative nature. That which grows or swells is literally Brahman, and hence, as Dr. Maryla Falk rightly points out, originally the term Brahman signified the female principle and did not convey the neuter conception that is now assigned to it. 'The vast Brahman is my womb' says the Lord in the Gita. But manifestation or creation essentially implies a change or a movement and if Brahman is the cause of it then that too must be changeful in its nature or at least must be affected somehow or other by the changes in the effect. If the immutability of Brahman is to be preserved, change must be denied or Brahman must be conceived as itself changing or moving. The Upaniṣads steer clear of this dilemma. We have pointed out in the introduction that all the Upaniṣads unfailingly point out the two broad features of Reality viz. *Agni* and *Ātman*. The whole structure of the Upaniṣadic wisdom rests on these two conceptions, and it is through the instrument of these two principles that the Upaniṣads solve all problems, however hard, with an ease that is striking and remarkable. Now, as Agni or Prāṇa the Supreme Reality produces and sustains the whole existence. 'Whatever is, all this world issues forth from the moving Prāṇa. 'All that is here and in the heavens are under the control of Prāṇa. Agni is, therefore, significantly called *'Jātavedas'* the knower of all that is created and as the *Nirukta* points out, in giving its various etymological meanings, it also signifies that all created things know it because it is the source of them all and as such in direct touch with them. It also exists eternally in every cycle of creation, it is behind each and very manifestation. It is again the *Śabda Brahman*, the root of all creations, the Supreme Logos, the Creative Word. It is also *Sāvitrī*, the Divine Mother, who gives birth to the universe, and *Gāyatrī*, the redeeming Mother, who guides all movements in the hearts of beings as well as in the heavens. Its very nature is composed of two principles, *Jñāna* and *Kriyā*, Reason and Action, as Śaṅkara rightly points out and hence creativity is its fundamental feature. Here, 'Reality is undoubtedly creative, i.e. productive of effects in which it transcends and expands its own being', as Bergson states it. But this Prāṇa is a richer principle than Bergson's *elan vital*, for it is not a blind urge or a pointless movement alone like the latter, moving on and on without knowing an end, but a luminous conscious force that knowingly creates and creatively knows. Here knowledge and and movement go hand in hand and what the vision directs the movement executes. Thus direction and execution proceed from the same source here and therefore Prāṇa is at once the *'anujñā'* or the command, as well as the *'saṁvardbaitā'*, the executor or the exuberant flow of creation. Hence, *'mithuna'* or the mixture of two, i.e. unity-in-difference, is the very basic nature of Prāṇa. The world with its differences and diversities is he taken up within the unit of the single organism or Prāṇa, the parts meet in the whole, the subject and the object are found to be complementary parts of the same whole. Hegel's Absolute Idea thus comes very near this conception of Prāṇa in the Upaniṣads. His idea of the principle of differentiation within the unity of the Absolute bears close resemblance to the similar Upaniṣadic conception about Prāṇa. Hegel's view appears very fascinating to our mind and still holds its sway over us because 'what our intellect really aims at is neither variety nor unity

taken singly but *totality*', as James rightly points out. Our intellect is confronted with a bewildering variety and its sole effort is directed towards the construction of a system or a coherent whole out of this chaotic mass. It endeavours to create a perfect world in the sense of a rounded whole, 'a spherical system with no loose ends hanging out for foreignness to get a hold upon'. Hence our intellect conceives that the Absolute is the entire system of internal discords transmuted into ever richer harmonies and into the harmonious unity of the whole. Organic unity is the highest unity that our intellect can comprehend or envisage.

But still there is a higher unity beyond it pointed out by the Upaniṣads. We were confronted with the dilemma that if Brahman is the cause of the universe or the manifestation, it must be conceived as itself changing, or change must be denied if the immutability of Brahman is to be preserved. Through the conception of Prāṇa, we have found, the Upaniṣads do not deny or explain away change or manifestation, but rather exhibit that the whole wealth of creativity is in the very heart of Reality. But how then is the immutability of Brahman preserved if change or movement happens to issue out of its very centre? It is preserved through the conception of transcendence, which is the quintessence of the whole Upaniṣadic wisdom. As Agni or Prana Reality is immanent, as Ātman it is transcendent. '*Asaṅgo by ayaṁ puruṣaḥ*' is the supreme truth indicated about the nature of the Ātman. The Ātman is absolutely untouched to untainted by all the colourful changes wrought over it and retains its pure majesty unsullied all through.

Then, does transcendence imply that the Ātman or Brahman is outside the sphere of existence, far above the noise and tumult enjoying a blessed solitude? We must warn readers here that the Upaniṣadic conception of transcendence and immanence should never be confused with the conceptions passing by those names in the West. In the West, transcendence has always signified the exclusive aspect of Reality, which is outside and above the process of creation and this has given the inspiration to Deism or Theism which worships Reality from a venerable distance, adoring its tremendous majesty and extolling its utter unapproachability. Immanence stands for the opposite conception, which signifies a total identification of existence or creation with Reality, which equates God and the World and as such leads to Pantheism, which finds God as an intimate companion, no longer above and beyond but close to the heart and here in the dust. Between these two extremes stands the so-called Panentheism which tries to cut a middle path by putting forth the view that the nature of Reality is all immanence and some transcendence. It holds that the Supreme Reality is completely immanent in the universe but this does not exhaust its nature and so it is something more and hence partly transcendent.

The Indian view or the Upaniṣadic conception of Reality is everywhere represented and condemned in the West as sheer pantheism, which strikes at the root of all morality and obliterates the distinction between good and evil, virtue and vice. Pantheism is defined as the doctrine which 'identified God with the entire universe, which beholds him in the movement of the tiniest insect or in the lustre of the brilliant gem, in the mind of a Socrates or in the brain of a Newton. But if this pantheism be the doctrine of the Hindus, how the latter can be condemned in the same breath as a theory of illusion passes our comprehension. In order to

condemn the Indian theory of so-called illusion, the Western scholars would represent it as sheer transcendentalism and again just to represent the Indian doctrine as the most obnoxious and abominable, in which there is 'unbridled license of a sensuous idolatry', in which 'the grossest impurities are not only permitted, but perpetuated under the sanction of religion, they would call it mere pantheism. All this is the result of a bias or prejudice which is regrettable in every true scholar.

The Upaniṣadic Conception of Transcendence & Immanence

The Indian or Upaniṣadic conception of transcendence and immanence is totally different and distinct from the Western view. Here transcendence never signifies an aloofness or exclusion, because the Brahman of the Upaniṣads is not a unitary principle which is opposed to the multiplicity of creation. Not only has it created the whole of existence, not only has it brought all this into being, but, having created this all, has veritably entered into it as the Upaniṣad expressly declares *(tat sṛṣṭvā tadēvā' nuprāviśat).* Not only is it the efficient cause, the *nimitta-kāraṇa*, of the creation but the material cause, the *upadana-karana* too. The *anupraveśa*, the entering into creation, the very fact of immanence signifies its transcendence. Here the entering or *anupraveśa* does not indicate something like the entering of one thing into another but simply points to the fact that by the act of creation the Supreme Reality has made itself accessible to the intellect (*buddhi*). This access to the intellect is the true meaning and significance of *'anupraveśa'*. But the intellect is the subtlest thing, being the very first and foremost principle in creation, and naturally that which can enter even into this subtlest thing must be subtler still. Only the subtle can enter into the gross and not vice versa. Hence, the Brahman surpasses even the intellect in subtleness and thus easily enters into it; and being subtler than the intellect it is not touched or tainted by any of the blemishes of the intellect. By the very fact of its entering, it proves its transcending nature. Transcendence thus, in our sense, always signifies the uniqueness, the *vilakṣaṇatā*, the distinctness of Brahman, and never any exclusiveness or apartness. 'Other than the known, and more than the unknown is That declares the Upaniṣad, while signifying the transcendent nature of Brahman. Here the two terms *'anyat'* and *'adbi'* peculiarly suggest the uniqueness of the nature of Reality and signify its transcendence of all categories of thought.

Similarly the ' *ne' ti ne' ti'* of Yājñavalkya simply signifies the distinctness of the Ātman from all this that is here and does not convey any sense of excluding everything from it, as is ordinarily supposed. The Brahman of the Upaniṣads has no opposition whatsoever to anything and as such need not exclude anything in order to maintain its reality or purity. Thus *'ne' ti ne' ti'* does not deny the reality of existence, it 'denies all the empirical characterization of reality. It just signifies that Reality is something unique and distinct from the empirical. If we keep this sense of denial in mind, then it will be clear that 'the denial of attributes and qualifications to Brahman does not reduce it to a void' but on the contrary, points to its inexhaustible fullness, which remains absolutely undiminished even after the whole of creation streams out of it, because it is not touched by this process of continuous ebb and flow at all, being absolutely distinct from all this. Here by a strange mathematics even after he subtraction of the full from the full, the

remainder still remains the full !

How does this miracle happen? It happens because Brahman creates not in the ordinary way of a cause and effect series, but in a unique non-causal way. This is the much misunderstood theory of *vivartavāda* in Vedānta. In all the creations we find in the world, the effect is produced through a transformation of the cause into something else. The cause dies in order to give birth to the effect. Whether we take the side of *ārambbavāda* and say that the effect is something new and novel, which has just come into being and was previously non-existent, or concur with *Pariṇāmavāda* that it was already there in the cause in a latent form and has only been made patent through the process of so-called creation, a change in the cause, some form of alteration in it, has somehow or other to be admitted, in either case, in order to account for the emergence of the effect. It is possible in any way to keep the cause absolutely unaltered, and yet have the effect produced? The *vivartavāda* makes a bold attempt in this line. It tries to show that even in this world there are illustrations of an effect being produced without any change or modification whatsoever in the cause. and here are brought in the classic example of illusions, like the rope-snake etc. The examples or illustrations have been taken in the wrong way everywhere and their true significance has been missed. It is generally assumed that by these illustrations the Vedanta has sought to explain away the world as a mere illusion or phantasmagoria, whereas the illustrations have quite another bearing. They only seek to show the unsullied nature of the cause, which is not touched in any way by the effect imposed upon it. As Sankara puts it: 'Not by the fact that a water-snake is taken to be a snake does it become full of poison nor a snake being taken for a water-snake becomes poisonless'. Similarly all the imperfections and limitations is creation do not touch Brahman as all, its eternal substratum, though Brahman is taken to be the world mistakenly. The illustration only goes upto this point and should not be pressed further.

The Vedānta, being a system of philosophy, tries to bring home the supra-rational truth in terms of rational concepts to the human mind. Without twisting or flouting human logic, it attempts to systematize the ineffable experience of the Absolute or Brahman. Here it almost sets an impossible task before it, for how can the supra-rational be presented through the methods of the rational intellect ? Either the supra-rationality suffers or has to be sacrificed, or rationality has to go. But the unique achievement of the Vedānta lies in this that it never brings down the supra-rational even an inch from its glorious height and yet presents a rational account of the whole manifestation out of it. It does not again say that a part of the cause is modified and a part of it remains unmodified, for that is contrary to all logic and will make the one indivisible reality a mere combined product of different parts and as such destroy its true unity. It keeps the whole cause unmodified and yet explains the modification or effect. This is not an explaining away of things but the only real attempt at explanation. The explaining away is, on the contrary, resorted to by those who merely accept the contradictory nature of Reality as presented to our intellect and experience and pronounce that this contradiction is the fundamental nature of it. To state that the Absolute or Brahman itself is modified as well as unmodified i.e. contradictory in nature is to equate Reality with the merely empirical.

It will not be out of point here to refer to the criticism of Hegel by Herbart. 'Inherent contradiction, says Hegel, is the very nature of these notions, as of all things in general; becoming, for example, is essentially unity of being and non-being etc. That, rejoins Herbart, is impossible so long as the principle of contradiction still retains its authority. That the notions of experience present contradictions is no fault of the objective world but of subjective perception, which must redress its erroneous construction by a transformation of these notions and an elimination of their contradictions. Herbart accuses the philosophy of Hegel of empiricism, in that it accepts from experience these contradictory notions unaltered; and not with standing discernment of their contradictory nature, regards them, just because they are empirically given, as justified and even, on their account, transforms the science of logic itself'. Hegel thus not only accepts the contradiction and attributes the contradictory nature to Reality, without attempting any solution but he also flouts the ordinary logic by inventing a logic of the Absolute. In other words, he frankly admits that to the ordinary logic the contradiction is inexplicable, and insoluble. The Vedānta, on the contrary, boldly accepts the fact of experience, acknowledges the contradiction and finally solves it in a unique way. It brings in the classic examples of illusion because on the intellectual plane there is no other analogy through which the unmodified nature of the cause along with the production of the effect can be illustrated. The plane of the intellect is accustomed to *'pariṇāma'*, i.e. creation through modification, it never knows creation without modification save in the cases of illusion, and that is why these illustrations are cited.

Unreality of Existence

But it may be objected here that this definitely takes away the reality or the created things and reduces the world to a mere illusory appearance, and though it may be the view of Śaṅkara, yet it may not be acceptable or us, concerned as we are here solely with the Upaniṣads. The question then comes: Do the Upaniṣads pronounce the world to be unreal? Certainly there are passage which definitely state all existence o be of a fleeting nature, pronounce it to be of very little worth and contrast the little with the Vast or *Bhūman* and condemn it as perishable and even go o far as o declare the many to be non-existent. so the doctrine of illusoriness of created things is not an invention of Sankara but has its roots in the Upaniṣads. All these "are covered by falsehood" declares the Upaniṣad. But the whole confusion arises from the use of the word *'anṛta'* or *'mithyā'* in connection with the existence of the world. Words always create a confusion because of their association with a certain definite import beyond which we cannot go. *'Mithyā'* has always come to mean, in ordinary parlance, the unreal or non-existing. But the term *mithya* is ordinary parlance, the unreal or non-existing. But the term *mithyā* is never applied in this sense to the world, and one must therefore carefully distinguish between the *'asat'* and the *'mithyā'*, the nonexistent and the untrue. The world is not *asat*, non-existent because it is verily a fact of experience as the *Vedānta-Sūtra* expressly declares: *nabbava upalabdheb*. Its is *mithyā* only in the sense that it has got a spurious reality. Its reality is not genuine, because it does not belong to it but is only delegated to it by something else. Hence its reality is a dependent reality and not an independent one, which can stand on its own grounds. Dependent reality,

borrowed reality, spurious reality is called *mithyā*, false, i.e. not genuine. The Upaniṣads have no objection if any one feels satisfied by using the term *satyam* with regard to the world or existence but then the Absolute or Reality must be called *Satyasya Satyam*, the Truth of the Truth, i.e. one must then distinguish between two orders of truth, in which the lower truth is sustained by the higher.

Thus, we find that it matters little whether we call the world *satya* or *mihyā*, if we rightly understand the connotations of these two terms. Even those who advocate the reality of the world can never assert that the world is of the same order of reality as the Absolute, but there are some who will raise a storm if it is called unreal or *mithyā*. It is only strict logic which forces one to use the term *'mithyā'*, for Truth is one and undivided, and it is logically absurd to speak of a more true or less true. If it is true, it is wholly true, if it is not true then it is false, that is the imperative demand of logic.

Degree of Reality

The question immediately comes: Do the Upaniṣads not recognise degrees of reality? Certainly they do but at the same time they know its limitations. This less and more, or the degrees are essentially a product of the intellect or the mind and do not apply to Reality itself. The intellect, while apprehending Reality, apprehends less or more of it according to its power of apprehension and attributes the degrees to Reality, while actually they belong to the intellect itself. Thus there are no degrees in Reality, though the degrees are of Reality. The Upaniṣads present Reality as a value from this point of view and they draw a hierarchy of values too : 'Higher than the senses are the (subtle) objects of sense; higher than those objects is the mind, higher than the mind is the intellect or *buddhi;* higher than the intellect is the Great Self or *Mahān Ātmā;* higher than the *Mahat* is the Unmanifest; higher than the Unmanifest is the Supreme Self or the *Purusa*. That is the End, that the Ultimate Goal' or again, 'Higher than the senses is the mind; above the mind is the intellect;; beyond the intellect is the Great Self; above the mind is the intellect; beyond the intellect is the Great Self: above the Great Self is the Unmanifest; higher than the Unmanifest is the Self or *Puruṣa*, all-pervading and devoid of any characteristic mark, having known which, every living being is liberated and goes to the immortal state'.

Thus, as we rise in the ladder of consciousness we get a clearer and clearer view of Reality but that does not signify that Reality itself is graded in nature. We have pointed out that it is only the power of apprehension that creates the degrees, and power always signifies a movement, and movement is essentially a function of Prāṇa. Thus degrees of reality hold very true in the sphere of Prāṇa which is graded in its very nature but they do not apply to the Ātman, which is single and simple in its being. Even the so-called illusionist Śaṅkara admits degrees of reality on the plane of the mind as when he says in his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtra* that although *one and the same* self is hidden in all beings, movable as well as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds which form the limiting conditions of the Self, Scripture declares that the self, *although eternally unchanging and uniform* reveals itself in a *graduated series* of beings and so appears in forms of various dignity and power'. Thus the axiological and the logical views of Reality are both placed side by side in the Upaniṣads and do not contradict each other because they refer to two distinct spheres altogether.

Axiologically, Reality exhibits higher and higher values, appears richer and richer in content and being, while logically it remains the same one unchanging Reality. The Upaniṣads give equal scope to both *Pariṇāmavāda* and *vivartavāda*. What is *pariṇāma* on the plane of the *prāṇa* and *buddhi* is *vivarta* on the plane of the Ātman of Brahman.

Purpose and value of Creation

Still our intellect protests. Being accustomed to *pariṇāma* or evolution, which is a fact of experience to it and hence very true, it refuses to acknowledge any plane or sphere, where this law of evolution or *pariṇāma* does not hold good. It question: 'Even if this experience of ourselves is illusory, the illusoriness itself is part and parcel of the experience and cannot be conjured away. For since we are parts of the Reality, or experience— illusoriness and all — is in the end a portion of God's experience. But the God, who is timeless, complete and positive Reality cannot be conceived as the ground of evil, error or illusion. *As we experience them* they are in respect to such a God 'mere negations'; and yet *as we experience them* they have a distinctive character and are in some sense real'; But the Upaniṣads nowhere conjure away the fact of experience. One the contrary, they show the extreme importance and utility of the so-called illusory world. It is this dual, this unreal, this finite with suggests the non-dual, the Real, the Infinite. All these forms of diversity are assumed by the Infinite itself in order to make its true nature revealed. 'Indra assumes these diverse forms through *māyā* in order to make known his own form'. The '*pururūpa*' or diverse forms are thus meant to point towards the '*svarūpa*' or the true form. As Śaṅkara rightly points out here: 'Had this name and form not been manifested then the unconditioned form of this Ātman, called the *prajñāghana*, would not have been revealed. There is thus a deep purpose behind the manifestation and hence it is not to be rejected or conjured away as a mere nothing. It is only by contrast with the unreality of the world that the reality of Brahman is realized, and here lies its supreme value and utility. That is why Reality creates this opposition between knowledge and ignorance, good and evil, virtue and sin etc. In itself, Reality does not stand in need of an opposite principle in order to make itself real, but it is only to make its *apprehension* possible that the creation of an opposite principle is needed. To make itself *known (praticakṣaṇāya)* it has created the diversity and not to make itself real. It is real by its own inherent nature and is not dependent on anything else to make itself real.

Hegel and his followers make Reality itself composed of these two opposite principles, unity and diversity, and they think these two constitute the very nature of Reality, which makes their Absolute a spurious one, because, according to them, 'appearance without reality would be impossible, for what then could appear ? And reality without appearance would be nothing, for there certainly is nothing outside appearances'. Such a relativity of the Absolute and the world takes away the very absoluteness of the Absolute because it militates against the intrinsic self-sufficiency of Absolute. The Upaniṣads never make this mistake of making the Absolute dependent on something else and thereby reducing it to a relative entity. They know that 'while a grin required a cat, a cat need not always have a grin', i.e. though the world always stands in need of Brahman in order to exist, yet Brahman never looks towards the world for its *existence*.

The mind in order to apprehend the existence of Brahman no doubt needs the world, for, as we have pointed out, it is only through the immanence that the transcendence is apprehended or realized, but that is no reason for attributing to Reality itself the necessity that is indispensable to the mind. The Upaniṣadic conception thus gives full scope and value o the appearances and yet never makes them a part and parcel of Reality. Reality is always established in its own majesty, declare the Upaniṣads: 'In what is the *Bhūman* or the Vast established ? In its own majesty or not even in its own majesty'.

It is so very self-sufficient that the Upaniṣads even feel diffident to state that it is established in *its own* majesty, and retracts its own statement, for that may give the impression that the *Bhūman* has to look to its own majesty in order to have its existence. Utter freedom, complete self-sufficiency is the mark of the Absolute, and the Upaniṣads never compromise it for the sake of our inability to grasp it.

Contradictions Reconciled

The Upaniṣads thus feel no difficulty whatsoever in asserting the complete immanence of Brahman in the world, as well as, in the same breath, declaring its complete transcendence. Everywhere they say that it is from the *Akṣara* or the Immutable that all the mutations proceed. They even speak in the same line of a verse of the two aspects: 'It is without life, without mind, pure, higher than the supremely immutable. From this is born life, mind as well as all the senses; the sky, the wind, the fire, the waters, the earth, the sustained of the universe'. Similarly, the speaks of the two functions in the same verse, the *'paryagāt'* and the *'Vyadadhāt'*, the spreading all around and the making or ordering of things. As Sri Aurobindo translates it: 'It is He that has gone abroad — That which is bright, bodiless, without scar of imperfection, without sinews, pure, unpierced by evil. The Seer, the Thinker, the One who becomes everywhere, the Self-existent has ordered objects perfectly according to their nature from years sempiternal'. As Rabindranath Tagore has pointed out in his brilliant exposition of this verse, that the first two lines describe Reality only in the neuter, while the concluding two lines use the masculine, which is very significant. In the first part again, Reality is described simply through negatives, like *akāya, avraṇa, asnāvira, apāpaviddha* etc., while in the second it is represented positively as the *kavi, manīṣī, paribhū, suayambhū* etc. To the Upaniṣadic eye it is the same Reality viewed from two aspects, now from within and now from without. The two pictures do not make Reality dual leave its unity unimpaired. The difference is in the points of view and not in Reality itself. Seen from within, the divine nature is Being resting in itself, nentred in itself, and, viewed from without, it is the source from which streams out the exuberant flow of creation, and unto which it returns. The absolute God thus becomes the creator God, when we look at it from the end of the world. Here Reality streams down into the world it has created, and penetrates, sustains and controls it. Here it is described as the 'Lord of all, the knower of all, the Indweller, the Source, the (principle of) generation and dissolution of all created things. But there it is all pure Being and nothing else. "Neither inwardly conscious, nor outwardly conscious, nor in both ways conscious, nor conscious all through, neither knowing nor unknowing, invisible, intangible, incomprehensible, indescribable, unthinkable, inexpressible, founded solely on the certainty of its own

self, th end of all existence, tranquil, blissful, timeless, that is the fourth, that is the Ātman, that is to be known".

This description wholly through negative terms creates in our mind the idea that the Reality is going to be depleted of all contents, it is being deprived of all richness and we are being led towards an utter blank, a vain abstraction, a void, a zero. This has led to the idea in the West that the Brahman of Indian philosophy is a characterless nothing, an empty abstrâction, a purposeless empty power without wisdom and activity, a unity into which all existences pass as into a dark and eternal night. That is why Caird describes the Indian Brahman as "as abyss of a negative infinitude..... a unity which has no principle of order in the manifold differences of things but merely a gulf in which all difference was lost". In the same strain, Pfleidered describes Brahman as "an indeterminate abstract Being, which is hardly distinguished from nothing; an abyss which produces and maintains the finite; it is like the cave of the lion into which all the footsteps lead and none lead out again". Instances need not be multiplied, for they are all too common in each and every book of the Western scholars and philosophers. But these writers and critics do really deserve our sympathy, for it is not usually possible for the human mind to conceive of this stanscendent sphere of Advaita, accustomed as it is to grow and know through a relation of duality. The Upaniṣads are very well aware of this fact; they state clearly the possibility of confusion in many of the discussions about Brahman. Thus this fear seized the heart of Maitreyī, when Yājñavalkya, describing to her the nature of Brahman, said that here was no consciousness thereafter i.e. after the realization of Brahman. To this Maitreyī protested, saying, that she was being utterly confused, because she felt that she was being led to a state of utter unconsciousness, an absolute void, and Yājñavalkya immediately reassured her, saying that, he did not mean to confuse her, the Ātman is truly immortal, and its nature or being is beyond annihilaction. Similarly Indra, when instructed by Prajāpati that the nature of the Ātman was akin to the state of sleep, felt disconcerted on thinking that then everything would face utter extinction, and the state would not be an enjoyable one at all. So he returned to Prajāpati, who appreciated his difficulty and clearly distinguished the pure nature of the Ātman from the state of sleep or unconsciousness. He assured him that one did not lose everything there but rather got back his own true form, became the Supreme Puruṣa, full of all enjoyments. It is a state where all is lost, yet all is found.

True Significance of Negative Descriptions

Hence, as we have already pointed out, the negative particle *ne' ti* which is so frequently used in describing Brahman, does not signify an annulment or rejection of all, as we commonly suppose, but everywhere suggests the uniqueness of Brahman or Ātman. The supreme experience of the Ātman or Brahman has no parallel in our common world of experience; it is something of a 'wholly other' nature and therefore those who refuse to move beyond the common experience of thought or those who try to push the analogy of this our experience to the sphere of the Absolute will certainly miss it.

Fortunately, there are some in the West who have lately realized the true significance of the negative approach and seem to appreciate it, finding its parallel

in some of the Western mystics' approach to Reality. Dr Otto, in his remarkable book, *'The Idea of the Holy'* rightly remarks: "This aspiration for the *'void'* and for becoming void and for becoming nothing, must seem a kind of lunacy to any one who has no inner sympathy for the esoteric language and ideograms of Mysticism and lacks the matrix from which these come necessarily to birth. To such one, Buddhism will be simply a morbid sort of pessimism. But, in fact, the 'void' of the Eastern, like the 'nothing' of the Western mystic, is a numinous ideogram of the 'wholly other'. James too in his *'Varieties of Religious Experience'* gives a correct appreciation of the Upaniṣadic approach through negatives thus: 'Their very denial of every adjective you may propose as applicable to the ultimate truth, — He, the Self, the Ātman, is to be described by "No ! no!" only, say the Upaniṣads — though it seems, on the surface, to be a no-function, is a denial made on behalf of a deeper Yes. Whoso calls the Absolute anything in particular, or says that it is *this*, seems implicitly to shut it off from being *that*— it is, as if, he lessened it. So we deny the *'this'*, negating the negation which it seems to us to imply, in the interest of the higher affirmative attitude by which we are possessed". Coomaraswamy, the great scholar and art-critic, hence rightly observes that "such a negative manner of speaking is inevitable: for here negation, *ne' ti ne' ti* 'not so, not thus' is a denial of limiting conditions, a double negative; not as with us who 'make innate denial' that we are other than ourselves, an affirmation of limiting conditions. So Godhead is 'void', light and darkness, it is rid of both, 'poised in itself in sable stillness', it is 'idle', 'effects neither this nor that', is 'as poor, as naked and as empty as though it were not; it has not, wills not, wants not, 'motionless dark'.

Royce's view examined

There are, again, some eminent philosophers, who, while deeply appreciating the true significance of this negative approach, yet do not feel quite at home in this dizzy height of the transcendent and hence recoil back to the safe level of synthesis of the intellect. The case of Royce is an instance to the point. We believe that no other philosopher in the West has presented the view of the Upaniṣads more faithfully and sympathetically, yet ultimately, somehow or other, he fails to truly appreciate the supreme Upaniṣadic wisdom, and perhaps his Hegelianism proved stronger than his spirit of appreciation. He raises the problem very nicely: "Absolute immediacy perfect peace, fulfillment of meaning by a simple and final presence — when do we finite beings come nearest to that ? On the border-lands of unconsciousness, when we are closest to dreamless slumber. The Absolute, then, although the Knower, must be in truth Unconscious. But if this is so, wherein does the Absolute Being differ from pure Nothingness? He himself states further that "the seers of the Upaniṣads are fully alive to this problem. It is a mistake to imagine that they ignore it. More than once they discuss it with the keenest dialectic. He then repeats the question: "Is the Absolute verily a *mere* nothing,"? and answers it as follows: "The Hindoo's answer to this last question is, in one sense, precise enough. The Absolute is the very opposite of a mere Nothing. For it is fulfilment, attainment, peace, the goal of life, the object of desire, the end of knowledge. Why then does it stubbornly appear as indistinguishable from mere nothing ? The answer is : *That is a part of our very illusion itself.* The light above the light is, to our deluded vision, darkness. It is our finite realm that is the falsity, the mere nothing. The Absolute is

All Truth. There can not be a more faithful and illuminating presentation of the Upaniṣadic view than this. But from this he goes to conclude that "this mystic Absolute gets, for the Hindoo, its very perfection from a Contrast-Effect, and here he definitely errs, for as we have already pointed out the perfection or existence of the Absolute never depends on the contrast with the illusory world but its *apprehension by us*, no doubt, does depend on this contrast alone. So it is not true to state that "this contrast-effect and this alone, gives the zero, that is the limit of the finite process, its value, its truth, its absoluteness". Taking his stand on this Contrast-Effect, Royce goes on to show the inherent inconsistency of the Upaniṣadic view of the Absolute thus: "But a zero that is contrasted with nothing at all, has so far not even any contrasting character, and remains thus a genuine and absolute nothing. Hence, if the Absolute of the Mystic is really different from nothing, it is so by virtue of the fact that it stands in real contrast with our own real but imperfect Being. We too then are. If our life behind the veil is, as the mystic says, our goal, if already, even as we are one with the Knower, then the absolute meaning does not ignore, but so far recognizes as real, even by virtue of the contrast, our present imperfect meaning. ......, But to suppose, as the mystic does, that the finite search has of itself no Being at all, is illusory, is *māyā*, is itself nothing, this is also to deprive the Absolute of even its poor value as a contrasting goal. For a nothing that is merely other than another nothing, a goal that is a goal of no real process, a zero that merely differs from another zero, has as little value as it has content, as little Being as it has finitude".

The whole misapprehension arises from the failure on Royce's part to appreciate truly the significance of the socalled unreality or illusoriness or *māyā*, as he calls it. The Upaniṣads nowhere deny that 'we too then are', but we are, not in virtue of ourselves, but we exist only through the existence of the Absolute or Brahman. Royce would feel comforted and reassured if some reality is conceded to the finite, if it is said that '*it is real in its own way*', and the Upaniṣads never object to conceding this sort of reality to the finite. The finite is certainly real in its own way, but it is not real in the way the Absolute is Real. The Reality of the Absolute is of a different category altogether, because It is Real on its own merit, while all else is real by virtue of its reality and has no intrinsic reality of its own. Hence, as we have already pointed out, it is only strict logic which forces Śaṅkara to call the finite unreal, when contrasted with the Absolute Reality, while he himself admits degrees of reality *within the realm of the finite*. Thus, it is not a contrast between two degrees of reality here, between the less real and the more real, but between two different *orders* or reality. The contrast is not between one nothing and another nothing, between one zero and another zero, but between the only true thing and the nothing, between the only one integer and the infinite zeros. Remove the integer and all the zeros become mere nothing, while attached to it, they acquire infinite value.

Royce wants to picture the Infinite as only a magnified finite, because he thinks "it is not only the goal but the whole series of stages on the way to this goal that is the Reality". But, as Joachim puts it, "the Infinite cannot be regarded as merely a bigger or a more lasting, or a numerically greater finite: its nature is in no sense made up of finite parts. It must be conceived in a manner *toto genere* different from that in which we conceive the finite. This is what the Upaniṣads think about the nature of the Infinite. The Upaniṣads

never try to effect a hollow compromise between the finite and the infinite. "The finite has not somehow to be retained in the Absolute. The Vedānta does not pull up the finite to the level of the Absolute non does it bring down the Absolute to the level of the finite. It gives us another solution of the problem. The Absolute is all of the finite, it is its *adhiṣṭhāna* and *āśraya*, its ground and support. The finite cannot and does not live for a moment without the Absolute. But what from the standpoint of true knowledge is the Absolute appears as the finite from the standpoint of ignorance or ordinary empirical knowledge." Thus it is the finite which points towards its ground or substratum by the very fact of its dependence on the Infinite and the contrast-effect is enhanced and not diminished by the so-called unreality or rather dependent reality of the finite.

Hockings view examined

We have quoted Royce at length and have engaged ourselves so long with him, just to show how a great mind, even on approaching the very border of the Supreme Reality ultimately recoils to its own safe harbour of the intellect. Royce's is not the only case, but most of the great thinkers and philosophers suffer from this 'last infirmity of the noble mind. Being accustomed to move on the crutches of the intellect, they get afraid finally to dispense with them and move unaided straight into the heart of Reality to perceive the soul through the soul. They timidly knock at the door of Reality but remain wavering even when the door is ajar and miss the opportunity of entering into the *sanctum sanctorum*. Hocking's illuminating book, "Types of Philosophy" is another illustration to the point. He nicely states the difference between Realism, Idealism and Mysticism, thus: 'Realism separates object and knower, idealism holds that all objects belong to some knower; mysticism holds that the objects and the knower belong to each other—they are the same reality, they are one'. He deals exhaustively with each of the three views, adding his own critical comments at the end of each. He begins with Realism and finishes with Mysticism and it apparently seems that he realizes that the true consummation or the final solution lies in Mysticism, but he really purports to show that Realism and Mysticism are two extremes, the one favouring total separation, the other total union, and the wisdom lies in the middle, in the views and Idealism. He admits, while introducing the topic of Mysticism that "Idealism — even with the intuitions which lead to it— leave us unsatisfied, suffering 'with the wound of Absence.' There is, so to speak, another stage of intuition, in which the sense of otherness drops away and the knower realises that he is identical with the inner being of his object." But, he again gets alarmed at this total dropping away of otherness, the entire identity of the knower and the known. He apprehends that "pure unity, unless it were understood to be the unity of something plural, would be a non-descript unity indistinguishable from nothing". This apprehension again and again haunts our mind and prevents us from viewing the Reality in its utter truth and nakedness. It is again this bias which represents the transcendence as an exclusion or aloofness, which is never its real sense, as we have already pointed out. Hocking therefore recoils back from the position of the mystic, refusing to proceed to the farthest limit along with him and feels secure in the midposition, swinging or alternating between the one and the many. His sense of the practical predominates over has sense of the real and hence he concludes: "The law of

alternation is a practical principle, perhaps the chief of practical principles. It declares that we cannot make out a good life either by exclusive contemplation of the One or by intelligent management of the Many; but we must have both, in the form of a rhythm, like the rhythm of work and play, or of sleep and waking."

We have already pointed out how all these misapprehensions arise due to the failure to comprehend the true nature of transcendence. We have mentioned Hocking's case, because both he and Royce refer to the Upaniṣadic view as belonging to the type of mysticism. But we must here warn that the Upaniṣadic doctrine is too great to be contained in any single 'ism'. If mysticism signifies an 'exclusive contemplation of the One' then the Upaniṣadic teaching is most emphatically not mystic in character. There is no spirit of exclusiveness in the Upaniṣadic teaching; on the other hand, it exceeds even the supreme inclusiveness. The Upaniṣadic or the Vedāntic doctrine is hence significantly termed *'advaita'* or non-dualism. It does not exclusively seek the One, nor lean towards the many, neither does it somehow work up a compromise between the two but transcends both. "It is no 'nearer' I than 2 and we may also note that the term *advaita*, usually loosely rendered as monism, means actually non-dualism, which is not quite the same thing. The Upaniṣads are very well aware of the synthesis, which Hocking and Royce and thinkers of the same line put forward. They know how to 'have both, in the form of a rhythm' and this rhythm is the Prāṇa or Agni, as we shall try to show in dealing with the different *vidyās*. This law of rhythm is truly'the chief of practical principles', nay, the very basic principle behind all manifestation. But that does not mean that this law is the final truth of things, though it may be 'the chief of practical principles'. There is still behind it a source from which even this supreme law emanates, and the Upaniṣads never rest content till they that final source, the Light of all lights *(jyotiṣām jyotiḥ)*, they never deny the value of the practical principle, but rather give the fullest scope to it and yet pass on to view things from the standpoint of the Real. There is thus no conflict between the practical and the real from the Upaniṣadic point of view, and the Upaniṣads never try to bring down the real and completely identify it with the practical in order to make it suit our taste and temperament.

The True Nature of Reality

What then is the picture of Reality or the Absolute as we can finally draw it from the Upaniṣads? We have seen that the texts speak of both forms, *Para* and *Apara*, the Transcendent as well as the Immanent. Is it then a composite picture, of which the one half represents transcendence and the other half immanence? The Upaniṣads never try to join up somehow the two contradictory aspects or get them placed together on the same canvas. They never try to effect a '*samuccaya*' or synthesis or getting together of the two, not do they cause a sundering between them. A *sumuccaya* or synthesis is necessary where there is an opposition between two terms, which stand in the relation of thesis and antithesis. But the transcendence of Brahman, which we have tried to depict, has no opposition to immanence, if we rightly comprehend its nature. The Western conception, as we have pointed out, takes them in opposite sense and hence, there are some who posit a third entity, which is represented as neutral in its nature and of which both transcendence and immanence are two equally real aspects, and in this way, they try to effect a

reconciliation between the two and yet keep the Absolute above the conflict. But the Upaniṣads, we have found, speak of two Brahmans and not of a third beyond both, because, according to them, there is no relation of opposition between immanence and transcendence which are to be reconciled in a third neutral entity. Here the transcendence itself signifies the real nature of the Absolute or Brahman and the very same transcendent Reality is viewed as immanent when looked at from the end of the world. 'Spirit-in-itself is transcendent, Spirit is immanent in reference to the order of expression'. 'The transcendent alone is truth, the dynamic divine is the transcendent presented in the aspect of relation'. The relation or the absence of relation leaves the transcendence unimpaired. The transcendent is called *'para'*, the supreme or the higher, and the immanent *'apara* or the 'not-supreme' or the lower, not to depreciate the one and exalt the other, but the immanent is *'apara'* in the sense that it is the view of Reality through a medium or relation and hence not direct and intimate, while the transcendent is the view of Reality in and through itself, and hence *'para'*. But one must pass through this immanent to the transcendent, because every one of us happens to be a denizen of the world of relations and, as such, must view Reality through the relation first, before hoping to pass beyond all relations. The attempt to view the transcendent from the end of the world will always lead, as it has led everywhere up till now, to a vague abstraction. The Neo-Vedāntists, in their zeal to extol the *Nirguṇa Brahman*, have almost reduced it to a mere nothing, an empty contentless being. Hence Vidyāraṇya rightly reminds us that only those who have mediated on the *Saguṇa Brahman* are fit to know the *Para Brahman*, and learn this supreme *Brahmavidyā*.

We must also note here that the true has always its counterfeit and thus there is a false transcendence, as well as a false immanence which imitate the originals and thereby cause a deception. The false transcendence is achieved by cutting oneself of altogether from all manifestation and through the ushering in of the blissful silence. This is the path of Sāṅkhya, which seeks an aloneness or *kaivalya*, away from the diverse mutations of *prakṛti*. The true transcendence, too, is a state *above* all manifestation, but *not aloof* or *away* from manifestation. Neither is it *in* all manifestation and yet somehow *above* it. It has no in or out, within or beyond, below or above. It is *'anantara', 'avāhya.'* It is, what it is, in its own majesty, preserving its uniqueness amidst all contradictions. It is also the silence, but not the silence that is opposed to movement or change. It is called the silence, because its inherent nature or uniqueness is never disturbed or moved in any place or time. There is always a risk of misunderstanding this supreme silence as the silence of death, which benumbs all the creative flow of life but in fact it is the silence of which both death and immortality are equally shadows. The world is thus not cast off in this true transcendence, as in Śaṅkhya, for that would mean a lapse into dualism and an abandonment of the true *advaita* position. The true *advaita* never needs the excision of a second in order to achieve its non-duality, for that very sundered or excised part will remain as an eternal challenge to its genuine non-duality, and falsify it. The *Vārttikasāra*, therefore, rightly points out that if the world is denied in Brahman and is conceived as existing apart from it, then it will lead to the view of the Śaṅkhya and therefore the all-inclusiveness is being stated. To know the transcendent, then, is not to lose the

immanental richness but to surpass it through a fullness that is over-flowing. To know it, is to comprehend it in its own being or essence, as well as, in the details of the relations, because having transcended all relations, it knows haw all relations work and arrange themselves. Having reached that Light of all lights, one not only knows it in its pure white radiance, but also comes to know how, through what curvatures and colours, it appears manifold in the world of manifestations. It will not do merely to know that all this is the play of that one Light but one must also know the *how* or the details of the process through which the Light appears in diverse colours. To state in the terms of the classical example of Vedānta, it will not do merely to know that the snake is nothing but the rope, but one must fully know how, through what process of misapprehension, the rope had appeared as the snake. Till then the illusion will not be dispelled, the fear will not be removed, the truth will not be revealed. True transcendence thus implies a knowledge in details of the entire process of manifestation.

The Conception of Immanence or Īśvara

Having distinguished the spurious or pseudo-transcendence from the true one, let us now proceed to have an acquaintance with the aspect of immanence. Immanence, again, does not mean merely a pervasiveness through all space and time. Rather it signifies the principle of sustenance, which makes things exist and appear. It is that aspect of Reality which is in identification with existence. We have already pointed out that the immanent is nothing but the transcendent seen from the aspect of the world. It is thus Brahman itself which becomes the Īśvara, when taken or viewed in reference to the world or creation. As the *Pañcadaśī* expressly says: 'It is Brahman itself which appears as Īśvara, when in contact with the *upādhi* of its *Śakti*'. This *Śakti* is termed as *māyā* or *pakṛti* by the *Śvetāśuatara*, the nature of which we shall have to discuss presently. He who is in touch with this *māyā* is the *Maheśvara* or the Supreme Lord. "Īśvara then is the self as shining on and in *māya* which has the three guṇas (attributes or elements) of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and is, accordingly, both *triguṇātīta* (transcending these guns) and *śuddha-sattva-upādhi* (invested with a transparent body of *sattva)*. That one God covered himself of his own nature by the net born of the *pradhāna* or *prakṛti*, like the spider enveloping itself by the web'. One thing which is to be marked here is that he covered himself *of his own accord (suabhāvatāḥ)*, and not by any compulsion. This is what makes him *Īśa* or the Lord, while the *jīva* becomes *anīśa*, because his covering is not conscious or self-willed, but rather imposed or thrust upon him. Hence, the *jīvas* cannot lift the veil or remove the net whenever they wish, while Īśvara is always free to do so. Therefore, the *jīvas* look towards Īśvara for help in the matter of the removal of this veil.

Here the close connexion between the Īśvara and the Guru becomes patent. Not only is he the Creator but also the Redeemer. The *Pātañjala Yoga-Sūtra*, therefore, rightly calls him the eternal and most supreme Guru. Vyāsa, in his commentary, points out that though he has no personal benefit to gain yet his sole concern is to favour the created beings *(bhūtānugrahaḥ prayojanam)*. This function of *'anugraha'* is something like a divine prerogative with him. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* expressly mentions this latter function: 'The Self-manifested has pierced the apertures of the senses outwards,

therefore creatures look outwards and do not see the inner self'. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Kauṣītaki* also state it more explicitly: 'It is he who makes that man perform good deeds whom he wants to uplift, and again it is he who makes that man perform evil actions whom he wants to thrust downwards'. Thus the creature or *jīvas* are absolutely at the mercy of Īśvara. This, however, does not make the Īśvara a mere despot, or reduce the *jīvas* into mere automata, for the *jīvas* are, in reality, his own images or reflections. He becomes the benefactor or oppressor, not of some entities which are apart from him, but he oppresses or molests himself by himself and again favours himself through himself. This is what is called his play or sport or *līlā (lokavattu līlākaivalyam)*. The Tantras rightly lay stress on these functions of *'nigraha'* and *'anugraba'*, and emphasize, that not even a thousand effort on the part of the *paśu* or the *jīva* can remove the original nescience, the limitation or 'dirt of smallness' or finitude, the *āṇava mala*. It is only *Paśupati*, the Lord, who has deliberately put on this veil, that can lift it once more through his act of grace. Here lies the significance of *dīkṣā* or initiation, which symbolises the removal of the original veil by an act of grace from above.

Thus the conception of Īśvara provides a great hope and affords a sustenance to all created beings, who are plunged in ignorance. Brahman does not sit aloof having plunged the world in ignorance but is eternally engaged as Īśvara in taking it once more out of the mire or darkness. Īśvara is actively interested in every bit of creation, though as Brahman he remains absolutely untouched and unconcerned. As Īśvara he is the vast refuge of all, the adorable beneficent Lord. He sits in the heart of all creatures as the Ruler, the Great Soul lords over all. He is the Controller of all, the Ruler of all, the Lord of all. He is the Overlord, the Sustainer of all creatures, the Lord of all creatures, the Bridge, which sustains and prevents the separation of all these spheres. He is the Mighty Fear, the Upraised Thunderbolt. 'Out of its fear the wind blows, out of its fear rises the Sun as well as the Fire and the Moon, and the fifth, Death flies'; or, as another Upaniṣad puts it, 'out of its fear the fire burns, out of its fear burns the Sun, out of its fear move or run Indra, Vāyu and the fifth Mṛtyu or Death'. He is again called the Immutable, the *Akṣara*, and 'by the ruling or ordaining of this *Akṣara*, O Gārgī, the Sun and the Moon are sustained, by the ruling of this *Akṣara* the heaven and earth are sustained, by the ruling of this *Akṣara* the seconds, moments, days, nights, fortnights, months, seasons and years are sustained, by the ruling of this *Akṣara* flow the rivers towards the east from the white mountains and similarly other rivers to their respective directions' and so on. Again, it is he who pervades everywhere: 'His eyes are all the world over, his mouth all around, his hands and feet everywhere'. He is also called the *Antaryāmi* or the Indweller: 'This is your Ātman, the Indweller is Immortal' and Yājñavalkya goes to point him out in details as the indwelling principle in all the elements, quarters, planets as well as in the creatures, in their lives, minds and the senses. He is also represented as of golden colour, the effulgent Puruṣa, the Creator, the Lord, the progenitor the Brahmā. It is rare to find so rich and beautiful a description of God in any religious literature of the world. The whole Upaniṣadic literature resounds with the glory of this personal God or Īśvara, and his glowing description is strewn all over. Thus, this Īśvara is not a 'myth', as Gough and other writers similarly disposed, have

ventured to describe, in their ignorance of the true bearing of the Upaniṣadic teaching. And we must also here point out another very erroneous conception which is too much current: "Brahman and Īśvara have sometimes been called the higher god and the lower god. definite language of some of the systematizing scholiasts is responsible for it. No doubt there is a distinction between the *conceptions*. Yet Īśvara is not *in reality* different from Brahman." Īśvara is nothing but Brahman viewed with reference to the world, as we have already pointed out, and hence they are the same Reality.

That this Īśvara is the same as Prāṇa is expressly stated in the *Kausītaki*; 'It is this Prāṇa itself which is the *Prajñātmā*, or Conscious Self, the Delight, the Undecaying, the Immortal', and the passage concludes, 'this is the Sustainer of the spheres, the Lord of the spheres, this the Lord of all'. Thus this Prāṇa represents the Concrete Absolute, of which Hegel and his followers are so staunch advocates. Hence, the synthesis of which Hegel speaks was not unknown to the Upaniṣads, but they passed on further in order to find a still higher solution, of which Hegel had no idea. The *Śvetāśvatara*, evidently a later Upaniṣad with a definite theistic note, almost anticipates the Hegelian dialectic through the positing of three terms. We have previously pointed out that the earlier Upaniṣads all speak of two Brahmans and do not feel the need of positing a third, but here in the *Śvetāśvatara* we find a reference to three forms of Brahman *(trividham brahmam etat)*, viz., the Enjoyer, the Enjoyed the the Director. It, again, says that *vidyā* and *avidyā* are concealed in the Supreme Infinite Brahman, of which *avidyā* is fleeting and *vidyā* is immortal and He who controls both is another. This reminds one of a similar solution given in the *Gīta* through the three concepts of *Kṣara, Akṣara* and *Puruṣottama*. The earlier Upaniṣads, when they speak of the Īśvara as the third status, refer to the Supreme or Para Brahman as the fourth or *turīya*, in order to distinguish it from the former.

Rāmānuja's view

The vast Upaniṣadic wisdom contains all forms of solutions and that is why it has been possible for different and divergent systems to quote the Upanisadic text in support of their respective views. Sankara's is not the only system which goes by the name of Vedānta, but there are other schools like that of Rāmājuja, which are equally affiliated to the Vedāntic system of thought, i.e. spring from the Upanisads. Rāmānuja is an advocate of the Concrete Absolute, and to him, the Ultimate Reality is the repository of all beneficent qualities, one who sustains all by a fraction of his own power and is full of power, majesty, knowledge, great strength etc. The teachings of the Vedānta, according to him, are that there are three ultimate entities known to philosophy: the intelligent individual soul, the non-intelligent matter and God; that God is the Supreme Brahman, and is the cause of the universe, matter and soul constituting his body or modes, *'Prakāra'*; that the soul enters into matter and thereby makes it live and similarly God enters into matter and soul and guides them from within, that Brahman is not devoid of attributes but endowed with all the imaginable auspicious qualities; that the world, as we see it, is not illusory but real, only its reality is not independent of or apart from Brahman, that these three entities are naturally distinct from each other that there is no essential oneness of the individual self with the supreme self; that

salvation means not that the individual soul becomes identical, in essence, with the Supreme Self, but that it acquires most of the divine qualities of that Self, and, in that sense, becomes one with Him. Brahman, according to Rāmānuja, thus comprises within itself, distinct elements of plurality, which all lay claim to reality. It is a Personal God, who is all-powerful, all-knowing and all-merciful. Thus, to use the usual terminology of Hegelian philosophers, we have in Rāmānuja's system, God, man and nature, and transcending nature, and both man and nature finding their ultimate reconciliation in God — a unity-in-diversity.

Bhartṛprapañca's view

Even before Śankara, a great Vedāntin thinker, named Bhartṛprapañca, was the upholder of the conception of the Concrete Universal. Unfortunately, Bhartṛprapañca's original works are not available and one has to collect his views only from other's references to him. Śaṅkara refers to him again and again in his *bhāṣya*, and Sureśvara, in his great *Vārttika*, presents the latter's views somewhat fully and clearly. The credit goes to Professor Hiriyanna for collecting the views of this old Vedāntin from the fragments and presenting them beautifully in a nutshell. Hiriyanna points out that, Brahman, according to Bhartṛprapañca, is '*saprapañca*'— not robbed of its manifestations but possessing all of them, and, he adds, that this conception resembles that of the 'concrete universal' in modern philosophy. 'Bhartṛ maintained like Śankara that monism was the ultimate teaching of the Upaniṣads. A conspicuous feature of the latter's doctrine is the distinction between a *'Para'* or higher and an *'apara'* or lower Brahman. Bhartṛ also appears to have recognized this distinction; but while Sankara explains the lower Brahman as an appearance *(vivarta)* of the higher and therefore not of the same order of reality, Bhartr regards them both as real in the same sense. According to Sankara, the two Brahmans form, as it is put, a non-duality *(a-dvaita)*. The relation between them *(tādātmya)* is unreal, it being a relation between things of different order s of being. In Bhartr's doctrine, on the other hand, the two things related being equally real, the relation also is real. But the things are not altogether disparate, so that the relation is not one of entire distinction *(bheda)* as between a pot and a piece of cloth. It is rather *bhedābheda* and the Ultimate Reality may, therefore, be described as an identity-in - difference.

We have referred here to Rāmānuja and Bhartṛprapañca to show that the Indian philosophic thought is not unaware of the conception of the Absolute as an identity-in-difference, as is generally supposed. Śaṅkara, too, knows it full well and gives it an honored place in his scheme of things. He also sings the glory of the Īśvara and says that this grand creation, which it is impossible even to conceive through the mind, can be brought into being by the supreme Īśvara alone and never even by all the great gods and angels or other divine powers. The Advaita Vedāntin, too, has to look to this Īśvara for favour in order to have the desire for *advaita* and so it has been rightly said that it is only from the favour of Īśvara that men have the desire for the non-duality. Śaṅkara unfailingly points out and emphatically states that the knowledge of this Apara Brahman is the door to the knowledge of the Para Brahman, and so it cannot be skipped over or dispensed with as a mere 'myth' or 'fiction'. The difference between Bhartr and Śaṅkara is, therefore, only a difference in emphasis and not in essentials, and it is very curious and

interesting to find that Sureśvara tries to explain Bhartṛ's viewpoint as *in effect* the same as Śaṅkara's and represents Bhartṛ as a *vivartavādin* instead of a *pariṇāmavādin*.

As a matter of fact, if one judges the whole of Indian thought impartially, remembering the true significance of transcendence as we have put it, then it will be found that each and every system points ultimately towards this unique state, though sometimes the emphasis is put on one aspect and sometimes on the other. Thus, the Yoga systems, which is represented as an 'isolationist' school of thought, really hints at this transcendent state because it does not speak of *kaivalya* all at once but only after the *vibhūtipāda*, where one attains omniscience and omnipotence. This great achievement, too, is cast off ultimately in order to attain *kaivalya*. Here the stress is on *kaivalya*, but the *vibhūti* is not ignored. Similarly, the Tāntric thought, which is represented simply as evolutionary or dynamic in characters, has also this transcendental aspect everywhere. Contrary to the Sāṅkhya, here the stress is no doubt on *Śakti* or Power, but the final goal is the supreme *Śiva*, which is beautifully described thus: "(Though) full of activity (it looks) idle, (though) light in its sole nature (yet) dark, not a void (yet) like the void, such is the inscrutable nature of *Śambhu* or *Śiva*". Similarly of this final state of realization the Tantras speak thus: "Then in that supreme sky with the sun and moon having set, one remains, as it were, unconscious as in the state of sleep, yet wide awake, (with his consciousness) uncovered". The Upaniṣads, we have pointed out, lay equal stress on both the aspects through the two concepts of Prāṇa or Agni and Ātman, and thereby work out an unique synthesis.

The Concept of Jīva or the Individual Soul

The Conception of Īśvara has taken us too far. Closely allied to this concept is the other one of *jīva*. In fact, the two are represented in the Upaniṣad as close friends, an eternal pair of birds occupying the same tree. Of the two birds one eats the tasteful fruits, while the other merely looks on, without eating anything. In other words, the one is the enjoyer, the other is the seer. Now this enjoyment is the enjoyment of the fruits of action, and it is the *jīva* who becomes attached to or bound by the actions and hence comes under bondage. Therefore, it laments from the loss of its lordship or freedom and is downcast, plunged in sorrow. Only when he views the other, the Lord, and realizes his greatness, then alone is he freed from all lamentations. The *jīva* is then a projected image of *Īśā*, which is sent forth into the lower world of birth and death. These images are our personal selves and hence the *Kaṭha* speaks of the one as the light and the other as the shadow. These shadows of images 'are thrown down into the sea of physical matter like a fisher's net, and, when their 'catch' of experience is full, they are withdrawn once more by the fisher'. Hence the *Śvetāśuatara* significantly calls the isvara *'jālavān'*, the netter or the fisher. The himself does not descend into the sea but 'site above in his boat throughout the long ages of the Cosmic Day, knowing in himself neither birth nor death nor sorrow'.

There is a lot of discussion and divergent opinions as to whether the *jīva* is a projection or image of Īśvara, or whether both of them are images of the one Supreme Brahman. We prefer to hold with the author of *Vivaraṇa* that a *jīva* is an image of Īśvara, for, this explains more clearly the necessity of the dependence of the former on the latter, as well as their

close mutual connexion. This also satisfactorily accounts for the *svātantrya* or the independence of the Īśvara and dependence of *jīva*. The difference between *jīva* and Isvara is sometimes accounted for by saying that when the pure consciousness becomes reflected in *māyā* it becomes Īśvara, while when reflected in *avidyā* it becomes *jīva*. *Māyā* is represented as made up of pure *sattva*, untainted by *rajas* and *tamas*, and *avidyā* is said to be of darkened *sattva*, overpowered by *rajas* and *tamas*.

There are, again, others who distinguish between the two by saying that in *māyā*, the *vikṣepa* or distraction element predominates, while in *avidyā*, and *āvaraṇa* or covering, or concealment is the main element. Hence Īśvara being connected with the diffusive or destructive aspect goes on creating the diversity, without being covered or enveloped by nescience, while the *jīva* is completely in darkness being totally overpowered by the covering function. This also explain why the one is all-knowing and there absolutely ignorant. Others again hold that Īśvara is the reflection of the consciousness in *avidyā*, while *jīva* is the reflection in the *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind. However, divergent may be the views, it is clear that somehow or other, the one and the same light has been split into two, and the difference is only the difference of the medium which reflects the light and not of the light itself.

A very vexed question remains about the status of *jīva*. Is it permanent and eternal or a mere fiction and evanescent? There is a passage in the *Kaṭha* and *Śvetāśvatara* which seems to support the eternal nature of *jīva*. It describes the Īśvara thus: 'He who is eternal among eternals, conscious among conscious entities, who, as one, distributes or allocates the desired things to many'. This passage asserts that Īśvara and *jīva* have these aspects in common, viz. that they are both eternal and conscious, while they differ in this that the one is singular, the other is plural and the one lacks the objects of desire, while other other supplies them to the other. This last feature reveals that the *jīvas* lack *ānanda*, while they share the nature of *sat* and *cit* with Īśvara. We shall have occasion to show that the *ānandamaya* is verily Īśvara, as expressly stated in the *Māṇḍukya* and hence bliss is the marked feature of Īśvara which distinguishes him from *jīvas*. This bliss signifies fullness, and as the Īśvara is not limited within the bounds of finitude, his fullness and bliss are inherent in his very nature, while the *jīvas* being essentially limited and imprisoned in finitude suffer from a lack of fullness and are deprived of bliss.

But the crux of the question is : what happens when the bonds of finitude are shaken off? Does the *jīva* still retain his entity or does he become absorbed in the vastness of the infinitude? In Western philosophical thought, even Bosanquet, who solely concerns himself with the destiny of the individual, has to admit that in the Absolute the content of the imperfect individual, has to be 'transmuted and rearranged', and there is an 'expansion and *absorption* of the self'. Bradley also speaks of the perfection and harmony which the individual attains in the Absolute as 'the complete gift and dissipation of his personality', in which 'he, as such, must vanish'. 'The finite, as such, disappears in being accomplished'.

To the Upaniṣads the problem does not appear as a baffling one. The Upaniṣads everywhere emphatically affirm the complete identity of *jīva* and Brahman: 'As pure water dropped in another pure water becomes absolutely like that, similar is the state of the self of the knowing sage', 'As all these flowing rivers, moving towards the

ocean, on reaching the ocean lose themselves, removed are their name and form, and they are called the ocean itself, similarly the sixteen parts of this realiser or knower, on getting the Purusa are lost, gone are their name and form and are called as Purusa itself'. The term *'astam gachhanti', literally 'sets'* or *'gets lost'*, may cause an alarm to many, who believe that the loss of individuality is a loss of all consciousness. But one must remember that 'to be rid of the ego is not to be rid of life'. Here one rather loser to find, dies to live. From the point of view of the Supreme, the question of the persistence of individuality is superfluous, and from the standpoint of Īśvara, the question is readily taken up and it is specifically stated that the indivividual who gets this realisation, 'on rising from this body', i.e. casting off the false or spurious individuality and on attaining the Supreme Light, is endowed with his own true form *(suena rūpeṇā bhinispadyate)*, he becomes the Supreme Purusa *(sa uttamaḥ Purusah)*. It is always our finite consciousness that gets alarmed at the very idea of its merging in the Infinite, but, in fact, the moment one sheds his individuality, he is endowed with a super-individuality, which far surpasses our comprehension.

The Upaniṣads, thus, do not make the Absolute a mere unity of persons, or a system of selves, related to each other as parts of a substance like a college and its members, as conceived by Mctaggart, but keep the absolute unity of the Absolute or Brahman intact and yet allow full scope and value to the individuals in the sphere of existence. *Jīva* is, empirically, not a fiction but a reality, and though he cannot be called *jīva;* as such, on attaining the Supreme, yet that does not in any way signify that he vanishes into nothingness. On the other hand, he attains a fullness, which was always his, on casting off the fetters of finitude. He becomes the true Purusa on ceasing to be a *jīva*. Hence, it is not a loss but a regaining of the true personality.

The Concept of Māyā

But what really makes the one Supreme Consciousness split up into two, the *jīva* and the Īśvara? We have already seen that it is through the instrumentation of *māyā* that this division occurs. Not only does it create the twin selves, the higher and the lower, the wise and the ignorant, the happy and the miserable, the seer and the eater but it also makes a deeper division, the division between the subject and the object. As it brings forth the *jīva*, and the Īśvara, so it immediately provides them with a *jagat* or world to be enjoyed and ruled by each of them respectively. Thus, the division between the subject and the object is within the womb of *māyā*, and beyond that is the undifferentiated unity.

Now, what is this supreme power called *māyā*, which is at the root of creation and behind all manifestation? The usual translation of the word as 'illusion' is entirely misleading, and has led to a complete misunderstanding of the whole Vedanta. *Māyā* is essentially that which measures *(mīyate anayā)*. Hence, it signifies that function which measures the Immeasurable, sets a limit to the limitless. From this comes its secondary sense of the power of concealment, for unless the vastness of the Infinite is concealed, it becomes impossible to represent it as small or finite. Its third sense of conjuring trick or deception also follows from this, in as much as it deceives all by presenting the Infinite as the finite, the Vast as the small, the Eternal as the fleeting, and also vice versa. It is, therefore, represented as having two functions, viz. veiling and distraction *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*. It first

puts a veil on the face of Reality and this is its covering function; thereafter, it goes on to make some other things pass for the Truth or Reality and this is its distracling function. This concealment of Truth or Reality is referred to, again and again, in the Upaniṣads, which evidently point to the *āvaraṇa* or *māyā*, and the second function is also referred to in the famous line: *'Indro māyābhiḥ Pururūpa īyate,'* where the assuming of many forms is attributed to *māyā*, and the term is used in the plural to make it tally with the plurality of forms assumed thereby.

There are some who are disposed to think that the doctrine of *māyā* is an invention of Sankara and that it does not find any place in the Upaniṣads, but this is an absolutely wrong idea, as has been ably pointed out by Ranade. Śaṅkara may have worked it out in detail but the idea lies rooted in the Upaniṣads themselves. Gough rightly refutes Colebrooke, who is wrong in imagining that it is a later graft upon the old Vedāntic philosophy, and firmly asserts that "the tenet of *māyā* is no modern invention; the thought, if not the word, is every where present in the Upaniṣads, as an inseparable element of the philosophy, and the word itself is of no infrequent occurrence;...... there has been no addition from without, but only a development from within; no graft but only a growth".

All the problems of philosophy, of immanence and transcendence, unity and diversity, finite and infinite arise because of the presence of this principle of *māyā*. *Māyā* represents the principle of non-Being, it is the matrix of all becoming. The problem immediately arises: what is the relation between this non-Being and the Being? If this non-Being or becoming is in a relation of identity with Being, then the immutability of Being ceases, and again, if the relation is a relation of difference, then there are two independent principles, which destroy the doctrine of *advaita*. To get out of this dilemma, the Vedāntins call it *'anirvacanīya'* or inexplicable, but it must be remembered that this inexplicability is only to the human consciousness, from *our* point of view, because we, being a product of *māyā*, cannot know, as such, the nature of our origin. As the *Nāsadīya Sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* points out: "Who knows and who shall say whence has it come, whence did it come?" Only He who is beyond the *māyā* and site above it knows its nature, to all else who are below it, i.e. under *māyā*, the knowledge is hidden and it's nature remains inscrutable.

Those who complain that the Vedānta thus leaves things unexplained, evidently forget that the very attempt to explain this original mystery is self-stultifying, because it is something like an attempt to ride on one's own shoulders. As Green puts it: "The old question, why God made the world, has never been answered, nor will be. We know not why the world should be; we only know that there it is". Those who feel a satisfaction in attributing the becoming to the very nature of Being, thereby, make the Being or the Absolute lose its very character. The Vedānta, on the contrary, accepts the mystery with veneration, acknowledges the becoming as a fact, and yet holds on with equal firmness, to the other great fact of the intrinsic self-sufficiency of the Absolute, its pure non dual nature. Thus, *māyā* is not a fiction or an unreality, not *'asat'*, to *us*, to our empirical consciousness, and again, it is not a reality or *'sat'* from the standpoint of the Absolute. Hence it is called neither *'sat'* nor *'asat'*, neither something nor a pure nothing. The Reality is one and indivisible, and yet that very Reality apparently splits itself somehow into two. A mirror comes, as it were, in the

middle, and makes the one original face split in twain. The splitting is only apparent, for when the mirror breaks or is removed it is again the one single face. Hence *māyā* is not darkness, but shining and resplendent like a clean mirror, and so the Upaniṣad calls it the golden lid, which covers the face of Truth. Again, it is sometimes called the truth and then the Reality is called the Immortal *(amṛta)*, which signifies that the one is the apparent truth and the other the abiding or immortal truth *(satyasya satyam)*.

Māyā, in one sense, is the repository of all knowledge, and again, it is the very seat of ignorance, a bewildering paradox. The entire knowledge of the whole manifestation is here, because she holds within her womb the entire creation, and again it is here that the veil is cast over the face of Truth or Reality, and the plunge into the ignorance is taken. Īśvara, being the Creator, is in eternal union with *māyā*, which "is properly speaking the 'means whereby' the Great Magician *(māyin)* operates, viz. all the 'measure' (root *mā*, as in *nirmā*, 'to create') that belongs to the divine nature, *svabhāva, prakṛti* etc. Hence the *Śvetāśvatara* rightly calls this power as the *own* power of the Lord *(devātma-śaktim)*. It is not something separate and undivine in nature like the *prakṛti* of Sāṅkhya. In the words of Śaṅkara it is "the divine power, in which names and forms lie unevolved and which is the antecedent condition of names and forms. The Lord is never separate from this power but in eternal conjunction with it. 'His supreme power is said to be of many kinds; knowledge, will and action are natural to Him. The Creator without his power of creativity is inconceivable. It is through the medium of this mirror of *māyā* that the supreme consciousness assumes self-consciousness, comes to know itself, as it were, in all its richness.

Thus Īśvara and *māyā* are in a relation of identity-in-difference, the power and the wielder of power being inseparable from each other, yet different somehow from each other. The division is, in other words, within the one and the same entity. "Hence comes the peculiarity that the *Parā-prakṛti* is both different from Brahman and an aspect of Brahman." From the standpoint of the Supreme or the Absolute, the question of the relation between it and *māyā* does not arise at all, because there it is one undivided homogeneous Reality *(ekarasa)*. Only when 'the pure Spirit becomes the subject' then immediately comes confronting it 'the non-subject or object' and 'interaction between the two sets in.' 'The cosmic process is the gradual realisation of values in its upward ascent from pure nothingness to the Kingdom of God, under the influence and inspiration of the living God. Thus the whole evolution is in *māyā*, and, within her is the polarity of subject and object. Īśvara or God is, no doubt, above *māyā* and so is the Supreme or the Absolute, but the one is above it as a controller or ruler, while the other is above it as its support and substratum *(adhiṣṭhāna)*. Hence the one is organically related with it, while the other is eternally unrelated because of its uniqueness. "While God is organically bound up with the universe, the Absolute is not." So, "creation neither adds to nor takes away from the reality of the Absolute. Evolution may be a part of our cosmic process, but the Absolute is not subject to it. The Absolute is incapable of increase. Thus this conception of *māyā* accounts for the evolution and yet preserves the perfection of the Absolute. It takes its reality from the Absolute, works out the diversity, and yet leaves the original unity unimpaired.

Māyā has been identified with *prakṛti* in the *Śvetāśuatara* and the famous verse *'ajām ekām'* etc. evidently represents it as

composed of three *guṇas*, symbolised by the three colours, red, white and black. It should also be noted that it is *'ajā'* i.e. without birth or beginning because, as we have pointed out, nobody knows its origin. It is also sometimes identified with *avidyā*, but as we have pointed out, a distinction, too, is drawn between them. *Māyā* is represented to be composed of pure *sattva*, while *avidyā* is impure through the admixture of *rajas* and *tamas*. *Māya* is a more general term which includes both *vidyā* and *avidyā*. It binds through *avidyā* and again releases through *vidyā*. So in the Tantras we find the propitiation of the Mother, for it is only she who can effect the release, because the bondage, too, is purely due to her. The Tantras have also, therefore, classified *māyā* from different aspects, and named them differently as *mobamāyā, māyā, mahāmāyā, yogamāyā* etc. The Upanisad, through its legend in the *Kena* about the divine resplendent Mother Umā, evidently refers to this pure and divine form of *māyā*, who alone, finally, reveals the nature of the Supreme Reality to Indra. Those who neglect this *vidyā* or divine aspect of *māyā* miss the whole significance of it. Agani, "the term *avidyā*, as applied to her, means primarily the dark abyss of *non-being* (for *'vid'* means both to be and to know), and secondarily the mysterious darkness of the unmanifest state. It is in this sense that the term *'asat'* is used to denote her in many places in the Upanisads, as well as the term *'avyākṛta'*. She has contraction and expansion in her very nature and so sometimes she is the mere potentiality of all things and sometimes the actuality.

Solution of Problem

We now return to our original problem with which we started our enquiry *'Īśa vāsyaṁ idaṁ sarvam.'* We have surveyed so far the nature of *Īśa* and have just seen the nature of *'idam'* or non-Being as presented by *māyā*. In our ordinary consciousness the *'idam'* predominates, the world of objects prevails over the subject. The *Īśa* lies covered or concealed under the load of *'idam'*. Instead of the *Isa* covering the *'idam'*, the *'idam'* has come to cover the *Īśa*. now the process has to be reversed, the 'backward-flowing movement' has to be initiated, the gaze has to be turned back *(āuṛttacakṣuḥ)*, the *'parāk'* or the outward must turn *'pratyak'* or inward. A return to pure subjectivity is demanded. Does it mean an annulment or negation of all objectivity ?

No; the Upaniṣad itself goes on to show the stages through which this return to subjectivity is realized and points out its true nature. When the hold of the *'idam'* is first slackened, one begins to feel dimly the presence of the other element, viz. *Īśa* or Ātman along with it. Gradually the *'idam'* is integrated with the *Īśa*, the objects are found to inhere in the subject, like the beads strung together in a thread. As the vision grows, one comes to realize an organic unity between the two: there is no subject without the object, nor any object without the subject; all the *bhūtas* are in the Ātman and the Ātman is in all the *bhūtas*. Here, one feels 'the existence of the one in the other and through the other', as Pringle-Pattison puts it. But still there is a higher vision, where the objects *(the 'bhutas')* are not seen *in* the Ātman but *as* the Ātman itself (*ātmai 'vā'bhūt*), i.e., the objects are found to exist only in and through the Ātman. Here the term *'abbut'* does not signify a 'becoming' of the Atman, for that has already been indicated in the previous verse through the statement of the reciprocal relation of cause and effect subsisting between the *bhūtas* and the Ātman, and again between the Ātman and the *bhutas*. Here what the Upaniṣad hints at is the transcendental

relation subsisting between the objects and Ātman. In reality, the objects are the Ātman, and not mere products of the Ātman, for that would signify a relation of difference even in the midst of identity. It is to the deluded vision that the objects appear as independent entities. With the first dawning of knowledge and a partial removal of delusion, the objects appear as dependent on the Ātman and no longer separate and independent, but then the Ātman, too has to be dependent on them. So in the final vision, the absolute freedom of the Ātman is once more realized; there is no relation of mutual dependence any more, of there are no two entities here, but the Ātman itself is all in all, all the objects or *bhūtas* have no separate existence. In the previous state, there was a 'seeing' *(anupaśyati)* as well as a seer *(yas tu)*, but here it is a 'becoming' *(abhūt)* and there is, hence, no longer a seer, who observes through a relation of separation, but the observer or realizer becomes the very ground or substratum, the *'adhiṣṭhāna'* or all *(yasmin)*.

The Upaniṣads, thus, solve the problem of the subject and the object not by a denial of the one and an affirmation of the other, neither by a denial of both, nor by an affirmation of both, but simply through a transcendence of both the terms. So, the *'vāsyam'* in the sense of 'inhabiting' may be realized in the stage of *'yas tu sarvāṇi bhūtāni'*, but in the next stage of *'yasmin'*, the *'vāsyam'* assumes a different meaning. It is not a 'clothing' or 'covering' in the sense that it makes the *'idam'* non-existent or invisible, but it is a 'clothing' through which the *'idam'* is still seen, but no longer as a separate reality but as the Ātman itself. The two senses will also differ according as one interprets the term, *'Isa'*. If by *Īśa*, the Īśvara is taken, then he undoubtedly inhabits all the things created, he being organically related to the universe; but if by Īśa, one takes the Supreme or the Ātman, then the sense of inhabiting no longer fits, because the Ātman is all in all, there is nothing else to be inhabited by it. Thus the Upaniṣad itself beautifully explains the process or stages of *'vāsyam'* through the two successive verses.

As Coommaraswamy rightly points out, "it is, then, a fundamental error to assume that either Veda or Vedānta regards the world as a mistake; what is asserted is that in so far as its parts or principles are *separately* envisaged and not in their integrity, *sub specie aeternitatis* as God sees them all together, the vision is a sorry one. The unenlightened man has knowledge of *(avidyā)* each thing *independently* and runs in vain pursuit of particular goods *(pṛthak paśyans tān evā' nubidhāvati. Katha 4. 14)*, for, as Ulvich Engelberti expresses it, *ignoratia divisiva est errantium*. But whoever looks in the eternal mirror and that is the same thing as 'with eyes inverted' or 'thinking inversely' *(pratyakcetana - Yoga Sūtra 1.29)* or 'upstream' *(Pratikūla* etc, *Passim)* or with *daivyacakṣus* and not the *māṁsacakṣus* sees at once all things and God, as He sees Himself and so, far from losing anything, possesses all things in their incorruptible perfection. It is not the spectacle but the profanes vision, that of the unrelated sciences or humanism for example, that the Vedānta calls an 'illusion' *(moba)* ...... What Śaṅkara denies is the ultimate reality of things as they are known 'ignorantly' i.e. objectively and as they are in themselves, not that of things "as they are in God." A modern Vedāntin beautifully points out the uniqueness of the Vedantic vision thus: "The world as not separate from *Cit* or Consciousness is one vision. The *Cit* as not one with the world is the second. Now with the opening of the first (vision), the world is conceived as true

or real; with the dawning of the second, the sense of unreality (comes), but with the opening of both comes the clear vision that the *Cit* alone is really true and all else apart from it is untrue. Thus, though the world is by its nature untrue, yet from the nature of the Ātman is verily true". He also distinguishes clearly between the Buddhist, Tāntrik and Vedāntist vision thus: The *Vijñānavādin* is predominantly of internal vision alone, the *Śūnyavādin* is predominantly of both visions (because he denies both the inner and the outer), the *Svātantryavādin* (Tāntrik) is predominantly of a divine vision alone, but the Vedantins have all their three eyes wide open, they having plunged in that ocean of non-duality, without cancelling or negating the inner and outer existences". Such is the uniqueness of the Vedāntic vision, which the Upaniṣads embody. It does not shut its eyes to existence but keeps them wide open looking simultaneously above and below. The final solution of things lies here alone' all other solutions are only partial because they do not heal the division but only cover it up.

Descartes

In Western philosophic thought it was Descartes, who first felt acutely existence of the division, or rather created it himself. So he rightly looked upon as the father or originator of modern Western philosophy. He began with universal doubt and ultimately stumbled upon the great truth that the doubter could not be doubted, which he formulated in that famous proposition of his, '*Cogito ergo sum*'. Descartes then discovered that in complete distinctness from this principle of thought was the other principle of extension, and these two formed the warp and woof of our whole existence. He also found that 'thought and extension are not only different from each other but it is the very nature of these substances to negate each other; for spirit is not only cognizable without the attributes of body, but it is in itself the negation of the attributes of body'. Spirit and body are essentially diverse and possess nothing in common. He understands both of these as 'substances', i.e., elements which stand on their own right, independently of each other. They stand opposed to each other like centrifugal and centripetal forces. Having thus placed mind and matter, consciousness and the world, in complete separation from each other, Descartes fails to answer the question as to how they happen to get mutually connected and affected by each other. For every such act of connexion he has to bring in a third substance, God, as a *deus ex machina*, who effects the unity of the ego with the matter of extension.

Spinoza

The artificiality of this conception struck the thinkers that followed Descartes. Spinoza, who came next, realized that the inner contradiction of the philosophy of Descartes lies in his attribution of substantiality to the two entities, viz., matter and mind, both of which he takes as a substance. The remedy lies, Spinoza thought, in abandoning the conception of both as substances and instead, taking them as forms of the manifestation of a single substance. In the philosophy of Spinoza this one substance is named God. He says, that "by Substance, I mean that which is in itself and the conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception'. This notion of substance being assumed, there can exist, according to Spinoza, only a single substance. What is through its own self alone is necessarily infinite, unconditioned and unlimited by

anything else. A plurality of infinites, is, therefore, impossible, and hence the plurality of substances, as assumed by Descartes, is necessarily a manifest contradiction. It is possible for only one substance, and that an absolutely infinite substance, to exist. So, the two substances of Descartes, matter and mind, are taken by Spinoza as the two 'attributes', in which the single substance reveals itself to us. It is only the human understanding that invests substance with the two attributes, substance itself being unexhausted by any such specialities of form.

It is impossible to do justice to the sublime conception of Spinoza within a short compass. He made one of the boldest attempts, in the whole history of philosophic thought, to rise above the contradiction in order to view things *sub specie eternitatis*. But yet the complaint against him is that his substance is like the lion's den to which all footprints lead, but *nulla vestigia retrorsum*. As James puts it: "You cannot redescend into the world of particulars by the Absolute's aid or deduce necessary consequences of detail, important for your life, from your idea of his nature". So Joachim feels that "there is an inner contradiction in his conception of God, as at once excluding all determination and comprehending an infinite diversity of ultimate characters". "There is nothing to explain why the unity should, even in appearance, be broken up into multiplicity, why the Infinite should appear in the guise of innumerable finites, why this world of illusion should be here at all" Thus Spinoza's lofty conception of substance failed to account for the dualism and contradiction here below, for his substance was much too aloof and indifferent to concern itself with these differences. Though he freed substance from all opposition and contradiction by conceiving it as one and infinite, and not two like Descartes, yet as attributes, thought remained only thought and extension as only extension and this makes it inevitable that the one will exclude the other. So the search for in inner principle of union between them had still to be pursued. The reconciliation must be found through the very two terms of opposition and this could be effected in two ways: either from the end of matter or from the end of the spirit. Either mind was to subordinated to matter or matter was to be subsumed under mind. Descartes began with dualism, Spinoza summarily resolved it through his neutralism, but after him the philosophical world, abandoning his neutralism, definitely divided itself into two hostile camps, viz. of Idealism and Realism, the one taking the side of mind, the other that of matter. The conflict has remained eternally acute ever since, though there have been heroic attempts to effect a compromise every now and them.

Leibnitz

The first reaction to the views of Spinoza is noticed in Leibniz, who set himself in sharp opposition to Spinoza's conception of substance. "Like Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz based his philosophy on the notion of substance, but he differed radically from them as regards the relation of mind and matter, and as regards the number of substances. Descartes allowed three substances, God and mind and matter; Spinoza admitted God alone. For Descartes, extension is the essence of matter; for Spinoza, both extension and thought are attributes of God. Leibniz held that extension cannot be an attribute of a substance. His reason was that extension involves plurality and can, therefore, only belong to an aggregate of substances; each single substance must be unextended. He believed, consequently, in an infinite

number of substances, which he called "monads". Thus, in antithesis to the philosophy of Spinoza, the fundamental thesis of that of Liebniz is this: there is a plurality of monads which constitute the element of all reality, the fundamental being of the whole physical and spiritual universe. This is the Monadology of Leibniz which was the reaction from Spinoza's monism. For Spinoza's One Infinite Substance, Leibniz substituted a plurality of independent finite substances, Leibniz substituted a plurality of independent finite substances, meaning by "substance" not (as in Descartes and Spinoza) something static and inert, but that which is essentially dynamic and active. But Leibniz, by his conception of plurality of monads, created a fresh difficulty. As he expreses it: 'the monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out', and thus, since each monad is independent and self-sufficient the question as to how they come to interact, as in the case of perception, remains unanswerable. To save the situation, Leibniz has to take recourse to a 'pre-established harmony' between the monads, which leads almost to a relapse to the position of Descartes, who had also conceived of God as effecting the tie between matter and mind. If the unity of the universe was to be saved, then the absolute independence of the monads had to go, or if the absolute independence of the monads was to be preserved, the unity was impossible of achievement. So the problem remained where it was.

Kant

The next great figure in Western philosophy was Kant, who tried to effect a compromise between the one-sided realistic and idealistic tendencies that preceded him. Before him, while on the one hand, empiricists, like Locks, Berkeley and Hume, assigned to the mind, in subordination to the world of sense, a role of pure passivity; the rationalists, on the other hand, like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, assigned to it, in superiority to the world of sense and in its sufficiency for its own self, a role of pure activity. 'Kant, for his part, endeavoured to harmonize the pretensions of both. He proclaimed the mind or the ego, as practical ego, free and autonomous, the unconditioned arbiter of itself, but again as theoretical ego, absolutely receptive and conditioned by the world of sense'. Kant began his enquiry with a critical scrutiny of the origin of human experience or cognition in man, and hence his philosophy is critical and known as criticism. Kant's famous *'Critique of Pure Reason'* is devoted to this scrutiny and he arrives at the following results. He finds, first of all, that all cognition involves two factors, the subject and the object, the cognizer and the cognized. Of them, the one factor, the external object, contributes the material of knowledge, while the other factor, the subject contributes the form, — those notions, viz, by virtue of which alone any connected knowledge, any synthesis of individual perceptions into a whole of experience, is possible. Both these factors are equally indispensable for all knowledge whatsoever; were there no external world, there were no perception; and were there no *a priori* notions, these perceptions were merely an indefinite plurality and maniness, a chaotic mass, without mutual combination, and without connexion in the unity of a whole. In that case there would not be any such thing as experience. Therefore, Kant concludes, that while perceptions without notions are blind and notions without perceptions are empty, cognition is a union of both, in this way that it fills up the frames of notions with the matter of experience or rather

disposes the matter of experience into the net of notions.

Thus, though Kant discovered the unity of subject and object in all human experience or knowledge, yet this healing of the division proved absolutely deceptive and of no value whatsoever. For along with the discovery of the fusion of the subject and the object, Kant also came to discover that it is impossible to know things as they are in themselves. The very unity of the subject and the object stood as a stumbling block to the knowledge of the thing-in-itself, because, in all cognitions the contribution of the subject produces some change in the object. The innate forms or categories mould or modify the object i.e., in other words, the object appears to us only as modified by categories. Secondly, no perceptions reach us pure and uncoloured, but only through the medium of time and space. Whatever is to be perceived, must be perceived in time and space; without them perception is impossible, because they are the universal forms of all objects of sense. Thus being an active contributor to the process of cognition, the subject makes it impossible for the object to reveal itself in its true being. The very fusion or unity of two elements destroys the purity of the cognition and turns it into a spurious one. It follows, then, that we only know appearances and not things themselves in their own true nature. So, 'unknown and unknowable' was the last word of Kant about the true nature of things, and the philosophical world remained in utter darkness as before. The light was still to be found.

Hegel

A light was kindled in Hegel, which seemed almost to be the final, that will dispel all darkness and provide a supreme solution to all the problems. In fact, the nineteenth century was wholly dominated by the philosophy of Hegel and it still holds its sway over a large section of philosophical thinkers. Hegel resolved the deadlock which Kant's thing-in-itself had brought about. The unity of subject and object, which Kant perceived as permeating all human cognitions, was to Hegel the very soul of Reality. Thought itself was to him the Absolute and the very impact and opposition of being and non-being provided for him infinite richness to its conception. As he states it: "Being, as being, is nothing fixed or definite; it yields to a dialectic and sinks into its opposite, which also taken immediately is nothing (saying that God is only the supreme Being and nothing more is declaring. Him to be so negatively also.) The mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is, therefore, the absolutely negative. To prevent one nullifying the other, man must first discover some field-predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing; this of necessity leads to the onward movement, and gives to Being a 'true or concrete significance' (and this significance consists in the idea of Becoming). Becoming is the unity of Being and Nothing. The unity has to be conceived in the diversity, which is all the while present and explicit. To become is the true expression for the resultant of '*to be*' and 'not to be'. Becoming is the first concrete thought and therefore the first notion, whereas Being and Naught are empty abstraction".

Thus to Hegel the very process of thought reveals the dynamic self-evolution of the Absolute Idea. Hence, he rejects his predecessor Schelling's bare principle of identity, on the ground that it reduced the Absolute into 'monotony and abstract universality', a kind of 'eternal night in which all cows are black'. Hegel, therefore, discards static categories and lays great stress on the idea of development. But yet

the crux of-the question remains: Is this development real or purely formal and logical? A close scrutiny of Hegel's philosophy reveals that he takes the development as purely logical. There is, at the heart of things, no real flux but the movement is purely dialectical. The Absolute has no history and from the point of view of the Eternal Being, time and history are illusions. This is stated by Hegel himself in a passage, which has become famous since Pringle-Pattison first pointed it out, in which Hegel repeats the word *Tauschung* four times, which literally means a *'deception'*. He states thus: "Within the range of the finite we can never see or experience that the End has been really secured. The consummation of the infinite End, therefore, consists *merely in removing the illusion*, which makes it *seem* yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world and the result is that *it need not wait upon us*, but *is already* by implication, as well as *in full actuality, accomplished*. This is *the illusion under which we live......* In the course of its process, *the Idea creates that illusion* by setting an antithesis to confront itself, and its action consists in *getting rid of the illusion*, which it has created". Thus Hegel takes away with one hand the reality he had conceded to the process or movement with the other. His reconciliation is thus found to be far from satisfactory and Pringle-Pattison rightly complains against this view thus: "But can we hope to preserves the interest if we admit to ourselves — even though it be only in our speculative moment—that it is all a cleverly arranged deception? The view, as Hegel here presents it, seems to me, I confess, to paralyze our energies at their source".

Hegel was thus forced to admit the illusory nature of the dynamic movement and yet he tried desperately to give a reality to the history through time. The contradiction between the timeless and the time thus remained unsolved. Hegel left unanswered the question, why should Absolute Perfection, to which there is nothing 'unaccomplished' delight in creating the illusion of imperfection? How is Perfection in general to be reconciled with even the appearance of many particular imperfections? Though the solution which Hegel offered was at first hailed as unique that supreme, yet ultimately, on a close analysis, it was found to have left the problem where it was, the chasm remaining as wide as ever. The root of the problem is that if one tried to assign reality to the process of change or movement, then the Absolute itself has to be conceived as changing and as yet imperfect, or if the Absolute is to be conceived as perfect and eternally self-complete, then the process or change becomes only apparent and turns out to be illusory.

Hegel's solution having proved deceptive, the twentieth century witnessed a reaction against the whole idealist mode of thought. It was felt that so long philosophy had been much too engrossed with the analysis of the mind, which in its turn had led to mere abstractions, without any touch with the concrete nature of life and the world. So the natural demand was that 'the center of gravity of philosophy must, therefore, alter its place. The earth of things, long thrown into shadow by the glories of the upper ether, must resume its rights'. The need of the modern man was 'a philosophy that will not only exercise the powers of intellectual abstraction but that will make some positive connexion with this actual world of finite human lives'. The tremendous progress and achievement of modern science too contributed not a little to this orientation

of outlook. Philosophy which was so long under the domination of psychology, henceforward came to be dominated by physics and biology. On the one hand, the analysis of matter by the physicist has led almost to a return to the views of Kant, because a principle of uncertainty, an unknowable X is baffling all scientists, and on the other hand, the study of life has revealed almost a bewildering richness, which is absolutely beyond the grasp of the intellect. This has also led to a revolution in the method of philosophy. Intellect has given place to intuition, reason to feeling.

Bergson

The chief protagonist of this new type of philosophy is Bergson, who raises the standard of revolt of the modern man of action against the cool intellectualism of all philosophers beginning from Plato. To Bergson, reality is a flux or change. The universe is conceived as one continuous flow, and the vital urge has neither beginning nor end, neither completeness nor finality. 'The world, then, is the embodiment of an immanent principle of living change, which, as it comes into existence, progressively creates the evolving universe. This principle is Bergson's celebrated *elan vital*'. Bergson, thus, does not show any regard for a finished and eternally complete Absolute but even goes so far as to say that this idea of staticity, is a mere illusion of the intellect. He says that "we are at ease only in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead. *The intellect is characterized by a natural intability to comprehend life.* So he sets up intuition as the supreme method for grasping the living reality and discards the intellect altogether. The novelty of Bergson's views is no doubt striking but the drawback lies in the fact that there is no distant end or aim to direct the course of his creative evolution, and the final truth of things turns out to be cosmic pointlessness. Bergson has, no doubt, rendered a great service to philosophy by releasing it from the static prison-house of the intellect, but he has gone again to the other extreme, by making that very unfettered state of release an end in itself, which has made his philosophy a merely animless wandered. He has deeply felt the throb of creative impulse but has not been able to follow it to its ultimate source or end. Hence, he fails to comprehend the 'whence' and 'whither' of the movement and so the riddle of existence remains unsolved.

Alexander

Closely following Bergson, Alexander sets up a creative and living picture of his Absolute as Space-Time. His Absolute may be conceived as an infinite and continuous whole, of which Space may be described as the body and Time as the soul, and which is impregnated from the beginning with a creative nisus. "The real is Space-Time as a whole and every complex or part within it. Our consciousness of reality is the consciousness, that anything we apprehend belong to Space-Time..... Reality is, then, experienced whether in enjoymen or contemplation as that which belongs to Space-Time or the character of reality is the Character of so belonging". And again, "within the all-embracing stuff of Space-Time, the universe exhibits an emergence in Time of successive levels of finite existences, each with its characteristic empirical quality".

But the main difficulty remains that it leaves unexplained how the higher evolves out of the lower. If the Absolute be bare Space-Time, shown of all contents that belong to our experience, what is the source of the qualities that we experience? Whence do the higher qualities come, if

they are not somehow or other latent in the Absolute from the beginning? Hence, at every stage of evolution, one has to admit a complete miracle, and so Alexander feels that all are absolutely in the dark about the nature of the next higher quality that is to evolve, viz. Deity. "Our human altars still are raised to the unknown God. If we could know what deity is, how it feels to be divine, we should first have to have become as gods. What we know of it is but its relation to the other empirical qualities which precede it in time. Its nature we cannot penetrate." Here his agnosticism is complete.

Jeans, Eddington

Similar is the case with the scientist-philosophers, like Jeans and Eddington. Through their approach to Reality with the aid of science they find that "most of our common impressions of substance, worldwide instants and so on, have turned out to be illusory, and the externality of the world might be equally untrustworthy." The reality escapes the scientist, he is only left with illusions and so he frankly admits that "the supposed approach through the physical world leads only into the cycle of physics, where we run round and round like a kitten chasing its tail and never reach the world-stuff at all." Thus here, too, the unknowability looms large and the problem sits heavy on the soul. By exhausting both the ends, viz. of mind as well of matter, Western philosophy stands today perplexed, because everywhere a deadlock confronts it and an inner contradiction wholly falsifies all its solutions. One is forced ultimately to admit, like Russel, that "empiricism and idealism alike are faced with a problem, to which, so far, philosophy has found no satisfactory solution. This is the problem of showing how we have knowledge of other things than ourself and the operations of our own mind.' In other words, the problem is the old problem of the subject and the object: how they come to be connected if they are utterly disparate, and again, if they are really one what creates the division? Their unity as well as diversity is perplexing indeed. All solutions have been tried, — the equal affirmation of both, the outright denial of both, the affirmation of one and the denial of the other and so on—but all have been found wanting. Is there, then, no way out of the problem?

The unique nature of the Upaniṣadic solution

The Upaniṣads show us the way out of this insuperable difficulty by offering the supreme solution in the form of the unique conception of the Atman or Brahman. Western philosophy, we have seen, through its long history is merely moving in a circle since the time of Descartes, and this has been the case because there is a fundamental error in the original conception of Descartes, which has escaped the notice of all so far. Descartes gave the primary place to thought, and it was thought which gave the clue to him to the existence of the 'I' or the ego. The 'I', thus, had a secondary and derived existence, and the original principle was taken to be thought, which, however, was confronted by its opposite, viz. extension or matter. The opposition between thought and matter has, therefore, continued to be fundamental, the though there have been heroic attempts to resolve the opposition either by a violent denial of one of the terms or by a worked-up compromise between the two, yet no attempt has been made to transcend the opposition through the conception of a still more fundamental thing than thought, which is the very pre-supposition of both thought and extension. The Upaniṣads do not posit the

existence of the 'I' or the Self through thought, but the Ātman, according to them, is the most fundamental of all things, and hence self-revealed by nature. As Radhakrishnan aptly puts it: 'Descartes *cogito ergo sum*, "I think therefore I am" is not correctly expressed. I am not because I think, I think because I am. *Sun ergo cogito*. The self is primary and consciousness is inherent in it.......It is not a necessity of thought or an object of faith as Kant affirms, but is enjoyed as the content of spiritual consciousness. It is the felt awareness of transcendent reality". Descartes' famous dictum has thus to be reversed if the final solution of the problem is to be found. The Upaniṣads give the clue to the reversal of the original wrong position taken up by Western philosophy, for, to the Upaniṣads, it is always the Ātman that is the most fundamental and primary of all things, the eternal prius of everything in the world. The whole enquiry of the Upaniṣads centres round this 'Atman which is the inmost of all things' *(ya ātmā sarvāntaraḥ)*, and as the true nature of this Ātman is revealed nowhere else than in the texts of the Upanisads, hence it is significantly called the Purusa of the Upaniṣads *(aupaniṣadam puruṣam)*. It is only by a true comprehension of the *'aupaniṣadam puruṣam'* that the final solution of all problems can be found.

We have seen that it is called the inmost of all things *(sarvāntaraḥ)*, but does that mean that it is purely inward by nature? That it is not so is proved by other statements of the Upaniṣads which assert that all the outer manifestations, too, are this Ātman. Then is it both inward an outward by nature? The famous statement of the *Māṇḍukya* about the true nature of the Atman categorically states that 'it is neither inwardly conscious, nor outwardly conscious nor conscious both ways'. We are always accustomed to think in terms of the outer and the inner. We only think of inclusion and exclusion, but the Ātman transcends both. It does not include as well as exclude all, but neither includes nor excludes anything. As Sureśvara states, again and again, about the nature of the Ātman: 'It is neither exclusive nor pervasive'. If it is not exclusive, we immediately think that it must be all-pervasive, and if it is not all- pervasive we take it to be exclusive by nature, and hence, by denying both, the transcendental nature is sought to be indicated here. But does not this total denial of both amount almost to a denial of the very existence of the principle called Ātman? To guard against it Sureśvara immediately adds that it is 'full and stationed in itself' *(pūrṇaḥ svātmany avasthitaḥ)*. It is not a *śūnya'* or a void that is conveyed by this absolute denial, but it is a *'pūrṇa'*, an immeasurable fulness which transcends all, that is sought to be grasped through this negation. The *Māṇḍukya*, too, after indulging in a relentless denial or absolute nation finally says that it is 'the very essence of the sole awareness of the Self' *(ekātmapratya-yasāram)*. and is utterly 'calm, beneficent and non-dual' *(śāntam śivam advaitam)*.

That there can be no question of exclusion in this conception of the Ātman is proved by the very term *'turīya'*, which is used to describe the supreme nature of the Atman. *'Turniya'* means the 'fourth', and hence it does not exclude three, but not only includes but transcends it. The three are not cast off, nor taken in, but simply transcended. Again, we must remind that this transcendence merely means the uniqueness, by virtue of which the Ātman, though in touch with all the three states, remains untouched by them all. The ordinary dual conception of immanence and transcendence has no

meaning here. The question of immanence and transcendence does not arise with reference to the Absolute. For immanence implies the existence of an other in which the Absolute is immanent. But the Absolute represents, the totality of being and there is nothing other than it'. The *Turīya*, therefore, does not represent a single aspect of being but stands for that which covers all, and because it covers all, it necessarily transcends all i.e. stands unique from all else. It is the simulates awareness of all the levels of existence or consciousness that is signified by the term *Turīya*. Hence, as we have seen, Sankara Bhārati rightly represents the true Vedāntin as one with his three eyes wide open *(visphāritalocanatrayāstu vedāntinaḥ)*. There is no sense of withdrawal in this conception of transcendence, there is no shutting of one's gaze or a refusal to see all existence. Through this vision, one comes to realize how the same Reality while remaining a non-dual pure unity or *'abheda'* in its true nature, appears as a unity-in-difference or *'bhedābheda'* in the plane of Prāṇa or Buddhi, and again as complete difference or *'bheda'* in the still lower level of the ignorant mind. The Ātman or Brahman of the Upaniṣads is, accordingly, no abyss which swallows up all finite beings' it is no 'cave into which everything passes as into a kind of eternal night'; it is no 'lion's den into which all the footsteps go and none lead out again.' The final solution of all problems lies in this unique conception alone and it is by providing us with this solution that the Upaniṣads prove their unerring wisdom and shine in a singular blaze glory.

RITUAL OF SACRIFICE

The Upaniṣadic philosophy thus marked a revolt from objectivity to subjectivity, from materialism to spiritualism, from pluralistic polytheism to mystical monotheism, or even Monistic Idealism. This, is sun, is the essence of views held in this connection by Max Muller, Oldenberg, Hillebrandt, Hertel, Garbe, Winternitz, Pargiter, Hopkins, Deussen, etc.

While the above Revolt Theory attributes developments of thought in the Upanisadic period to a revolt amidst the Aryan fold itself, another theory propounds Racial admixture as the cause thereof. As an evidence, it is pointed out by Prof. G.W. Brown (following Slater) that the language of Proto-Aryan (=Dravidian) inhabitants of ancient India has definitely influenced the Indo-Iranian language of the invading Aryans and converted it into Indo-Aryan. In the religious sphere, again, the deity called Rudra or Śiva, Linga-worship, Visnu-cult, etc. also are Dravidian traits incorporated into the Āryan hieratic religion which was earlier predominated by sacrificial rituals. It follows as a corollary that the line of thought must have been affected too. Accordingly, it is posited that while earlier Maṇḍala-s of *ṚV* embody pure Aryan ways to thinking, the later portions of Rgvedic Maṇḍalas (I.X. etc.) as well as many portions in the *AV* sporadically represent the Aryan (polytheistic) henotheism, etc., transformed through the assimilation of Animism, the higher side of the amorphous Dravidian religion, into nonotheism under the Dravidian influence, and so on. This gradual racial admixture of thought-waves is believed to have found its culmination in the Upanisads;' so much so that the elements of Animism, Contemplative Spiritualism, non-dualism, metempsychosis, etc. which, succeeded in gaining the upper hand therein are all suspected to be of Dravidian origin.

A similar conclusion is arrived at by Rev. A.E. Gough, although thinking in a different vein and direction. For, he considers the Naturalistic religion of Rgvedic Aryans to have been a lofty one, characterized by optimism and Active enthusiasm; and further, he deems it to have suffered a gradual *downfall* partly due to the hot Indian climate turning thhose people lazy and inactive, and partly (—or rather, *largely—)* to their increasing contact with aboriginals of this land who, according to Gough, were primitive anti-progressive races and must be held responsible for the incorporation of Mantra (Magical formula), Tantra (abstruse ritual), Phallus-worship, self-torturing yogic practices, belief in an unending cycle of births and deaths for an individual, and such other 'degraded' elements into the Āryan thought and religion...

Be it this way or that, the common factor between both the above views in this that the infiltration of non-Aryan elements is supposed to have gone on very gradually and imperceptibly, that it never gave occasion for any severe criticism of Āryan elements or vociferous justification of non-Āryan ones' obviously, an overt revolt was out of question. It was only covertly that those non-Āryan elements made their way into the minds, hearts and religious practices as well as philosophical musings of the Aryans intermingling with non-Aryans on political, social, religious and other planes.

In contradistinction with both the above theories, we have a third theory which was mentioned at the outset (vide *supra*, s.v. zero) Its main basis is that some features of earlier Vedic Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇas are found even in the Upaniṣads e.g. (a) The latter consider a proposition to have been established satisfactorily, even if only one similar case or analogous example has been adduced,— no matter even if the similarity is far-fetched; this trend has been inherited from the Brāhmaṇa texts. (b) the Brahmana-s adhered to the theory of correspondence *(bandhutā)* which held that every category of the physical world had its correlate or prototype in the domain of sacrifice, the world of gods, the sphere of human society and the province of the inner psychic self. The same tendency is found in the Upanisads which often says: "*...ity adhi-daivatam. Athadhyātmam...*" *(Ch. Up. 4. 3. 2-3)* and so on. (c) Even for the various *upāsanā*-s (meditations) prescribed in the upanisads, symbols are often taken from some Brahmana text or Vedic ritual or its accessories. viz, the implements used, the Saman-s sung, the Ṛk-s and Yajus formulas recited, the fire, the act of obtation, Soma, the Agnihotra etc. All this is adduced to prove the Upanisads to be indebted to Vedic tradition alone, and to nothing else.

In a similar strain, but on a slightly different basis, Dr. G.U. Thite writes "... in the Upaniṣadic literature, although it pretends (!) to be of philosophical nature, there are numerous magico- religious rites... There is only a difference of subjects and not a difference of opinion between the Brāhmaṇa texts and Upaniṣads texts. The magico-religious rites described in the Upaniṣads are essentially similar to those described in other ritual texts... they (the Upaniṣads) also implicitly and to some extent explicitly endorse the general religious trends of the brahmanism"!

However, a closer look at the rites enumerated in Thite's article reveals that very few of them prescribe actual oblations, and these also are not quote the same as those in the Brahmanic sacrifices; moreover, they are found mainly in the last chapter of the *BAU*, the second chapter of

the *KUB*, and rarely from *Tai. U.* Thus in the *Tai. U.* 1.4, a teacher desiring many good students to come to him, and fame, etc. must make oblations of clarified butter while uttering formulas for the fulfillment of each of his desires. Similarly, *KUB* prescribes certain oblations to be offered on particular *nights* (a rare time for Vedic rites except in a day-and-night sacrifice or *(Abhicāraiṣṭic)* for mundane purposes like winning a prize *(ibid. 2.2)*, the love of a man or a woman (2.3) etc. *BAU* 6.3.3.f. again, prescribes a somewhat elaborate ceremony including oblations of melted butter mixed with various fruits and herbs to Agni, Soma, for obtaining something great; 6.4.14 *(ibid)* f. does so for begetting progeny of desired specific qualities, its safe birth and longevity, prosperity etc. and 6.4.12 *(ibid)* advises oblation of reed-arrows in inverse order as a sorcery against one's wife's paramour! But we need not forget here the contrast of the *subject* and *tone* of *BAU* 6.3. f. from the rest of this very same Upaniṣad.

A few others of the 'magico-religious rites' cited by Thite involve (a) some simple actions and recitation of some Mantras for the longevity of a son *(KUB* 2.6.-7); (b) worship of the sun at its rising, setting and midpoints for destruction of one's sins *(KUB* 2.5); (c) worship of the uktha as Rc, Yajus, Sāman, Śrī (glory), etc. for winning the praise, adherence, subjugation/respect, glory, etc. from people respectively *(KUB* 2.4); (d) worship of food as Brahman (magico-religiously potent formula) and as great, a firm foundation *(pratiṣṭha)*, mind adoration, the dying around *(parimara)* of foes, etc. *(= Tai. U. 2. 10)*; and even (e) some depictions of the good results of the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī vidyā *(Tai. U. 3.6)*; or (f) knowledge of Brahman as given in *KUB (1. 3-4)*. These are not same as Brāhmaṇic rituals, to be sure!

Moreover, Thite has himself made an admittance at the outset of his said paper which runs counter to his own concluding remarks quoted above. Thus, in the very second paragraph of that paper, he has stated: "(Although) the Upanisads — at least those regarded as ancient and principal ones — deal *mainly* with the philosophical thoughts in their own way (there are often some magico-religious details to be met with)". This very admittance of philosophical disquititions being the *main* topic of the Upanisads refutes his later charge that they *pretend* to be of philosophical nature *(vide)* the first quotation above from his paper).

Are we, then, inclined to accept the Revolt theory of development of Indian thought? Not quote so. For, as pointed out by TGM *(op. cit. 14-15)*, even as far back as the *ṚV*, we find evidence of non-Brahmin contribution in the composition of various symns. Also, for the sacrifices performed by Brahmin priests, the patrons were mainly from the Kaṣtriya caste. Contrarily, Upanisadic musings were not a monopoly of Kaṣtriya-s alone' some of the most prominent teachers therein were indeed Brahmins' Yājñavalkya, Uddālaka Āruṇi, Pippalāda, etc. to mention only some.... These evidences of Brahmin-non-Brahmin co-operation, right from Ṛg-Vedic times down to the Upaniṣadic, leave no scope for justification of the Revolt theory. Again, argues Dr. Mainkar, if Upaniṣads were a result of non-Brahmin revolt, then how is it that they were preserved and handed down to posterity by none but the Brahmins?

How, then, about accepting the theory of Racial admixture and Dravidian elements as the origins of the Upanisadic Philosophy? TGM counters this theory in the same manner as Keith (1925: 497) had. Both of them have pointed out that Dravidian elements had started creeping into the Aryan fold since very early times,

as is evident from non-Aryan names like Kavaṣa Ailūṣa, Lusa Dhānāka etc. among authors of Rg-Vedic hymns. These cultural elements, then, must have gone on entering and getting blended gradually with Aryan elements, so that both lost their original identities and amalgamated into a single unity, as in a chemical fusion.

Thus, for instance, one cannot pin down the monistic expressions to be purely Dravidian elements occurring for the first time in the Vedic literature. For, even among the mainly polytheistic Ṛg-Vedic Mantras, we do find Dirghatamas Māmateya stating very clearly and expressly: *"ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti";* and, what grounds do we have to call this a Dravidian viewpoint? Couldn't some *reflective* Āryan mind have hit upon this truth on its own?

This leaves us only with the third alternative theory. As regards Thite's version of it, we have already laid bare pitfalls of the same in 3A.1' *supra.* Let us now turn to Dr. Mainkar's ground for subscribing to it.

TGM, in his printed lecture series mentioned at the outset of this paper, has given numerous instances from the Upanisads *which according to him,* a display great regard for the earlier Vedic literature rather than hatred, dissatisfaction, disrespect, indifference and the like which might have been in order, had they been out to revolt against the same *(op. cit., p.* 21 ff.). Not only that, Upanisads are shown to have taken over a lot from earlier Vedic literature in terms of topics, imagery language, expressions, etc. *(op. cit.,* p. 19 ff.).

On the face of it, TGM's unending batteries of such reference appear very impressive and persuade us to agree with him. One must, however, be on guard when phrases, clauses or statements are quoted bereft of their context.

For instance, TGM *(op. cit.,* p. 49) quotes *'uiñānaṁ yajñaṁ tanute'* as one of the statements indicating the importance of the sacrifice even in Upanisadic times. In fact, there is reference here to the external ritual called 'sacrifice' all right; but does it really stress the same as important? The text further reads: *'Karmāṇi tanute' pi ca'.* The meaning of the full sentence is: "Vijnana (= Understanding/ intellect/ knowledge) directs the sacrifice and also the deeds", meaning that proper and adequate knowledge is essential for correct and fruitful performance of religious as well as non-religious acts. The meaning is endorsed by the second line of the same verse from which it becomes absolutely clear that what is extolled here is not the sacrifice but rather the *Vijñānamaya* sheath of the Ātman: the fourth among five encasements posited by Vedāntins as enveloping the Soul.

TGM *(ibid)* quotes as very important *ch. Up.* 3.16.17 where the life of the individual is compared with a sacrifice, the three Soma-pressings (Savana-s) being exemplified by the three stages of life; childhood, youth and old age; activities of everyday routine such as eating, drinking, etc., or abstention from these are likened to minor accessories of a sacrifice: *upasad, dīkṣā* and the like' austerity, charity, straightforwardness, non-violence and the speaking of truth—these are identified with the fee for the priest, and death with the final ablution *(avabhṛtha-snāna)* of a sacrifice.

This detailed analogy is indeed very impressive; but has it been given here to indicate that sacrifice was an exıremely sacred and noble thing, as Mainkar puts it? Actually, rather than eulogize the sacrifice, *Ch. Up.* 3.16. 2, 4, 6 and 7 say that in case of sickness, the gods should be requested to see that this sacrifice of

Life is not broken down anywhere in the middle, until the goal of a hundred and sixteen years is reached. Evidently, then, the imagery of sacrifice was resorted to, because gods were believed to take care of it till its very end.

TGM *(op. cit. 24)* quotes *Ch. Up.* 7.1.4 *(nāma vā ṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ....)* as indicating that knowledge of the four Vedas is regarded as identical with *Brahman*. Actually, the citation further says: All his is *just* its name *(nāma eva etat...)* and 'there does exist something [else] greater than (this) name': *nāmno vāva bhuyo' stiti: 7.1.5 ibid.*

In *BAU* 1. 5. 17, a dying father says to his son. *"Tvam (me) brahma; tvam yajñaḥ, tuam loka iti...."* As interpreted in Śri Śankarācārya's commentary, the implied sense is: Let the study of the Vedas *(Brahman)* which so long was my duty, be henceforth done by you.... Let whatever sacrifice I used to perform, be henceforth performed by you....And whatever words (= spheres of accomplishment?) there are, that were to be won by me, whether I have won them or not, should be won by you now..." TGM *(op. cit., 48)* cites this as indicating the importance of sacrifice. Well, this does show that sacrifice, like Vedic recitation, still formed part of a person's duty at the time of *BAU;* but nothing beyond that.

Tai. U 1.8.1 says: "With Aum, one assents to the Agnihotra", and 1.9.1 *(ibid.)* enumerates Agnihotra along with Vedic recitation and teaching, as part of one's daily duty or austerity. (TGM *op. cit. 51).* While this is true, it must be realized that the said passages do not indicate any brahmanical type of predilection for the Agnihotra; *it is mentioned only casually.*

And, if we turn to the other Upaniṣads, we even find that the external performance of Agnihotra was expected to be accompanied by some internal awareness also. Thus, *Ch.Up.* 5. 24. 1-3 says that, if offered without a certain knowledge (of five breaths and their associations in the cosmos—), the Agnihotra would be as futile as if it were poured on dead ashes.... The same idea seems to be stated more expressly in *KUB* 2.5 which speaks of the restraint of breath while speaking and of speech while breathing as two eternal oblations of an *inner Agnihotra*. It adds: "All other oblations (i.e. those in external performances of rituals) are ephemeral, since they consist of (volitional) action. Knowing this, the ancient seas did not go in a (formal) sacrifice." Clearly, this indicates the disinclination for mechanically performed rituals even in an older Up. like the *KUB*.

The sacrificial cult showed great respect for Soma juice and often attached the epithet 'King' to Soma. The same collocation occurs in some of the Upanisads also: *KUB* 2.9 and 4. 19, *BAU* 2.1.15 and 6.2.16, *Ch Up. 5.10.4,*etc. TGM *(op. cit.* 51-2) *adduces this as* indicative of respect shown by Upanisadic sages for the sacrificial cult itself.

My humble suggestion, however, is that *'Soma rājā'* had become so conventional a usage by then, that Upaniṣadic people used the expression out of habit. How else could we explain the statement that "gods enjoy/devour the *Soma Rājā*, making it swell and dwindle repeatedly? (vide *BAU* 6.2.16 and *Ch. Up.* 5.10.4 cited above).

TGM *(op. cit.* 26) points out that the ritualistic *Naciketa* fire mentioned in *Tai. Br. 3.11.7* and *Tai. Ā. 1.22.10,* is further extolled in the *Kaṭhop.* But the said Up (1.1.14) mentions that heavenly fire as being "hidden in the cavity (of the heart)" Obviously the ritualistic concept behind it has here given way to something symbolic and spiritual...

Similarly, the term *vaiśvānara agni* in *BAU* 5.9.1 refers, not to the sacrificial fire or the Great Element *(mahābhūta)* Fire, but to the soul 'residing within all men' This has been admitted by TGM himself *(op. cit.* 52-3) though he seems to interpret even this as indicative of the importance given to ritual terms and concepts by Upaniṣadic thinkers.

Of course, someone might cite in favour of TGM, *Ch. Up.* 5: 11-18 where, in its macrocosmic form, *vaiśvānara agni* is said to have the fire altar as His chest, the sacreu grass as His hair and the three fires as His heart, mind and mouth respectively.... To such an argument, one need only point out that even non-sacrificial elements like the light, universal forms, varied courses, wealth and the earth are identified as His head, eye, breath, bladder and feet. Moreover, the same macrocosmic *vaiśvānara* was earlier said to be (identical with) the micro-cosmic *vaisvanara*, viz., each individual soul which has the measure of just one span *(prādeśa-mātram)*.

References to sacrifical implements such as kindling sticks *(araṇi)* are also cited by TGM *(op. cit.* 51) as proving his point. Of these, let us first take *BAU* 6.4.22 which quotes from *RV* 10.184.23 since this refers to two *araṇi-s* of gold from which the Aśvins kindled fire), these could not refer to ordinary attrition-sticks that are necessarily wooden. Obviously, then, these had a figurative signification right from Ṛg-vedic times and in the context of *BAU* 6.4.22, it is certain that they cannot be taken literally.

In *Kaṭhop.* 2.1.8 *(aranyor nihito jātavedāḥ)*, however, *arani* and fire could indeed be interpreted literally; but then, they are here mentioned only to provide an analogy for explaining how the Universal Self lies concealed within every being (just like fire dormant within the kindling-sticks before attrition).

Carrying forward the same imagery, *Śvet. Up.* 1.14 tells us that one should visualize the Lord concealed within oneself [like fire], through contemplation as the churning action *(nirmantha)*, using one's body and the mantra *AUM* as the lower and upper kindling-sticks respectively.

TGM *(op. cit.)* has also pointed out a number of places where the verb *hu-* (—to offer an oblation in fire) is used in the Upanisads. Of these, *KUB* 2.3-4 and *Ch. Up.* 4.17.4, it must be admitted do refer to actual oblations. However, the utterances in *KUB* 2.4: "I offer/oblate your speech etc. in myself" cannot but mean a figurative or symbolic oblation.

As regards *hu-* used repeatedly in *BAU* 6.2.2-14 and *Ch. Up.* 5.3.3 to 5.8.2., which form part of the Pañcāgni-vidyā, vide under 3.B. 11 *infra*.

Repeated allusions to fire, fuel, sacrificial altar, sacred grass, the act of oblation, etc. cannot be denied in sections dealing with "the doctrine of Five Fires" (vide TGM, *op. cit.*; 51-2). We also find here a reference to performers of sacrifice (and of other benevolent deeds) as being entitled to travel by Pitṛyāṇa which leads them through the smoke, night, Pitṛloka and Ākāśa to the moon.

However, a detailed and thorough study of the whole doctrine in its entirety and both its versions would reveal that only the garb of language used here is connected with sacrificial terminology; in other words, the various sacrificial accessories have here been mentioned merely to form a metaphor for shrouding in mystic secrecy a novel doctrine of metempsychosis which covers an individual's death, the soul's after-death sojourn, rebirth, law of retribution of deeds partly in the other world and partly here on earth, etc.

Ch. Up. 4.16.1 is quoted by TGM *(op.*

cit. 48) as indicating that sacrifice was still regarded as sanctifying the whole, even while it was in progress. Actually, however, the passage identifies the wind *(pavana)* with *yajña*, interpreting the latter word through a play on letters; *yad esa avanah yann idam sarvam punāti, tasmād eṣa eva yajñāḥ. (Tasya manaś ca vāk ca vartanī...)*

Similarly, *BAU* 3.9.21 says that "... Yama of the southern direction depends on Yajña, Yajña depends on *daksina* (the priestly fee)". It is perhaps the phonological similarity between *daksina* and *daksina* that has led to the association of Yajna with Yama.....

This tendency is evidently a remnant of etymologies gives in Brahmana texts, of which Upanisads from the final portion.

JUB also contains many such passages which could have been quoted in favour of Dr. Mainkar's standpoint. Thus 4.1.1-9 *ibid.* (The Sāman saves a man from the clutches of death); or 3.13.13 and 3.14.9 *ibid* (A sacrificer is carried to the sun and the moon by an *udgātṛ*, the sun being an immortal goal (1.6.3-4 *ibid.*) or Devaloka, and the moon being a Manusyaloka (3.13.12 *ibid.*)... Again, *JUB* 3.11.3 speaks of three deaths and births, the second one of which refers to sacrifical initiation; an almost identical passage is found in *Śat. Br.* (11.2.1.1.)

One must admit that some of these passage display a favorable bent towards sacrifice, Saman, etc. But then, *JUB* is not a pure Upanisad. It is an Upanisad-Brahmana. Moreover, in spite of its Brahmanic character, *JUB* does also display a tendency to spiritualize the sacrificial cult itself (in 3.11.3 mentioned above, etc)...

A predilection for the sacrifice is *apparent* in some other Upaniṣadic passage also. Thus *Ch. Up.* 4.17.4 prescribes atonement for flaws in uttering Mantras during the sacrifice; 4 16.2-5 says that the Brahma priest must speak very rarely during the sacrifice, and 2.23.1 *(ibid.)* mentions the sacrifice, study (of the Vedas?) and alms-giving as the three branches of duty.

Muṇḍ-Up. 1.2.1-6, again, posits sacrifices of various types (Darśa-pūrṇamāsa, Cāturmāsya, Āgrāyaṇa, Agnihotra...) as the most important means for leading one, through the rays, to Brahma-loka. But one need not be carried away by this eulogy. For, immediately afterwards (in 1.2.7-12 *ibid.*), *Munda. Up.* presents us the the most vehement criticism of sacrificial rituals as unsteady boats that may drown one any time, or as leading to repeated birth, old age and death. Adherents to rituals are unequivocally termed here as *mūḍhāḥ* (in 7), *pramūḍhāḥ* (in 10) and *andhāḥ* (in 8) etc., while those who resort to penance, faith and knowledge are promised worlds of the Immortal Person. Since this view is placed later, it was most probably the one favoured by the author of this Upaniṣad himself.

Some one may feel that the Mundaka polemic against rituals can only be taken as representative of the younger Upanisads. What about the stand of the older ones: *KUB, BAU, Ch. Up.* etc.? In places such as quoted above, they do display regard and concern about ritualisti facts, or at least a non-antagonistic attitude... This is true to some extent, no doubt, but at other places, those very Upanisads (esp. *BAU* and *Ch. Up.*) evince a shift to stress also: from adherence to merely the external format or procedure of the ritual to obtainment of knowledge of its inner significance, etc.

Thus, e.g., *Ch. Up.* 1.10.9 and 1.11.9 state that without the knowledge of deities presiding over the Prastāva, Udgītha, etc., he who chants these will have his head fall off. (*Ch. Up.* 1.12 contains a canine

chant— *Śauva udgītha*, which perhaps forms a parody of the various chantings of the Saman-s by the priests.) — Further, *Ch. Up.* 8.5.1. while extolling celibacy, says that the very fruit of the so-called sacrifice can be attained by mere practice of *brahmacarya*. (Note the wrong interpretation of stress here in TGM. *op. cit.*, 48 : in fact, the fruits of sacrifice and celibacy are merely stated as being the same)... In *BAU* 1.1-2, we can discern a tendency to give a subjective turn or metaphysical tinge to the Aśvamedha sacrifice by transforming it into a meditative act (rather than an external ritual for matrial ends), in which the horse is substituted by the whole universe (1.1 *ibid.*) or by the year (1.2.7*ibid.*)...

BAU 1.5.16, again, clearly origines that actions like the sacrifice lead only to the moon or the world of Pitrs. For attaining the highest world of the gods, one needs must resort to Vidyā. *Ch. Up.* 5.10.3, *BAU* 6.2.16, *Muṇḍ. Up.* 1.2.10-11 and *Praśna Up.* 1.9 repeatedly speak in a similar vein...

Further, *BAU* 3.5.1 states that Brahman, which is immediately present everywhere and can be directly perceived, is the Self which is within all things; it is *that* alone which transcends hunger and thirst, sorrow and delusion, old age and death. The Brahmana-s (meaning here the knowers of Brahman), having known that Self, overcome all desire for sons, wealth, the worlds, etc. and (prefer to) live the life of mendicants. In other words, knowledge of the Self involves withdrawal of the mind from all objects which interest worldly men; rather renunciation of such interests and desires is the main prerequisite for attainment of such self-knowledge...

These very desires are believed to lead to ritual and other actions, and actions to lead to the experience of results in this very birth or in another *(kāmān yah kāmayate manyamānaḥ, sa kāmabhir jāyate tatra tatra: Mund. Up.* 3.2.2.). This is an unwelcome state of affairs. Our real goal aught to be 'liberation in this very lifetime and also beyond', which can be attained by virtue of desirelessness (3.2.2. to 3.2.10 *ibid.*). Such statements are clearly directed against mechanical performance of sacrifical rituals, the very basis whereof is Desire : either *aihika* (pertaining to this world) viz., wealth, progeny, etc., or *āmuṣmika* (other-worldly), such as pleasures and comforts in heaven. The Brāhmaṇa texts had been propounding more and more elaborately the very intricate meshes of rituals suited for fulfilling each of the desires. It must be the excess of this ritualism that must have led some rational minds to start doubting the real efficacy of each detail of a ritual, and led some others to criticize them vehemently, as is done in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* etc., or mildly, as in BAU 1.5.16 quoted earlier in this section.

Someone may object to the above statements, pointing out that traces of such doubting, or of transforming the meaning of rituals from gross to subtle, had already begun in the Āraṇyaka portions of the Brāhmaṇas here and there. True, they had; but these were rather sporadic and vague in those Āraṇyaka passages. Hence, it will not be wrong to state that it was mainly the Upaniṣads that marked an age of great speculative and spiritual ferment, which comprised individual contemplation as well as animated discussions among various thinkers irrespective of caste, creed, sex or age. Thus the learned and proud Brahmin of Gargya clan, Balaki, on being shown that his various concepts of Brahman were all imperfect, showed readiness to become the pupil of Ajātaśatru, a Kṣatriya ruler, contrary to traditional practice *(BAU* 2.1.14). So also in *Ch. Up.* 1.8 and 5.3-10,

the Kṣatriya king Pravāhaṇa Jaivali is resorted to by two knowers of Udgītha, and also by Uddālaka Āruṇi along with his son Svetaketu, for learning his philosophical doctrine about space *(ākāśa)* and about the Five Fires respectively. Again, the incident wherein Uṣasti Cākrayaṇa, being poor, begs for beans from the plate in which a possessor of elephants (- obviously of the fourth class -) was already eating *(Ch. Up.* 1.10), shows that caste and race intermingling was not totally non-existent in the Upaniṣadic age. Even the word *maṭacī* used in 1.10.1 *(ibid.)* is perhaps an old Dravidian loan-word in Sanskrit, meaning locust, as suggested by Prof. S.K. Chatterji.

All these evidences point to us that, although we may not adhere *strictly* to the Revolt Theory or the Racial-admixture theory as defining the contents and the line of thought in the Upaniṣads, yet these factors might certainly have played their part in leading to the distinct break-throughs made by the Upaniṣads in man's quest for truth and for the meaning of things around him, including prevalent Vedic rituals, their accessories and all life itself.

From all this ferment emerged pearls of thought in the form of sporadic bubbles of intuition (which were only later crystallized, strung together and given the shape of various systems of Philosophy). Thus, for example, the earlier Brāhmaṇic idea that good luck, enjoyment and fulfillment of desires are the result automatically yielded by the performance of various rituals and chanting of *mantras* strictly as per tradition, was questioned by thoughtful pondering mind and finally Yajnavalkya came to the conclusion that all this depended on actions in general, both physical and mental, the latter comprising the volition, judgement, resolve or attitude *(kratu)* of the mind as well as of desire *(kāma)*. Thus, he says in *BAU* 4.4.51 *Sa yathākāmo bhavati, tat-kratur bhavati, yat-kratar bhavati tat karma kurute; yat karma kurute tad abhisampadyate.*

Similarly, *Ch. Up.* 5.10.7, *Isa Upanisad* 17, *Kaṭha Up.* 2.2.7, *Śvet. Up.* 5.7, 5.11 and *Praśna Up.* 3.7 speak of good and bad deeds leading individual souls to corresponding births (or worlds—*lokas*), *without any reference to the performance or otherwise of a prescribed ritual....*

Thus, even though we do read in the Upaniṣads that Uddālaka Āruṇi had studied all about sacrifice in the past *(Ch. Up. 3.7)* or that Janaka performed a sacrifice giving away plentiful alms *(BAU. 3.1.1)* and engaged himself in a discussion on the Agnihotra *(BAU* 4.3.1), we need not hasten to adhere to Dr. Thite's view (3.A above) or the more elaborate and earlier version of it in Prof. Mainkar's booklet mentioned at the outset of this paper. For, these elements only point to the fact that the sacrificial ritual and imagery were still wide-spread and, may be, even predominant in the social life and the external religious worship by and large. Yet, this need not mean that all people were happy with the ritual intricacies and credulous of the vociferous claims made by ritualists. There were many, among Ksatriyas *and even among discerning brahmins*, who did not like to accept blindly any and every thing that was said in earlier Vedic texts — expecially the ritualistic manuals. Hence sacrifice, which had almost become the be-all and end-all of all religious activity, was duly cut to size.

Nevertheless, we cannot say that there was open and outright revolt (vide Section 1 above) against all sacrificial ritual. It was rather a silent and imperceptible revolution (not a revolt—), if at all such terminology may be employed. Or, we can

say that the external ritual aspects of the sacrifice were gradually replaced by mental contemplative meditations *(upāsanās)* helpful to the process of acquisition of spiritual knowledge or awareness of the inner essence and significance of all that one experiences.

Some how, or perhaps to make to the newer ideas palatable to people nurtured in the ritualistic traditions, Upaniṣadic 'seers' like Pravāhana Jaivali, Yājñavalkya, etc. chose to shroud their novel mystic doctrines within the veil of the well-known imagery and idiom of the sacrificial rituals. How else, can we explain, e.g., the identification, in *Praśna Up.* 4.3, of life-breaths with 'fires'?

This *tendency of serving new wine in old bottles* is peculiar to the Indian ethos (as against the Western one of old wine in new bottles). That is how we have so many philosophic systems claiming allegiance to the same Vedic texts and, what is more, so many Vedāntic sects based on one and the same manual of Bādarāyaṇa!... This may be extolled as a richness or greatness of older conceptions which kept on assuming newer significations. But is the same factor not responsible, at least in part, for the abstruse and vague nature of mystic Upaniṣadic musings, and the misunderstanding of it all by many a scholar, as has been shown in the present paper?

This dictionary has been compiled by a leading Hindu spiritual teacher and eminent vedic scholar **Swami Parmeshwaranand** of Haridwar (U.P.) He has written several books on hindu religion and translated many important religious scriptures into english He has also conducted several seminars, and work shops where many reputed theologists from all over the world took participation.

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